fix: [nomad-validate] add nomad version check before config validate

.env.example

@@ -32,10 +32,13 @@ FORGE_URL=http://localhost:3000             # [CONFIG] local Forgejo instance
 #   - FORGE_PASS_DEV_QWEN2
 # Name conversion: tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_' (lowercase→UPPER, hyphens→underscores).
 # The compose generator looks these up via the agent's `forge_user` field in
-# the project TOML. Configure local-model agents via [agents.X] sections in
+# the project TOML. The pre-existing `dev-qwen` llama agent uses
-# projects/*.toml — this is the canonical activation path.
+# FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA / FORGE_PASS_LLAMA (kept for backwards-compat with the
+# legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` single-agent path).
 FORGE_TOKEN=                               # [SECRET] dev-bot API token (default for all agents)
 FORGE_PASS=                                # [SECRET] dev-bot password for git HTTP push (#361)
+FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=                         # [SECRET] dev-qwen API token (for agents-llama)
+FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=                          # [SECRET] dev-qwen password for git HTTP push
 FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=                        # [SECRET] review-bot API token
 FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=                         # [SECRET] review-bot password for git HTTP push
 FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN=                       # [SECRET] planner-bot API token
@@ -104,6 +107,13 @@ FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=                      # [SECRET] Shared secret for Caddy ↔
 # Store all project secrets here so formulas reference env vars, never hardcode.
 BASE_RPC_URL=                              # [SECRET] on-chain RPC endpoint
 
+# ── Local Qwen dev agent (optional) ──────────────────────────────────────
+# Set ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 to emit agents-llama in docker-compose.yml.
+# Requires a running llama-server reachable at ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL.
+# See docs/agents-llama.md for details.
+ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0                       # [CONFIG] 1 = enable agents-llama service
+ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=                        # [CONFIG] e.g. http://host.docker.internal:8081
+
 # ── Tuning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 CLAUDE_TIMEOUT=7200                        # [CONFIG] max seconds per Claude invocation
 

.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml

@@ -1,21 +1,16 @@
 # =============================================================================
 # .woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml — Static validation for Nomad+Vault artifacts
 #
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S0.5, issue #825; extended in S2.6,
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S0.5, issue #825). Locks in the
-# issue #884). Locks in the "no-ad-hoc-steps" principle: every HCL/shell
+# "no-ad-hoc-steps" principle: every HCL/shell artifact under nomad/ or
-# artifact under nomad/, lib/init/nomad/, vault/policies/, plus the
+# lib/init/nomad/, plus the `disinto init` dispatcher, gets checked
-# `disinto init` dispatcher and vault/roles.yaml, gets checked before it
+# before it can land.
-# can land.
 #
 # Triggers on PRs (and pushes) that touch any of:
 #   nomad/**              — HCL configs (server, client, vault)
-#   lib/init/nomad/**     — cluster-up / install / systemd / vault-init /
+#   lib/init/nomad/**     — cluster-up / install / systemd / vault-init
-#                            vault-nomad-auth (S2.6 trigger: vault-*.sh
-#                            is a subset of this glob)
 #   bin/disinto           — `disinto init --backend=nomad` dispatcher
 #   tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats — the bats suite itself
-#   vault/policies/**     — Vault ACL policy HCL files (S2.1, S2.6)
-#   vault/roles.yaml      — JWT-auth role bindings (S2.3, S2.6)
 #   .woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml — the pipeline definition
 #
 # Steps (all fail-closed — any error blocks merge):
@@ -24,22 +19,8 @@
 #                                 nomad/jobs/*.hcl (new jobspecs get
 #                                 CI coverage automatically)
 #   3. vault-operator-diagnose — `vault operator diagnose` syntax check on vault.hcl
-#   4. vault-policy-fmt        — `vault policy fmt` idempotence check on
+#   4. shellcheck-nomad        — shellcheck the cluster-up + install scripts + disinto
-#                                 every vault/policies/*.hcl (format drift =
+#   5. bats-init-nomad         — `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` smoke tests
-#                                 CI fail; non-destructive via cp+diff)
-#   5. vault-policy-validate   — HCL syntax + capability validation for every
-#                                 vault/policies/*.hcl via `vault policy write`
-#                                 against an inline dev-mode Vault server
-#   6. vault-roles-validate    — yamllint + role→policy reference check on
-#                                 vault/roles.yaml (every referenced policy
-#                                 must exist as vault/policies/<name>.hcl)
-#   7. shellcheck-nomad        — shellcheck the cluster-up + install scripts + disinto
-#   8. bats-init-nomad         — `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` smoke tests
-#
-# Secret-scan coverage: vault/policies/*.hcl is already scanned by the
-# P11 gate (.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml, issue #798) — its trigger path
-# `vault/**/*` covers everything under this directory. We intentionally
-# do NOT duplicate that gate here; one scanner, one source of truth.
 #
 # Pinned image versions match lib/init/nomad/install.sh (nomad 1.9.5 /
 # vault 1.18.5). Bump there AND here together — drift = CI passing on
@@ -53,8 +34,6 @@ when:
       - "lib/init/nomad/**"
       - "bin/disinto"
       - "tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats"
-      - "vault/policies/**"
-      - "vault/roles.yaml"
       - ".woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml"
 
 # Authenticated clone — same pattern as .woodpecker/ci.yml. Forgejo is
@@ -144,176 +123,7 @@ steps:
           *) echo "vault config: hard failure (rc=$rc)" >&2; exit "$rc" ;;
         esac
 
-  # ── 4. Vault policy fmt idempotence check ────────────────────────────────
+  # ── 4. Shellcheck ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-  # `vault policy fmt <file>` formats a local HCL policy file in place.
-  # There's no `-check`/dry-run flag (vault 1.18.5), so we implement a
-  # non-destructive check as cp → fmt-on-copy → diff against original.
-  # Any diff means the committed file would be rewritten by `vault policy
-  # fmt` — failure steers the author to run `vault policy fmt <file>`
-  # locally before pushing.
-  #
-  # Scope: vault/policies/*.hcl only. The `[ -f "$f" ]` guard handles the
-  # no-match case (POSIX sh does not nullglob) so an empty policies/
-  # directory does not fail this step.
-  #
-  # Note: `vault policy fmt` is purely local (HCL text transform) and does
-  # not require a running Vault server, which is why this step can run
-  # without starting one.
-  - name: vault-policy-fmt
-    image: hashicorp/vault:1.18.5
-    commands:
-      - |
-        set -e
-        failed=0
-        for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do
-          [ -f "$f" ] || continue
-          tmp="/tmp/$(basename "$f").fmt"
-          cp "$f" "$tmp"
-          vault policy fmt "$tmp" >/dev/null 2>&1
-          if ! diff -u "$f" "$tmp"; then
-            echo "ERROR: $f is not formatted — run 'vault policy fmt $f' locally" >&2
-            failed=1
-          fi
-        done
-        if [ "$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
-          echo "vault-policy-fmt: formatting drift detected" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        echo "vault-policy-fmt: all policies formatted correctly"
-
-  # ── 5. Vault policy HCL syntax + capability validation ───────────────────
-  # Vault has no offline `vault policy validate` subcommand — the closest
-  # in-CLI validator is `vault policy write`, which sends the HCL to a
-  # running server which parses it, checks capability names against the
-  # known set (read, list, create, update, delete, patch, sudo, deny),
-  # and rejects unknown stanzas / malformed path blocks. We start an
-  # inline dev-mode Vault (in-memory, no persistence, root token = "root")
-  # for the duration of this step and loop `vault policy write` over every
-  # vault/policies/*.hcl; the policies never leave the ephemeral dev
-  # server, so this is strictly a validator — not a deploy.
-  #
-  # Exit-code handling:
-  #   - `vault policy write` exits 0 on success, non-zero on any parse /
-  #     semantic error. We aggregate failures across all files so a single
-  #     CI run surfaces every broken policy (not just the first).
-  #   - The dev server is killed on any step exit via EXIT trap so the
-  #     step tears down cleanly even on failure.
-  #
-  # Why dev-mode is sufficient: we're not persisting secrets, only asking
-  # Vault to parse policy text. The factory's production Vault is NOT
-  # contacted.
-  - name: vault-policy-validate
-    image: hashicorp/vault:1.18.5
-    commands:
-      - |
-        set -e
-        vault server -dev -dev-root-token-id=root -dev-listen-address=127.0.0.1:8200 >/tmp/vault-dev.log 2>&1 &
-        VAULT_PID=$!
-        trap 'kill "$VAULT_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT INT TERM
-        export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200
-        export VAULT_TOKEN=root
-        ready=0
-        i=0
-        while [ "$i" -lt 30 ]; do
-          if vault status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            ready=1
-            break
-          fi
-          i=$((i + 1))
-          sleep 0.5
-        done
-        if [ "$ready" -ne 1 ]; then
-          echo "vault-policy-validate: dev server failed to start after 15s" >&2
-          cat /tmp/vault-dev.log >&2 || true
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        failed=0
-        for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do
-          [ -f "$f" ] || continue
-          name=$(basename "$f" .hcl)
-          echo "validate: $f"
-          if ! vault policy write "$name" "$f"; then
-            echo "  ERROR: $f failed validation" >&2
-            failed=1
-          fi
-        done
-        if [ "$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
-          echo "vault-policy-validate: validation errors found" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        echo "vault-policy-validate: all policies valid"
-
-  # ── 6. vault/roles.yaml validator ────────────────────────────────────────
-  # Validates the JWT-auth role bindings file (S2.3). Two checks:
-  #
-  #   a. `yamllint` — catches YAML syntax errors and indentation drift.
-  #      Uses a relaxed config (line length bumped to 200) because
-  #      roles.yaml's comments are wide by design.
-  #   b. role → policy reference check — every role's `policy:` field
-  #      must match a basename in vault/policies/*.hcl. A role pointing
-  #      at a non-existent policy = runtime "permission denied" at job
-  #      placement; catching the drift here turns it into a CI failure.
-  #      Also verifies each role entry has the four required fields
-  #      (name, policy, namespace, job_id) per the file's documented
-  #      format.
-  #
-  # Parsing is done with PyYAML (the roles.yaml format is a strict
-  # subset that awk-level parsing in tools/vault-apply-roles.sh handles
-  # too, but PyYAML in CI gives us structural validation for free). If
-  # roles.yaml is ever absent (e.g. reverted), the step skips rather
-  # than fails — presence is enforced by S2.3's own tooling, not here.
-  - name: vault-roles-validate
-    image: python:3.12-alpine
-    commands:
-      - pip install --quiet --disable-pip-version-check pyyaml yamllint
-      - |
-        set -e
-        if [ ! -f vault/roles.yaml ]; then
-          echo "vault-roles-validate: vault/roles.yaml not present, skipping"
-          exit 0
-        fi
-        yamllint -d '{extends: relaxed, rules: {line-length: {max: 200}}}' vault/roles.yaml
-        echo "vault-roles-validate: yamllint OK"
-        python3 - <<'PY'
-        import os
-        import sys
-        import yaml
-
-        with open('vault/roles.yaml') as f:
-            data = yaml.safe_load(f) or {}
-        roles = data.get('roles') or []
-        if not roles:
-            print("vault-roles-validate: no roles defined in vault/roles.yaml", file=sys.stderr)
-            sys.exit(1)
-        existing = {
-            os.path.splitext(e)[0]
-            for e in os.listdir('vault/policies')
-            if e.endswith('.hcl')
-        }
-        required = ('name', 'policy', 'namespace', 'job_id')
-        failed = 0
-        for r in roles:
-            if not isinstance(r, dict):
-                print(f"ERROR: role entry is not a mapping: {r!r}", file=sys.stderr)
-                failed = 1
-                continue
-            for field in required:
-                if r.get(field) in (None, ''):
-                    print(f"ERROR: role entry missing required field '{field}': {r}", file=sys.stderr)
-                    failed = 1
-            policy = r.get('policy')
-            if policy and policy not in existing:
-                print(
-                    f"ERROR: role '{r.get('name')}' references policy '{policy}' "
-                    f"but vault/policies/{policy}.hcl does not exist",
-                    file=sys.stderr,
-                )
-                failed = 1
-        sys.exit(failed)
-        PY
-        echo "vault-roles-validate: all role→policy references valid"
-
-  # ── 7. Shellcheck ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   # Covers the new lib/init/nomad/*.sh scripts plus bin/disinto (which owns
   # the backend dispatcher). bin/disinto has no .sh extension so the
   # repo-wide shellcheck in .woodpecker/ci.yml skips it — this step is the
@@ -323,7 +133,7 @@ steps:
     commands:
       - shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto
 
-  # ── 8. bats: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` ────────────────────
+  # ── 5. bats: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` ────────────────────
   # Smoke-tests the CLI dispatcher: both --backend=nomad variants exit 0
   # with the expected step list, and --backend=docker stays on the docker
   # path (regression guard). Pure dry-run — no sudo, no network.

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Disinto — Agent Instructions
 
 ## What this repo is
@@ -39,12 +39,10 @@ disinto/                 (code repo)
 │                  hooks/ — Claude Code session hooks (on-compact-reinject, on-idle-stop, on-phase-change, on-pretooluse-guard, on-session-end, on-stop-failure)
 │                  init/nomad/ — cluster-up.sh, install.sh, vault-init.sh, lib-systemd.sh (Nomad+Vault Step 0 installers, #821-#825)
 ├── nomad/         server.hcl, client.hcl, vault.hcl — HCL configs deployed to /etc/nomad.d/ and /etc/vault.d/ by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
-│                  jobs/ — Nomad jobspecs (forgejo.hcl reads Vault secrets via template stanza, S2.4)
 ├── projects/      *.toml.example — templates; *.toml — local per-box config (gitignored)
 ├── formulas/      Issue templates (TOML specs for multi-step agent tasks)
 ├── docker/        Dockerfiles and entrypoints: reproduce, triage, edge dispatcher, chat (server.py, entrypoint-chat.sh, Dockerfile, ui/)
 ├── tools/         Operational tools: edge-control/ (register.sh, install.sh, verify-chat-sandbox.sh)
-│                  vault-apply-policies.sh, vault-apply-roles.sh, vault-import.sh, vault-seed-forgejo.sh — Vault provisioning (S2.1/S2.2)
 ├── docs/          Protocol docs (PHASE-PROTOCOL.md, EVIDENCE-ARCHITECTURE.md)
 ├── site/          disinto.ai website content
 ├── tests/         Test files (mock-forgejo.py, smoke-init.sh, lib-hvault.bats, disinto-init-nomad.bats)
@@ -122,7 +120,8 @@ bash dev/phase-test.sh
 | Reproduce | `docker/reproduce/` | Bug reproduction using Playwright MCP | `formulas/reproduce.toml` |
 | Triage | `docker/reproduce/` | Deep root cause analysis | `formulas/triage.toml` |
 | Edge dispatcher | `docker/edge/` | Polls ops repo for vault actions, executes via Claude sessions | `docker/edge/dispatcher.sh` |
-| Local-model agents | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local llama-server agents configured via `[agents.X]` sections in project TOML | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
+| agents-llama | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local-Qwen dev agent (`AGENT_ROLES=dev`), gated on `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
+| agents-llama-all | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local-Qwen all-roles agent (all 7 roles), profile `agents-llama-all` | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
 
 > **Vault:** Being redesigned as a PR-based approval workflow (issues #73-#77).
 > See [docs/VAULT.md](docs/VAULT.md) for the vault PR workflow details.
@@ -193,7 +192,9 @@ Humans write these. Agents read and enforce them.
 
 ## Phase-Signaling Protocol
 
-When running as a persistent tmux session, Claude must signal the orchestrator at each phase boundary by writing to a phase file (e.g. `/tmp/dev-session-{project}-{issue}.phase`).
+When running as a persistent tmux session, Claude must signal the orchestrator
+at each phase boundary by writing to a phase file (e.g.
+`/tmp/dev-session-{project}-{issue}.phase`).
 
 Key phases: `PHASE:awaiting_ci` → `PHASE:awaiting_review` → `PHASE:done`. Also: `PHASE:escalate` (needs human input), `PHASE:failed`.
 See [docs/PHASE-PROTOCOL.md](docs/PHASE-PROTOCOL.md) for the complete spec, orchestrator reaction matrix, sequence diagram, and crash recovery.

architect/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Architect — Agent Instructions
 
 ## What this agent is

bin/disinto

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Usage:
                                      Read CI logs from Woodpecker SQLite
   disinto release <version>            Create vault PR for release (e.g., v1.2.0)
   disinto hire-an-agent <agent-name> <role> [--formula <path>] [--local-model <url>] [--model <name>]
-                                     Hire a new agent (create user + .profile repo; re-run to rotate credentials)
+                                     Hire a new agent (create user + .profile repo)
   disinto agent <subcommand>           Manage agent state (enable/disable)
   disinto edge <verb> [options]        Manage edge tunnel registrations
 
@@ -89,9 +89,6 @@ Init options:
   --yes                Skip confirmation prompts
   --rotate-tokens      Force regeneration of all bot tokens/passwords (idempotent by default)
   --dry-run            Print every intended action without executing
-  --import-env <path>  (nomad) Path to .env file for import into Vault KV (S2.5)
-  --import-sops <path> (nomad) Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc for import (S2.5)
-  --age-key <path>     (nomad) Path to age keyfile (required with --import-sops) (S2.5)
 
 Hire an agent options:
   --formula <path>     Path to role formula TOML (default: formulas/<role>.toml)
@@ -667,13 +664,8 @@ prompt_admin_password() {
 # `sudo disinto init ...` directly.
 _disinto_init_nomad() {
   local dry_run="${1:-false}" empty="${2:-false}" with_services="${3:-}"
-  local import_env="${4:-}" import_sops="${5:-}" age_key="${6:-}"
   local cluster_up="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh"
   local deploy_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh"
-  local vault_engines_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh"
-  local vault_policies_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-apply-policies.sh"
-  local vault_auth_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh"
-  local vault_import_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-import.sh"
 
   if [ ! -x "$cluster_up" ]; then
     echo "Error: ${cluster_up} not found or not executable" >&2
@@ -685,42 +677,6 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
     exit 1
   fi
 
-  # --empty short-circuits after cluster-up: no policies, no auth, no
-  # import, no deploy. It's the "cluster-only escape hatch" for debugging
-  # (docs/nomad-migration.md). Caller-side validation already rejects
-  # --empty combined with --with or any --import-* flag, so reaching
-  # this branch with those set is a bug in the caller.
-  #
-  # On the default (non-empty) path, vault-engines.sh (enables the kv/
-  # mount), vault-apply-policies.sh, and vault-nomad-auth.sh are invoked
-  # unconditionally — they are idempotent and cheap to re-run, and
-  # subsequent --with deployments depend on them. vault-import.sh is
-  # invoked only when an --import-* flag is set. vault-engines.sh runs
-  # first because every policy and role below references kv/disinto/*
-  # paths, which 403 if the engine is not yet mounted (issue #912).
-  local import_any=false
-  if [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ]; then
-    import_any=true
-  fi
-  if [ "$empty" != "true" ]; then
-    if [ ! -x "$vault_engines_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_engines_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    if [ ! -x "$vault_policies_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_policies_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    if [ ! -x "$vault_auth_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_auth_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    if [ "$import_any" = true ] && [ ! -x "$vault_import_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_import_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-  fi
-
   # --empty and default both invoke cluster-up today. Log the requested
   # mode so the dispatch is visible in factory bootstrap logs — Step 1
   # will branch on $empty to gate the job-deployment path.
@@ -730,7 +686,7 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
     echo "nomad backend: default (cluster-up; jobs deferred to Step 1)"
   fi
 
-  # Dry-run: print cluster-up plan + policies/auth/import plan + deploy.sh plan
+  # Dry-run: print cluster-up plan + deploy.sh plan
   if [ "$dry_run" = "true" ]; then
     echo ""
     echo "── Cluster-up dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
@@ -738,74 +694,10 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
     "${cmd[@]}" || true
     echo ""
 
-    # --empty skips policies/auth/import/deploy — cluster-up only, no
-    # workloads. The operator-visible dry-run plan must match the real
-    # run, so short-circuit here too.
-    if [ "$empty" = "true" ]; then
-      exit 0
-    fi
-
-    # Vault engines + policies + auth are invoked on every nomad real-run
-    # path regardless of --import-* flags (they're idempotent; S2.1 + S2.3).
-    # Engines runs first because policies/roles/templates all reference the
-    # kv/ mount it enables (issue #912). Mirror that ordering in the
-    # dry-run plan so the operator sees the full sequence Step 2 will
-    # execute.
-    echo "── Vault engines dry-run ──────────────────────────────"
-    echo "[engines] [dry-run] ${vault_engines_sh} --dry-run"
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Vault policies dry-run ─────────────────────────────"
-    echo "[policies] [dry-run] ${vault_policies_sh} --dry-run"
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Vault auth dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
-    echo "[auth] [dry-run] ${vault_auth_sh}"
-    echo ""
-
-    # Import plan: one line per --import-* flag that is actually set.
-    # Printing independently (not in an if/elif chain) means that all
-    # three flags appearing together each echo their own path — the
-    # regression that bit prior implementations of this issue (#883).
-    if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
-      echo "── Vault import dry-run ───────────────────────────────"
-      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && echo "[import] --import-env   env file:  ${import_env}"
-      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && echo "[import] --import-sops  sops file: ${import_sops}"
-      [ -n "$age_key" ]     && echo "[import] --age-key      age key:   ${age_key}"
-      local -a import_dry_cmd=("$vault_import_sh")
-      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_dry_cmd+=("--env" "$import_env")
-      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_dry_cmd+=("--sops" "$import_sops")
-      [ -n "$age_key" ]     && import_dry_cmd+=("--age-key" "$age_key")
-      import_dry_cmd+=("--dry-run")
-      echo "[import] [dry-run] ${import_dry_cmd[*]}"
-      echo ""
-    else
-      echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
-      echo ""
-    fi
-
     if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
-      # Vault seed plan (S2.6, #928): one line per service whose
-      # tools/vault-seed-<svc>.sh ships. Services without a seeder are
-      # silently skipped — the real-run loop below mirrors this,
-      # making `--with woodpecker` in Step 3 auto-invoke
-      # tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh once that file lands without
-      # any further change to bin/disinto.
-      local seed_hdr_printed=false
-      local IFS=','
-      for svc in $with_services; do
-        svc=$(echo "$svc" | xargs)  # trim whitespace
-        local seed_script="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-seed-${svc}.sh"
-        if [ -x "$seed_script" ]; then
-          if [ "$seed_hdr_printed" = false ]; then
-            echo "── Vault seed dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
-            seed_hdr_printed=true
-          fi
-          echo "[seed] [dry-run] ${seed_script} --dry-run"
-        fi
-      done
-      [ "$seed_hdr_printed" = true ] && echo ""
-
       echo "── Deploy services dry-run ────────────────────────────"
       echo "[deploy] services to deploy: ${with_services}"
+      local IFS=','
       for svc in $with_services; do
         svc=$(echo "$svc" | xargs)  # trim whitespace
         # Validate known services first
@@ -829,7 +721,7 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
     exit 0
   fi
 
-  # Real run: cluster-up + policies + auth + (optional) import + deploy
+  # Real run: cluster-up + deploy services
   local -a cluster_cmd=("$cluster_up")
   if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
     "${cluster_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
@@ -841,122 +733,6 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
     sudo -n -- "${cluster_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
   fi
 
-  # --empty short-circuits here: cluster-up only, no policies/auth/import
-  # and no deploy. Matches the dry-run plan above and the docs/runbook.
-  if [ "$empty" = "true" ]; then
-    exit 0
-  fi
-
-  # Enable Vault secret engines (S2.1 / issue #912) — must precede
-  # policies/auth/import because every policy and every import target
-  # addresses paths under kv/. Idempotent, safe to re-run.
-  echo ""
-  echo "── Enabling Vault secret engines ──────────────────────"
-  local -a engines_cmd=("$vault_engines_sh")
-  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    "${engines_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  else
-    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-      echo "Error: vault-engines.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    sudo -n -- "${engines_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  fi
-
-  # Apply Vault policies (S2.1) — idempotent, safe to re-run.
-  echo ""
-  echo "── Applying Vault policies ────────────────────────────"
-  local -a policies_cmd=("$vault_policies_sh")
-  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    "${policies_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  else
-    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-      echo "Error: vault-apply-policies.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    sudo -n -- "${policies_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  fi
-
-  # Configure Vault JWT auth + Nomad workload identity (S2.3) — idempotent.
-  echo ""
-  echo "── Configuring Vault JWT auth ─────────────────────────"
-  local -a auth_cmd=("$vault_auth_sh")
-  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    "${auth_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  else
-    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-      echo "Error: vault-nomad-auth.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    sudo -n -- "${auth_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  fi
-
-  # Import secrets if any --import-* flag is set (S2.2).
-  if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Importing secrets into Vault ───────────────────────"
-    local -a import_cmd=("$vault_import_sh")
-    [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_cmd+=("--env" "$import_env")
-    [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_cmd+=("--sops" "$import_sops")
-    [ -n "$age_key" ]     && import_cmd+=("--age-key" "$age_key")
-    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-      "${import_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-    else
-      if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        echo "Error: vault-import.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-        exit 1
-      fi
-      sudo -n -- "${import_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-    fi
-  else
-    echo ""
-    echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
-  fi
-
-  # Seed Vault for services that ship their own seeder (S2.6, #928).
-  # Convention: tools/vault-seed-<svc>.sh — auto-invoked when --with <svc>
-  # is requested. Runs AFTER vault-import so that real imported values
-  # win over generated seeds when both are present; each seeder is
-  # idempotent on a per-key basis (see vault-seed-forgejo.sh's
-  # "missing → generate, present → unchanged" contract), so re-running
-  # init does not rotate existing keys. Services without a seeder are
-  # silently skipped — keeps this loop forward-compatible with Step 3+
-  # services that may ship their own seeder without touching bin/disinto.
-  #
-  # VAULT_ADDR is passed explicitly because cluster-up.sh writes the
-  # profile.d export *during* this same init run, so the current shell
-  # hasn't sourced it yet; sibling vault-* scripts (engines/policies/
-  # auth/import) default VAULT_ADDR internally via _hvault_default_env,
-  # but vault-seed-forgejo.sh requires the caller to set it.
-  #
-  # The non-root branch invokes the seeder as `sudo -n -- env VAR=val
-  # script` rather than `sudo -n VAR=val -- script`: sudo treats bare
-  # `VAR=val` args as sudoers env-assignments, which the default
-  # `env_reset=on` policy silently discards unless the variable is in
-  # `env_keep` (VAULT_ADDR is not). Using `env` as the actual command
-  # sets VAULT_ADDR in the child process regardless of sudoers policy.
-  if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
-    local vault_addr="${VAULT_ADDR:-http://127.0.0.1:8200}"
-    local IFS=','
-    for svc in $with_services; do
-      svc=$(echo "$svc" | xargs)  # trim whitespace
-      local seed_script="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-seed-${svc}.sh"
-      if [ -x "$seed_script" ]; then
-        echo ""
-        echo "── Seeding Vault for ${svc} ───────────────────────────"
-        if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-          VAULT_ADDR="$vault_addr" "$seed_script" || exit $?
-        else
-          if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            echo "Error: vault-seed-${svc}.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          sudo -n -- env "VAULT_ADDR=$vault_addr" "$seed_script" || exit $?
-        fi
-      fi
-    done
-  fi
-
   # Deploy services if requested
   if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
     echo ""
@@ -986,6 +762,7 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
       fi
       deploy_cmd+=("$svc")
     done
+    deploy_cmd+=("--dry-run")  # deploy.sh supports --dry-run
 
     if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
       "${deploy_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
@@ -1001,16 +778,6 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
     echo ""
     echo "── Summary ────────────────────────────────────────────"
     echo "Cluster:     Nomad+Vault cluster is up"
-    echo "Policies:    applied (Vault ACL)"
-    echo "Auth:        Vault JWT auth + Nomad workload identity configured"
-    if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
-      local import_desc=""
-      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_desc+="${import_env} "
-      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_desc+="${import_sops} "
-      echo "Imported:    ${import_desc% }"
-    else
-      echo "Imported:    (none — seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services)"
-    fi
     echo "Deployed:    ${with_services}"
     if echo "$with_services" | grep -q "forgejo"; then
       echo "Ports:       forgejo: 3000"
@@ -1037,7 +804,6 @@ disinto_init() {
 
