Merge pull request 'fix: edge-control: admin-approved allowlist for project names (#1092)' (#1097) from fix/issue-1092 into main

.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py

@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ def main() -> int:
         "aefd9f655411a955395e6e5995ddbe6f": "vault-seed binary check pattern (forgejo + ops-repo)",
         "60f0c46deb5491599457efb4048918e5": "vault-seed VAULT_ADDR + hvault_token_lookup check (forgejo + ops-repo)",
         "f6838f581ef6b4d82b55268389032769": "vault-seed VAULT_ADDR + hvault_token_lookup die (forgejo + ops-repo)",
+        # Common shell control-flow: if → return 1 → fi → fi (env.sh + register.sh)
+        "a8bdb7f1a5d8cbd0a5921b17b6cf6f4d": "Common shell control-flow (return 1 / fi / fi / return 0 / }) (env.sh + register.sh)",
     }
 
     if not sh_files:

tools/edge-control/README.md

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ This control plane runs on the public edge host (Debian DO box) and provides:
 │  │  disinto-register│    │  /var/lib/disinto/                            │  │
 │  │  (authorized_keys│    │  ├── registry.json (source of truth)          │  │
 │  │   forced cmd)    │    │  ├── registry.lock (flock)                    │  │
+│  │                  │    │  └── allowlist.json (admin-approved names)    │  │
 │  │                  │    │  └── authorized_keys (rebuildable)            │  │
 │  └────────┬─────────┘    └───────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
 │           │                                                                   │
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ curl -sL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/disinto-admin/disinto/fix/issue-621/t
    - `disinto-tunnel` — no password, no shell, only receives reverse tunnels
 
 2. **Creates data directory**:
-   - `/var/lib/disinto/` with `registry.json`, `registry.lock`
+   - `/var/lib/disinto/` with `registry.json`, `registry.lock`, `allowlist.json`
    - Permissions: `root:disinto-register 0750`
 