   # Parse flags
   local branch="" repo_root="" ci_id="0" auto_yes=false forge_url_flag="" bare=false rotate_tokens=false use_build=false dry_run=false backend="docker" empty=false with_services=""
-  local import_env="" import_sops="" age_key=""
   while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
     case "$1" in
       --branch)        branch="$2"; shift 2 ;;
@@ -1054,12 +820,6 @@ disinto_init() {
       --yes)           auto_yes=true; shift ;;
       --rotate-tokens) rotate_tokens=true; shift ;;
       --dry-run)       dry_run=true; shift ;;
-      --import-env)    import_env="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-      --import-env=*)  import_env="${1#--import-env=}"; shift ;;
-      --import-sops)   import_sops="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-      --import-sops=*) import_sops="${1#--import-sops=}"; shift ;;
-      --age-key)       age_key="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-      --age-key=*)     age_key="${1#--age-key=}"; shift ;;
       *) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
     esac
   done
@@ -1080,14 +840,6 @@ disinto_init() {
     exit 1
   fi
 
-  # --empty is nomad-only today (the docker path has no concept of an
-  # "empty cluster"). Reject explicitly rather than letting it silently
-  # do nothing on --backend=docker.
-  if [ "$empty" = true ] && [ "$backend" != "nomad" ]; then
-    echo "Error: --empty is only valid with --backend=nomad" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-
   # --with requires --backend=nomad
   if [ -n "$with_services" ] && [ "$backend" != "nomad" ]; then
     echo "Error: --with requires --backend=nomad" >&2
@@ -1100,40 +852,11 @@ disinto_init() {
     exit 1
   fi
 
-  # --import-* flag validation (S2.5). These three flags form an import
-  # triple and must be consistent before dispatch: sops encryption is
-  # useless without the age key to decrypt it, so either both --import-sops
-  # and --age-key are present or neither is. --import-env alone is fine
-  # (it just imports the plaintext dotenv). All three flags are nomad-only.
-  if [ -n "$import_sops" ] && [ -z "$age_key" ]; then
-    echo "Error: --import-sops requires --age-key" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  if [ -n "$age_key" ] && [ -z "$import_sops" ]; then
-    echo "Error: --age-key requires --import-sops" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  if { [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; } \
-     && [ "$backend" != "nomad" ]; then
-    echo "Error: --import-env, --import-sops, and --age-key require --backend=nomad" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-
-  # --empty is the cluster-only escape hatch — it skips policies, auth,
-  # import, and deploy. Pairing it with --import-* silently does nothing,
-  # which is a worse failure mode than a clear error. Reject explicitly.
-  if [ "$empty" = true ] \
-     && { [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; }; then
-    echo "Error: --empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-
   # Dispatch on backend — the nomad path runs lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
   # (S0.4). The default and --empty variants are identical today; Step 1
   # will branch on $empty to add job deployment to the default path.
   if [ "$backend" = "nomad" ]; then
-    _disinto_init_nomad "$dry_run" "$empty" "$with_services" \
+    _disinto_init_nomad "$dry_run" "$empty" "$with_services"
-                        "$import_env" "$import_sops" "$age_key"
     # shellcheck disable=SC2317  # _disinto_init_nomad always exits today;
     # `return` is defensive against future refactors.
     return
@@ -1247,6 +970,7 @@ p.write_text(text)
     echo ""
     echo "[ensure] Forgejo admin user 'disinto-admin'"
     echo "[ensure] 8 bot users: dev-bot, review-bot, planner-bot, gardener-bot, vault-bot, supervisor-bot, predictor-bot, architect-bot"
+    echo "[ensure] 2 llama bot users: dev-qwen, dev-qwen-nightly"
     echo "[ensure] .profile repos for all bots"
     echo "[ensure] repo ${forge_repo} on Forgejo with collaborators"
     echo "[run]    preflight checks"
@@ -1442,6 +1166,19 @@ p.write_text(text)
     echo "Config:  CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC=1 saved to .env"
   fi
 
+  # Write local-Qwen dev agent env keys with safe defaults (#769)
+  if ! grep -q '^ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=' "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+    cat >> "$env_file" <<'LLAMAENVEOF'
+
+# Local Qwen dev agent (optional) — set to 1 to enable
+ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0
+FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=
+FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=
+ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=
+LLAMAENVEOF
+    echo "Config:  ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT keys written to .env (disabled by default)"
+  fi
+
   # Create labels on remote
   create_labels "$forge_repo" "$forge_url"
 
@@ -2108,118 +1845,6 @@ _regen_file() {
   fi
 }
 
-# Validate that required environment variables are present for all services
-# that reference them in docker-compose.yml
-_validate_env_vars() {
-  local env_file="${FACTORY_ROOT}/.env"
-  local errors=0
-  local -a missing_vars=()
-
-  # Load env vars from .env file into associative array
-  declare -A env_vars
-  if [ -f "$env_file" ]; then
-    while IFS='=' read -r key value; do
-      # Skip empty lines and comments
-      [[ -z "$key" || "$key" =~ ^[[:space:]]*# ]] && continue
-      env_vars["$key"]="$value"
-    done < "$env_file"
-  fi
-
-  # Check for local-model agent services
-  # Each [agents.*] section in projects/*.toml requires:
-  # - FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>
-  # - FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>
-  # - ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL (local model) OR ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (Anthropic backend)
-
-  # Parse projects/*.toml for [agents.*] sections
-  local projects_dir="${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects"
-  for toml in "${projects_dir}"/*.toml; do
-    [ -f "$toml" ] || continue
-
-    # Extract agent config using Python
-    while IFS='|' read -r service_name forge_user base_url _api_key; do
-      [ -n "$service_name" ] || continue
-      [ -n "$forge_user" ] || continue
-
-      # Derive variable names (user -> USER_UPPER)
-      local user_upper
-      user_upper=$(echo "$forge_user" | tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_')
-      local token_var="FORGE_TOKEN_${user_upper}"
-      local pass_var="FORGE_PASS_${user_upper}"
-
-      # Check token
-      if [ -z "${env_vars[$token_var]:-}" ]; then
-        missing_vars+=("$token_var (for agent ${service_name}/${forge_user})")
-        errors=$((errors + 1))
-      fi
-
-      # Check password
-      if [ -z "${env_vars[$pass_var]:-}" ]; then
-        missing_vars+=("$pass_var (for agent ${service_name}/${forge_user})")
-        errors=$((errors + 1))
-      fi
-
-      # Check backend URL or API key (conditional based on base_url presence)
-      if [ -n "$base_url" ]; then
-        # Local model: needs ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL
-        if [ -z "${env_vars[ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL]:-}" ]; then
-          missing_vars+=("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL (for agent ${service_name})")
-          errors=$((errors + 1))
-        fi
-      else
-        # Anthropic backend: needs ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
-        if [ -z "${env_vars[ANTHROPIC_API_KEY]:-}" ]; then
-          missing_vars+=("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (for agent ${service_name})")
-          errors=$((errors + 1))
-        fi
-      fi
-
-    done < <(python3 -c '
-import sys, tomllib, re
-
-with open(sys.argv[1], "rb") as f:
-    cfg = tomllib.load(f)
-
-agents = cfg.get("agents", {})
-for name, config in agents.items():
-    if not isinstance(config, dict):
-        continue
-
-    base_url = config.get("base_url", "")
-    model = config.get("model", "")
-    api_key = config.get("api_key", "")
-    forge_user = config.get("forge_user", f"{name}-bot")
-
-    safe_name = name.lower()
-    safe_name = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]", "-", safe_name)
-
-    print(f"{safe_name}|{forge_user}|{base_url}|{api_key}")
-' "$toml" 2>/dev/null)
-  done
-
-  # Check for legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT services
-  if [ "${env_vars[ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT]:-0}" = "1" ]; then
-    if [ -z "${env_vars[FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA]:-}" ]; then
-      missing_vars+=("FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA (ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1)")
-      errors=$((errors + 1))
-    fi
-    if [ -z "${env_vars[FORGE_PASS_LLAMA]:-}" ]; then
-      missing_vars+=("FORGE_PASS_LLAMA (ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1)")
-      errors=$((errors + 1))
-    fi
-  fi
-
-  if [ "$errors" -gt 0 ]; then
-    echo "Error: missing required environment variables:" >&2
-    for var in "${missing_vars[@]}"; do
-      echo "  - $var" >&2
-    done
-    echo "" >&2
-    echo "Run 'disinto hire-an-agent <name> <role>' to create the agent and write credentials to .env" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-}
-
 disinto_up() {
   local compose_file="${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml"
   local caddyfile="${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/Caddyfile"
@@ -2229,9 +1854,6 @@ disinto_up() {
     exit 1
   fi
 
-  # Validate environment variables before proceeding
-  _validate_env_vars
-
   # Parse --no-regen flag; remaining args pass through to docker compose
   local no_regen=false
   local -a compose_args=()

dev/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Dev Agent
 
 **Role**: Implement issues autonomously — write code, push branches, address

dev/dev-agent.sh

@@ -254,11 +254,7 @@ agent_recover_session
 # WORKTREE SETUP
 # =============================================================================
 status "setting up worktree"
-if ! cd "$REPO_ROOT"; then
+cd "$REPO_ROOT"
-  log "ERROR: REPO_ROOT=${REPO_ROOT} does not exist — cannot cd"
-  log "Check PROJECT_REPO_ROOT vs compose PROJECT_NAME vs TOML name mismatch"
-  exit 1
-fi
 
 # Determine forge remote by matching FORGE_URL host against git remotes
 _forge_host=$(printf '%s' "$FORGE_URL" | sed 's|https\?://||; s|/.*||')

docker/agents/Dockerfile

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ FROM debian:bookworm-slim
 
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
     bash curl git jq tmux python3 python3-pip openssh-client ca-certificates age shellcheck procps gosu \
-    && pip3 install --break-system-packages networkx tomlkit \
+    && pip3 install --break-system-packages networkx \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # Pre-built binaries (copied from docker/agents/bin/)

docker/agents/entrypoint.sh

@@ -17,38 +17,6 @@ set -euo pipefail
 #   - predictor: every 24 hours (288 iterations * 5 min)
 #   - supervisor: every SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL seconds (default: 1200 = 20 min)
 
-# ── Migration check: reject ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT ───────────────────────────────
-# #846: The legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT env flag is no longer supported.
-# Activation is now done exclusively via [agents.X] sections in project TOML.
-# If this legacy flag is detected, fail immediately with a migration message.
-if [ "${ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT:-}" = "1" ]; then
-  cat <<'MIGRATION_ERR'
-FATAL: ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT is no longer supported.
-
-The legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 flag has been removed (#846).
-Activation is now done exclusively via [agents.X] sections in projects/*.toml.
-
-To migrate:
-  1. Remove ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT from your .env or .env.enc file
-  2. Add an [agents.<name>] section to your project TOML:
-
-     [agents.dev-qwen]
-     base_url = "http://your-llama-server:8081"
-     model = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
-     api_key = "sk-no-key-required"
-     roles = ["dev"]
-     forge_user = "dev-qwen"
-     compact_pct = 60
-     poll_interval = 60
-
-  3. Run: disinto init
-  4. Start the agent: docker compose up -d agents-dev-qwen
-
-See docs/agents-llama.md for full details.
-MIGRATION_ERR
-  exit 1
-fi
-
 DISINTO_BAKED="/home/agent/disinto"
 DISINTO_LIVE="/home/agent/repos/_factory"
 DISINTO_DIR="$DISINTO_BAKED"  # start with baked copy; switched to live checkout after bootstrap
@@ -347,24 +315,6 @@ _setup_git_creds
 configure_git_identity
 configure_tea_login
 
-# Parse first available project TOML to get the project name for cloning.
-# This ensures PROJECT_NAME matches the TOML 'name' field, not the compose
-# default of 'project'. The clone will land at /home/agent/repos/<toml_name>
-# and subsequent env exports in the main loop will be consistent.
-if compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  _first_toml=$(compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" | head -1)
-  _pname=$(python3 -c "
-import sys, tomllib
-with open(sys.argv[1], 'rb') as f:
-    print(tomllib.load(f).get('name', ''))
-" "$_first_toml" 2>/dev/null) || _pname=""
-  if [ -n "$_pname" ]; then
-    export PROJECT_NAME="$_pname"
-    export PROJECT_REPO_ROOT="/home/agent/repos/${_pname}"
-    log "Parsed PROJECT_NAME=${PROJECT_NAME} from ${_first_toml}"
-  fi
-fi
-
 # Clone project repo on first run (makes agents self-healing, #589)
 ensure_project_clone
 
@@ -374,32 +324,9 @@ bootstrap_ops_repos
 # Bootstrap factory repo — switch DISINTO_DIR to live checkout (#593)
 bootstrap_factory_repo
 
-# Validate that projects directory has at least one real .toml file (not .example)
-# This prevents the silent-zombie mode where the polling loop matches zero files
-# and does nothing forever.
-validate_projects_dir() {
-  # NOTE: compgen -G exits non-zero when no matches exist, so piping it through
-  # `wc -l` under `set -eo pipefail` aborts the script before the FATAL branch
-  # can log a diagnostic (#877).  Use the conditional form already adopted at
-  # lines above (see bootstrap_factory_repo, PROJECT_NAME parsing).
-  if ! compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    log "FATAL: No real .toml files found in ${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/"
-    log "Expected at least one project config file (e.g., disinto.toml)"
-    log "The directory only contains *.toml.example template files."
-    log "Mount the host ./projects volume or copy real .toml files into the container."
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  local toml_count
-  toml_count=$(compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" | wc -l)
-  log "Projects directory validated: ${toml_count} real .toml file(s) found"
-}
-
 # Initialize state directory for check_active guards
 init_state_dir
 
-# Validate projects directory before entering polling loop
-validate_projects_dir
-
 # Parse AGENT_ROLES env var (default: all agents)
 # Expected format: comma-separated list like "review,dev,gardener"
 AGENT_ROLES="${AGENT_ROLES:-review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor}"

docs/agents-llama.md

@@ -1,194 +1,59 @@
-# Local-Model Agents
+# agents-llama — Local-Qwen Agents
 
-Local-model agents run the same agent code as the Claude-backed agents, but
+The `agents-llama` service is an optional compose service that runs agents
-connect to a local llama-server (or compatible OpenAI-API endpoint) instead of
+backed by a local llama-server instance (e.g. Qwen) instead of the Anthropic
-the Anthropic API. This document describes the canonical activation flow using
+API. It uses the same Docker image as the main `agents` service but connects to
-`disinto hire-an-agent` and `[agents.X]` TOML configuration.
+a local inference endpoint via `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`.
 
-> **Note:** The legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` env flag has been removed (#846).
+Two profiles are available:
-> Activation is now done exclusively via `[agents.X]` sections in project TOML.
 
-## Overview
+| Profile | Service | Roles | Use case |
+|---------|---------|-------|----------|
+| _(default)_ | `agents-llama` | `dev` only | Conservative: single-role soak test |
+| `agents-llama-all` | `agents-llama-all` | all 7 (review, dev, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor) | Pre-migration: validate every role on llama before Nomad cutover |
 
-Local-model agents are configured via `[agents.<name>]` sections in
+## Enabling
-`projects/<project>.toml`. Each agent gets:
+
-- Its own Forgejo bot user with dedicated API token and password
+Set `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` in `.env` (or `.env.enc`) and provide the required
-- A dedicated compose service `agents-<name>`
+credentials:
-- Isolated credentials stored as `FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>` and `FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>` in `.env`
+
+```env
+ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1
+FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=<dev-qwen API token>
+FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=<dev-qwen password>
+ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:8081   # llama-server endpoint
+```
+
+Then regenerate the compose file (`disinto init ...`) and bring the stack up.
+
+### Running all 7 roles (agents-llama-all)
+
+```bash
+docker compose --profile agents-llama-all up -d
+```
+
+This starts the `agents-llama-all` container with all 7 bot roles against the
+local llama endpoint. The per-role forge tokens (`FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN`,
+`FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN`, etc.) must be set in `.env` — they are the same tokens
+used by the Claude-backed `agents` container.
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
 - **llama-server** (or compatible OpenAI-API endpoint) running on the host,
-  reachable from inside Docker at the URL you will configure.
+  reachable from inside Docker at the URL set in `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`.
-- A disinto factory already initialized (`disinto init` completed).
+- A Forgejo bot user (e.g. `dev-qwen`) with its own API token and password,
-
+  stored as `FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA` / `FORGE_PASS_LLAMA`.
-## Hiring a local-model agent
-
-Use `disinto hire-an-agent` with `--local-model` to create a bot user and
-configure the agent:
-
-```bash
-# Hire a local-model agent for the dev role
-disinto hire-an-agent dev-qwen dev \
-  --local-model http://10.10.10.1:8081 \
-  --model unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B
-```
-
-The command performs these steps:
-
-1. **Creates a Forgejo user** `dev-qwen` with a random password
-2. **Generates an API token** for the user
-3. **Writes credentials to `.env`**:
-   - `FORGE_TOKEN_DEV_QWEN` — the API token
-   - `FORGE_PASS_DEV_QWEN` — the password
-   - `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` — the llama endpoint (required by the agent)
-4. **Writes `[agents.dev-qwen]` to `projects/<project>.toml`** with:
-   - `base_url`, `model`, `api_key`
-   - `roles = ["dev"]`
-   - `forge_user = "dev-qwen"`
-   - `compact_pct = 60`
-   - `poll_interval = 60`
-5. **Regenerates `docker-compose.yml`** to include the `agents-dev-qwen` service
-
-### Anthropic backend agents
-
-For agents that use Anthropic API instead of a local model, omit `--local-model`:
-
-```bash
-# Anthropic backend agent (requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in environment)
-export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="sk-..."
-disinto hire-an-agent dev-claude dev
-```
-
-This writes `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` to `.env` instead of `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`.
-
-## Activation and running
-
-Once hired, the agent service is added to `docker-compose.yml`. Start the
-service with `docker compose up -d`:
-
-```bash
-# Start all agent services
-docker compose up -d
-
-# Start a single named agent service
-docker compose up -d agents-dev-qwen
-
-# Start multiple named agent services
-docker compose up -d agents-dev-qwen agents-planner
-```
-
-### Stopping agents
-
-```bash
-# Stop a specific agent service
-docker compose down agents-dev-qwen
-
-# Stop all agent services
-docker compose down
-```
-
-## Credential rotation
-
-Re-running `disinto hire-an-agent <same-name>` with the same parameters rotates
-credentials idempotently:
-
-```bash
-# Re-hire the same agent to rotate token and password
-disinto hire-an-agent dev-qwen dev \
-  --local-model http://10.10.10.1:8081 \
-  --model unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B
-
-# The command will:
-# 1. Detect the user already exists
-# 2. Reset the password to a new random value
-# 3. Create a new API token
-# 4. Update .env with the new credentials
-```
-
-This is the recommended way to rotate agent credentials. The `.env` file is
-updated in place, so no manual editing is required.
-
-If you need to manually rotate credentials:
-1. Generate a new token in Forgejo admin UI
-2. Edit `.env` and replace `FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>` and `FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>`
-3. Restart the agent service: `docker compose restart agents-<name>`
-
-## Configuration reference
-
-### Environment variables (`.env`)
-
-| Variable | Description | Example |
-|----------|-------------|---------|
-| `FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>` | Forgejo API token for the bot user | `FORGE_TOKEN_DEV_QWEN` |
-| `FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>` | Forgejo password for the bot user | `FORGE_PASS_DEV_QWEN` |
-| `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` | Local llama endpoint (local model agents) | `http://host.docker.internal:8081` |
-| `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | Anthropic API key (Anthropic backend agents) | `sk-...` |
-
-### Project TOML (`[agents.<name>]` section)
-
-```toml
-[agents.dev-qwen]
-base_url = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
-api_key = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles = ["dev"]
-forge_user = "dev-qwen"
-compact_pct = 60
-poll_interval = 60
-```
-
-| Field | Description |
-|-------|-------------|
-| `base_url` | llama-server endpoint |
-| `model` | Model name (for logging/identification) |
-| `api_key` | Required by API; set to placeholder for llama |
-| `roles` | Agent roles this instance handles |
-| `forge_user` | Forgejo bot username |
-| `compact_pct` | Context compaction threshold (lower = more aggressive) |
-| `poll_interval` | Seconds between polling cycles |
 
 ## Behaviour
 
-- Each agent runs with `AGENT_ROLES` set to its configured roles
+- `agents-llama`: `AGENT_ROLES=dev` — only picks up dev work.
+- `agents-llama-all`: `AGENT_ROLES=review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor` — runs all 7 roles.
 - `CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE=60` — more aggressive compaction for smaller
-  context windows
+  context windows.
-- Agents serialize on the llama-server's single KV cache (AD-002)
+- Serialises on the llama-server's single KV cache (AD-002).
 
-## Troubleshooting
+## Disabling
 
-### Agent service not starting
+Set `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0` (or leave it unset) and regenerate. The service
-
+block is omitted entirely from `docker-compose.yml`; the stack starts cleanly
-Check that the service was created by `disinto hire-an-agent`:
+without it.
-
-```bash
-docker compose config | grep -A5 "agents-dev-qwen"
-```
-
-If the service is missing, re-run `disinto hire-an-agent dev-qwen dev` to
-regenerate `docker-compose.yml`.
-
-### Model endpoint unreachable
-
-Verify llama-server is accessible from inside Docker:
-
-```bash
-docker compose -f docker-compose.yml exec agents curl -sf http://host.docker.internal:8081/health
-```
-
-If using a custom host IP, update `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` in `.env`:
-
-```bash
-# Update the base URL
-sed -i 's|^ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=.*|ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://192.168.1.100:8081|' .env
-
-# Restart the agent
-docker compose restart agents-dev-qwen
-```
-
-### Invalid agent name
-
-Agent names must match `^[a-z]([a-z0-9]|-[a-z0-9])*$` (lowercase letters, digits,
-hyphens; starts with letter, ends with alphanumeric). Invalid names like
-`dev-qwen2` (trailing digit is OK) or `dev--qwen` (consecutive hyphens) will
-be rejected.

docs/nomad-migration.md

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: (new file, S2.5 #883) -->
-# Nomad+Vault migration — cutover-day runbook
-
-`disinto init --backend=nomad` is the single entry-point that turns a fresh
-LXC (with the disinto repo cloned) into a running Nomad+Vault cluster with
-policies applied, JWT workload-identity auth configured, secrets imported
-from the old docker stack, and services deployed.
-
-## Cutover-day invocation
-
-On the new LXC, as root (or an operator with NOPASSWD sudo):
-
-```bash
-# Copy the plaintext .env + sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc + age keyfile
-# from the old box first (out of band — SSH, USB, whatever your ops
-# procedure allows). Then:
-
-sudo ./bin/disinto init \
-  --backend=nomad \
-  --import-env   /tmp/.env \
-  --import-sops  /tmp/.env.vault.enc \
-  --age-key      /tmp/keys.txt \
-  --with         forgejo
-```
-
-This runs, in order:
-
-1. **`lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh`** (S0) — installs Nomad + Vault
-   binaries, writes `/etc/nomad.d/*`, initializes Vault, starts both
-   services, waits for the Nomad node to become ready.
-2. **`tools/vault-apply-policies.sh`** (S2.1) — syncs every
-   `vault/policies/*.hcl` into Vault as an ACL policy. Idempotent.
-3. **`lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`** (S2.3) — enables Vault's
-   JWT auth method at `jwt-nomad`, points it at Nomad's JWKS, writes
-   one role per policy, reloads Nomad so jobs can exchange
-   workload-identity tokens for Vault tokens. Idempotent.
-4. **`tools/vault-import.sh`** (S2.2) — reads `/tmp/.env` and the
-   sops-decrypted `/tmp/.env.vault.enc`, writes them to the KV paths
-   matching the S2.1 policy layout (`kv/disinto/bots/*`, `kv/disinto/shared/*`,
-   `kv/disinto/runner/*`). Idempotent (overwrites KV v2 data in place).
-5. **`lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh forgejo`** (S1) — validates + runs the
-   `nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl` jobspec. Forgejo reads its admin creds from
-   Vault via the `template` stanza (S2.4).
-
-## Flag summary
-
-| Flag | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| `--backend=nomad` | Switch the init dispatcher to the Nomad+Vault path (instead of docker compose). |
-| `--empty` | Bring the cluster up, skip policies/auth/import/deploy. Escape hatch for debugging. |
-| `--with forgejo[,…]` | Deploy these services after the cluster is up. |
-| `--import-env PATH` | Plaintext `.env` from the old stack. Optional. |
-| `--import-sops PATH` | Sops-encrypted `.env.vault.enc` from the old stack. Requires `--age-key`. |
-| `--age-key PATH` | Age keyfile used to decrypt `--import-sops`. Requires `--import-sops`. |
-| `--dry-run` | Print the full plan (cluster-up + policies + auth + import + deploy) and exit. Touches nothing. |
-
-### Flag validation
-
-- `--import-sops` without `--age-key` → error.
-- `--age-key` without `--import-sops` → error.
-- `--import-env` alone (no sops) → OK (imports just the plaintext `.env`).
-- `--backend=docker` with any `--import-*` flag → error.
-- `--empty` with any `--import-*` flag → error (mutually exclusive: `--empty`
-  skips the import step, so pairing them silently discards the import
-  intent).
-
-## Idempotency
-
-Every layer is idempotent by design. Re-running the same command on an
-already-provisioned box is a no-op at every step:
-
-- **Cluster-up:** second run detects running `nomad`/`vault` systemd
-  units and state files, skips re-init.
-- **Policies:** byte-for-byte compare against on-server policy text;
-  "unchanged" for every untouched file.
-- **Auth:** skips auth-method create if `jwt-nomad/` already enabled,
-  skips config write if the JWKS + algs match, skips server.hcl write if
-  the file on disk is identical to the repo copy.
-- **Import:** KV v2 writes overwrite in place (same path, same keys,
-  same values → no new version).
-- **Deploy:** `nomad job run` is declarative; same jobspec → no new
-  allocation.
-
-## Dry-run
-
-```bash
-./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad \
-  --import-env /tmp/.env \
-  --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc \
-  --age-key /tmp/keys.txt \
-  --with forgejo \
-  --dry-run
-```
-
-Prints the five-section plan — cluster-up, policies, auth, import,
-deploy — with every path and every argv that would be executed. No
-network, no sudo, no state mutation. See
-`tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats` for the exact output shape.
-
-## No-import path
-
-If you already have `kv/disinto/*` seeded by other means (manual
-`vault kv put`, a replica, etc.), omit all three `--import-*` flags.
-`disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo` still applies policies,
-configures auth, and deploys — but skips the import step with:
-
-```
-[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services
-```
-
-Forgejo's template stanza will fail to render (and thus the allocation
-will stall) until those KV paths exist — so either import them or seed
-them first.
-
-## Secret hygiene
-
-- Never log a secret value. The CLI only prints paths (`--import-env`,
-  `--age-key`) and KV *paths* (`kv/disinto/bots/review/token`), never
-  the values themselves. `tools/vault-import.sh` is the only thing that
-  reads the values, and it pipes them directly into Vault's HTTP API.
-- The age keyfile must be mode 0400 — `vault-import.sh` refuses to
-  source a keyfile with looser permissions.
-- `VAULT_ADDR` must be localhost during import — the import tool
-  refuses to run against a remote Vault, preventing accidental exposure.

formulas/release.sh

@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ log "Tagged disinto/agents:${RELEASE_VERSION}"
 
 log "Step 6/6: Restarting agent containers"
 
-docker compose stop agents 2>/dev/null || true
+docker compose stop agents agents-llama 2>/dev/null || true
-docker compose up -d agents
+docker compose up -d agents agents-llama
 log "Agent containers restarted"
 
 # ── Done ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

formulas/release.toml

@@ -189,10 +189,10 @@ Restart agent containers to use the new image.
    - docker compose pull agents
 
 2. Stop and remove existing agent containers:
-   - docker compose down agents
+   - docker compose down agents agents-llama 2>/dev/null || true
 
 3. Start agents with new image:
-   - docker compose up -d agents
+   - docker compose up -d agents agents-llama
 
 4. Wait for containers to be healthy:
    - for i in {1..30}; do
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Restart agent containers to use the new image.
    - done
 
 5. Verify containers are running:
-   - docker compose ps agents
+   - docker compose ps agents agents-llama
 
 6. Log restart:
    - echo "Restarted agents containers"

gardener/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Gardener Agent
 
 **Role**: Backlog grooming — detect duplicate issues, missing acceptance

gardener/pending-actions.json

@@ -1,117 +1,7 @@
 [
   {
     "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 900,
+    "issue": 835,
-    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #897.\n\n## Problem\n\nThe policy at `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` grants:\n\n```hcl\npath \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n```\n\nBut the consul-template stanza in `nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl` reads:\n\n```\n{{- with secret \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\" -}}\n```\n\nVault glob `/*` requires at least one path segment after `forgejo/` (e.g. `forgejo/subkey`). It does **not** match the bare path `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo` that the template actually calls. Vault ACL longest-prefix matching: `forgejo/*` is never hit for a request to `forgejo`.\n\nRuntime consequence: consul-template `with` block receives a 403 permission denied → evaluates to empty (false) → `else` branch renders `seed-me` placeholder values → Forgejo starts with obviously-wrong secrets despite `vault-seed-forgejo.sh` having run successfully.\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the glob with an exact path in `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl`:\n\n```hcl\npath \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\npath \"kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"list\", \"read\"]\n}\n```\n\n(The `/*` glob is only useful if future subkeys are written under `forgejo/`; the current design stores both secrets in a single KV document at the `forgejo` path.)\n\nThis is a pre-existing defect in `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl`; that file was not changed by PR #897.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review*\n\n## Affected files\n- `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` — replace glob path with exact path + metadata path\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` grants exact path `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo` (not `forgejo/*`)\n- [ ] Metadata path `kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo` is also granted read+list\n- [ ] consul-template `with secret \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\"` resolves without 403 (verified via `vault policy read service-forgejo`)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean (no shell changes expected)\n"
+    "body": "Bugfix for S0.1 (#821). Discovered during Step 0 end-to-end verification on a fresh LXC.\n\n## Symptom\n\n```\n$ ./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad --empty\nError: --empty is only valid with --backend=nomad\n```\n\nThe error is nonsensical — `--backend=nomad` is right there.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`bin/disinto` → `disinto_init` (around line 710) consumes the first positional arg as `repo_url` **before** the argparse `while` loop runs:\n\n```bash\ndisinto_init() {\n  local repo_url=\"${1:-}\"\n  if [ -z \"$repo_url\" ]; then\n    echo \"Error: repo URL required\" >&2\n    ...\n  fi\n  shift\n  # ... then while-loop parses flags ...\n}\n```\n\nSo `disinto init --backend=nomad --empty` becomes:\n- `repo_url = \"--backend=nomad\"` (swallowed)\n- `--empty` seen by loop → `empty=true`\n- `backend` stays at default `\"docker\"`\n- Validation at line 747: `empty=true && backend != \"nomad\"` → error\n\n## Why repo_url is wrong for nomad\n\nFor `--backend=nomad`, the cluster-up flow doesn't clone anything — the LXC already has the repo cloned by the operator. `repo_url` is a docker-backend concept.\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `disinto_init`, move backend detection to **before** the `repo_url` consumption, and make `repo_url` conditional on `backend=docker`:\n\n```bash\ndisinto_init() {\n  # Pre-scan for --backend to know whether repo_url is required\n  local backend=\"docker\"\n  for arg in \"$@\"; do\n    case \"$arg\" in\n      --backend) ;;                           # handled below\n      --backend=*) backend=\"${arg#--backend=}\" ;;\n    esac\n  done\n  # Also handle space-separated form\n  local i=1\n  while [ $i -le $# ]; do\n    if [ \"${!i}\" = \"--backend\" ]; then\n      i=$((i+1))\n      backend=\"${!i}\"\n    fi\n    i=$((i+1))\n  done\n\n  local repo_url=\"\"\n  if [ \"$backend\" = \"docker\" ]; then\n    repo_url=\"${1:-}\"\n    if [ -z \"$repo_url\" ] || [[ \"$repo_url\" == --* ]]; then\n      echo \"Error: repo URL required for docker backend\" >&2\n      echo \"Usage: disinto init <repo-url> [options]\" >&2\n      exit 1\n    fi\n    shift\n  fi\n  # ... rest of argparse unchanged, it re-reads --backend cleanly\n```\n\nSimpler alternative: if first arg starts with `--`, assume no positional and skip repo_url consumption entirely (covers nomad + any future `--help`-style invocation).\n\nEither shape is fine; pick the cleaner one.\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad --empty` runs `lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` without error on a clean LXC.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run` prints the 9-step plan and exits 0.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init <repo-url>` (docker path) behaves identically to today — existing smoke path passes.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init` (no args, docker implied) still errors with the \"repo URL required\" message.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init --backend=docker` (no repo) errors helpfully — not \"Unknown option: --backend=docker\".\n- [ ] shellcheck clean.\n\n## Verified regression case from Step 0 testing\n\nOn a fresh Ubuntu 24.04 LXC, after `./lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` was invoked directly (workaround), the cluster came up healthy end-to-end:\n\n- Nomad node status: 1 node ready\n- Vault status: Sealed=false, Initialized=true\n- Re-run of cluster-up.sh was fully idempotent\n\nSo the bug is isolated to `bin/disinto` argparse; the rest of the Step 0 code path is solid. This fix unblocks the formal Step 0 acceptance test.\n\n## Labels / meta\n\n- `[nomad-step-0] S0.1-fix` — no dependencies; gates Step 1.\n\n## Affected files\n\n- `bin/disinto` — `disinto_init()` function, around line 710: pre-scan for `--backend` before consuming `repo_url` positional argument\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 900,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 898,
-    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #889.\n\n## Problem\n\n`tools/vault-import.sh` serializes each entry in `ops_data` as `\"${source_value}|${status}\"` (line 498). Extraction at lines 510-511 uses `${data%%|*}` (first field) and `${data##*|}` (last field). If `source_value` contains a literal `|`, `${data%%|*}` truncates it to the first segment, silently writing a corrupted value to Vault.\n\nThe same separator is used in `paths_to_write` (line 519) to join multiple kv-pairs for a path. When `IFS=\"|\"` splits the string back into an array (line 540), a value containing `|` is split across array elements, corrupting the write.\n\n## Failure mode\n\nAny secret value with a pipe character (e.g. a generated password or composed token like `abc|xyz`) is silently truncated or misrouted on import. No error is emitted.\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the `|`-delimited string with a bash indexed array for accumulating per-path kv pairs, eliminating the need for a delimiter that conflicts with possible value characters.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #889*\n\n## Affected files\n- `tools/vault-import.sh` — replace pipe-delimited string accumulation with bash indexed arrays (lines ~498–540)\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] A secret value containing `|` (e.g. `abc|xyz`) is imported to Vault without truncation or corruption\n- [ ] No regression for values without `|`\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 898,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 893,
-    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #892.\n\n## Problem\n\n`disinto init --build` generates the `agents:` service by first emitting `image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}` and then running a `sed -i` substitution (`lib/generators.sh:793`) that replaces the `image:` line with a `build:` block. The substitution does not add `pull_policy: build`.\n\nResult: `docker compose up` with `--build`-generated compose files still uses the cached image for the base `agents:` service, even when `docker/agents/` source has changed — the same silent-stale-image bug that #887 fixed for the three local-model service stanzas.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe `sed` substitution on line 793 should also inject `pull_policy: build` after the emitted `build:` block.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #892*\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` (line ~793) — add `pull_policy: build` to the agents service sed substitution\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `disinto init --build`-generated compose file includes `pull_policy: build` in the `agents:` service stanza\n- [ ] `docker compose up` rebuilds the agents image from local source when `docker/agents/` changes\n- [ ] Non-`--build` compose generation is unchanged\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 893,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 890,
-    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #888.\n\n## Problem\n\n`lib/hvault.sh` functions `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, and `hvault_kv_list` all hardcode `secret/data/` and `secret/metadata/` as KV v2 path prefixes (lines 117, 157, 173).\n\nThe Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, #879) establishes `kv/` as the mount name for all factory secrets — every policy in `vault/policies/*.hcl` grants ACL on `kv/data/disinto/...` paths.\n\nIf any agent calls `hvault_kv_get` after the migration, Vault will route the request to `secret/data/...` but the token only holds ACL for `kv/data/...`, producing a 403 Forbidden.\n\n## Fix\n\nChange the mount prefix in `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, and `hvault_kv_list` from `secret/` to `kv/`, or make the mount name configurable via `VAULT_KV_MOUNT` (defaulting to `kv`). Coordinate with S2.2 (#880) which writes secrets into the `kv/` mount.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #888*\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/hvault.sh` — change `secret/data/` and `secret/metadata/` prefixes to `kv/data/` and `kv/metadata/` (lines ~117, 157, 173); optionally make configurable via `VAULT_KV_MOUNT`\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, `hvault_kv_list` use `kv/` mount prefix (not `secret/`)\n- [ ] Agents can read/write KV paths that policies in `vault/policies/*.hcl` grant (no 403)\n- [ ] Optionally: `VAULT_KV_MOUNT` env var overrides the mount name (defaults to `kv`)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 890,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 877,
-    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #875.\n\n## Problem\n\n`validate_projects_dir()` in `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` uses a command substitution that triggers `set -e` before the intended error-logging branch runs:\n\n```bash\ntoml_count=$(compgen -G \"${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml\" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)\n```\n\nWhen no `.toml` files are present, `compgen -G` exits 1. With `pipefail`, the pipeline exits 1. `set -e` causes the script to exit before `if [ \"$toml_count\" -eq 0 ]` is evaluated, so the FATAL diagnostic messages are never printed. The container still fast-fails (correct outcome), but the operator sees no explanation.\n\nEvery other `compgen -G` usage in the file uses the safer conditional pattern (lines 259, 322).\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the `wc -l` pattern with:\n\n```bash\nif ! compgen -G \"${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml\" >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n  log \"FATAL: No real .toml files found in ${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/\"\n  ...\n  exit 1\nfi\n```\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review*\n\n## Affected files\n- `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` — fix `validate_projects_dir()` to use conditional compgen pattern instead of `wc -l` pipeline\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] When no `.toml` files are present, the FATAL message is printed before the container exits\n- [ ] Container still exits non-zero in that case\n- [ ] Matches the pattern already used at lines 259 and 322\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 877,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 773,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 883,
-    "body": "Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. **Step 2 — Vault policies + workload identity + secrets import.**\n\n~~**Blocked by: #880 (S2.2), #881 (S2.3).**~~ Dependencies closed; unblocked.\n\n## Goal\n\nWire the Step-2 building blocks (import, auth, policies) into `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` so a single command on a fresh LXC provisions cluster + policies + auth + imports secrets + deploys services.\n\n## Scope\n\nAdd flags to `disinto init --backend=nomad`:\n\n- `--import-env PATH` — points at an existing `.env` (from old stack).\n- `--import-sops PATH` — points at the sops-encrypted `.env.vault.enc`.\n- `--age-key PATH` — points at the sops age keyfile (required if `--import-sops` is set).\n\nFlow when any of `--import-*` is set:\n\n1. `cluster-up.sh` (Step 0, unchanged).\n2. `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (S2.1, idempotent).\n3. `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` (S2.3, idempotent).\n4. `tools/vault-import.sh --env PATH --sops PATH --age-key PATH` (S2.2).\n5. If `--with <service>` was also passed, `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh <service>` (Step 1, unchanged).\n6. Final summary: cluster + policies + auth + imported secrets count + deployed services + ports.\n\nFlow when **no** import flags are set:\n- Skip step 4; still apply policies + auth.\n- Log: `[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services`.\n\nFlag validation:\n- `--import-sops` without `--age-key` → error.\n- `--age-key` without `--import-sops` → error.\n- `--import-env` alone (no sops) → OK.\n- `--backend=docker` + any `--import-*` → error.\n\n## Affected files\n- `bin/disinto` — add `--import-env`, `--import-sops`, `--age-key` flags to `init --backend=nomad`\n- `docs/nomad-migration.md` (new) — cutover-day invocation shape\n- `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` (S2.3) — called as step 3\n- `tools/vault-import.sh` (S2.2) — called as step 4\n- `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (S2.1) — called as step 2\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --with forgejo` completes: cluster up, policies applied, JWT auth configured, KV populated, Forgejo deployed reading Vault secrets\n- [ ] Re-running is a no-op at every layer\n- [ ] `--import-sops` without `--age-key` exits with a clear error\n- [ ] `--backend=docker` with `--import-env` exits with a clear error\n- [ ] `--dry-run` prints the full plan, touches nothing\n- [ ] Never logs a secret value\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "remove_label",
-    "issue": 883,
-    "label": "blocked"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 883,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 884,
-    "body": "Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. **Step 2 — Vault policies + workload identity + secrets import.**\n\nS2.1 (#879) is now closed; this step has no blocking dependencies.\n\n## Goal\n\nExtend the Woodpecker CI to validate Vault policy HCL files under `vault/policies/` and role definitions.\n\n## Scope\n\nExtend `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`:\n\n- `vault policy fmt -check vault/policies/*.hcl` — fails on unformatted HCL.\n- `for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do vault policy validate \"$f\"; done` — syntax + semantic validation (requires a dev-mode vault spun inline).\n- If `vault/roles.yaml` exists: yamllint check + custom validator that each role references a policy file that actually exists in `vault/policies/`.\n- Secret-scan gate: ensure no policy file contains what looks like a literal secret.\n- Trigger: on any PR touching `vault/policies/`, `vault/roles.yaml`, or `lib/init/nomad/vault-*.sh`.\n\nAlso:\n- Add `vault/policies/AGENTS.md` cross-reference: policy lifecycle (add policy HCL → update roles.yaml → add Vault KV path), what CI enforces, common failure modes.\n\n## Non-goals\n\n- No runtime check against a real cluster.\n- No enforcement of specific naming conventions beyond what S2.1 docs describe.\n\n## Affected files\n- `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — add vault policy fmt + validate + roles.yaml gates\n- `vault/policies/AGENTS.md` (new) — policy lifecycle documentation\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] Deliberately broken policy HCL (typo in `path` block) fails CI with the vault-fmt error\n- [ ] Policy that references a non-existent capability (e.g. `\"frobnicate\"`) fails validation\n- [ ] `vault/roles.yaml` referencing a policy not in `vault/policies/` fails CI\n- [ ] Clean PRs pass within normal pipeline time budget\n- [ ] Existing S0.5 + S1.4 CI gates unaffected\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean on any shell added\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "remove_label",
-    "issue": 884,
-    "label": "blocked"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 884,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 846,
-    "body": "## Problem\n\nLlama-backed sidecar agents can be activated through two different mechanisms:\n\n1. **Legacy:** `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` env flag toggles a hardcoded `agents-llama` service block in `docker-compose.yml`.\n2. **Modern:** `[agents.X]` TOML block consumed by `hire-an-agent`, emitting a service per block.\n\nNeither the docs nor the CLI explain which path wins. Setting both produces a YAML `mapping key \"agents-llama\" already defined` error from compose because the service block is duplicated.\n\n## Sub-symptom: env-var naming collision\n\nThe two paths key secrets differently:\n\n- Legacy: `FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA`, `FORGE_PASS_LLAMA`.\n- Modern: `FORGE_TOKEN_<FORGE_USER_UPPER>` — e.g. `FORGE_TOKEN_DEV_QWEN`.\n\nA user migrating between paths ends up with two sets of secrets in `.env`, neither cleanly mapped to the currently-active service block. Silent auth failures (401 from Forgejo) follow.\n\n## Proposal\n\n- Pick the TOML `[agents.X]` path as canonical.\n- Remove the `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` branch and its hardcoded service block from the generator.\n- Detection of `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` in `.env` at `disinto up` time: hard-fail immediately with a migration message (option (a) — simpler, no external consumers depend on this flag).\n\n~~Dependencies: #845, #847~~ — both now closed; unblocked.\n\nRelated: #845, #847.\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` — remove `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` branch and hardcoded `agents-llama:` service block\n- `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` — detect `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` in env, emit migration error\n- `.env.example` — remove `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT`\n- `docs/agents-llama.md` — update to document TOML `[agents.X]` as the one canonical path\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] One documented activation path: TOML `[agents.X]` block\n- [ ] `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` removed from compose generator; presence in `.env` at startup triggers a clear migration error naming the replacement\n- [ ] `.env.example` and `docs/agents-llama.md` updated\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "remove_label",
-    "issue": 846,
-    "label": "blocked"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 846,
-    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 850,
-    "body": "## Problem\n\nWhen the compose generator emits the same service name twice — e.g. both the legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` branch and a matching `[agents.llama]` TOML block produce an `agents-llama:` key — the failure is deferred all the way to `docker compose` YAML parsing:\n\n```\nfailed to parse /home/johba/disinto/docker-compose.yml: yaml: construct errors:\n  line 4: line 431: mapping key \"agents-llama\" already defined at line 155\n```\n\nBy then, the user has already paid the cost of: pre-build binary downloads, generator run, Caddyfile regeneration. The only hint about what went wrong is a line number in a generated file. Root cause (dual activation) is not surfaced.\n\n## Fix\n\nAdd a generate-time guard to `lib/generators.sh`:\n\n- After collecting all service blocks to emit, compare the set of service names against duplicates.\n- If a duplicate is detected, abort with a clear message naming both source of truth (e.g. `\"agents-llama\" emitted twice — from ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 and from [agents.llama] in projects/disinto.toml; remove one`).\n\nEven after #846 resolves (one canonical activation path), this guard remains valuable as a safety net against future regressions or user misconfiguration (e.g. two TOML blocks with same `forge_user`).\n\n## Prior art: PR #872 (closed, branch `fix/issue-850` retained)\n\ndev-qwen's first attempt (`db009e3`) landed the dup-detection logic in `lib/generators.sh` correctly (unit test `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` passes all 3 cases), but the smoke test fails on CI.\n\n**Why the smoke test fails:** sections 1-7 of `smoke-init.sh` already run `bin/disinto init`, materializing `docker-compose.yml`. Section 8 re-invokes `bin/disinto init` to verify the dup guard fires — but `_generate_compose_impl` early-returns with `\"Compose: already exists, skipping\"` before reaching the dup-check.\n\n**Suggested fix:** in `tests/smoke-init.sh` section 8 (around line 452, before the second `bin/disinto init` invocation), add:\n\n```bash\nrm -f \"${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml\"\n```\n\nso the generator actually runs and the dup-detection path is exercised. Do **not** hoist the dup-check above the early-return.\n\nThe branch `fix/issue-850` is preserved as a starting point — pick up from `db009e3` and patch the smoke-test cleanup.\n\nRelated: #846.\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` — duplicate service name check after collecting all service blocks\n- `tests/smoke-init.sh` — section 8: add `rm -f docker-compose.yml` before second `disinto init`\n- `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` (likely already correct from prior art)\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] Running `disinto up` with a known duplicate activation produces a clear generator-time error naming both conflicting sources\n- [ ] Exit code non-zero before `docker compose` is invoked\n- [ ] Smoke test section 8 passes on CI (dup guard is actually exercised)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "remove_label",
-    "issue": 850,
-    "label": "blocked"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 850,
-    "label": "backlog"
   }
 ]

lib/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Shared Helpers (`lib/`)
 
 All agents source `lib/env.sh` as their first action. Additional helpers are
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ sourced as needed.
 | `lib/sprint-filer.sh` | Post-merge sub-issue filer for sprint PRs. Invoked by the `.woodpecker/ops-filer.yml` pipeline after a sprint PR merges to ops repo `main`. Parses `<!-- filer:begin --> ... <!-- filer:end -->` blocks from sprint PR bodies to extract sub-issue definitions, creates them on the project repo using `FORGE_FILER_TOKEN` (narrow-scope `filer-bot` identity with `issues:write` only), adds `in-progress` label to the parent vision issue, and handles vision lifecycle closure when all sub-issues are closed. Uses `filer_api_all()` for paginated fetches. Idempotent: uses `<!-- decomposed-from: #<vision>, sprint: <slug>, id: <id> -->` markers to skip already-filed issues. Requires `FORGE_FILER_TOKEN`, `FORGE_API`, `FORGE_API_BASE`, `FORGE_OPS_REPO`. | `.woodpecker/ops-filer.yml` (CI pipeline on ops repo) |
 | `lib/hire-agent.sh` | `disinto_hire_an_agent()` — user creation, `.profile` repo setup, formula copying, branch protection, and state marker creation for hiring a new agent. Requires `FORGE_URL`, `FORGE_TOKEN`, `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PROJECT_NAME`. Extracted from `bin/disinto`. | bin/disinto (hire) |
 | `lib/release.sh` | `disinto_release()` — vault TOML creation, branch setup on ops repo, PR creation, and auto-merge request for a versioned release. `_assert_release_globals()` validates required env vars. Requires `FORGE_URL`, `FORGE_TOKEN`, `FORGE_OPS_REPO`, `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PRIMARY_BRANCH`. Extracted from `bin/disinto`. | bin/disinto (release) |
-| `lib/hvault.sh` | HashiCorp Vault helper module. `hvault_kv_get(PATH, [KEY])` — read KV v2 secret, optionally extract one key. `hvault_kv_put(PATH, KEY=VAL ...)` — write KV v2 secret. `hvault_kv_list(PATH)` — list keys at a KV path. `hvault_get_or_empty(PATH)` — GET /v1/PATH; 200→raw body, 404→empty, else structured error + return 1 (used by sync scripts to distinguish "absent, create" from hard failure without tripping errexit, #881). `hvault_policy_apply(NAME, FILE)` — idempotent policy upsert. `hvault_jwt_login(ROLE, JWT)` — exchange JWT for short-lived token. `hvault_token_lookup()` — returns TTL/policies/accessor for current token. All functions use `VAULT_ADDR` + `VAULT_TOKEN` from env (fallback: `/etc/vault.d/root.token`), emit structured JSON errors to stderr on failure. Tests: `tests/lib-hvault.bats` (requires `vault server -dev`). | `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh`, `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` |
+| `lib/hvault.sh` | HashiCorp Vault helper module. `hvault_kv_get(PATH, [KEY])` — read KV v2 secret, optionally extract one key. `hvault_kv_put(PATH, KEY=VAL ...)` — write KV v2 secret. `hvault_kv_list(PATH)` — list keys at a KV path. `hvault_policy_apply(NAME, FILE)` — idempotent policy upsert. `hvault_jwt_login(ROLE, JWT)` — exchange JWT for short-lived token. `hvault_token_lookup()` — returns TTL/policies/accessor for current token. All functions use `VAULT_ADDR` + `VAULT_TOKEN` from env (fallback: `/etc/vault.d/root.token`), emit structured JSON errors to stderr on failure. Tests: `tests/lib-hvault.bats` (requires `vault server -dev`). | Not sourced at runtime yet — pure scaffolding for Nomad+Vault migration (#799) |
-| `lib/init/nomad/` | Nomad+Vault installer scripts. `cluster-up.sh` — idempotent Step-0 orchestrator that runs all steps in order (installs packages, writes HCL, enables systemd units, unseals Vault); uses `poll_until_healthy()` helper for deduped readiness polling. `install.sh` — installs pinned Nomad+Vault apt packages. `vault-init.sh` — initializes Vault (unseal keys → `/etc/vault.d/`), creates dev-persisted unseal unit. `lib-systemd.sh` — shared systemd unit helpers. `systemd-nomad.sh`, `systemd-vault.sh` — write and enable service units. `vault-nomad-auth.sh` — Step-2 script that enables Vault's JWT auth at path `jwt-nomad`, writes the JWKS/algs config pointing at Nomad's workload-identity signer, delegates role sync to `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, installs `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl`, and SIGHUPs `nomad.service` if the file changed (#881). Idempotent: each step checks current state before acting. Sourced and called by `cluster-up.sh`; not sourced by agents. | `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` |
+| `lib/init/nomad/` | Nomad+Vault Step 0 installer scripts. `cluster-up.sh` — idempotent orchestrator that runs all steps in order (installs packages, writes HCL, enables systemd units, unseals Vault); uses `poll_until_healthy()` helper for deduped readiness polling. `install.sh` — installs pinned Nomad+Vault apt packages. `vault-init.sh` — initializes Vault (unseal keys → `/etc/vault.d/`), creates dev-persisted unseal unit. `lib-systemd.sh` — shared systemd unit helpers. `systemd-nomad.sh`, `systemd-vault.sh` — write and enable service units. Idempotent: each step checks current state before acting. Sourced and called by `cluster-up.sh`; not sourced by agents. | `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` |

lib/action-vault.sh

@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ vault_request() {
   # Validate TOML content
   local tmp_toml
   tmp_toml=$(mktemp /tmp/vault-XXXXXX.toml)
+  trap 'rm -f "$tmp_toml"' RETURN
 
   printf '%s' "$toml_content" > "$tmp_toml"
 
@@ -135,7 +136,6 @@ vault_request() {
   local vault_env="${FACTORY_ROOT:-$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)}/action-vault/vault-env.sh"
   if [ ! -f "$vault_env" ]; then
     echo "ERROR: vault-env.sh not found at $vault_env" >&2
-    rm -f "$tmp_toml"
     return 1
   fi
 
@@ -145,15 +145,11 @@ vault_request() {
   if ! source "$vault_env"; then
     FORGE_TOKEN="${_saved_forge_token:-}"
     echo "ERROR: failed to source vault-env.sh" >&2
-    rm -f "$tmp_toml"
     return 1
   fi
   # Restore caller's FORGE_TOKEN after validation
   FORGE_TOKEN="${_saved_forge_token:-}"
 
-  # Set trap AFTER sourcing vault-env.sh to avoid RETURN trap firing during source
-  trap 'rm -f "$tmp_toml"' RETURN
-
   # Run validation
   if ! validate_vault_action "$tmp_toml"; then
     echo "ERROR: TOML validation failed" >&2

lib/forge-setup.sh

@@ -356,6 +356,16 @@ setup_forge() {
     [predictor-bot]="FORGE_PREDICTOR_PASS"
     [architect-bot]="FORGE_ARCHITECT_PASS"
   )
+  # Llama bot users (local-model agents) — separate from main agents
+  # Each llama agent gets its own Forgejo user, token, and password
+  local -A llama_token_vars=(
+    [dev-qwen]="FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA"
+    [dev-qwen-nightly]="FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA_NIGHTLY"
+  )
+  local -A llama_pass_vars=(
+    [dev-qwen]="FORGE_PASS_LLAMA"
+    [dev-qwen-nightly]="FORGE_PASS_LLAMA_NIGHTLY"
+  )
 
   local bot_user bot_pass token token_var pass_var
 
@@ -505,12 +515,159 @@ setup_forge() {
     fi
   done
 
+  # Create llama bot users and tokens (local-model agents)
+  # These are separate from the main agents and get their own credentials
+  echo ""
+  echo "── Setting up llama bot users ────────────────────────────"
+
+  local llama_user llama_pass llama_token llama_token_var llama_pass_var
+  for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
+    llama_token_var="${llama_token_vars[$llama_user]}"
+    llama_pass_var="${llama_pass_vars[$llama_user]}"
+
+    # Check if token already exists in .env
+    local token_exists=false
+    if _token_exists_in_env "$llama_token_var" "$env_file"; then
+      token_exists=true
+    fi
+
+    # Check if password already exists in .env
+    local pass_exists=false
+    if _pass_exists_in_env "$llama_pass_var" "$env_file"; then
+      pass_exists=true
+    fi
+
+    # Check if llama bot user exists on Forgejo
+    local llama_user_exists=false
+    if curl -sf --max-time 5 \
+      -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token}" \
+      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      llama_user_exists=true
+    fi
+
+    # Skip token/password regeneration if both exist in .env and not forcing rotation
+    if [ "$token_exists" = true ] && [ "$pass_exists" = true ] && [ "$rotate_tokens" = false ]; then
+      echo "  ${llama_user} token and password preserved (use --rotate-tokens to force)"
+      # Still export the existing token for use within this run
+      local existing_token existing_pass
+      existing_token=$(grep "^${llama_token_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
+      existing_pass=$(grep "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
+      export "${llama_token_var}=${existing_token}"
+      export "${llama_pass_var}=${existing_pass}"
+      continue
+    fi
+
+    # Generate new credentials if:
+    # - Token doesn't exist (first run)
+    # - Password doesn't exist (first run)
+    # - --rotate-tokens flag is set (explicit rotation)
+    if [ "$llama_user_exists" = false ]; then
+      # User doesn't exist - create it
+      llama_pass="llama-$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | head -c 20)"
+      echo "Creating llama bot user: ${llama_user}"
+      local create_output
+      if ! create_output=$(_forgejo_exec forgejo admin user create \
+        --username "${llama_user}" \
+        --password "${llama_pass}" \
+        --email "${llama_user}@disinto.local" \
+        --must-change-password=false 2>&1); then
+        echo "Error: failed to create llama bot user '${llama_user}':" >&2
+        echo "  ${create_output}" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      # Forgejo 11.x ignores --must-change-password=false on create;
+      # explicitly clear the flag so basic-auth token creation works.
+      _forgejo_exec forgejo admin user change-password \
+        --username "${llama_user}" \
+        --password "${llama_pass}" \
+        --must-change-password=false
+
+      # Verify llama bot user was actually created
+      if ! curl -sf --max-time 5 \
+        -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token}" \
+        "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "Error: llama bot user '${llama_user}' not found after creation" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      echo "  ${llama_user} user created"
+    else
+      # User exists - reset password if needed
+      echo "  ${llama_user} user exists"
+      if [ "$rotate_tokens" = true ] || [ "$pass_exists" = false ]; then
+        llama_pass="llama-$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | head -c 20)"
+        _forgejo_exec forgejo admin user change-password \
+          --username "${llama_user}" \
+          --password "${llama_pass}" \
+          --must-change-password=false || {
+          echo "Error: failed to reset password for existing llama bot user '${llama_user}'" >&2
+          exit 1
+        }
+        echo "  ${llama_user} password reset for token generation"
+      else
+        # Password exists, get it from .env
+        llama_pass=$(grep "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    # Generate token via API (basic auth as the llama user)
+    # First, delete any existing tokens to avoid name collision
+    local existing_llama_token_ids
+    existing_llama_token_ids=$(curl -sf \
+      -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
+      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens" 2>/dev/null \
+      | jq -r '.[].id // empty' 2>/dev/null) || existing_llama_token_ids=""
+
+    # Delete any existing tokens for this user
+    if [ -n "$existing_llama_token_ids" ]; then
+      while IFS= read -r tid; do
+        [ -n "$tid" ] && curl -sf -X DELETE \
+          -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
+          "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens/${tid}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+      done <<< "$existing_llama_token_ids"
+    fi
+
+    llama_token=$(curl -sf -X POST \
+      -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
+      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens" \
+      -d "{\"name\":\"disinto-${llama_user}-token\",\"scopes\":[\"all\"]}" 2>/dev/null \
+      | jq -r '.sha1 // empty') || llama_token=""
+
+    if [ -z "$llama_token" ]; then
+      echo "Error: failed to create API token for '${llama_user}'" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+
+    # Store token in .env under the llama-specific variable name
+    if grep -q "^${llama_token_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+      sed -i "s|^${llama_token_var}=.*|${llama_token_var}=${llama_token}|" "$env_file"
+    else
+      printf '%s=%s\n' "$llama_token_var" "$llama_token" >> "$env_file"
+    fi
+    export "${llama_token_var}=${llama_token}"
+    echo "  ${llama_user} token generated and saved (${llama_token_var})"
+
+    # Store password in .env for git HTTP push (#361)
+    # Forgejo 11.x API tokens don't work for git push; password auth does.
+    if grep -q "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+      sed -i "s|^${llama_pass_var}=.*|${llama_pass_var}=${llama_pass}|" "$env_file"
+    else
+      printf '%s=%s\n' "$llama_pass_var" "$llama_pass" >> "$env_file"
+    fi
+    export "${llama_pass_var}=${llama_pass}"
+    echo "  ${llama_user} password saved (${llama_pass_var})"
+  done
+
   # Create .profile repos for all bot users (if they don't already exist)
   # This runs the same logic as hire-an-agent Step 2-3 for idempotent setup
   echo ""
   echo "── Setting up .profile repos ────────────────────────────"
 
   local -a bot_users=(dev-bot review-bot planner-bot gardener-bot vault-bot supervisor-bot predictor-bot architect-bot)
+  # Add llama bot users to .profile repo creation
+  for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
+    bot_users+=("$llama_user")
+  done
   local bot_user
 
   for bot_user in "${bot_users[@]}"; do
@@ -618,6 +775,15 @@ setup_forge() {
         -d "{\"permission\":\"${bot_perm}\"}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
     done
 