 3. **Installs Caddy**:
@@ -180,6 +181,43 @@ Shows all registered tunnels with their ports and FQDNs.
 }
 ```
 
+## Allowlist
+
+The allowlist prevents project name squatting by requiring admin approval before a name can be registered. It is **opt-in**: when `allowlist.json` is empty (no project entries), registration works as before. Once the admin adds entries, only approved names are accepted.
+
+### Setup
+
+Edit `/var/lib/disinto/allowlist.json` as root:
+
+```json
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "allowed": {
+    "myproject": {
+      "pubkey_fingerprint": "SHA256:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+    },
+    "open-project": {
+      "pubkey_fingerprint": ""
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- **With `pubkey_fingerprint`**: Only the specified SSH key can register this project name. The fingerprint is the SHA256 output of `ssh-keygen -lf <keyfile>`.
+- **With empty `pubkey_fingerprint`**: Any caller may register this project name (name reservation without key binding).
+- **Not listed**: Registration is refused with `{"error":"name not approved"}`.
+
+### Workflow
+
+1. Admin edits `/var/lib/disinto/allowlist.json` (via ops repo PR, or direct `ssh root@edge`).
+2. File is `root:root 0644` — `disinto-register` only reads it; `register.sh` never mutates it.
+3. Callers run `register` as usual. The allowlist is checked transparently.
+
+### Security
+
+- The allowlist is a **first-come-first-serve defense**: once a name is approved for a key, no one else can claim it.
+- It does **not** replace per-operation ownership checks (sibling issue #1094) — it only prevents the initial race.
+
 ## Recovery
 
 ### After State Loss
@@ -274,6 +312,7 @@ ssh disinto-register@edge.disinto.ai "register myproject $(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
 - `lib/ports.sh` — Port allocator over `20000-29999`, jq-based, flockd
 - `lib/authorized_keys.sh` — Deterministic rebuild of `disinto-tunnel` authorized_keys
 - `lib/caddy.sh` — POST to Caddy admin API for route mapping
+- `/var/lib/disinto/allowlist.json` — Admin-approved project name allowlist (root-owned, read-only by register.sh)
 
 ## Dependencies
 

tools/edge-control/install.sh

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 #
 # What it does:
 #   1. Creates users: disinto-register, disinto-tunnel
-#   2. Creates /var/lib/disinto/ with registry.json, registry.lock
+#   2. Creates /var/lib/disinto/ with registry.json, registry.lock, allowlist.json
 #   3. Installs Caddy with Gandi DNS plugin
 #   4. Sets up SSH authorized_keys for both users
 #   5. Installs control plane scripts to /opt/disinto-edge/
@@ -152,6 +152,15 @@ LOCK_FILE="${REGISTRY_DIR}/registry.lock"
 touch "$LOCK_FILE"
 chmod 0644 "$LOCK_FILE"
 
+# Initialize allowlist.json (empty = no restrictions until admin populates)
+ALLOWLIST_FILE="${REGISTRY_DIR}/allowlist.json"
+if [ ! -f "$ALLOWLIST_FILE" ]; then
+  echo '{"version":1,"allowed":{}}' > "$ALLOWLIST_FILE"
+  chmod 0644 "$ALLOWLIST_FILE"
+  chown root:root "$ALLOWLIST_FILE"
+  log_info "Initialized allowlist: ${ALLOWLIST_FILE}"
+fi
+
 # =============================================================================
 # Step 3: Install Caddy with Gandi DNS plugin
 # =============================================================================

tools/edge-control/register.sh

@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ DOMAIN_SUFFIX="${DOMAIN_SUFFIX:-disinto.ai}"
 # Reserved project names — operator-adjacent, internal roles, and subdomain-mode prefixes
 RESERVED_NAMES=(www api admin root mail chat forge ci edge caddy disinto register tunnel)
 
+# Allowlist path (root-owned, never mutated by this script)
+ALLOWLIST_FILE="${ALLOWLIST_FILE:-/var/lib/disinto/allowlist.json}"
+
+# Captured error from check_allowlist (used for JSON response)
+_ALLOWLIST_ERROR=""
+
 # Print usage
 usage() {
   cat <<EOF
@@ -42,6 +48,51 @@ EOF
   exit 1
 }
 
+# Check whether the project/pubkey pair is allowed by the allowlist.
+# Usage: check_allowlist <project> <pubkey>
+# Returns: 0 if allowed, 1 if denied (prints error JSON to stderr)
+check_allowlist() {
+  local project="$1"
+  local pubkey="$2"
+
+  # If allowlist file does not exist, allow all (opt-in policy)
+  if [ ! -f "$ALLOWLIST_FILE" ]; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  # Look up the project in the allowlist
+  local entry
+  entry=$(jq -c --arg p "$project" '.allowed[$p] // empty' "$ALLOWLIST_FILE" 2>/dev/null) || entry=""
+
+  if [ -z "$entry" ]; then
+    # Project not in allowlist at all
+    _ALLOWLIST_ERROR="name not approved"
+    return 1
+  fi
+
+  # Project found — check pubkey fingerprint binding
+  local bound_fingerprint
+  bound_fingerprint=$(echo "$entry" | jq -r '.pubkey_fingerprint // ""' 2>/dev/null)
+
+  if [ -n "$bound_fingerprint" ]; then
+    # Fingerprint is bound — verify caller's pubkey matches
+    local caller_fingerprint
+    caller_fingerprint=$(ssh-keygen -lf /dev/stdin <<<"$pubkey" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $2}') || caller_fingerprint=""
+
+    if [ -z "$caller_fingerprint" ]; then
+      _ALLOWLIST_ERROR="invalid pubkey for fingerprint check"
+      return 1
+    fi
+
+    if [ "$caller_fingerprint" != "$bound_fingerprint" ]; then
+      _ALLOWLIST_ERROR="pubkey does not match allowed key for this project"
+      return 1
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  return 0
+}
+
 # Register a new tunnel
 # Usage: do_register <project> <pubkey>
 # When EDGE_ROUTING_MODE=subdomain, also registers forge.<project>, ci.<project>,
@@ -85,6 +136,12 @@ do_register() {
   # Full pubkey for registry
   local full_pubkey="${key_type} ${key}"
 
+  # Check allowlist (opt-in: no file = allow all)
+  if ! check_allowlist "$project" "$full_pubkey"; then
+    echo "{\"error\":\"${_ALLOWLIST_ERROR}\"}"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
   # Allocate port (idempotent - returns existing if already registered)
   local port
   port=$(allocate_port "$project" "$full_pubkey" "${project}.${DOMAIN_SUFFIX}")