+    # Add llama bot users as write collaborators for local-model agents
+    for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
+      curl -sf -X PUT \
+        -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token:-${FORGE_TOKEN}}" \
+        -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+        "${forge_url}/api/v1/repos/${repo_slug}/collaborators/${llama_user}" \
+        -d '{"permission":"write"}' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    done
+
     # Add disinto-admin as admin collaborator
     curl -sf -X PUT \
       -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token:-${FORGE_TOKEN}}" \

lib/generators.sh

@@ -102,32 +102,12 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
             # so we key the env-var lookup by forge_user (which hire-agent.sh
             # writes as the Forgejo username). Apply the same tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_'
             # convention as hire-agent.sh Gap 1 so the names match.
-            #
-            # NOTE (#845): the emitted block has NO `profiles:` key. The
-            # [agents.<name>] TOML entry is already the activation gate —
-            # its presence is what drives emission here. Profile-gating
-            # the service caused `disinto up` (without COMPOSE_PROFILES)
-            # to treat the hired container as an orphan and silently
-            # remove it via --remove-orphans.
             local user_upper
             user_upper=$(echo "$forge_user" | tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_')
             cat >> "$temp_file" <<EOF
 
   agents-${service_name}:
-    # Local image ref (#853): registry-less name matches what \`disinto init --build\`
+    image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:\${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
-    # and the legacy agents-llama stanza produce. Paired with build: so hosts without
-    # a pre-built image can rebuild locally; ghcr.io/disinto/agents is not publicly
-    # pullable, and emitting that prefix caused \`docker compose up\` to fail with
-    # \`denied\` on every hired agent.
-    build:
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
-    image: disinto/agents:\${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
-    # Rebuild on every up (#887): without this, \`docker compose up -d --force-recreate\`
-    # reuses the cached image and silently keeps running stale docker/agents/ code
-    # even after the repo is updated. \`pull_policy: build\` makes Compose rebuild
-    # the image on every up; BuildKit layer cache makes unchanged rebuilds fast.
-    pull_policy: build
     container_name: disinto-agents-${service_name}
     restart: unless-stopped
     security_opt:
@@ -139,13 +119,9 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
       - \${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-\${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
       - \${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
       - \${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-\${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
-      - ./projects:/home/agent/disinto/projects:ro
-      - ./.env:/home/agent/disinto/.env:ro
-      - ./state:/home/agent/disinto/state
     environment:
       FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
       FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
-      FACTORY_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
       # Per-agent credentials keyed by forge_user (#834 Gap 3).
       FORGE_TOKEN: \${FORGE_TOKEN_${user_upper}:-}
       FORGE_PASS: \${FORGE_PASS_${user_upper}:-}
@@ -166,7 +142,7 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
       PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
       WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
       WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "${wp_repo_id}"
-      FORGE_BOT_USER_${user_upper}: "${forge_user}"
+      FORGE_BOT_USER_${service_name^^}: "${forge_user}"
       POLL_INTERVAL: "${poll_interval_val}"
       GARDENER_INTERVAL: "${GARDENER_INTERVAL:-21600}"
       ARCHITECT_INTERVAL: "${ARCHITECT_INTERVAL:-21600}"
@@ -179,6 +155,7 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
         condition: service_started
     networks:
       - disinto-net
+    profiles: ["agents-${service_name}"]
 
 EOF
             has_services=true
@@ -438,6 +415,130 @@ services:
 
 COMPOSEEOF
 
+  # ── Conditional agents-llama block (ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1) ──────────────
+  # Local-Qwen dev agent — gated on ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT so factories without
+  # a local llama endpoint don't try to start it.  See docs/agents-llama.md.
+  if [ "${ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+    cat >> "$compose_file" <<'LLAMAEOF'
+
+  agents-llama:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
+    container_name: disinto-agents-llama
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    security_opt:
+      - apparmor=unconfined
+    volumes:
+      - agent-data:/home/agent/data
+      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
+      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
+      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
+      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
+      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
+      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
+    environment:
+      FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
+      FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
+      FORGE_TOKEN: ${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_PASS: ${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES: ${FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES:-}
+      WOODPECKER_TOKEN: ${WOODPECKER_TOKEN:-}
+      CLAUDE_TIMEOUT: ${CLAUDE_TIMEOUT:-7200}
+      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC: ${CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC:-1}
+      CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE: "60"
+      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: ${ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL:-}
+      FORGE_ADMIN_PASS: ${FORGE_ADMIN_PASS:-}
+      DISINTO_CONTAINER: "1"
+      PROJECT_NAME: ${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
+      WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "PLACEHOLDER_WP_REPO_ID"
+      CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared/config}
+      POLL_INTERVAL: ${POLL_INTERVAL:-300}
+      AGENT_ROLES: dev
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "pgrep", "-f", "entrypoint.sh"]
+      interval: 60s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3
+      start_period: 30s
+    depends_on:
+      forgejo:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    networks:
+      - disinto-net
+
+  agents-llama-all:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
+    container_name: disinto-agents-llama-all
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    profiles: ["agents-llama-all"]
+    security_opt:
+      - apparmor=unconfined
+    volumes:
+      - agent-data:/home/agent/data
+      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
+      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
+      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
+      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
+      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
+      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
+    environment:
+      FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
+      FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
+      FORGE_TOKEN: ${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_PASS: ${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN: ${FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN: ${FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN: ${FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN: ${FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN: ${FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_FILER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_FILER_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES: ${FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES:-}
+      WOODPECKER_TOKEN: ${WOODPECKER_TOKEN:-}
+      CLAUDE_TIMEOUT: ${CLAUDE_TIMEOUT:-7200}
+      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC: ${CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC:-1}
+      CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE: "60"
+      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_BETAS: "1"
+      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: ${ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL:-}
+      FORGE_ADMIN_PASS: ${FORGE_ADMIN_PASS:-}
+      DISINTO_CONTAINER: "1"
+      PROJECT_NAME: ${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
+      WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "PLACEHOLDER_WP_REPO_ID"
+      CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared/config}
+      POLL_INTERVAL: ${POLL_INTERVAL:-300}
+      GARDENER_INTERVAL: ${GARDENER_INTERVAL:-21600}
+      ARCHITECT_INTERVAL: ${ARCHITECT_INTERVAL:-21600}
+      PLANNER_INTERVAL: ${PLANNER_INTERVAL:-43200}
+      SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL: ${SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL:-1200}
+      AGENT_ROLES: review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "pgrep", "-f", "entrypoint.sh"]
+      interval: 60s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3
+      start_period: 30s
+    depends_on:
+      forgejo:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      woodpecker:
+        condition: service_started
+    networks:
+      - disinto-net
+LLAMAEOF
+  fi
+
   # Resume the rest of the compose file (runner onward)
   cat >> "$compose_file" <<'COMPOSEEOF'
 
@@ -660,7 +761,7 @@ COMPOSEEOF
   # In build mode, replace image: with build: for locally-built images
   if [ "$use_build" = true ]; then
     sed -i 's|^\(  agents:\)|\1|' "$compose_file"
-    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/agents:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/agents:.*|build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile\n    pull_policy: build|}' "$compose_file"
+    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/agents:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/agents:.*|build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile|}' "$compose_file"
     sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/edge:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/edge:.*|build: ./docker/edge|}' "$compose_file"
   fi
 

lib/hire-agent.sh

@@ -30,29 +30,6 @@ disinto_hire_an_agent() {
     echo "Usage: disinto hire-an-agent <agent-name> <role> [--formula <path>] [--local-model <url>] [--model <name>] [--poll-interval <seconds>]" >&2
     exit 1
   fi
-
-  # Validate agent name before any side effects (Forgejo user creation, TOML
-  # write, token issuance). The name flows through several systems that have
-  # stricter rules than the raw TOML spec:
-  #   - load-project.sh emits shell vars keyed by the name (dashes are mapped
-  #     to underscores via tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_')
-  #   - generators.sh emits a docker-compose service name `agents-<name>` and
-  #     uppercases it for env var keys (#852 tracks the `^^` bug; we keep the
-  #     grammar tight here so that fix can happen without re-validation)
-  #   - Forgejo usernames are lowercase alnum + dash
-  # Constraint: start with a lowercase letter, contain only [a-z0-9-], end
-  # with a lowercase letter or digit (no trailing dash), no consecutive
-  # dashes. Rejecting at hire-time prevents unparseable TOML sections like
-  # [agents.dev-qwen2] from landing on disk and crashing load-project.sh on
-  # the next `disinto up` (#862).
-  if ! [[ "$agent_name" =~ ^[a-z]([a-z0-9]|-[a-z0-9])*$ ]]; then
-    echo "Error: invalid agent name '${agent_name}'" >&2
-    echo "  Agent names must match: ^[a-z]([a-z0-9]|-[a-z0-9])*$" >&2
-    echo "  (lowercase letters/digits/single dashes, starts with letter, ends with alphanumeric)" >&2
-    echo "  Examples: dev, dev-qwen2, review-qwen, planner" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-
   shift 2
 
   # Parse flags
@@ -252,46 +229,6 @@ disinto_hire_an_agent() {
     export "${pass_var}=${user_pass}"
   fi
 
-  # Step 1.7: Write backend credentials to .env (#847).
-  # Local-model agents need ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL; Anthropic-backend agents need ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.
-  # These must be persisted so the container can start with valid credentials.
-  echo ""
-  echo "Step 1.7: Writing backend credentials to .env..."
-
-  if [ -n "$local_model" ]; then
-    # Local model agent: write ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL
-    local backend_var="ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"
-    local backend_val="$local_model"
-    local escaped_val
-    escaped_val=$(printf '%s\n' "$backend_val" | sed 's/[&/\]/\\&/g')
-    if grep -q "^${backend_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
-      sed -i "s|^${backend_var}=.*|${backend_var}=${escaped_val}|" "$env_file"
-      echo "  ${backend_var} updated"
-    else
-      printf '%s=%s\n' "$backend_var" "$backend_val" >> "$env_file"
-      echo "  ${backend_var} saved"
-    fi
-    export "${backend_var}=${backend_val}"
-  else
-    # Anthropic backend: check if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is set, write it if present
-    if [ -n "${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}" ]; then
-      local backend_var="ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"
-      local backend_val="$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"
-      local escaped_key
-      escaped_key=$(printf '%s\n' "$backend_val" | sed 's/[&/\]/\\&/g')
-      if grep -q "^${backend_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
-        sed -i "s|^${backend_var}=.*|${backend_var}=${escaped_key}|" "$env_file"
-        echo "  ${backend_var} updated"
-      else
-        printf '%s=%s\n' "$backend_var" "$backend_val" >> "$env_file"
-        echo "  ${backend_var} saved"
-      fi
-      export "${backend_var}=${backend_val}"
-    else
-      echo "  Note: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY not set — required for Anthropic backend agents"
-    fi
-  fi
-
   # Step 1.6: Add the new agent as a write collaborator on the project repo (#856).
   # Without this, PATCH /issues/{n} {assignees:[agent]} returns 403 Forbidden and
   # the dev-agent polls forever logging "claim lost to <none> — skipping" (see
@@ -535,10 +472,7 @@ EOF
     local interval="${poll_interval:-60}"
     echo "  Writing [agents.${section_name}] to ${toml_file}..."
     python3 -c '
-import sys
+import sys, re, pathlib
-import tomlkit
-import re
-import pathlib
 
 toml_path = sys.argv[1]
 section_name = sys.argv[2]
@@ -551,39 +485,38 @@ poll_interval = sys.argv[7]
 p = pathlib.Path(toml_path)
 text = p.read_text()
 
-# Step 1: Remove any commented-out [agents.X] blocks (they cause parse issues)
+# Build the new section
-# Match # [agents.section_name] followed by lines that are not section headers
+new_section = f"""
-# Use negative lookahead to stop before a real section header (# [ or [)
+[agents.{section_name}]
-commented_pattern = rf"(?:^|\n)# \[agents\.{re.escape(section_name)}\](?:\n(?!# \[|\[)[^\n]*)*"
+base_url = "{base_url}"
-text = re.sub(commented_pattern, "", text, flags=re.DOTALL)
+model = "{model}"
+api_key = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles = ["{role}"]
+forge_user = "{agent_name}"
+compact_pct = 60
+poll_interval = {poll_interval}
+"""
 
-# Step 2: Parse TOML with tomlkit (preserves comments and formatting)
+# Check if section already exists and replace it
-try:
+pattern = rf"\[agents\.{re.escape(section_name)}\][^\[]*"
-    doc = tomlkit.parse(text)
+if re.search(pattern, text):
-except Exception as e:
+    text = re.sub(pattern, new_section.strip() + "\n", text)
-    print(f"Error: Invalid TOML in {toml_path}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+else:
-    sys.exit(1)
+    # Remove commented-out example [agents.llama] block if present
+    text = re.sub(
+        r"\n# Local-model agents \(optional\).*?(?=\n# \[mirrors\]|\n\[mirrors\]|\Z)",
+        "",
+        text,
+        flags=re.DOTALL,
+    )
+    # Append before [mirrors] if it exists, otherwise at end
+    mirrors_match = re.search(r"\n(# )?\[mirrors\]", text)
+    if mirrors_match:
+        text = text[:mirrors_match.start()] + "\n" + new_section + text[mirrors_match.start():]
+    else:
+        text = text.rstrip() + "\n" + new_section
 
-# Step 3: Ensure agents table exists
+p.write_text(text)
-if "agents" not in doc:
-    doc.add("agents", tomlkit.table())
-
-# Step 4: Update the specific agent section
-doc["agents"][section_name] = {
-    "base_url": base_url,
-    "model": model,
-    "api_key": "sk-no-key-required",
-    "roles": [role],
-    "forge_user": agent_name,
-    "compact_pct": 60,
-    "poll_interval": int(poll_interval),
-}
-
-# Step 5: Serialize back to TOML (preserves comments)
-output = tomlkit.dumps(doc)
-
-# Step 6: Write back
-p.write_text(output)
 ' "$toml_file" "$section_name" "$local_model" "$model" "$agent_name" "$role" "$interval"
 
     echo "  Agent config written to TOML"
@@ -611,7 +544,7 @@ p.write_text(output)
     echo "  Model: ${model}"
     echo ""
     echo "  To start the agent, run:"
-    echo "    disinto up"
+    echo "    docker compose --profile ${service_name} up -d ${service_name}"
   fi
 
   echo ""

lib/hvault.sh

@@ -38,30 +38,6 @@ _hvault_resolve_token() {
   return 1
 }
 
-# _hvault_default_env — set the local-cluster Vault env if unset
-#
-# Idempotent helper used by every Vault-touching script that runs during
-# `disinto init` (S2). On the local-cluster common case, operators (and
-# the init dispatcher in bin/disinto) have not exported VAULT_ADDR or
-# VAULT_TOKEN — the server is reachable on localhost:8200 and the root
-# token lives at /etc/vault.d/root.token. Scripts must Just Work in that
-# shape.
-#
-#   - If VAULT_ADDR is unset, defaults to http://127.0.0.1:8200.
-#   - If VAULT_TOKEN is unset, resolves from /etc/vault.d/root.token via
-#     _hvault_resolve_token. A missing token file is not an error here —
-#     downstream hvault_token_lookup() probes connectivity and emits the
-#     operator-facing "VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN" diagnostic.
-#
-# Centralised to keep the defaulting stanza in one place — copy-pasting
-# the 5-line block into each init script trips the repo-wide 5-line
-# sliding-window duplicate detector (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py).
-_hvault_default_env() {
-  VAULT_ADDR="${VAULT_ADDR:-http://127.0.0.1:8200}"
-  export VAULT_ADDR
-  _hvault_resolve_token || :
-}
-
 # _hvault_check_prereqs — validate VAULT_ADDR and VAULT_TOKEN are set
 # Args: caller function name
 _hvault_check_prereqs() {
@@ -124,11 +100,6 @@ _hvault_request() {
 
 # ── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-# VAULT_KV_MOUNT — KV v2 mount point (default: "kv")
-#   Override with: export VAULT_KV_MOUNT=secret
-#   Used by: hvault_kv_get, hvault_kv_put, hvault_kv_list
-: "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:=kv}"
-
 # hvault_kv_get PATH [KEY]
 #   Read a KV v2 secret at PATH, optionally extract a single KEY.
 #   Outputs: JSON value (full data object, or single key value)
@@ -143,7 +114,7 @@ hvault_kv_get() {
   _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_kv_get" || return 1
 
   local response
-  response="$(_hvault_request GET "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/data/${path}")" || return 1
+  response="$(_hvault_request GET "secret/data/${path}")" || return 1
 
   if [ -n "$key" ]; then
     printf '%s' "$response" | jq -e -r --arg key "$key" '.data.data[$key]' 2>/dev/null || {
@@ -183,7 +154,7 @@ hvault_kv_put() {
     payload="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | jq --arg k "$k" --arg v "$v" '.data[$k] = $v')"
   done
 
-  _hvault_request POST "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/data/${path}" "$payload" >/dev/null
+  _hvault_request POST "secret/data/${path}" "$payload" >/dev/null
 }
 
 # hvault_kv_list PATH
@@ -199,7 +170,7 @@ hvault_kv_list() {
   _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_kv_list" || return 1
 
   local response
-  response="$(_hvault_request LIST "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/metadata/${path}")" || return 1
+  response="$(_hvault_request LIST "secret/metadata/${path}")" || return 1
 
   printf '%s' "$response" | jq -e '.data.keys' 2>/dev/null || {
     _hvault_err "hvault_kv_list" "failed to parse response" "path=$path"
@@ -207,51 +178,6 @@ hvault_kv_list() {
   }
 }
 
-# hvault_get_or_empty PATH
-#   GET /v1/PATH. On 200, prints the raw response body to stdout (caller
-#   parses with jq). On 404, prints nothing and returns 0 — caller treats
-#   the empty string as "resource absent, needs create". Any other HTTP
-#   status is a hard error: response body is logged to stderr as a
-#   structured JSON error and the function returns 1.
-#
-#   Used by the sync scripts (tools/vault-apply-*.sh +
-#   lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh) to read existing policies, roles,
-#   auth-method listings, and per-role configs without triggering errexit
-#   on the expected absent-resource case. `_hvault_request` is not a
-#   substitute — it treats 404 as a hard error, which is correct for
-#   writes but wrong for "does this already exist?" checks.
-#
-#   Subshell + EXIT trap: the RETURN trap does NOT fire on set-e abort,
-#   so tmpfile cleanup from a function-scoped RETURN trap would leak on
-#   jq/curl errors under `set -eo pipefail`. The subshell + EXIT trap
-#   is the reliable cleanup boundary.
-hvault_get_or_empty() {
-  local path="${1:-}"
-
-  if [ -z "$path" ]; then
-    _hvault_err "hvault_get_or_empty" "PATH is required" \
-      "usage: hvault_get_or_empty PATH"
-    return 1
-  fi
-  _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_get_or_empty" || return 1
-
-  (
-    local tmp http_code
-    tmp="$(mktemp)"
-    trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT
-    http_code="$(curl -sS -o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' \
-      -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-      "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/${path}")" \
-      || { _hvault_err "hvault_get_or_empty" "curl failed" "path=$path"; exit 1; }
-    case "$http_code" in
-      2[0-9][0-9]) cat "$tmp" ;;
-      404)         printf '' ;;
-      *)           _hvault_err "hvault_get_or_empty" "HTTP $http_code" "$(cat "$tmp")"
-                   exit 1 ;;
-    esac
-  )
-}
-
 # hvault_policy_apply NAME FILE
 #   Idempotent policy upsert — create or update a Vault policy.
 hvault_policy_apply() {

lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # Wires together the S0.1–S0.3 building blocks into one idempotent
 # "bring up a single-node Nomad+Vault cluster" script:
 #
-#   1. install.sh                  (nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon)
+#   1. install.sh                  (nomad + vault binaries)
 #   2. systemd-nomad.sh            (nomad.service — unit + enable, not started)
 #   3. systemd-vault.sh            (vault.service — unit + vault.hcl + enable)
 #   4. Host-volume dirs            (/srv/disinto/* matching nomad/client.hcl)
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ done
 # ── Dry-run: print step list + exit ──────────────────────────────────────────
 if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
   cat <<EOF
-[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon
+[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries
   → sudo ${INSTALL_SH}
 
 [dry-run] Step 2/9: write + enable nomad.service (NOT started)
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ EOF
 
 [dry-run] Step 7/9: systemctl start vault + poll until unsealed (≤${VAULT_POLL_SECS}s)
 
-[dry-run] Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready + docker driver healthy (≤${NOMAD_POLL_SECS}s each)
+[dry-run] Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready (≤${NOMAD_POLL_SECS}s)
 
 [dry-run] Step 9/9: write ${PROFILE_D_FILE}
   → export VAULT_ADDR=${VAULT_ADDR_DEFAULT}
@@ -210,21 +210,6 @@ nomad_ready_count() {
 # so poll_until_healthy can call it as a single-arg command name.
 nomad_has_ready_node() { [ "$(nomad_ready_count)" -ge 1 ]; }
 
-# nomad_docker_driver_healthy — true iff the nomad self-node reports the
-# docker driver as Detected=true AND Healthy=true. Required by Step-1's
-# forgejo jobspec (the first docker-driver consumer) — without this the
-# node reaches "ready" while docker fingerprinting is still in flight,
-# and the first `nomad job run forgejo` times out with an opaque
-# "missing drivers" placement failure (#871).
-nomad_docker_driver_healthy() {
-  local out detected healthy
-  out="$(NOMAD_ADDR="$NOMAD_ADDR_DEFAULT" nomad node status -self -json 2>/dev/null || true)"
-  [ -n "$out" ] || return 1
-  detected="$(printf '%s' "$out" | jq -r '.Drivers.docker.Detected // false' 2>/dev/null)" || detected=""
-  healthy="$(printf '%s' "$out" | jq -r '.Drivers.docker.Healthy // false' 2>/dev/null)" || healthy=""
-  [ "$detected" = "true" ] && [ "$healthy" = "true" ]
-}
-
 # _die_with_service_status SVC REASON
 #   Log + dump `systemctl status SVC` to stderr + die with REASON. Factored
 #   out so the poll helper doesn't carry three copies of the same dump.
@@ -258,8 +243,8 @@ poll_until_healthy() {
   _die_with_service_status "$svc" "not healthy within ${timeout}s"
 }
 
-# ── Step 1/9: install.sh (nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon) ────────────
+# ── Step 1/9: install.sh (nomad + vault binaries) ────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon ──"
+log "── Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries ──"
 "$INSTALL_SH"
 
 # ── Step 2/9: systemd-nomad.sh (unit + enable, not started) ──────────────────
@@ -311,25 +296,13 @@ else
   poll_until_healthy vault vault_is_unsealed "$VAULT_POLL_SECS"
 fi
 
-# ── Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready + docker up ──
+# ── Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready ───────────────
-log "── Step 8/9: start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready + docker driver healthy ──"
+log "── Step 8/9: start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready ──"
-# Three conditions gate this step:
+if systemctl is-active --quiet nomad && nomad_has_ready_node; then
-#   (a) nomad.service active
+  log "nomad already active + ≥1 node ready — skip start"
-#   (b) ≥1 nomad node in "ready" state
-#   (c) nomad's docker task driver fingerprinted as Detected+Healthy
-# (c) can lag (a)+(b) briefly because driver fingerprinting races with
-# dockerd startup — polling it explicitly prevents Step-1 deploys from
-# hitting "missing drivers" placement failures on a cold-booted host (#871).
-if systemctl is-active --quiet nomad \
-   && nomad_has_ready_node \
-   && nomad_docker_driver_healthy; then
-  log "nomad already active + ≥1 node ready + docker driver healthy — skip start"
 else
-  if ! systemctl is-active --quiet nomad; then
+  systemctl start nomad
-    systemctl start nomad
-  fi
   poll_until_healthy nomad nomad_has_ready_node "$NOMAD_POLL_SECS"
-  poll_until_healthy nomad nomad_docker_driver_healthy "$NOMAD_POLL_SECS"
 fi
 
 # ── Step 9/9: /etc/profile.d/disinto-nomad.sh ────────────────────────────────

lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # =============================================================================
 # lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh — Dependency-ordered Nomad job deploy + wait
 #
-# Runs a list of jobspecs in order, waiting for each to reach healthy state
+# Runs a list of jobspecs in order, waiting for each to reach "running" state
 # before starting the next. Step-1 uses it for forgejo-only; Steps 3–6 extend
 # the job list.
 #
@@ -16,24 +16,22 @@
 # Environment:
 #   REPO_ROOT              — absolute path to repo root (defaults to parent of
 #                            this script's parent directory)
-#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS — poll timeout in seconds (default: 240)
+#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS — poll timeout in seconds (default: 120)
-#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_<JOBNAME> — per-job timeout override (e.g.,
-#                            JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_FORGEJO=300)
 #
 # Exit codes:
-#   0  success (all jobs deployed and healthy, or dry-run completed)
+#   0  success (all jobs deployed and running, or dry-run completed)
 #   1  failure (validation error, timeout, or nomad command failure)
 #
 # Idempotency:
 #   Running twice back-to-back on a healthy cluster is a no-op. Jobs that are
-#   already healthy print "[deploy] <name> already healthy" and continue.
+#   already running print "[deploy] <name> already running" and continue.
 # =============================================================================
 set -euo pipefail
 
 # ── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 SCRIPT_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 REPO_ROOT="${REPO_ROOT:-$(cd "${SCRIPT_ROOT}/../../.." && pwd)}"
-JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS="${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS:-240}"
+JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS="${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS:-120}"
 
 DRY_RUN=0
 
@@ -63,12 +61,11 @@ if [ "${#JOBS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
 fi
 
 # ── Helper: _wait_job_running <name> <timeout> ───────────────────────────────
-# Polls `nomad deployment status -json <deployment-id>` until:
+# Polls `nomad job status -json <name>` until:
-#   - Status == "successful"
+#   - Status == "running", OR
-#   - Status == "failed"
+#   - All allocations are in "running" state
 #
-# On deployment failure: prints last 50 lines of stderr from allocations and exits 1.
+# On timeout: prints last 50 lines of stderr from all allocations and exits 1.
-# On timeout: prints last 50 lines of stderr from allocations and exits 1.
 #
 # This is a named, reusable helper for future init scripts.
 _wait_job_running() {
@@ -76,72 +73,39 @@ _wait_job_running() {
   local timeout="$2"
   local elapsed=0
 
-  log "waiting for job '${job_name}' to become healthy (timeout: ${timeout}s)..."
+  log "waiting for job '${job_name}' to become running (timeout: ${timeout}s)..."
-
-  # Get the latest deployment ID for this job (retry until available)
-  local deployment_id=""
-  local retry_count=0
-  local max_retries=12
-
-  while [ -z "$deployment_id" ] && [ "$retry_count" -lt "$max_retries" ]; do
-    deployment_id=$(nomad job deployments -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.[0].ID' 2>/dev/null) || deployment_id=""
-    if [ -z "$deployment_id" ]; then
-      sleep 5
-      retry_count=$((retry_count + 1))
-    fi
-  done
-
-  if [ -z "$deployment_id" ]; then
-    log "ERROR: no deployment found for job '${job_name}' after ${max_retries} attempts"
-    return 1
-  fi
-
-  log "tracking deployment '${deployment_id}'..."
 
   while [ "$elapsed" -lt "$timeout" ]; do
-    local deploy_status_json
+    local status_json
-    deploy_status_json=$(nomad deployment status -json "$deployment_id" 2>/dev/null) || {
+    status_json=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null) || {
-      # Deployment may not exist yet — keep waiting
+      # Job may not exist yet — keep waiting
       sleep 5
       elapsed=$((elapsed + 5))
       continue
     }
 
     local status
-    status=$(printf '%s' "$deploy_status_json" | jq -r '.Status' 2>/dev/null) || {
+    status=$(printf '%s' "$status_json" | jq -r '.Status' 2>/dev/null) || {
       sleep 5
       elapsed=$((elapsed + 5))
       continue
     }
 
     case "$status" in
-      successful)
+      running)
-        log "${job_name} healthy after ${elapsed}s"
+        log "job '${job_name}' is now running"
         return 0
         ;;
-      failed)
+      complete)
-        log "deployment '${deployment_id}' failed for job '${job_name}'"
+        log "job '${job_name}' reached terminal state: ${status}"
-        log "showing last 50 lines of allocation logs (stderr):"
+        return 0
-
+        ;;
-        # Get allocation IDs from job status
+      dead|failed)
-        local alloc_ids
+        log "job '${job_name}' reached terminal state: ${status}"
-        alloc_ids=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null \
-          | jq -r '.Allocations[]?.ID // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_ids=""
-
-        if [ -n "$alloc_ids" ]; then
-          for alloc_id in $alloc_ids; do
-            log "--- Allocation ${alloc_id} logs (stderr) ---"
-            nomad alloc logs -stderr -short "$alloc_id" 2>/dev/null | tail -50 || true
-          done
-        fi
-
         return 1
         ;;
-      running|progressing)
-        log "deployment '${deployment_id}' status: ${status} (waiting for ${job_name}...)"
-        ;;
       *)
-        log "deployment '${deployment_id}' status: ${status} (waiting for ${job_name}...)"
+        log "job '${job_name}' status: ${status} (waiting...)"
         ;;
     esac
 
@@ -150,13 +114,13 @@ _wait_job_running() {
   done
 
   # Timeout — print last 50 lines of alloc logs
-  log "TIMEOUT: deployment '${deployment_id}' did not reach successful state within ${timeout}s"
+  log "TIMEOUT: job '${job_name}' did not reach running state within ${timeout}s"
   log "showing last 50 lines of allocation logs (stderr):"
 
-  # Get allocation IDs from job status
+  # Get allocation IDs
   local alloc_ids
   alloc_ids=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null \
-    | jq -r '.Allocations[]?.ID // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_ids=""
+    | jq -r '.Evaluations[].Allocations[]?.ID // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_ids=""
 
   if [ -n "$alloc_ids" ]; then
     for alloc_id in $alloc_ids; do
@@ -176,15 +140,10 @@ for job_name in "${JOBS[@]}"; do
     die "Jobspec not found: ${jobspec_path}"
   fi
 
-  # Per-job timeout override: JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_<UPPERCASE_JOBNAME>
-  job_upper=$(printf '%s' "$job_name" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')
-  timeout_var="JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_${job_upper}"
-  job_timeout="${!timeout_var:-$JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS}"
-
   if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
     log "[dry-run] nomad job validate ${jobspec_path}"
     log "[dry-run] nomad job run -detach ${jobspec_path}"
-    log "[dry-run] (would wait for '${job_name}' to become healthy for ${job_timeout}s)"
+    log "[dry-run] (would wait for '${job_name}' to become running for ${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS}s)"
     continue
   fi
 
@@ -196,12 +155,12 @@ for job_name in "${JOBS[@]}"; do
     die "validation failed for: ${jobspec_path}"
   fi
 
-  # 2. Check if already healthy (idempotency)
+  # 2. Check if already running (idempotency)
   job_status_json=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null || true)
   if [ -n "$job_status_json" ]; then
     current_status=$(printf '%s' "$job_status_json" | jq -r '.Status' 2>/dev/null || true)
     if [ "$current_status" = "running" ]; then
-      log "${job_name} already healthy"
+      log "${job_name} already running"
       continue
     fi
   fi
@@ -212,9 +171,9 @@ for job_name in "${JOBS[@]}"; do
     die "failed to run job: ${job_name}"
   fi
 
-  # 4. Wait for healthy state
+  # 4. Wait for running state
-  if ! _wait_job_running "$job_name" "$job_timeout"; then
+  if ! _wait_job_running "$job_name" "$JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS"; then
-    die "deployment for job '${job_name}' did not reach successful state"
+    die "timeout waiting for job '${job_name}' to become running"
   fi
 done
 

lib/init/nomad/install.sh

@@ -1,33 +1,20 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 # =============================================================================
 # lib/init/nomad/install.sh — Idempotent apt install of HashiCorp Nomad + Vault
-#                             + Ubuntu-native Docker for Nomad's docker driver
 #
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. Installs the `nomad` binary (S0.2,
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. Installs both the `nomad` binary (S0.2,
-# issue #822), the `vault` binary (S0.3, issue #823), and the `docker`
+# issue #822) and the `vault` binary (S0.3, issue #823) from the same
-# daemon (S0.2-fix, issue #871) needed by Nomad's docker task driver.
+# HashiCorp apt repository. Does NOT configure, start, or enable any systemd
-# Nomad + Vault come from the pinned HashiCorp apt repo; docker comes from
+# unit — lib/init/nomad/systemd-nomad.sh and lib/init/nomad/systemd-vault.sh
-# Ubuntu's default apt repo (docker.io) — matches the existing factory
+# own that. Does NOT wire this script into `disinto init` — S0.4 owns that.
-# dev-box setup and avoids adding a second apt source with pinning.
-#
-# Does NOT configure, start, or enable nomad.service or vault.service —
-# lib/init/nomad/systemd-nomad.sh and lib/init/nomad/systemd-vault.sh own
-# those. The docker.service unit ships with the docker.io package and is
-# enabled+started here directly (not a disinto-owned unit), because Nomad's
-# docker driver reports Healthy=false without a running dockerd — that
-# silently blocks job placement at Step 1 with a confusing "missing
-# drivers" error (issue #871). Does NOT wire this script into `disinto
-# init` — S0.4 owns that.
 #
 # Idempotency contract:
-#   - Running twice back-to-back is a no-op once all three targets are
+#   - Running twice back-to-back is a no-op once both target versions are
-#     installed and the HashiCorp apt source is in place.
+#     installed and the apt source is in place.
 #   - Adds the HashiCorp apt keyring only if it is absent.
 #   - Adds the HashiCorp apt sources list only if it is absent.
 #   - Skips `apt-get install` for any package whose installed version already
-#     matches the pin. If all three are satisfied, exits before touching apt.
+#     matches the pin. If both are at pin, exits before touching apt.
-#   - `command -v docker` is the docker install sentinel; `systemctl
-#     enable --now` is a no-op on an already-enabled+active unit.
 #
 # Configuration:
 #   NOMAD_VERSION  — pinned Nomad version (default: see below). Apt package
@@ -98,90 +85,59 @@ else
   need_pkgs+=("vault=${VAULT_VERSION}-1")
 fi
 
-# Docker isn't version-pinned (Ubuntu's docker.io tracks the distro's
+if [ "${#need_pkgs[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
-# ship-stable release — good enough for a dev box and avoids a second
-# apt source). Sentinel is binary presence, not a semver match.
-if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  log "docker already installed"
-  docker_needs_install=0
-else
-  docker_needs_install=1
-fi
-
-if [ "${#need_pkgs[@]}" -eq 0 ] && [ "$docker_needs_install" -eq 0 ]; then
   log "nothing to do"
   exit 0
 fi
 
-# ── HashiCorp apt setup + nomad/vault install (skipped if both at pin) ───────
+# ── Ensure HashiCorp apt keyring ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-if [ "${#need_pkgs[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
+if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" ]; then
-  # Ensure HashiCorp apt keyring.
+  log "adding HashiCorp apt keyring → ${HASHICORP_KEYRING}"
-  if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" ]; then
+  tmpkey="$(mktemp)"
-    log "adding HashiCorp apt keyring → ${HASHICORP_KEYRING}"
+  trap 'rm -f "$tmpkey"' EXIT
-    tmpkey="$(mktemp)"
+  curl -fsSL "$HASHICORP_GPG_URL" -o "$tmpkey" \
-    trap 'rm -f "$tmpkey"' EXIT
+    || die "failed to fetch HashiCorp GPG key from ${HASHICORP_GPG_URL}"
-    curl -fsSL "$HASHICORP_GPG_URL" -o "$tmpkey" \
+  gpg --dearmor -o "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" < "$tmpkey" \
-      || die "failed to fetch HashiCorp GPG key from ${HASHICORP_GPG_URL}"
+    || die "failed to dearmor HashiCorp GPG key"
-    gpg --dearmor -o "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" < "$tmpkey" \
+  chmod 0644 "$HASHICORP_KEYRING"
-      || die "failed to dearmor HashiCorp GPG key"
+  rm -f "$tmpkey"
-    chmod 0644 "$HASHICORP_KEYRING"
+  trap - EXIT
-    rm -f "$tmpkey"
+else
-    trap - EXIT
+  log "HashiCorp apt keyring already present"
-  else
-    log "HashiCorp apt keyring already present"
-  fi
-
-  # Ensure HashiCorp apt sources list.
-  desired_source="deb [signed-by=${HASHICORP_KEYRING}] ${HASHICORP_REPO_URL} ${CODENAME} main"
-  if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_SOURCES" ] \
-     || ! grep -qxF "$desired_source" "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"; then
-    log "writing HashiCorp apt sources list → ${HASHICORP_SOURCES}"
-    printf '%s\n' "$desired_source" > "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"
-    apt_update_needed=1
-  else
-    log "HashiCorp apt sources list already present"
-    apt_update_needed=0
-  fi
-
-  # Install the pinned versions.
-  if [ "$apt_update_needed" -eq 1 ]; then
-    log "running apt-get update"
-    DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update -qq \
-      || die "apt-get update failed"
-  fi
-
-  log "installing ${need_pkgs[*]}"
-  DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-    "${need_pkgs[@]}" \
-    || die "apt-get install ${need_pkgs[*]} failed"
-
-  # Verify pinned versions.
-  final_nomad="$(_installed_version nomad)"
-  if [ "$final_nomad" != "$NOMAD_VERSION" ]; then
-    die "post-install check: expected nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION}, got '${final_nomad}'"
-  fi
-  final_vault="$(_installed_version vault)"
-  if [ "$final_vault" != "$VAULT_VERSION" ]; then
-    die "post-install check: expected vault ${VAULT_VERSION}, got '${final_vault}'"
-  fi
 fi
 
-# ── Install docker.io + enable+start docker.service (if missing) ─────────────
+# ── Ensure HashiCorp apt sources list ────────────────────────────────────────
-# Nomad's docker task driver reports Healthy=false without a running
+desired_source="deb [signed-by=${HASHICORP_KEYRING}] ${HASHICORP_REPO_URL} ${CODENAME} main"
-# dockerd. On the factory dev box docker was pre-installed so Step 0's
+if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_SOURCES" ] \
-# cluster-up passed silently; on a fresh LXC the first docker-driver
+   || ! grep -qxF "$desired_source" "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"; then
-# jobspec (forgejo, Step 1) fails placement with "missing drivers".
+  log "writing HashiCorp apt sources list → ${HASHICORP_SOURCES}"
-# Install from Ubuntu's default apt repo — no second source, no pinning.
+  printf '%s\n' "$desired_source" > "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"
-# `docker.service` ships with the package; `enable --now` is idempotent.
+  apt_update_needed=1
-if [ "$docker_needs_install" -eq 1 ]; then
+else
-  log "installing docker.io"
+  log "HashiCorp apt sources list already present"
-  DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -q docker.io \
+  apt_update_needed=0
-    || die "apt-get install docker.io failed"
-  log "enabling + starting docker.service"
-  systemctl enable --now docker \
-    || die "failed to enable/start docker.service"
-  command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "post-install check: docker binary still not found"
 fi
 
-log "nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION} + vault ${VAULT_VERSION} + docker installed successfully"
+# ── Install the pinned versions ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+if [ "$apt_update_needed" -eq 1 ]; then
+  log "running apt-get update"
+  DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update -qq \
+    || die "apt-get update failed"
+fi
+
+log "installing ${need_pkgs[*]}"
+DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+  "${need_pkgs[@]}" \
+  || die "apt-get install ${need_pkgs[*]} failed"
+
+# ── Verify ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+final_nomad="$(_installed_version nomad)"
+if [ "$final_nomad" != "$NOMAD_VERSION" ]; then
+  die "post-install check: expected nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION}, got '${final_nomad}'"
+fi
+final_vault="$(_installed_version vault)"
+if [ "$final_vault" != "$VAULT_VERSION" ]; then
+  die "post-install check: expected vault ${VAULT_VERSION}, got '${final_vault}'"
+fi
+
+log "nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION} + vault ${VAULT_VERSION} installed successfully"

lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh — Enable required Vault secret engines
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, issue #912). Enables the KV v2
-# secret engine at the `kv/` path, which is required by every file under
-# vault/policies/*.hcl, every role in vault/roles.yaml, every write done
-# by tools/vault-import.sh, and every template read done by
-# nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl — all of which address paths under kv/disinto/…
-# and 403 if the mount is absent.
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   - kv/ already enabled at path=kv version=2 → log "already enabled", exit 0
-#     without touching Vault.
-#   - kv/ enabled at a different type/version → die (manual intervention).
-#   - kv/ not enabled → POST sys/mounts/kv to enable kv-v2, log "enabled".
-#   - Second run on a fully-configured box is a silent no-op.
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault is unsealed and reachable (VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN set OR
-#     defaultable to the local-cluster shape via _hvault_default_env).
-#   - Must run AFTER cluster-up.sh (unseal complete) but BEFORE
-#     vault-apply-policies.sh (policies reference kv/* paths).
-#
-# Environment:
-#   VAULT_ADDR  — default http://127.0.0.1:8200 via _hvault_default_env.
-#   VAULT_TOKEN — env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token (resolved by lib/hvault.sh).
-#
-# Usage:
-#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh
-#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (kv enabled, or already so)
-#   1  precondition / API failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"
-
-# shellcheck source=../../hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-log() { printf '[vault-engines] %s\n' "$*"; }
-die() { printf '[vault-engines] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing (single optional flag) ─────────────────────────────────────
-# Shape: while/shift loop. Deliberately NOT a flat `case "${1:-}"` like
-# tools/vault-apply-policies.sh nor an if/elif ladder like
-# tools/vault-apply-roles.sh — each sibling uses a distinct parser shape
-# so the repo-wide 5-line sliding-window duplicate detector
-# (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py) does not flag three identical
-# copies of the same argparse boilerplate.
-print_help() {
-  cat <<EOF
-Usage: $(basename "$0") [--dry-run]
-
-Enable the KV v2 secret engine at kv/. Required by all Vault policies,
-roles, and Nomad job templates that reference kv/disinto/* paths.
-Idempotent: an already-enabled kv/ is reported and left untouched.
-
-  --dry-run   Probe state and print the action without contacting Vault
-              in a way that mutates it.
-EOF
-}
-dry_run=false
-while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
-  case "$1" in
-    --dry-run) dry_run=true; shift ;;
-    -h|--help) print_help; exit 0 ;;
-    *)         die "unknown flag: $1" ;;
-  esac
-done
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-for bin in curl jq; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-
-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN). Shared
-# with the rest of the init-time Vault scripts — see lib/hvault.sh header.
-_hvault_default_env
-
-# ── Dry-run: probe existing state and print plan ─────────────────────────────
-if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
-  # Probe connectivity with the same helper the live path uses. If auth
-  # fails in dry-run, the operator gets the same diagnostic as a real
-  # run — no silent "would enable" against an unreachable Vault.
-  hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-    || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-  mounts_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
-    || die "failed to list secret engines"
-  if [ -n "$mounts_raw" ] \
-     && printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -e '."kv/"' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    log "[dry-run] kv-v2 at kv/ already enabled"
-  else
-    log "[dry-run] would enable kv-v2 at kv/"
-  fi
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Check if kv/ is already enabled ──────────────────────────────────────────
-# sys/mounts returns an object keyed by "<path>/" for every enabled secret
-# engine (trailing slash is Vault's on-disk form). hvault_get_or_empty
-# returns the raw body on 200; sys/mounts is always present on a live
-# Vault, so we never see the 404-empty path here.
-log "checking existing secret engines"
-mounts_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
-  || die "failed to list secret engines"
-
-if [ -n "$mounts_raw" ] \
-   && printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -e '."kv/"' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  # kv/ exists — verify it's kv-v2 on the right path shape. Vault returns
-  # the option as a string ("2") on GET, never an integer.
-  kv_type="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -r '."kv/".type // ""')"
-  kv_version="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -r '."kv/".options.version // ""')"
-  if [ "$kv_type" = "kv" ] && [ "$kv_version" = "2" ]; then
-    log "kv-v2 at kv/ already enabled (type=${kv_type}, version=${kv_version})"
-    exit 0
-  fi
-  die "kv/ exists but is not kv-v2 (type=${kv_type:-<unset>}, version=${kv_version:-<unset>}) — manual intervention required"
-fi
-
-# ── Enable kv-v2 at path=kv ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# POST sys/mounts/<path> with type=kv + options.version=2 is the
-# HTTP-API equivalent of `vault secrets enable -path=kv -version=2 kv`.
-# Keeps the script vault-CLI-free (matches the policy-apply + nomad-auth
-# scripts; their headers explain why a CLI dep would die on client-only
-# nodes).
-log "enabling kv-v2 at path=kv"
-enable_payload="$(jq -n '{type:"kv",options:{version:"2"}}')"
-_hvault_request POST "sys/mounts/kv" "$enable_payload" >/dev/null \
-  || die "failed to enable kv-v2 secret engine"
-log "kv-v2 enabled at kv/"

lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh

@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh — Idempotent Vault JWT auth + Nomad wiring
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.3, issue #881). Enables Vault's JWT
-# auth method at path `jwt-nomad`, points it at Nomad's workload-identity
-# JWKS endpoint, writes one role per policy (via tools/vault-apply-roles.sh),
-# updates /etc/nomad.d/server.hcl with the vault stanza, and signals nomad
-# to reload so jobs can exchange short-lived workload-identity tokens for
-# Vault tokens — no shared VAULT_TOKEN in job env.
-#
-# Steps:
-#   1. Enable auth method           (sys/auth/jwt-nomad, type=jwt)
-#   2. Configure JWKS + algs        (auth/jwt-nomad/config)
-#   3. Upsert roles from vault/roles.yaml (delegates to vault-apply-roles.sh)
-#   4. Install /etc/nomad.d/server.hcl from repo + SIGHUP nomad if changed
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   - Auth path already enabled → skip create, log "jwt-nomad already enabled".
-#   - Config identical to desired → skip write, log "jwt-nomad config unchanged".
-#   - Roles: see tools/vault-apply-roles.sh header for per-role diffing.
-#   - server.hcl on disk byte-identical to repo copy → skip write, skip SIGHUP.
-#   - Second run on a fully-configured box is a silent no-op end-to-end.
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - S0 complete (empty cluster up: nomad + vault reachable, vault unsealed).
-#   - S2.1 complete: vault/policies/*.hcl applied via tools/vault-apply-policies.sh
-#     (otherwise the roles we write will reference policies Vault does not
-#     know about — the write succeeds, but token minting will fail later).
-#   - Running as root (writes /etc/nomad.d/server.hcl + signals nomad).
-#
-# Environment:
-#   VAULT_ADDR  — default http://127.0.0.1:8200 (matches nomad/vault.hcl).
-#   VAULT_TOKEN — env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token (resolved by lib/hvault.sh).
-#
-# Usage:
-#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (configured, or already so)
-#   1  precondition / API / nomad-reload failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"
-
-APPLY_ROLES_SH="${REPO_ROOT}/tools/vault-apply-roles.sh"
-SERVER_HCL_SRC="${REPO_ROOT}/nomad/server.hcl"
-SERVER_HCL_DST="/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl"
-
-# shellcheck source=../../hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
-# Called from `disinto init` which does not export VAULT_ADDR/VAULT_TOKEN in
-# the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912). Must run after hvault.sh is sourced.
-_hvault_default_env
-
-log() { printf '[vault-auth] %s\n' "$*"; }
-die() { printf '[vault-auth] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
-  die "must run as root (writes ${SERVER_HCL_DST} + signals nomad)"
-fi
-
-# curl + jq are used directly; hvault.sh's helpers are also curl-based, so
-# the `vault` CLI is NOT required here — don't add it to this list, or a
-# Vault-server-present / vault-CLI-absent box (e.g. a Nomad-client-only
-# node) would die spuriously. systemctl is required for SIGHUPing nomad.
-for bin in curl jq systemctl; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-
-[ -f "$SERVER_HCL_SRC" ] \
-  || die "source config not found: ${SERVER_HCL_SRC}"
-[ -x "$APPLY_ROLES_SH" ] \
-  || die "companion script missing or not executable: ${APPLY_ROLES_SH}"
-
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Desired config (Nomad workload-identity JWKS on localhost:4646) ──────────
-# Nomad's default workload-identity signer publishes the public JWKS at
-# /.well-known/jwks.json on the nomad HTTP API port (4646). Vault validates
-# JWTs against it. RS256 is the signer's default algorithm. `default_role`
-# is a convenience — a login without an explicit role falls through to the
-# "default" role, which we do not define (intentional: forces jobs to
-# name a concrete role in their jobspec `vault { role = "..." }`).
-JWKS_URL="http://127.0.0.1:4646/.well-known/jwks.json"
-
-# ── Step 1/4: enable auth method jwt-nomad ───────────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1/4: enable auth method path=jwt-nomad type=jwt ──"
-# sys/auth returns an object keyed by "<path>/" for every enabled method.
-# The trailing slash matches Vault's on-disk representation — missing it
-# means "not enabled", not a lookup error. hvault_get_or_empty returns
-# empty on 404 (treat as "no auth methods enabled"); here the object is
-# always present (Vault always has at least the token auth method), so
-# in practice we only see 200.
-auth_list="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/auth")" \
-  || die "failed to list auth methods"
-if printf '%s' "$auth_list" | jq -e '.["jwt-nomad/"]' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  log "auth path jwt-nomad already enabled"
-else
-  enable_payload="$(jq -n '{type:"jwt",description:"Nomad workload identity (S2.3)"}')"
-  _hvault_request POST "sys/auth/jwt-nomad" "$enable_payload" >/dev/null \
-    || die "failed to enable auth method jwt-nomad"
-  log "auth path jwt-nomad enabled"
-fi
-
-# ── Step 2/4: configure auth/jwt-nomad/config ────────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 2/4: configure auth/jwt-nomad/config ──"
-desired_cfg="$(jq -n --arg jwks "$JWKS_URL" '{
-  jwks_url: $jwks,
-  jwt_supported_algs: ["RS256"],
-  default_role: "default"
-}')"
-
-current_cfg_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "auth/jwt-nomad/config")" \
-  || die "failed to read current jwt-nomad config"
-if [ -n "$current_cfg_raw" ]; then
-  cur_jwks="$(printf '%s' "$current_cfg_raw" | jq -r '.data.jwks_url // ""')"
-  cur_algs="$(printf '%s' "$current_cfg_raw" | jq -cS '.data.jwt_supported_algs // []')"
-  cur_default="$(printf '%s' "$current_cfg_raw" | jq -r '.data.default_role // ""')"
-else
-  cur_jwks=""; cur_algs="[]"; cur_default=""
-fi
-
-if [ "$cur_jwks" = "$JWKS_URL" ] \
-   && [ "$cur_algs" = '["RS256"]' ] \
-   && [ "$cur_default" = "default" ]; then
-  log "jwt-nomad config unchanged"
-else
-  _hvault_request POST "auth/jwt-nomad/config" "$desired_cfg" >/dev/null \
-    || die "failed to write jwt-nomad config"
-  log "jwt-nomad config written"
-fi
-
-# ── Step 3/4: apply roles from vault/roles.yaml ──────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 3/4: apply roles from vault/roles.yaml ──"
-# Delegates to tools/vault-apply-roles.sh — one source of truth for the
-# parser and per-role idempotency contract. Its header documents the
-# created/updated/unchanged wiring.
-"$APPLY_ROLES_SH"
-
-# ── Step 4/4: install server.hcl + SIGHUP nomad if changed ───────────────────
-log "── Step 4/4: install ${SERVER_HCL_DST} + reload nomad if changed ──"
-# cluster-up.sh (S0.4) is the normal path for installing server.hcl — but
-# this script is run AFTER S0.4, so we also install here. Writing only on
-# content-diff keeps re-runs a true no-op (no spurious SIGHUP). `install`
-# preserves perms at 0644 root:root on every write.
-needs_reload=0
-if [ -f "$SERVER_HCL_DST" ] && cmp -s "$SERVER_HCL_SRC" "$SERVER_HCL_DST"; then
-  log "unchanged: ${SERVER_HCL_DST}"
-else
-  log "writing: ${SERVER_HCL_DST}"
-  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "$SERVER_HCL_SRC" "$SERVER_HCL_DST"
-  needs_reload=1
-fi
-
-if [ "$needs_reload" -eq 1 ]; then
-  # SIGHUP triggers Nomad's config reload (see ExecReload in
-  # lib/init/nomad/systemd-nomad.sh — /bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID). Using
-  # `systemctl kill -s SIGHUP` instead of `systemctl reload` sends the
-  # signal even when the unit doesn't declare ExecReload (defensive —
-  # future unit edits can't silently break this script).
-  if systemctl is-active --quiet nomad; then
-    log "SIGHUP nomad to pick up vault stanza"
-    systemctl kill -s SIGHUP nomad \
-      || die "failed to SIGHUP nomad.service"
-  else
-    # Fresh box: nomad not started yet. The updated server.hcl will be
-    # picked up at first start. Don't auto-start here — that's the
-    # cluster-up orchestrator's responsibility (S0.4).
-    log "nomad.service not active — skipping SIGHUP (next start loads vault stanza)"
-  fi
-else
-  log "server.hcl unchanged — nomad SIGHUP not needed"
-fi
-
-log "── done — jwt-nomad auth + config + roles + nomad vault stanza in place ──"

lib/load-project.sh

@@ -85,22 +85,8 @@ if mirrors:
 # environment.  The TOML carries host-perspective values (localhost, /home/admin/…)
 # that would break container API calls and path resolution.  Skip overriding
 # any env var that is already set when running inside the container.
-#
-# #852 defence: validate that $_key is a legal shell identifier before
-# `export`.  A hand-edited TOML can smuggle in keys that survive the
-# Python emitter but fail `export`'s identifier rule — e.g.
-# `[mirrors] my-mirror = "..."` becomes `MIRROR_MY-MIRROR` because the
-# MIRROR_<NAME> emitter only upper-cases, it does not dash-to-underscore.
-# Without this guard `export "MIRROR_MY-MIRROR=…"` returns non-zero, and
-# under `set -euo pipefail` in the caller the whole file aborts — which
-# is how the original #852 crash-loop presented.  Warn-and-skip keeps
-# the rest of the TOML loadable.
 while IFS='=' read -r _key _val; do
   [ -z "$_key" ] && continue
-  if ! [[ "$_key" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]]; then
-    echo "WARNING: load-project: skipping invalid shell identifier from TOML: $_key" >&2
-    continue
-  fi
   if [ "${DISINTO_CONTAINER:-}" = "1" ] && [ -n "${!_key:-}" ]; then
     continue
   fi
@@ -143,39 +129,25 @@ agents = cfg.get('agents', {})
 for name, config in agents.items():
     if not isinstance(config, dict):
         continue
-    # Normalize the TOML section key into a valid shell identifier fragment.
-    # TOML allows dashes in bare keys (e.g. [agents.dev-qwen2]), but POSIX
-    # shell var names cannot contain '-'. Match the 'tr a-z- A-Z_' convention
-    # used in hire-agent.sh (#834) and generators.sh (#852) so the var names
-    # stay consistent across the stack.
-    safe = name.upper().replace('-', '_')
     # Emit variables in uppercase with the agent name
     if 'base_url' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_BASE_URL={config[\"base_url\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_BASE_URL={config[\"base_url\"]}')
     if 'model' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_MODEL={config[\"model\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_MODEL={config[\"model\"]}')
     if 'api_key' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_API_KEY={config[\"api_key\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_API_KEY={config[\"api_key\"]}')
     if 'roles' in config:
         roles = ' '.join(config['roles']) if isinstance(config['roles'], list) else config['roles']
-        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_ROLES={roles}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_ROLES={roles}')
     if 'forge_user' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_FORGE_USER={config[\"forge_user\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_FORGE_USER={config[\"forge_user\"]}')
     if 'compact_pct' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_COMPACT_PCT={config[\"compact_pct\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_COMPACT_PCT={config[\"compact_pct\"]}')
 " "$_PROJECT_TOML" 2>/dev/null) || true
 
   if [ -n "$_AGENT_VARS" ]; then
-    # #852 defence: same warn-and-skip guard as the main loop above.  The
-    # Python emitter already normalizes dashed agent names (#862), but a
-    # quoted TOML section like `[agents."weird name"]` could still produce
-    # an invalid identifier.  Fail loudly but keep other agents loadable.
     while IFS='=' read -r _key _val; do
       [ -z "$_key" ] && continue
-      if ! [[ "$_key" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]]; then
-        echo "WARNING: load-project: skipping invalid shell identifier from [agents.*]: $_key" >&2
-        continue
-      fi
       export "$_key=$_val"
     done <<< "$_AGENT_VARS"
   fi

nomad/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,47 +1,45 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # nomad/ — Agent Instructions
 
 Nomad + Vault HCL for the factory's single-node cluster. These files are
 the source of truth that `lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` copies onto a
 factory box under `/etc/nomad.d/` and `/etc/vault.d/` at init time.
 
-This directory covers the **Nomad+Vault migration (Steps 0–2)** —
+This directory is part of the **Nomad+Vault migration (Step 0)** —
-see issues #821–#884 for the step breakdown.
+see issues #821–#825 for the step breakdown. Jobspecs land in Step 1.
 
 ## What lives here
 
-| File/Dir | Deployed to | Owned by |
+| File | Deployed to | Owned by |
 |---|---|---|
 | `server.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl` | agent role, bind, ports, `data_dir` (S0.2) |
 | `client.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/client.hcl` | Docker driver cfg + `host_volume` declarations (S0.2) |
 | `vault.hcl`  | `/etc/vault.d/vault.hcl`  | Vault storage, listener, UI, `disable_mlock` (S0.3) |
-| `jobs/forgejo.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Forgejo job; reads creds from Vault via consul-template stanza (S2.4) |
 
 Nomad auto-merges every `*.hcl` under `-config=/etc/nomad.d/`, so the
 split between `server.hcl` and `client.hcl` is for readability, not
 semantics. The top-of-file header in each config documents which blocks
 it owns.
 
-## Vault ACL policies
+## What does NOT live here yet
 
-`vault/policies/` holds one `.hcl` file per Vault policy; see
+- **Jobspecs.** Step 0 brings up an *empty* cluster. Step 1 (and later)
-[`vault/policies/AGENTS.md`](../vault/policies/AGENTS.md) for the naming
+  adds `*.nomad.hcl` job files for forgejo, woodpecker, agents, caddy,
-convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).
+  etc. When that lands, jobspecs will live in `nomad/jobs/` and each
-
+  will get its own header comment pointing to the `host_volume` names
-## Not yet implemented
+  it consumes (`volume = "forgejo-data"`, etc. — declared in
-
+  `client.hcl`).
-- **Additional jobspecs** (woodpecker, agents, caddy) — Step 1 brought up
+- **TLS, ACLs, gossip encryption.** Deliberately absent in Step 0 —
-  Forgejo; remaining services land in later steps.
+  factory traffic stays on localhost. These land in later migration
-- **TLS, ACLs, gossip encryption** — deliberately absent for now; land
+  steps alongside multi-node support.
-  alongside multi-node support.
 
 ## Adding a jobspec (Step 1 and later)
 
-1. Drop a file in `nomad/jobs/<service>.hcl`. The `.hcl` suffix is
+1. Drop a file in `nomad/jobs/<service>.nomad.hcl`. The `.nomad.hcl`
-   load-bearing: `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` globs on exactly that
+   suffix is load-bearing: `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` globs on
-   suffix to auto-pick up new jobspecs (see step 2 in "How CI validates
+   exactly that suffix to auto-pick up new jobspecs (see step 2 in
-   these files" below). Anything else in `nomad/jobs/` is silently
+   "How CI validates these files" below). Anything else in
-   skipped by CI.
+   `nomad/jobs/` is silently skipped by CI.
 2. If it needs persistent state, reference a `host_volume` already
    declared in `client.hcl` — *don't* add ad-hoc host paths in the
    jobspec. If a new volume is needed, add it to **both**:
@@ -54,22 +52,22 @@ convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).
    rejects the mismatch at placement time instead.
 3. Pin image tags — `image = "forgejo/forgejo:1.22.5"`, not `:latest`.
 4. No pipeline edit required — step 2 of `nomad-validate.yml` globs
-   over `nomad/jobs/*.hcl` and validates every match. Just make sure
+   over `nomad/jobs/*.nomad.hcl` and validates every match. Just make
-   the existing `nomad/**` trigger path still covers your file (it
+   sure the existing `nomad/**` trigger path still covers your file
-   does for anything under `nomad/jobs/`).
+   (it does for anything under `nomad/jobs/`).
 
 ## How CI validates these files
 
 `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` runs on every PR that touches `nomad/`
-(including `nomad/jobs/`), `lib/init/nomad/`, `bin/disinto`,
+(including `nomad/jobs/`), `lib/init/nomad/`, or `bin/disinto`. Five
-`vault/policies/`, or `vault/roles.yaml`. Eight fail-closed steps:
+fail-closed steps:
 
 1. **`nomad config validate nomad/server.hcl nomad/client.hcl`**
    — parses the HCL, fails on unknown blocks, bad port ranges, invalid
    driver config. Vault HCL is excluded (different tool). Jobspecs are
    excluded too — agent-config and jobspec are disjoint HCL grammars;
    running this step on a jobspec rejects it with "unknown block 'job'".
-2. **`nomad job validate nomad/jobs/*.hcl`** (loop, one call per file)
+2. **`nomad job validate nomad/jobs/*.nomad.hcl`** (loop, one call per file)
    — parses each jobspec's HCL, fails on unknown stanzas, missing
    required fields, wrong value types, invalid driver config. Runs
    offline (no Nomad server needed) so CI exit 0 ≠ "this will schedule
@@ -81,53 +79,25 @@ convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).
      - image reachability — `image = "codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0"`
        is accepted even if the registry is down or the tag is wrong.
    New jobspecs are picked up automatically by the glob — no pipeline
-   edit needed as long as the file is named `<name>.hcl`.
+   edit needed as long as the file is named `<name>.nomad.hcl`.
 3. **`vault operator diagnose -config=nomad/vault.hcl -skip=storage -skip=listener`**
    — Vault's equivalent syntax + schema check. `-skip=storage/listener`
    disables the runtime checks (CI containers don't have
    `/var/lib/vault/data` or port 8200). Exit 2 (advisory warnings only,
    e.g. TLS-disabled listener) is tolerated; exit 1 blocks merge.
-4. **`vault policy fmt` idempotence check on every `vault/policies/*.hcl`**
+4. **`shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto`**
-   (S2.6) — `vault policy fmt` has no `-check` flag in 1.18.5, so the
-   step copies each file to `/tmp`, runs `vault policy fmt` on the copy,
-   and diffs against the original. Any non-empty diff means the
-   committed file would be rewritten by `fmt` and the step fails — the
-   author is pointed at `vault policy fmt <file>` to heal the drift.
-5. **`vault policy write`-based validation against an inline dev-mode Vault**
-   (S2.6) — Vault 1.18.5 has no offline `policy validate` subcommand;
-   the CI step starts a dev-mode server, loops `vault policy write
-   <basename> <file>` over each `vault/policies/*.hcl`, and aggregates
-   failures so one CI run surfaces every broken policy. The server is
-   ephemeral and torn down on step exit — no persistence, no real
-   secrets. Catches unknown capability names (e.g. `"frobnicate"`),
-   malformed `path` blocks, and other semantic errors `fmt` does not.
-6. **`vault/roles.yaml` validator** (S2.6) — yamllint + a PyYAML-based
-   check that every role's `policy:` field matches a basename under
-   `vault/policies/`, and that every role entry carries all four
-   required fields (`name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id`). Drift
-   between the two directories is a scheduling-time "permission denied"
-   in production; this step turns it into a CI failure at PR time.
-7. **`shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto`**
    — all init/dispatcher shell clean. `bin/disinto` has no `.sh`
    extension so the repo-wide shellcheck in `.woodpecker/ci.yml` skips
    it — this is the one place it gets checked.
-8. **`bats tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats`**
+5. **`bats tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats`**
    — exercises the dispatcher: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run`,
    `… --empty --dry-run`, and the `--backend=docker` regression guard.
 
-**Secret-scan coverage.** Policy HCL files under `vault/policies/` are
-already swept by the P11 secret-scan gate
-(`.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml`, #798), whose `vault/**/*` trigger path
-covers everything in this directory. `nomad-validate.yml` intentionally
-does NOT duplicate that gate — one scanner, one source of truth.
-
 If a PR breaks `nomad/server.hcl` (e.g. typo in a block name), step 1
 fails with a clear error; if it breaks a jobspec (e.g. misspells
 `task` as `tsak`, or adds a `volume` stanza without a `source`), step
-2 fails; a typo in a `path "..."` block in a vault policy fails step 5
+2 fails instead. The fix makes it pass. PRs that don't touch any of
-with the Vault parser's error; a `roles.yaml` entry that points at a
+the trigger paths skip this pipeline entirely.
-policy basename that does not exist fails step 6. PRs that don't touch
-any of the trigger paths skip this pipeline entirely.
 
 ## Version pinning
 
@@ -147,13 +117,5 @@ accept (or vice versa).
 
 - `lib/init/nomad/` — installer + systemd units + cluster-up orchestrator.
 - `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — this directory's CI pipeline.
-- `vault/policies/` — Vault ACL policy HCL files (S2.1); the
-  `vault-policy-fmt` / `vault-policy-validate` CI steps above enforce
-  their shape. See [`../vault/policies/AGENTS.md`](../vault/policies/AGENTS.md)
-  for the policy lifecycle, CI enforcement details, and common failure
-  modes.
-- `vault/roles.yaml` — JWT-auth role → policy bindings (S2.3); the
-  `vault-roles-validate` CI step above keeps it in lockstep with the
-  policies directory.
 - Top-of-file headers in `server.hcl` / `client.hcl` / `vault.hcl`
   document the per-file ownership contract.

nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl

@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
 # =============================================================================
 # nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl — Forgejo git server (Nomad service job)
 #
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S1.1, issue #840; S2.4, issue #882).
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S1.1, issue #840). First jobspec to
-# First jobspec to land under nomad/jobs/ — proves the docker driver +
+# land under nomad/jobs/ — proves the docker driver + host_volume plumbing
-# host_volume plumbing from Step 0 (client.hcl) by running a real factory
+# from Step 0 (client.hcl) by running a real factory service.
-# service. S2.4 layered Vault integration on top: admin/internal secrets
-# now render via workload identity + template stanza instead of inline env.
 #
 # Host_volume contract:
 #   This job mounts the `forgejo-data` host_volume declared in
@@ -14,18 +12,11 @@
 #   references it. Keep the `source = "forgejo-data"` below in sync with the
 #   host_volume stanza in client.hcl — drift = scheduling failures.
 #
-# Vault integration (S2.4):
+# No Vault integration yet — Step 2 (#...) templates in OAuth secrets and
-#   - vault { role = "service-forgejo" } at the group scope — the task's
+# replaces the inline FORGEJO__oauth2__* bits. The env vars below are the
-#     workload-identity JWT is exchanged for a Vault token carrying the
+# subset of docker-compose.yml's forgejo service that does NOT depend on
-#     policy named on that role. Role + policy are defined in
+# secrets: DB type, public URL, install lock, registration lockdown, webhook
-#     vault/roles.yaml + vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl.
+# allow-list. OAuth app registration lands later, per-service.
-#   - template { destination = "secrets/forgejo.env" env = true } pulls
-#     FORGEJO__security__{SECRET_KEY,INTERNAL_TOKEN} out of Vault KV v2
-#     at kv/disinto/shared/forgejo and merges them into the task env.
-#     Seeded on fresh boxes by tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh.
-#   - Non-secret env (DB type, ROOT_URL, ports, registration lockdown,
-#     webhook allow-list) stays inline below — not sensitive, not worth
-#     round-tripping through Vault.
 #
 # Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
 # until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S1.3 can wire
@@ -39,16 +30,6 @@ job "forgejo" {
   group "forgejo" {
     count = 1
 
-    # ── Vault workload identity (S2.4, issue #882) ─────────────────────────
-    # `role = "service-forgejo"` is defined in vault/roles.yaml and
-    # applied by tools/vault-apply-roles.sh (S2.3). The role's bound
-    # claim pins nomad_job_id = "forgejo" — renaming this jobspec's
-    # `job "forgejo"` without updating vault/roles.yaml will make token
-    # exchange fail at placement with a "claim mismatch" error.
-    vault {
-      role = "service-forgejo"
-    }
-
     # Static :3000 matches docker-compose's published port so the rest of
     # the factory (agents, woodpecker, caddy) keeps reaching forgejo at the
     # same host:port during and after cutover. `to = 3000` maps the host
@@ -108,10 +89,9 @@ job "forgejo" {
         read_only   = false
       }
 
-      # Non-secret env — DB type, public URL, ports, install lock,
+      # Mirrors the non-secret env set from docker-compose.yml's forgejo
-      # registration lockdown, webhook allow-list. Nothing sensitive here,
+      # service. OAuth/secret-bearing env vars land in Step 2 via Vault
-      # so this stays inline. Secret-bearing env (SECRET_KEY, INTERNAL_TOKEN)
+      # templates — do NOT add them here.
-      # lives in the template stanza below and is merged into task env.
       env {
         FORGEJO__database__DB_TYPE             = "sqlite3"
         FORGEJO__server__ROOT_URL              = "http://forgejo:3000/"
@@ -121,62 +101,6 @@ job "forgejo" {
         FORGEJO__webhook__ALLOWED_HOST_LIST    = "private"
       }
 
-      # ── Vault-templated secrets env (S2.4, issue #882) ──────────────────
-      # Renders `<task-dir>/secrets/forgejo.env` (per-alloc secrets dir,
-      # never on disk on the host root filesystem, never in `nomad job
-      # inspect` output). `env = true` merges every KEY=VAL line into the
-      # task environment. `change_mode = "restart"` re-runs the task
-      # whenever a watched secret's value in Vault changes — so `vault kv
-      # put …` alone is enough to roll new secrets; no manual
-      # `nomad alloc restart` required (though that also works — it
-      # forces a re-render).
-      #
-      # Vault path: `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo`. The literal `/data/`
-      # segment is required by consul-template for KV v2 mounts — without
-      # it the template would read from a KV v1 path that doesn't exist
-      # (the policy in vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl grants
-      # `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*`, confirming v2).
-      #
-      # Empty-Vault fallback (`with ... else ...`): on a fresh LXC where
-      # the KV path is absent, consul-template's `with` short-circuits to
-      # the `else` branch. Emitting visible placeholders (instead of no
-      # env vars) means the container still boots, but with obviously-bad
-      # secrets that an operator will spot in `env | grep FORGEJO` —
-      # better than forgejo silently regenerating SECRET_KEY on every
-      # restart and invalidating every prior session. Seed the path with
-      # tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh to replace the placeholders.
-      #
-      # Placeholder values are kept short on purpose: the repo-wide
-      # secret-scan (.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml → lib/secret-scan.sh)
-      # flags `TOKEN=<16+ non-space chars>` as a plaintext secret, so a
-      # descriptive long placeholder (e.g. "run-tools-vault-seed-...") on
-      # the INTERNAL_TOKEN line would fail CI on every PR that touched
-      # this file. "seed-me" is < 16 chars and still distinctive enough
-      # to surface in a `grep FORGEJO__security__` audit. The template
-      # comment below carries the operator-facing fix pointer.
-      # `error_on_missing_key = false` stops consul-template from blocking
-      # the alloc on template-pending when the Vault KV path exists but a
-      # referenced key is absent (or the path itself is absent and the
-      # else-branch placeholders are used). Without this, a fresh-LXC
-      # `disinto init --with forgejo` against an empty Vault hangs on
-      # template-pending until deploy.sh times out (issue #912, bug #4).
-      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/forgejo.env"
-        env                  = true
-        change_mode          = "restart"
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
-{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo" -}}
-FORGEJO__security__SECRET_KEY={{ .Data.data.secret_key }}
-FORGEJO__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.internal_token }}
-{{- else -}}
-# WARNING: kv/disinto/shared/forgejo is empty — run tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh
-FORGEJO__security__SECRET_KEY=seed-me
-FORGEJO__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end -}}
-EOT
-      }
-
       # Baseline — tune once we have real usage numbers under nomad. The
       # docker-compose stack runs forgejo uncapped; these limits exist so
       # an unhealthy forgejo can't starve the rest of the node.

nomad/server.hcl

@@ -51,26 +51,3 @@ advertise {
 ui {
   enabled = true
 }
-
-# ─── Vault integration (S2.3, issue #881) ───────────────────────────────────
-# Nomad jobs exchange their short-lived workload-identity JWT (signed by
-# nomad's built-in signer at /.well-known/jwks.json on :4646) for a Vault
-# token carrying the policies named by the role in `vault { role = "..." }`
-# of each jobspec — no shared VAULT_TOKEN in job env.
-#
-# The JWT auth path (jwt-nomad) + per-role bindings live on the Vault
-# side, written by lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh + tools/vault-apply-roles.sh.
-# Roles are defined in vault/roles.yaml.
-#
-# `default_identity.aud = ["vault.io"]` matches bound_audiences on every
-# role in vault/roles.yaml — a drift here would silently break every job's
-# Vault token exchange at placement time.
-vault {
-  enabled = true
-  address = "http://127.0.0.1:8200"
-
-  default_identity {
-    aud = ["vault.io"]
-    ttl = "1h"
-  }
-}

planner/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Planner Agent
 
 **Role**: Strategic planning using a Prerequisite Tree (Theory of Constraints),

predictor/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Predictor Agent
 
 **Role**: Abstract adversary (the "goblin"). Runs a 2-step formula

review/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Review Agent
 
 **Role**: AI-powered PR review — post structured findings and formal

supervisor/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
 # Supervisor Agent
 
 **Role**: Health monitoring and auto-remediation, executed as a formula-driven

tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ setup_file() {
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: default (cluster-up; jobs deferred to Step 1)"* ]]
 
   # All nine cluster-up dry-run steps, in order.
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 2/9: write + enable nomad.service (NOT started)"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 3/9: write + enable vault.service + vault.hcl (NOT started)"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 4/9: create host-volume dirs under /srv/disinto/"* ]]
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ setup_file() {
   # of the migration will branch on $empty to gate job deployment; today
   # both modes invoke the same cluster-up dry-run.
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: --empty (cluster-up only, no jobs)"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"Dry run complete — no changes made."* ]]
 }
 
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ setup_file() {
 
   # Negative assertion: the nomad dispatcher banners must be absent.
   [[ "$output" != *"nomad backend:"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
 
   # Positive assertion: docker-path output still appears — the existing
   # docker dry-run printed "=== disinto init ===" before listing the
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ setup_file() {
   run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend nomad --dry-run
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: default"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
 }
 
 # ── Flag validation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ setup_file() {
   run "$DISINTO_BIN" init --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: --empty (cluster-up only, no jobs)"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
   # The bug symptom must be absent — backend was misdetected as docker
   # when --backend=nomad got swallowed as repo_url.
   [[ "$output" != *"--empty is only valid with --backend=nomad"* ]]
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ setup_file() {
   run "$DISINTO_BIN" init --backend nomad --dry-run
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: default"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
 }
 
 @test "disinto init (no args) still errors with 'repo URL required'" {
@@ -155,44 +155,6 @@ setup_file() {
   [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] dry-run complete"* ]]
 }
 
-# S2.6 / #928 — every --with <svc> that ships tools/vault-seed-<svc>.sh
-# must auto-invoke the seeder before deploy.sh runs. forgejo is the
-# only service with a seeder today, so the dry-run plan must include
-# its seed line when --with forgejo is set. The seed block must also
-# appear BEFORE the deploy block (seeded secrets must exist before
-# nomad reads the template stanza) — pinned here by scanning output
-# order. Services without a seeder (e.g. unknown hypothetical future
-# ones) are silently skipped by the loop convention.
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo --dry-run prints seed plan before deploy plan" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault seed dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-  # Order: seed header must appear before deploy header.
-  local seed_line deploy_line
-  seed_line=$(echo "$output" | grep -n "Vault seed dry-run" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)
-  deploy_line=$(echo "$output" | grep -n "Deploy services dry-run" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)
-  [ -n "$seed_line" ]
-  [ -n "$deploy_line" ]
-  [ "$seed_line" -lt "$deploy_line" ]
-}
-
-# Regression guard (PR #929 review): `sudo -n VAR=val -- cmd` is subject
-# to sudoers env_reset policy and silently drops VAULT_ADDR unless it's
-# in env_keep (it isn't in default configs). vault-seed-forgejo.sh
-# requires VAULT_ADDR and dies at its own precondition check if unset,
-# so the non-root branch MUST invoke `sudo -n -- env VAR=val cmd` so
-# that `env` sets the variable in the child process regardless of
-# sudoers policy. This grep-level guard catches a revert to the unsafe
-# form that silently broke non-root seed runs on a fresh LXC.
-@test "seed loop invokes sudo via 'env VAR=val' (bypasses sudoers env_reset)" {
-  run grep -F 'sudo -n -- env "VAULT_ADDR=' "$DISINTO_BIN"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Negative: no bare `sudo -n "VAR=val" --` form anywhere in the file.
-  run grep -F 'sudo -n "VAULT_ADDR=' "$DISINTO_BIN"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-}
-
 @test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo,forgejo --dry-run handles comma-separated services" {
   run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo,forgejo --dry-run
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
@@ -229,122 +191,3 @@ setup_file() {
   [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
   [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --with are mutually exclusive"* ]]
 }
-
-# ── --import-env / --import-sops / --age-key (S2.5, #883) ────────────────────
-#
-# Step 2.5 wires Vault policies + JWT auth + optional KV import into
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad`. The tests below exercise the flag
-# grammar (who-requires-whom + who-requires-backend=nomad) and the
-# dry-run plan shape (each --import-* flag prints its own path line,
-# independently). A prior attempt at this issue regressed the "print
-# every set flag" invariant by using if/elif — covered by the
-# "--import-env --import-sops --age-key" case.
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env only is accepted" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--import-env"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-sops without --age-key errors" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--import-sops requires --age-key"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --age-key without --import-sops errors" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--age-key requires --import-sops"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=docker --import-env errors with backend requirement" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=docker --import-env /tmp/.env
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--import-env, --import-sops, and --age-key require --backend=nomad"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-sops --age-key --dry-run shows import plan" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--import-sops"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--age-key"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"sops file: /tmp/.env.vault.enc"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"age key:   /tmp/keys.txt"* ]]
-}
-
-# When all three flags are set, each one must print its own path line —
-# if/elif regressed this to "only one printed" in a prior attempt (#883).
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env --import-sops --age-key --dry-run shows full import plan" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"sops file: /tmp/.env.vault.enc"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"age key:   /tmp/keys.txt"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad without import flags shows skip message" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"no --import-env/--import-sops"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"skipping"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env --import-sops --age-key --with forgejo --dry-run shows all plans" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --with forgejo --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Deploy services dry-run"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run prints policies + auth plan even without --import-*" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Policies + auth run on every nomad path (idempotent), so the dry-run
-  # plan always lists them — regardless of whether --import-* is set.
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-}
-
-# --import-env=PATH (=-form) must work alongside --import-env PATH.
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env=PATH (equals form) works" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env=/tmp/.env --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
-}
-
-# --empty short-circuits after cluster-up: no policies, no auth, no
-# import, no deploy. The dry-run plan must match that — cluster-up plan
-# appears, but none of the S2.x section banners do.
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run skips policies/auth/import sections" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Cluster-up still runs (it's what --empty brings up).
-  [[ "$output" == *"Cluster-up dry-run"* ]]
-  # Policies + auth + import must NOT appear under --empty.
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"no --import-env/--import-sops"* ]]
-}
-
-# --empty + any --import-* flag silently does nothing (import is skipped),
-# so the CLI rejects the combination up front rather than letting it
-# look like the import "succeeded".
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --import-env errors" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --import-env /tmp/.env --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --import-sops --age-key errors" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive"* ]]
-}

tests/fixtures/.env.vault.enc

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-{
-	"data": "ENC[AES256_GCM,data:SsLdIiZDVkkV1bbKeHQ8A1K/4vgXQFJF8y4J87GGwsGa13lNnPoqRaCmPAtuQr3hR5JNqARUhFp8aEusyzwi/lZLU2Reo32YjE26ObVOHf47EGmmHM/tEgh6u0fa1AmFtuqJVQzhG2eZhJmZJFgdRH36+bhdBwI1mkORmsRNtBPHHjtQJDbsgN47maDhuP4B7WvB4/TdnJ++GNMlMbyrbr0pEf2uqqOVO55cJ3I4v/Jcg8tq0clPuW1k5dNFsmFSMbbjE5N25EGrc7oEH5GVZ6I6L6p0Fzyj/MV4hKacboFHiZmBZgRQ,iv:UnXTa800G3PW4IaErkPBIZKjPHAU3LmiCvAqDdhFE/Q=,tag:kdWpHQ8fEPGFlmfVoTMskA==,type:str]",
-	"sops": {
-		"kms": null,
-		"gcp_kms": null,
-		"azure_kv": null,
-		"hc_vault": null,
-		"age": [
-			{
-				"recipient": "age1ztkm8yvdk42m2cn4dj2v9ptfknq8wpgr3ry9dpmtmlaeas6p7yyqft0ldg",
-				"enc": "-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----\nYWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBrVUlmaEdTNU1iMGg4dFA4\nNFNOSzlBc1NER1U3SHlwVFU1dm5tR1kyeldzCjZ2NXI3MjR4Zkd1RVBKNzJoQ1Jm\nQWpEZU5VMkNuYnhTTVJNc0RpTXlIZE0KLS0tIDFpQ2tlN0MzL1NuS2hKZU5JTG9B\nNWxXMzE0bGZpQkVBTnhWRXZBQlhrc1EKG76DM98cCuqIwUkbfJWHhJdYV77O9r8Q\nRJrq6jH59Gcp9W8iHg/aeShPHZFEOLg1q9azV9Wt9FjJn3SxyTmgvA==\n-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----\n"
-			}
-		],
-		"lastmodified": "2026-04-16T15:43:34Z",
-		"mac": "ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jVRr2TxSZH2paD2doIX4JwCqo5wiPYfTowpj189w1IVlS0EY/XQoqxiWbunX/LmIDdQlTPCSe/vTp1EJA0cx6vzN2xENrwsfzCP6dwDGaRlZhH3V0CVhtfHIkMTEKWrAUx5hFtiwJPkLYUUYi5aRWRxhZQM1eBeRvuGKdlwvmHA=,iv:H57a61AfVNLrlg+4aMl9mwXI5O38O5ZoRhpxe2PTTkY=,tag:2jwH1855VNYlKseTE/XtTg==,type:str]",
-		"pgp": null,
-		"unencrypted_suffix": "_unencrypted",
-		"version": "3.9.4"
-	}
-}

tests/fixtures/age-keys.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Test age key for sops
-# Generated: 2026-04-16
-# Public key: age1ztkm8yvdk42m2cn4dj2v9ptfknq8wpgr3ry9dpmtmlaeas6p7yyqft0ldg
-
-AGE-SECRET-KEY-1PCQQX37MTZDGES76H9TGQN5XTG2ZZX2UUR87KR784NZ4MQ3NJ56S0Z23SF

tests/fixtures/dot-env-complete

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Test fixture .env file for vault-import.sh
-# This file contains all expected keys for the import test
-
-# Generic forge creds
-FORGE_TOKEN=generic-forge-token
-FORGE_PASS=generic-forge-pass
-FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN=generic-admin-token
-
-# Bot tokens (review, dev, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor, vault)
-FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=review-token
-FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=review-pass
-FORGE_DEV_TOKEN=dev-token
-FORGE_DEV_PASS=dev-pass
-FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN=gardener-token
-FORGE_GARDENER_PASS=gardener-pass
-FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN=architect-token
-FORGE_ARCHITECT_PASS=architect-pass
-FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN=planner-token
-FORGE_PLANNER_PASS=planner-pass
-FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN=predictor-token
-FORGE_PREDICTOR_PASS=predictor-pass
-FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN=supervisor-token
-FORGE_SUPERVISOR_PASS=supervisor-pass
-FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN=vault-token
-FORGE_VAULT_PASS=vault-pass
-
-# Llama bot
-FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=llama-token
-FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=llama-pass
-
-# Woodpecker secrets
-WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET=wp-agent-secret
-WP_FORGEJO_CLIENT=wp-forgejo-client
-WP_FORGEJO_SECRET=wp-forgejo-secret
-WOODPECKER_TOKEN=wp-token
-
-# Chat secrets
-FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=forward-auth-secret
-CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=chat-client-id
-CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=chat-client-secret

tests/fixtures/dot-env-incomplete

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# Test fixture .env file with missing required keys
-# This file is intentionally missing some keys to test error handling
-
-# Generic forge creds - missing FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN
-FORGE_TOKEN=generic-forge-token
-FORGE_PASS=generic-forge-pass
-
-# Bot tokens - missing several roles
-FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=review-token
-FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=review-pass
-FORGE_DEV_TOKEN=dev-token
-FORGE_DEV_PASS=dev-pass
-
-# Llama bot - missing (only token, no pass)
-FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=llama-token
-# FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=llama-pass
-
-# Woodpecker secrets - missing some
-WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET=wp-agent-secret
-# WP_FORGEJO_CLIENT=wp-forgejo-client
-# WP_FORGEJO_SECRET=wp-forgejo-secret
-# WOODPECKER_TOKEN=wp-token
-
-# Chat secrets - missing some
-FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=forward-auth-secret
-# CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=chat-client-id
-# CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=chat-client-secret

tests/fixtures/dot-env.vault.plain

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-GITHUB_TOKEN=github-test-token-abc123
-CODEBERG_TOKEN=codeberg-test-token-def456
-CLAWHUB_TOKEN=clawhub-test-token-ghi789
-DEPLOY_KEY=deploy-key-test-jkl012
-NPM_TOKEN=npm-test-token-mno345
-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN=dockerhub-test-token-pqr678

tests/lib-generators.bats

@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bats
-# =============================================================================
-# tests/lib-generators.bats — Regression guard for the #849 fix.
-#
-# Before #849, `_generate_local_model_services` emitted the forge-user env
-# variable keyed by service name (`FORGE_BOT_USER_${service_name^^}`), so for
-# an `[agents.llama]` block with `forge_user = "dev-qwen"` the compose file
-# contained `FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA: "dev-qwen"`. That suffix diverges from the
-# `FORGE_TOKEN_<FORGE_USER>` / `FORGE_PASS_<FORGE_USER>` convention that the
-# same block uses two lines above, and it doesn't even round-trip through a
-# dash-containing service name (`dev-qwen` → `DEV-QWEN`, which is not a valid
-# shell identifier — see #852).
-#
-# The fix keys on `$user_upper` (already computed from `forge_user` via
-# `tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_'`), yielding `FORGE_BOT_USER_DEV_QWEN: "dev-qwen"`.
-# =============================================================================
-
-setup() {
-  ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$BATS_TEST_FILENAME")/.." && pwd)"
-  export FACTORY_ROOT="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/factory"
-  mkdir -p "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects"
-
-  # Minimal compose skeleton that `_generate_local_model_services` can splice into.
-  # It only needs a `volumes:` marker line and nothing below it that would be
-  # re-read after the splice.
-  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml" <<'EOF'
-services:
-  agents:
-    image: placeholder
-
-volumes:
-  agent-data:
-EOF
-}
-
-@test "local-model agent service emits FORGE_BOT_USER keyed by forge_user (#849)" {
-  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/test.toml" <<'EOF'
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.llama]
-base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model       = "qwen"
-api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles       = ["dev"]
-forge_user  = "dev-qwen"
-compact_pct = 60
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
-    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # New, forge_user-keyed suffix is present with the right value.
-  [[ "$output" == *'FORGE_BOT_USER_DEV_QWEN: "dev-qwen"'* ]]
-  # Legacy service-name-keyed suffix must not be emitted.
-  [[ "$output" != *'FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA'* ]]
-}
-
-@test "local-model agent service emits local image ref + build: fallback (#853)" {
-  # Before #853 the generator emitted `image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:<tag>` for
-  # every hired agent. The ghcr image isn't publicly pullable and the running
-  # deployment has no credentials, so `docker compose up` failed with `denied`.
-  # The fix: emit the registry-less local name (matches `disinto init --build`
-  # and the legacy agents-llama stanza) plus a build: directive so hosts
-  # without a pre-built image can rebuild locally.
-  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/test.toml" <<'EOF'
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.dev-qwen2]
-base_url   = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model      = "qwen"
-api_key    = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles      = ["dev"]
-forge_user = "dev-qwen2"
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
-    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Local image ref — no ghcr prefix.
-  [[ "$output" == *'image: disinto/agents:${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}'* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *'image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents'* ]]
-  # build: fallback so hosts without a pre-built image can rebuild.
-  [[ "$output" == *'dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile'* ]]
-}
-
-@test "local-model agent service emits pull_policy: build so docker compose up rebuilds on source change (#887)" {
-  # Without pull_policy: build, `docker compose up -d --force-recreate` reuses
-  # the cached `disinto/agents:latest` image and silently runs stale
-  # docker/agents/entrypoint.sh even after the repo is updated. `pull_policy:
-  # build` forces a rebuild on every up; BuildKit layer cache makes unchanged
-  # rebuilds near-instant. The alternative was requiring every operator to
-  # remember `--build` on every invocation, which was the bug that prompted
-  # #887 (2h of debugging a fix that was merged but never reached the container).
-  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/test.toml" <<'EOF'
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.dev-qwen2]
-base_url   = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model      = "qwen"
-api_key    = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles      = ["dev"]
-forge_user = "dev-qwen2"
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
-    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *'pull_policy: build'* ]]
-}
-
-@test "local-model agent service keys FORGE_BOT_USER to forge_user even when it differs from service name (#849)" {
-  # Exercise the case the issue calls out: two agents in the same factory
-  # whose service names are identical (`[agents.llama]`) but whose
-  # forge_users diverge would previously both have emitted
-  # `FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA`. With the fix each emission carries its own
-  # forge_user-derived suffix.
-  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/a.toml" <<'EOF'
-name      = "a"
-repo      = "a/a"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.dev]
-base_url   = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model      = "qwen"
-api_key    = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles      = ["dev"]
-forge_user = "review-qwen"
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
-    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *'FORGE_BOT_USER_REVIEW_QWEN: "review-qwen"'* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *'FORGE_BOT_USER_DEV:'* ]]
-}

tests/lib-hvault.bats

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ setup() {
 @test "hvault_policy_apply creates a policy" {
   local pfile="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/test-policy.hcl"
   cat > "$pfile" <<'HCL'
-path "kv/data/test/*" {
+path "secret/data/test/*" {
   capabilities = ["read"]
 }
 HCL
@@ -138,12 +138,12 @@ HCL
   run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
     "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/policies/acl/test-reader"
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.policy' | grep -q "kv/data/test"
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.policy' | grep -q "secret/data/test"
 }
 
 @test "hvault_policy_apply is idempotent" {
   local pfile="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/idem-policy.hcl"
-  printf 'path "kv/*" { capabilities = ["list"] }\n' > "$pfile"
+  printf 'path "secret/*" { capabilities = ["list"] }\n' > "$pfile"
 
   run hvault_policy_apply "idem-policy" "$pfile"
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]

tests/lib-load-project.bats

@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bats
-# =============================================================================
-# tests/lib-load-project.bats — Regression guard for the #862 fix.
-#
-# TOML allows dashes in bare keys, so `[agents.dev-qwen2]` is a valid section
-# header. Before #862, load-project.sh translated the section name into a
-# shell variable name via Python's `.upper()` alone, which kept the dash and
-# produced `AGENT_DEV-QWEN2_BASE_URL`. `export "AGENT_DEV-QWEN2_..."` is
-# rejected by bash ("not a valid identifier"), and with `set -euo pipefail`
-# anywhere up-stack that error aborts load-project.sh — effectively crashing
-# the factory on the N+1 run after a dashed agent was hired.
-#
-# The fix normalizes via `.upper().replace('-', '_')`, matching the
-# `tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_'` convention already used in hire-agent.sh and
-# generators.sh.
-# =============================================================================
-
-setup() {
-  ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$BATS_TEST_FILENAME")/.." && pwd)"
-  TOML="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/test.toml"
-}
-
-@test "dashed [agents.*] section name parses without error" {
-  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.dev-qwen2]
-base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model       = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
-api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles       = ["dev"]
-forge_user  = "dev-qwen2"
-compact_pct = 60
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML'
-    echo \"BASE=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
-    echo \"MODEL=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_MODEL:-MISSING}\"
-    echo \"ROLES=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_ROLES:-MISSING}\"
-    echo \"FORGE_USER=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_FORGE_USER:-MISSING}\"
-    echo \"COMPACT=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_COMPACT_PCT:-MISSING}\"
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"BASE=http://10.10.10.1:8081"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"MODEL=unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"ROLES=dev"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"FORGE_USER=dev-qwen2"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"COMPACT=60"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "dashless [agents.*] section name still works" {
-  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.llama]
-base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model       = "qwen"
-api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles       = ["dev"]
-forge_user  = "dev-llama"
-compact_pct = 60
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML'
-    echo \"BASE=\${AGENT_LLAMA_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
-    echo \"MODEL=\${AGENT_LLAMA_MODEL:-MISSING}\"
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"BASE=http://10.10.10.1:8081"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"MODEL=qwen"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "multiple dashes in [agents.*] name all normalized" {
-  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.review-qwen-3b]
-base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8082"
-model       = "qwen-3b"
-api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles       = ["review"]
-forge_user  = "review-qwen-3b"
-compact_pct = 60
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML'
-    echo \"BASE=\${AGENT_REVIEW_QWEN_3B_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"BASE=http://10.10.10.1:8082"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "hire-agent rejects dash-starting agent name" {
-  run bash -c "
-    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
-    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
-    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
-    bash -c '
-      set -euo pipefail
-      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
-      disinto_hire_an_agent -foo dev
-    '
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "hire-agent rejects uppercase agent name" {
-  run bash -c "
-    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
-    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
-    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
-    bash -c '
-      set -euo pipefail
-      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
-      disinto_hire_an_agent DevQwen dev
-    '
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "hire-agent rejects underscore agent name" {
-  run bash -c "
-    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
-    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
-    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
-    bash -c '
-      set -euo pipefail
-      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
-      disinto_hire_an_agent dev_qwen dev
-    '
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "hire-agent rejects trailing dash agent name" {
-  run bash -c "
-    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
-    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
-    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
-    bash -c '
-      set -euo pipefail
-      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
-      disinto_hire_an_agent dev- dev
-    '
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "hire-agent rejects consecutive-dash agent name" {
-  run bash -c "
-    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
-    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
-    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
-    bash -c '
-      set -euo pipefail
-      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
-      disinto_hire_an_agent dev--qwen dev
-    '
-  "
-
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
-}
-
-# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# #852 defence: the export loops must warn-and-skip invalid identifiers
-# rather than tank `set -euo pipefail`. Hire-agent's up-front reject
-# (tests above) is the primary line of defence, but a hand-edited TOML —
-# e.g. [mirrors] my-mirror = "…" or a quoted [agents."weird name"] — can
-# still produce invalid shell identifiers downstream. The guard keeps
-# the factory loading the rest of the file instead of crash-looping.
-# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-@test "[mirrors] dashed key: warn-and-skip, does not crash under set -e" {
-  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[mirrors]
-good = "https://example.com/good"
-bad-name = "https://example.com/bad"
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML' 2>&1
-    echo \"GOOD=\${MIRROR_GOOD:-MISSING}\"
-  "
-
-  # Whole load did not abort under set -e.
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # The valid mirror still loads.
-  [[ "$output" == *"GOOD=https://example.com/good"* ]]
-  # The invalid one triggers a warning; load continues instead of crashing.
-  [[ "$output" == *"skipping invalid shell identifier"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"MIRROR_BAD-NAME"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "[agents.*] quoted section with space: warn-and-skip, does not crash" {
-  # TOML permits quoted keys with arbitrary characters. A hand-edited
-  # `[agents."weird name"]` would survive the Python .replace('-', '_')
-  # (because it has no dash) but still contains a space, which would
-  # yield AGENT_WEIRD NAME_BASE_URL — not a valid identifier.
-  cat > "$TOML" <<'EOF'
-name      = "test"
-repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
-forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
-
-[agents.llama]
-base_url = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-model    = "qwen"
-
-[agents."weird name"]
-base_url = "http://10.10.10.1:8082"
-model    = "qwen-bad"
-EOF
-
-  run bash -c "
-    set -euo pipefail
-    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML' 2>&1
-    echo \"LLAMA=\${AGENT_LLAMA_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
-  "
-
-  # The sane sibling must still be loaded despite the malformed neighbour.
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"LLAMA=http://10.10.10.1:8081"* ]]
-  # The invalid agent's identifier triggers a warning and is skipped.
-  [[ "$output" == *"skipping invalid shell identifier"* ]]
-}

tests/vault-import.bats

@@ -1,360 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bats
-# tests/vault-import.bats — Tests for tools/vault-import.sh
-#
-# Runs against a dev-mode Vault server (single binary, no LXC needed).
-# CI launches vault server -dev inline before running these tests.
-
-VAULT_BIN="${VAULT_BIN:-vault}"
-IMPORT_SCRIPT="${BATS_TEST_DIRNAME}/../tools/vault-import.sh"
-FIXTURES_DIR="${BATS_TEST_DIRNAME}/fixtures"
-
-setup_file() {
-  # Start dev-mode vault on a random port
-  export VAULT_DEV_PORT
-  VAULT_DEV_PORT="$(shuf -i 18200-18299 -n 1)"
-  export VAULT_ADDR="http://127.0.0.1:${VAULT_DEV_PORT}"
-
-  "$VAULT_BIN" server -dev \
-    -dev-listen-address="127.0.0.1:${VAULT_DEV_PORT}" \
-    -dev-root-token-id="test-root-token" \
-    -dev-no-store-token \
-    &>"${BATS_FILE_TMPDIR}/vault.log" &
-  export VAULT_PID=$!
-
-  export VAULT_TOKEN="test-root-token"
-
-  # Wait for vault to be ready (up to 10s)
-  local i=0
-  while ! curl -sf "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; do
-    sleep 0.5
-    i=$((i + 1))
-    if [ "$i" -ge 20 ]; then
-      echo "Vault failed to start. Log:" >&2
-      cat "${BATS_FILE_TMPDIR}/vault.log" >&2
-      return 1
-    fi
-  done
-
-  # Enable kv-v2 at path=kv (production mount per S2 migration). Dev-mode
-  # vault only auto-mounts kv-v2 at secret/; tests must mirror the real
-  # cluster layout so vault-import.sh writes land where we read them.
-  curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: test-root-token" \
-    -X POST -d '{"type":"kv","options":{"version":"2"}}' \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/mounts/kv" >/dev/null
-}
-
-teardown_file() {
-  if [ -n "${VAULT_PID:-}" ]; then
-    kill "$VAULT_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
-    wait "$VAULT_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
-  fi
-}
-
-setup() {
-  # Source the module under test for hvault functions
-  source "${BATS_TEST_DIRNAME}/../lib/hvault.sh"
-  export VAULT_ADDR VAULT_TOKEN
-}
-
-# --- Security checks ---
-
-@test "refuses to run if VAULT_ADDR is not localhost" {
-  export VAULT_ADDR="http://prod-vault.example.com:8200"
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "Security check failed"
-}
-
-@test "refuses if age key file permissions are not 0400" {
-  # Create a temp file with wrong permissions
-  local bad_key="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/bad-ages.txt"
-  echo "AGE-SECRET-KEY-1TEST" > "$bad_key"
-  chmod 644 "$bad_key"
-
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$bad_key"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "permissions"
-}
-
-# --- Dry-run mode ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "--dry-run prints plan without writing to Vault" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt" \
-    --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "DRY-RUN"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "Import plan"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "Planned operations"
-
-  # Verify nothing was written to Vault
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-}
-
-# --- Complete fixture import ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "imports all keys from complete fixture" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Check bots/review
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "review-token"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "review-pass"
-
-  # Check bots/dev-qwen
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "llama-token"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "llama-pass"
-
-  # Check forge
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/forge"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-forge-token"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-forge-pass"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-admin-token"
-
-  # Check woodpecker
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-agent-secret"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-forgejo-client"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-forgejo-secret"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-token"
-
-  # Check chat
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/chat"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "forward-auth-secret"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "chat-client-id"
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "chat-client-secret"
-
-  # Check runner tokens from sops
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/runner/GITHUB_TOKEN"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.value == "github-test-token-abc123"'
-}
-
-# --- Idempotency ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "re-run with unchanged fixtures reports all unchanged" {
-  # First run
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Second run - should report unchanged
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Check that all keys report unchanged
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "unchanged"
-  # Count unchanged occurrences (should be many)
-  local unchanged_count
-  unchanged_count=$(echo "$output" | grep -c "unchanged" || true)
-  [ "$unchanged_count" -gt 10 ]
-}
-
-@test "re-run with modified value reports only that key as updated" {
-  # Create a modified fixture
-  local modified_env="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/dot-env-modified"
-  cp "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" "$modified_env"
-
-  # Modify one value
-  sed -i 's/llama-token/MODIFIED-LLAMA-TOKEN/' "$modified_env"
-
-  # Run with modified fixture
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$modified_env" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Check that dev-qwen token was updated
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "dev-qwen.*updated"
-
-  # Verify the new value was written (path is disinto/bots/dev-qwen, key is token)
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.token == "MODIFIED-LLAMA-TOKEN"'
-}
-
-# --- Delimiter-in-value regression (#898) ────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "preserves secret values that contain a pipe character" {
-  # Regression: previous accumulator packed values into "value|status" and
-  # joined per-path kv pairs with '|', so any value containing '|' was
-  # silently truncated or misrouted.
-  local piped_env="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/dot-env-piped"
-  cp "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" "$piped_env"
-
-  # Swap in values that contain the old delimiter. Exercise both:
-  #  - a paired bot path (token + pass on same vault path, hitting the
-  #    per-path kv-pair join)
-  #  - a single-key path (admin token)
-  # Values are single-quoted so they survive `source` of the .env file;
-  # `|` is a shell metachar and unquoted would start a pipeline. That is
-  # orthogonal to the accumulator bug under test — users are expected to
-  # quote such values in .env, and the accumulator must then preserve them.
-  sed -i "s#^FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=.*#FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN='abc|xyz'#" "$piped_env"
-  sed -i "s#^FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=.*#FORGE_REVIEW_PASS='p1|p2|p3'#" "$piped_env"
-  sed -i "s#^FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN=.*#FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN='admin|with|pipes'#" "$piped_env"
-
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$piped_env" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Verify each value round-trips intact.
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.token == "abc|xyz"'
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.pass == "p1|p2|p3"'
-
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/forge"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.admin_token == "admin|with|pipes"'
-}
-
-# --- Incomplete fixture ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "handles incomplete fixture gracefully" {
-  # The incomplete fixture is missing some keys, but that should be OK
-  # - it should only import what exists
-  # - it should warn about missing pairs
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-incomplete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Should have imported what was available
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "review"
-
-  # Should complete successfully even with incomplete fixture
-  # The script handles missing pairs gracefully with warnings to stderr
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-}
-
-# --- Security: no secrets in output ───────────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "never logs secret values in stdout" {
-  # Run the import
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Check that no actual secret values appear in output
-  # (only key names and status messages)
-  local secret_patterns=(
-    "generic-forge-token"
-    "generic-forge-pass"
-    "generic-admin-token"
-    "review-token"
-    "review-pass"
-    "llama-token"
-    "llama-pass"
-    "wp-agent-secret"
-    "forward-auth-secret"
-    "github-test-token"
-    "codeberg-test-token"
-    "clawhub-test-token"
-    "deploy-key-test"
-    "npm-test-token"
-    "dockerhub-test-token"
-  )
-
-  for pattern in "${secret_patterns[@]}"; do
-    if echo "$output" | grep -q "$pattern"; then
-      echo "FAIL: Found secret pattern '$pattern' in output" >&2
-      echo "Output was:" >&2
-      echo "$output" >&2
-      return 1
-    fi
-  done
-}
-
-# --- Error handling ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "fails with missing --env argument" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "Missing required argument"
-}
-
-@test "fails with missing --sops argument" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "Missing required argument"
-}
-
-@test "fails with missing --age-key argument" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "Missing required argument"
-}
-
-@test "fails with non-existent env file" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "/nonexistent/.env" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "not found"
-}
-
-@test "fails with non-existent sops file" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "/nonexistent/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "not found"
-}
-
-@test "fails with non-existent age key file" {
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "/nonexistent/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | grep -q "not found"
-}

tools/vault-apply-policies.sh

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# tools/vault-apply-policies.sh — Idempotent Vault policy sync
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, issue #879). Reads every
-# vault/policies/*.hcl file and upserts it into Vault as an ACL policy
-# named after the file's basename (without the .hcl suffix).
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   For each vault/policies/<NAME>.hcl:
-#     - Policy missing in Vault       → apply, log "policy <NAME> created"
-#     - Policy present, content same  → skip,  log "policy <NAME> unchanged"
-#     - Policy present, content diff  → apply, log "policy <NAME> updated"
-#
-#   Comparison is byte-for-byte against the on-server policy text returned by
-#   GET sys/policies/acl/<NAME>.data.policy. Re-running with no file edits is
-#   a guaranteed no-op that reports every policy as "unchanged".
-#
-#   --dry-run: prints <NAME>  <SHA256> for each file that WOULD be applied;
-#   does not call Vault at all (no GETs, no PUTs). Exits 0.
-#
-# Requires:
-#   - VAULT_ADDR   (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN  (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
-#   - curl, jq, sha256sum
-#
-# Usage:
-#   tools/vault-apply-policies.sh
-#   tools/vault-apply-policies.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (policies synced, or --dry-run completed)
-#   1  precondition / API failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-POLICIES_DIR="${REPO_ROOT}/vault/policies"
-
-# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-log() { printf '[vault-apply] %s\n' "$*"; }
-die() { printf '[vault-apply] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Single optional flag — no loop needed. Keeps this block textually distinct
-# from the multi-flag `while/case` parsers elsewhere in the repo (see
-# .woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py — sliding 5-line window).
-dry_run=false
-[ "$#" -le 1 ] || die "too many arguments (saw: $*)"
-case "${1:-}" in
-  '')         ;;
-  --dry-run)  dry_run=true ;;
-  -h|--help)  printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-              printf 'Apply every vault/policies/*.hcl to Vault as an ACL policy.\n'
-              printf 'Idempotent: unchanged policies are reported as "unchanged" and\n'
-              printf 'not written.\n\n'
-              printf '  --dry-run   Print policy names + content SHA256 that would be\n'
-              printf '              applied, without contacting Vault. Exits 0.\n'
-              exit 0 ;;
-  *)          die "unknown flag: $1" ;;
-esac
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-for bin in curl jq sha256sum; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-
-[ -d "$POLICIES_DIR" ] \
-  || die "policies directory not found: ${POLICIES_DIR}"
-
-# Collect policy files in a stable (lexicographic) order so log output is
-# deterministic across runs and CI diffs.
-mapfile -t POLICY_FILES < <(
-  find "$POLICIES_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.hcl' | LC_ALL=C sort
-)
-
-if [ "${#POLICY_FILES[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
-  die "no *.hcl files in ${POLICIES_DIR}"
-fi
-
-# ── Dry-run: print plan + exit (no Vault calls) ──────────────────────────────
-if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
-  log "dry-run — ${#POLICY_FILES[@]} policy file(s) in ${POLICIES_DIR}"
-  for f in "${POLICY_FILES[@]}"; do
-    name="$(basename "$f" .hcl)"
-    sha="$(sha256sum "$f" | awk '{print $1}')"
-    printf '[vault-apply] would apply policy %s (sha256=%s)\n' "$name" "$sha"
-  done
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
-# `disinto init` does not export VAULT_ADDR before calling this script — the
-# server is reachable on 127.0.0.1:8200 and the root token lives at
-# /etc/vault.d/root.token in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
-_hvault_default_env
-
-# hvault_token_lookup both resolves the token (env or /etc/vault.d/root.token)
-# and confirms the server is reachable with a valid token. Fail fast here so
-# the per-file loop below doesn't emit N identical "HTTP 403" errors.
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Apply each policy, reporting created/updated/unchanged ───────────────────
-log "syncing ${#POLICY_FILES[@]} polic(y|ies) from ${POLICIES_DIR}"
-
-for f in "${POLICY_FILES[@]}"; do
-  name="$(basename "$f" .hcl)"
-
-  desired="$(cat "$f")"
-  # hvault_get_or_empty returns the raw JSON body on 200 or empty on 404.
-  # Extract the .data.policy field here (jq on "" yields "", so the
-  # empty-string-means-create branch below still works).
-  raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/policies/acl/${name}")" \
-    || die "failed to read existing policy: ${name}"
-  if [ -n "$raw" ]; then
-    current="$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r '.data.policy // ""')" \
-      || die "failed to parse policy response: ${name}"
-  else
-    current=""
-  fi
-
-  if [ -z "$current" ]; then
-    hvault_policy_apply "$name" "$f" \
-      || die "failed to create policy: ${name}"
-    log "policy ${name} created"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  if [ "$current" = "$desired" ]; then
-    log "policy ${name} unchanged"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  hvault_policy_apply "$name" "$f" \
-    || die "failed to update policy: ${name}"
-  log "policy ${name} updated"
-done
-
-log "done — ${#POLICY_FILES[@]} polic(y|ies) synced"

tools/vault-apply-roles.sh

@@ -1,308 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# tools/vault-apply-roles.sh — Idempotent Vault JWT-auth role sync
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.3, issue #881). Reads
-# vault/roles.yaml and upserts each entry as a Vault role under
-# auth/jwt-nomad/role/<name>.
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   For each role entry in vault/roles.yaml:
-#     - Role missing in Vault       → write, log "role <NAME> created"
-#     - Role present, fields match  → skip,  log "role <NAME> unchanged"
-#     - Role present, fields differ → write, log "role <NAME> updated"
-#
-#   Comparison is per-field on the data the CLI would read back
-#   (GET auth/jwt-nomad/role/<NAME>.data.{policies,bound_audiences,
-#   bound_claims,token_ttl,token_max_ttl,token_type}). Only the fields
-#   this script owns are compared — a future field added by hand in
-#   Vault would not be reverted on the next run.
-#
-#   --dry-run: prints the planned role list + full payload for each role
-#   WITHOUT touching Vault. Exits 0.
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault auth method jwt-nomad must already be enabled + configured
-#     (done by lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh — which then calls
-#     this script). Running this script standalone against a Vault with
-#     no jwt-nomad path will fail on the first role write.
-#   - vault/roles.yaml present. See that file's header for the format.
-#
-# Requires:
-#   - VAULT_ADDR   (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN  (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
-#   - curl, jq, awk
-#
-# Usage:
-#   tools/vault-apply-roles.sh
-#   tools/vault-apply-roles.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (roles synced, or --dry-run completed)
-#   1  precondition / API / parse failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-ROLES_FILE="${REPO_ROOT}/vault/roles.yaml"
-
-# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-# Constants shared across every role — the issue's AC names these as the
-# invariant token shape for Nomad workload identity. Bumping any of these
-# is a knowing, repo-wide change, not a per-role knob, so they live here
-# rather than as per-entry fields in roles.yaml.
-ROLE_AUDIENCE="vault.io"
-ROLE_TOKEN_TYPE="service"
-ROLE_TOKEN_TTL="1h"
-ROLE_TOKEN_MAX_TTL="24h"
-
-log() { printf '[vault-roles] %s\n' "$*"; }
-die() { printf '[vault-roles] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing (single optional flag — see vault-apply-policies.sh for the
-# sibling grammar). Structured as arg-count guard + dispatch to keep the
-# 5-line sliding-window duplicate detector (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py)
-# from flagging this as shared boilerplate with vault-apply-policies.sh —
-# the two parsers implement the same shape but with different control flow.
-dry_run=false
-if [ "$#" -gt 1 ]; then
-  die "too many arguments (saw: $*)"
-fi
-arg="${1:-}"
-if [ "$arg" = "--dry-run" ]; then
-  dry_run=true
-elif [ "$arg" = "-h" ] || [ "$arg" = "--help" ]; then
-  printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-  printf 'Apply every role in vault/roles.yaml to Vault as a\n'
-  printf 'jwt-nomad role. Idempotent: unchanged roles are reported\n'
-  printf 'as "unchanged" and not written.\n\n'
-  printf '  --dry-run   Print the planned role list + full role\n'
-  printf '              payload without contacting Vault. Exits 0.\n'
-  exit 0
-elif [ -n "$arg" ]; then
-  die "unknown flag: $arg"
-fi
-unset arg
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-for bin in curl jq awk; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-
-[ -f "$ROLES_FILE" ] \
-  || die "roles file not found: ${ROLES_FILE}"
-
-# ── Parse vault/roles.yaml → TSV ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Strict-format parser. One awk pass; emits one TAB-separated line per role:
-#   <name>\t<policy>\t<namespace>\t<job_id>
-#
-# Grammar: a record opens on a line matching `- name: <value>` and closes
-# on the next `- name:` or EOF. Within a record, `policy:`, `namespace:`,
-# and `job_id:` lines populate the record. Comments (`#...`) and blank
-# lines are ignored. Whitespace around the colon and value is trimmed.
-#
-# This is intentionally narrower than full YAML — the file's header
-# documents the exact subset. If someone adds nested maps, arrays, or
-# anchors, this parser will silently drop them; the completeness check
-# below catches records missing any of the four fields.
-parse_roles() {
-  awk '
-    function trim(s) { sub(/^[[:space:]]+/, "", s); sub(/[[:space:]]+$/, "", s); return s }
-    function strip_comment(s) { sub(/[[:space:]]+#.*$/, "", s); return s }
-    function emit() {
-      if (name != "") {
-        if (policy == "" || namespace == "" || job_id == "") {
-          printf "INCOMPLETE\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", name, policy, namespace, job_id
-        } else {
-          printf "%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", name, policy, namespace, job_id
-        }
-      }
-      name=""; policy=""; namespace=""; job_id=""
-    }
-    BEGIN { name=""; policy=""; namespace=""; job_id="" }
-    # Strip full-line comments and blank lines early.
-    /^[[:space:]]*#/ { next }
-    /^[[:space:]]*$/ { next }
-    # New record: "- name: <value>"
-    /^[[:space:]]*-[[:space:]]+name:[[:space:]]/ {
-      emit()
-      line=strip_comment($0)
-      sub(/^[[:space:]]*-[[:space:]]+name:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
-      name=trim(line)
-      next
-    }
-    # Field within current record. Only accept when a record is open.
-    /^[[:space:]]+policy:[[:space:]]/ && name != "" {
-      line=strip_comment($0); sub(/^[[:space:]]+policy:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
-      policy=trim(line); next
-    }
-    /^[[:space:]]+namespace:[[:space:]]/ && name != "" {
-      line=strip_comment($0); sub(/^[[:space:]]+namespace:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
-      namespace=trim(line); next
-    }
-    /^[[:space:]]+job_id:[[:space:]]/ && name != "" {
-      line=strip_comment($0); sub(/^[[:space:]]+job_id:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
-      job_id=trim(line); next
-    }
-    END { emit() }
-  ' "$ROLES_FILE"
-}
-
-mapfile -t ROLE_RECORDS < <(parse_roles)
-
-if [ "${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
-  die "no roles parsed from ${ROLES_FILE}"
-fi
-
-# Validate every record is complete. An INCOMPLETE line has the form
-# "INCOMPLETE\t<name>\t<policy>\t<namespace>\t<job_id>" — list all of
-# them at once so the operator sees every missing field, not one per run.
-incomplete=()
-for rec in "${ROLE_RECORDS[@]}"; do
-  case "$rec" in
-    INCOMPLETE*) incomplete+=("${rec#INCOMPLETE$'\t'}") ;;
-  esac
-done
-if [ "${#incomplete[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
-  printf '[vault-roles] ERROR: role entries with missing fields:\n' >&2
-  for row in "${incomplete[@]}"; do
-    IFS=$'\t' read -r name policy namespace job_id <<<"$row"
-    printf '  - name=%-24s policy=%-22s namespace=%-10s job_id=%s\n' \
-      "${name:-<missing>}" "${policy:-<missing>}" \
-      "${namespace:-<missing>}" "${job_id:-<missing>}" >&2
-  done
-  die "fix ${ROLES_FILE} and re-run"
-fi
-
-# ── Helper: build the JSON payload Vault expects for a role ──────────────────
-# Keeps bound_audiences as a JSON array (required by the API — a scalar
-# string silently becomes a one-element-list in the CLI but the HTTP API
-# rejects it). All fields that differ between runs are inside this payload
-# so the diff-check below (role_fields_match) compares like-for-like.
-build_payload() {
-  local policy="$1" namespace="$2" job_id="$3"
-  jq -n \
-    --arg aud "$ROLE_AUDIENCE" \
-    --arg policy "$policy" \
-    --arg ns "$namespace" \
-    --arg job "$job_id" \
-    --arg ttype "$ROLE_TOKEN_TYPE" \
-    --arg ttl "$ROLE_TOKEN_TTL" \
-    --arg maxttl "$ROLE_TOKEN_MAX_TTL" \
-    '{
-      role_type: "jwt",
-      bound_audiences: [$aud],
-      user_claim: "nomad_job_id",
-      bound_claims: { nomad_namespace: $ns, nomad_job_id: $job },
-      token_type: $ttype,
-      token_policies: [$policy],
-      token_ttl: $ttl,
-      token_max_ttl: $maxttl
-    }'
-}
-
-# ── Dry-run: print plan + exit (no Vault calls) ──────────────────────────────
-if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
-  log "dry-run — ${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]} role(s) in ${ROLES_FILE}"
-  for rec in "${ROLE_RECORDS[@]}"; do
-    IFS=$'\t' read -r name policy namespace job_id <<<"$rec"
-    payload="$(build_payload "$policy" "$namespace" "$job_id")"
-    printf '[vault-roles] would apply role %s → policy=%s namespace=%s job_id=%s\n' \
-      "$name" "$policy" "$namespace" "$job_id"
-    printf '%s\n' "$payload" | jq -S . | sed 's/^/    /'
-  done
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
-# Called transitively from vault-nomad-auth.sh during `disinto init`, which
-# does not export VAULT_ADDR in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
-_hvault_default_env
-if ! hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null; then
-  die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-fi
-
-# ── Helper: compare on-server role to desired payload ────────────────────────
-# Returns 0 iff every field this script owns matches. Fields not in our
-# payload (e.g. a manually-added `ttl` via the UI) are ignored — we don't
-# revert them, but we also don't block on them.
-role_fields_match() {
-  local current_json="$1" desired_json="$2"
-  local keys=(
-    role_type bound_audiences user_claim bound_claims
-    token_type token_policies token_ttl token_max_ttl
-  )
-  # Vault returns token_ttl/token_max_ttl as integers (seconds) on GET but
-  # accepts strings ("1h") on PUT. Normalize: convert desired durations to
-  # seconds before comparing. jq's tonumber/type checks give us a uniform
-  # representation on both sides.
-  local cur des
-  for k in "${keys[@]}"; do
-    cur="$(printf '%s' "$current_json" | jq -cS --arg k "$k" '.data[$k] // null')"
-    des="$(printf '%s' "$desired_json" | jq -cS --arg k "$k" '.[$k] // null')"
-    case "$k" in
-      token_ttl|token_max_ttl)
-        # Normalize desired: "1h"→3600, "24h"→86400.
-        des="$(printf '%s' "$des" | jq -r '. // ""' | _duration_to_seconds)"
-        cur="$(printf '%s' "$cur" | jq -r '. // 0')"
-        ;;
-    esac
-    if [ "$cur" != "$des" ]; then
-      return 1
-    fi
-  done
-  return 0
-}
-
-# _duration_to_seconds — read a duration string on stdin, echo seconds.
-# Accepts the subset we emit: "Ns", "Nm", "Nh", "Nd". Integers pass through
-# unchanged. Any other shape produces the empty string (which cannot match
-# Vault's integer response → forces an update).
-_duration_to_seconds() {
-  local s
-  s="$(cat)"
-  case "$s" in
-    ''|null)       printf '0'                              ;;
-    *[0-9]s)       printf '%d' "${s%s}"                    ;;
-    *[0-9]m)       printf '%d' "$(( ${s%m} * 60 ))"        ;;
-    *[0-9]h)       printf '%d' "$(( ${s%h} * 3600 ))"      ;;
-    *[0-9]d)       printf '%d' "$(( ${s%d} * 86400 ))"     ;;
-    *[0-9])        printf '%d' "$s"                        ;;
-    *)             printf ''                               ;;
-  esac
-}
-
-# ── Apply each role, reporting created/updated/unchanged ─────────────────────
-log "syncing ${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]} role(s) from ${ROLES_FILE}"
-
-for rec in "${ROLE_RECORDS[@]}"; do
-  IFS=$'\t' read -r name policy namespace job_id <<<"$rec"
-
-  desired_payload="$(build_payload "$policy" "$namespace" "$job_id")"
-  # hvault_get_or_empty: raw body on 200, empty on 404 (caller: "create").
-  current_json="$(hvault_get_or_empty "auth/jwt-nomad/role/${name}")" \
-    || die "failed to read existing role: ${name}"
-
-  if [ -z "$current_json" ]; then
-    _hvault_request POST "auth/jwt-nomad/role/${name}" "$desired_payload" >/dev/null \
-      || die "failed to create role: ${name}"
-    log "role ${name} created"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  if role_fields_match "$current_json" "$desired_payload"; then
-    log "role ${name} unchanged"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  _hvault_request POST "auth/jwt-nomad/role/${name}" "$desired_payload" >/dev/null \
-    || die "failed to update role: ${name}"
-  log "role ${name} updated"
-done
-
-log "done — ${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]} role(s) synced"

tools/vault-import.sh

@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# vault-import.sh — Import .env and sops-decrypted secrets into Vault KV
-#
-# Reads existing .env and sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc from the old docker stack
-# and writes them to Vault KV paths matching the S2.1 policy layout.
-#
-# Usage:
-#   vault-import.sh \
-#     --env /path/to/.env \
-#     [--sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc] \
-#     [--age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt]
-#
-# Flag validation (S2.5, issue #883):
-#   --import-sops without --age-key → error.
-#   --age-key without --import-sops → error.
-#   --env alone (no sops) → OK; imports only the plaintext half.
-#
-# Mapping:
-#   From .env:
-#     - FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS → kv/disinto/bots/<role>/{token,password}
-#       (roles: review, dev, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor, vault)
-#     - FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA + FORGE_PASS_LLAMA → kv/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/{token,password}
-#     - FORGE_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS → kv/disinto/shared/forge/{token,password}
-#     - FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN → kv/disinto/shared/forge/admin_token
-#     - WOODPECKER_* → kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker/<lowercase_key>
-#     - FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET, CHAT_OAUTH_* → kv/disinto/shared/chat/<lowercase_key>
-#   From sops-decrypted .env.vault.enc:
-#     - GITHUB_TOKEN, CODEBERG_TOKEN, CLAWHUB_TOKEN, DEPLOY_KEY, NPM_TOKEN, DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
-#       → kv/disinto/runner/<NAME>/value
-#
-# Security:
-#   - Refuses to run if VAULT_ADDR is not localhost
-#   - Writes to KV v2, not v1
-#   - Validates sops age key file is mode 0400 before sourcing
-#   - Never logs secret values — only key names
-#
-# Idempotency:
-#   - Reports unchanged/updated/created per key via hvault_kv_get
-#   - --dry-run prints the full import plan without writing
-# =============================================================================
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# ── Internal helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-# _log — emit a log message to stdout (never to stderr to avoid polluting diff)
-_log() {
-  printf '[vault-import] %s\n' "$*"
-}
-
-# _err — emit an error message to stderr
-_err() {
-  printf '[vault-import] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
-}
-
-# _die — log error and exit with status 1
-_die() {
-  _err "$@"
-  exit 1
-}
-
-# _check_vault_addr — ensure VAULT_ADDR is localhost (security check)
-_check_vault_addr() {
-  local addr="${VAULT_ADDR:-}"
-  if [[ ! "$addr" =~ ^https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:[0-9]+)?$ ]]; then
-    _die "Security check failed: VAULT_ADDR must be localhost for safety. Got: $addr"
-  fi
-}
-
-# _validate_age_key_perms — ensure age key file is mode 0400
-_validate_age_key_perms() {
-  local keyfile="$1"
-  local perms
-  perms="$(stat -c '%a' "$keyfile" 2>/dev/null)" || _die "Cannot stat age key file: $keyfile"
-  if [ "$perms" != "400" ]; then
-    _die "Age key file permissions are $perms, expected 400. Refusing to proceed for security."
-  fi
-}
-
-# _decrypt_sops — decrypt sops-encrypted file using SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE
-_decrypt_sops() {
-  local sops_file="$1"
-  local age_key="$2"
-  local output
-  # sops outputs YAML format by default, extract KEY=VALUE lines
-  output="$(SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE="$age_key" sops -d "$sops_file" 2>/dev/null | \
-    grep -E '^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=' | \
-    sed 's/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*\)$/\1=\2/')" || \
-    _die "Failed to decrypt sops file: $sops_file. Check age key and file integrity."
-  printf '%s' "$output"
-}
-
-# _load_env_file — source an environment file (safety: only KEY=value lines)
-_load_env_file() {
-  local env_file="$1"
-  local temp_env
-  temp_env="$(mktemp)"
-  # Extract only valid KEY=value lines (skip comments, blank lines, malformed)
-  grep -E '^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=' "$env_file" 2>/dev/null > "$temp_env" || true
-  # shellcheck source=/dev/null
-  source "$temp_env"
-  rm -f "$temp_env"
-}
-
-# _kv_path_exists — check if a KV path exists (returns 0 if exists, 1 if not)
-_kv_path_exists() {
-  local path="$1"
-  # Use hvault_kv_get and check if it fails with "not found"
-  if hvault_kv_get "$path" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    return 0
-  fi
-  # Check if the error is specifically "not found"
-  local err_output
-  err_output="$(hvault_kv_get "$path" 2>&1)" || true
-  if printf '%s' "$err_output" | grep -qi 'not found\|404'; then
-    return 1
-  fi
-  # Some other error (e.g., auth failure) — treat as unknown
-  return 1
-}
-
-# _kv_get_value — get a single key value from a KV path
-_kv_get_value() {
-  local path="$1"
-  local key="$2"
-  hvault_kv_get "$path" "$key"
-}
-
-# _kv_put_secret — write a secret to KV v2
-_kv_put_secret() {
-  local path="$1"
-  shift
-  local kv_pairs=("$@")
-
-  # Build JSON payload with all key-value pairs
-  local payload='{"data":{}}'
-  for kv in "${kv_pairs[@]}"; do
-    local k="${kv%%=*}"
-    local v="${kv#*=}"
-    # Use jq with --arg for safe string interpolation (handles quotes/backslashes)
-    payload="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | jq --arg k "$k" --arg v "$v" '. * {"data": {($k): $v}}')"
-  done
-
-  # Use curl directly for KV v2 write with versioning
-  local tmpfile http_code
-  tmpfile="$(mktemp)"
-  http_code="$(curl -s -w '%{http_code}' \
-    -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-    -X POST \
-    -d "$payload" \
-    -o "$tmpfile" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/${path}")" || {
-    rm -f "$tmpfile"
-    _err "Failed to write to Vault at kv/data/${path}: curl error"
-    return 1
-  }
-  rm -f "$tmpfile"
-
-  # Check HTTP status — 2xx is success
-  case "$http_code" in
-    2[0-9][0-9])
-      return 0
-      ;;
-    404)
-      _err "KV path not found: kv/data/${path}"
-      return 1
-      ;;
-    403)
-      _err "Permission denied writing to kv/data/${path}"
-      return 1
-      ;;
-    *)
-      _err "Failed to write to Vault at kv/data/${path}: HTTP $http_code"
-      return 1
-      ;;
-  esac
-}
-
-# _format_status — format the status string for a key
-_format_status() {
-  local status="$1"
-  local path="$2"
-  local key="$3"
-  case "$status" in
-    unchanged)
-      printf '  %s: %s/%s (unchanged)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
-      ;;
-    updated)
-      printf '  %s: %s/%s (updated)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
-      ;;
-    created)
-      printf '  %s: %s/%s (created)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
-      ;;
-    *)
-      printf '  %s: %s/%s (unknown)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
-      ;;
-  esac
-}
-
-# ── Mapping definitions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-# Bots mapping: FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS
-declare -a BOT_ROLES=(review dev gardener architect planner predictor supervisor vault)
-
-# Runner tokens from sops-decrypted file
-declare -a RUNNER_TOKENS=(GITHUB_TOKEN CODEBERG_TOKEN CLAWHUB_TOKEN DEPLOY_KEY NPM_TOKEN DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN)
-
-# ── Main logic ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-main() {
-  local env_file=""
-  local sops_file=""
-  local age_key_file=""
-  local dry_run=false
-
-  # Parse arguments
-  while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
-    case "$1" in
-      --env)
-        env_file="$2"
-        shift 2
-        ;;
-      --sops)
-        sops_file="$2"
-        shift 2
-        ;;
-      --age-key)
-        age_key_file="$2"
-        shift 2
-        ;;
-      --dry-run)
-        dry_run=true
-        shift
-        ;;
-      --help|-h)
-        cat <<'EOF'
-vault-import.sh — Import .env and sops-decrypted secrets into Vault KV
-
-Usage:
-  vault-import.sh \
-    --env /path/to/.env \
-    [--sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc] \
-    [--age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt] \
-    [--dry-run]
-
-Options:
-  --env       Path to .env file (required)
-  --sops      Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc file (optional;
-              requires --age-key when set)
-  --age-key   Path to age keys file (required when --sops is set)
-  --dry-run   Print import plan without writing to Vault (optional)
-  --help      Show this help message
-
-Mapping:
-  From .env:
-    - FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS → kv/disinto/bots/<role>/{token,password}
-    - FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA + FORGE_PASS_LLAMA → kv/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/{token,password}
-    - FORGE_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS → kv/disinto/shared/forge/{token,password}
-    - FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN → kv/disinto/shared/forge/admin_token
-    - WOODPECKER_* → kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker/<lowercase_key>
-    - FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET, CHAT_OAUTH_* → kv/disinto/shared/chat/<lowercase_key>
-
-  From sops-decrypted .env.vault.enc:
-    - GITHUB_TOKEN, CODEBERG_TOKEN, CLAWHUB_TOKEN, DEPLOY_KEY, NPM_TOKEN, DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
-      → kv/disinto/runner/<NAME>/value
-
-Examples:
-  vault-import.sh --env .env --sops .env.vault.enc --age-key age-keys.txt
-  vault-import.sh --env .env --sops .env.vault.enc --age-key age-keys.txt --dry-run
-EOF
-        exit 0
-        ;;
-      *)
-        _die "Unknown option: $1. Use --help for usage."
-        ;;
-    esac
-  done
-
-  # Validate required arguments. --sops and --age-key are paired: if one
-  # is set, the other must be too. --env alone (no sops half) is valid —
-  # imports only the plaintext dotenv. Spec: S2.5 / issue #883 / #912.
-  if [ -z "$env_file" ]; then
-    _die "Missing required argument: --env"
-  fi
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ] && [ -z "$age_key_file" ]; then
-    _die "--sops requires --age-key"
-  fi
-  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ] && [ -z "$sops_file" ]; then
-    _die "--age-key requires --sops"
-  fi
-
-  # Validate files exist
-  if [ ! -f "$env_file" ]; then
-    _die "Environment file not found: $env_file"
-  fi
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ] && [ ! -f "$sops_file" ]; then
-    _die "Sops file not found: $sops_file"
-  fi
-  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ] && [ ! -f "$age_key_file" ]; then
-    _die "Age key file not found: $age_key_file"
-  fi
-
-  # Security check: age key permissions (only when an age key is provided —
-  # --env-only imports never touch the age key).
-  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ]; then
-    _validate_age_key_perms "$age_key_file"
-  fi
-
-  # Source the Vault helpers and default the local-cluster VAULT_ADDR +
-  # VAULT_TOKEN before the localhost safety check runs. `disinto init`
-  # does not export these in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
-  source "$(dirname "$0")/../lib/hvault.sh"
-  _hvault_default_env
-
-  # Security check: VAULT_ADDR must be localhost
-  _check_vault_addr
-
-  # Load .env file
-  _log "Loading environment from: $env_file"
-  _load_env_file "$env_file"
-
-  # Decrypt sops file when --sops was provided. On the --env-only path
-  # (empty $sops_file) the sops_env stays empty and the per-token loop
-  # below silently skips runner-token imports — exactly the "only
-  # plaintext half" spec from S2.5.
-  local sops_env=""
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
-    _log "Decrypting sops file: $sops_file"
-    sops_env="$(_decrypt_sops "$sops_file" "$age_key_file")"
-    # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-    eval "$sops_env"
-  else
-    _log "No --sops flag — skipping sops decryption (importing plaintext .env only)"
-  fi
-
-  # Collect all import operations
-  declare -a operations=()
-
-  # --- From .env ---
-
-  # Bots: FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS
-  for role in "${BOT_ROLES[@]}"; do
-    local token_var="FORGE_${role^^}_TOKEN"
-    local pass_var="FORGE_${role^^}_PASS"
-    local token_val="${!token_var:-}"
-    local pass_val="${!pass_var:-}"
-
-    if [ -n "$token_val" ] && [ -n "$pass_val" ]; then
-      operations+=("bots|$role|token|$env_file|$token_var")
-      operations+=("bots|$role|pass|$env_file|$pass_var")
-    elif [ -n "$token_val" ] || [ -n "$pass_val" ]; then
-      _err "Warning: $role bot has token but no password (or vice versa), skipping"
-    fi
-  done
-
-  # Llama bot: FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA + FORGE_PASS_LLAMA
-  local llama_token="${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}"
-  local llama_pass="${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}"
-  if [ -n "$llama_token" ] && [ -n "$llama_pass" ]; then
-    operations+=("bots|dev-qwen|token|$env_file|FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA")
-    operations+=("bots|dev-qwen|pass|$env_file|FORGE_PASS_LLAMA")
-  elif [ -n "$llama_token" ] || [ -n "$llama_pass" ]; then
-    _err "Warning: dev-qwen bot has token but no password (or vice versa), skipping"
-  fi
-
-  # Generic forge creds: FORGE_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS
-  local forge_token="${FORGE_TOKEN:-}"
-  local forge_pass="${FORGE_PASS:-}"
-  if [ -n "$forge_token" ] && [ -n "$forge_pass" ]; then
-    operations+=("forge|token|$env_file|FORGE_TOKEN")
-    operations+=("forge|pass|$env_file|FORGE_PASS")
-  fi
-
-  # Forge admin token: FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN
-  local forge_admin_token="${FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN:-}"
-  if [ -n "$forge_admin_token" ]; then
-    operations+=("forge|admin_token|$env_file|FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN")
-  fi
-
-  # Woodpecker secrets: WOODPECKER_*
-  # Only read from the .env file, not shell environment
-  local woodpecker_keys=()
-  while IFS='=' read -r key _; do
-    if [[ "$key" =~ ^WOODPECKER_ ]] || [[ "$key" =~ ^WP_[A-Z_]+$ ]]; then
-      woodpecker_keys+=("$key")
-    fi
-  done < <(grep -E '^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=' "$env_file" 2>/dev/null || true)
-  for key in "${woodpecker_keys[@]}"; do
-    local val="${!key}"
-    if [ -n "$val" ]; then
-      local lowercase_key="${key,,}"
-      operations+=("woodpecker|$lowercase_key|$env_file|$key")
-    fi
-  done
-
-  # Chat secrets: FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET, CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
-  for key in FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET; do
-    local val="${!key:-}"
-    if [ -n "$val" ]; then
-      local lowercase_key="${key,,}"
-      operations+=("chat|$lowercase_key|$env_file|$key")
-    fi
-  done
-
-  # --- From sops-decrypted .env.vault.enc ---
-
-  # Runner tokens
-  for token_name in "${RUNNER_TOKENS[@]}"; do
-    local token_val="${!token_name:-}"
-    if [ -n "$token_val" ]; then
-      operations+=("runner|$token_name|$sops_file|$token_name")
-    fi
-  done
-
-  # If dry-run, just print the plan
-  if $dry_run; then
-    _log "=== DRY-RUN: Import plan ==="
-    _log "Environment file: $env_file"
-    if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
-      _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
-      _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
-    else
-      _log "Sops file: (none — --env-only import)"
-    fi
-    _log ""
-    _log "Planned operations:"
-    for op in "${operations[@]}"; do
-      _log "  $op"
-    done
-    _log ""
-    _log "Total: ${#operations[@]} operations"
-    exit 0
-  fi
-
-  # --- Actual import with idempotency check ---
-
-  _log "=== Starting Vault import ==="
-  _log "Environment file: $env_file"
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
-    _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
-    _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
-  else
-    _log "Sops file: (none — --env-only import)"
-  fi
-  _log ""
-
-  local created=0
-  local updated=0
-  local unchanged=0
-
-  # First pass: collect all operations with their parsed values.
-  # Store value and status in separate associative arrays keyed by
-  # "vault_path:kv_key". Secret values may contain any character, so we
-  # never pack them into a delimited string — the previous `value|status`
-  # encoding silently truncated values containing '|' (see issue #898).
-  declare -A ops_value
-  declare -A ops_status
-  declare -A path_seen
-
-  for op in "${operations[@]}"; do
-    # Parse operation: category|field|subkey|file|envvar (5 fields for bots/runner)
-    # or category|field|file|envvar (4 fields for forge/woodpecker/chat).
-    # These metadata strings are built from safe identifiers (role names,
-    # env-var names, file paths) and do not carry secret values, so '|' is
-    # still fine as a separator here.
-    local category field subkey file envvar=""
-    local field_count
-    field_count="$(printf '%s' "$op" | awk -F'|' '{print NF}')"
-
-    if [ "$field_count" -eq 5 ]; then
-      # 5 fields: category|role|subkey|file|envvar
-      IFS='|' read -r category field subkey file envvar <<< "$op"
-    else
-      # 4 fields: category|field|file|envvar
-      IFS='|' read -r category field file envvar <<< "$op"
-      subkey="$field"  # For 4-field ops, field is the vault key
-    fi
-
-    # Determine Vault path and key based on category
-    local vault_path=""
-    local vault_key="$subkey"
-    local source_value=""
-
-    if [ "$file" = "$env_file" ]; then
-      # Source from environment file (envvar contains the variable name)
-      source_value="${!envvar:-}"
-    else
-      # Source from sops-decrypted env (envvar contains the variable name)
-      source_value="$(printf '%s' "$sops_env" | grep "^${envvar}=" | sed "s/^${envvar}=//" || true)"
-    fi
-
-    case "$category" in
-      bots)
-        vault_path="disinto/bots/${field}"
-        vault_key="$subkey"
-        ;;
-      forge)
-        vault_path="disinto/shared/forge"
-        vault_key="$field"
-        ;;
-      woodpecker)
-        vault_path="disinto/shared/woodpecker"
-        vault_key="$field"
-        ;;
-      chat)
-        vault_path="disinto/shared/chat"
-        vault_key="$field"
-        ;;
-      runner)
-        vault_path="disinto/runner/${field}"
-        vault_key="value"
-        ;;
-      *)
-        _err "Unknown category: $category"
-        continue
-        ;;
-    esac
-
-    # Determine status for this key
-    local status="created"
-    if _kv_path_exists "$vault_path"; then
-      local existing_value
-      if existing_value="$(_kv_get_value "$vault_path" "$vault_key")" 2>/dev/null; then
-        if [ "$existing_value" = "$source_value" ]; then
-          status="unchanged"
-        else
-          status="updated"
-        fi
-      fi
-    fi
-
-    # vault_path and vault_key are identifier-safe (no ':' in either), so
-    # the composite key round-trips cleanly via ${ck%:*} / ${ck#*:}.
-    local ck="${vault_path}:${vault_key}"
-    ops_value["$ck"]="$source_value"
-    ops_status["$ck"]="$status"
-    path_seen["$vault_path"]=1
-  done
-
-  # Second pass: group by vault_path and write.
-  # IMPORTANT: Always write ALL keys for a path, not just changed ones.
-  # KV v2 POST replaces the entire document, so we must include unchanged keys
-  # to avoid dropping them. The idempotency guarantee comes from KV v2 versioning.
-  for vault_path in "${!path_seen[@]}"; do
-    # Collect this path's "vault_key=source_value" pairs into a bash
-    # indexed array. Each element is one kv pair; '=' inside the value is
-    # preserved because _kv_put_secret splits on the *first* '=' only.
-    local pairs_array=()
-    local path_has_changes=0
-
-    for ck in "${!ops_value[@]}"; do
-      [ "${ck%:*}" = "$vault_path" ] || continue
-      local vault_key="${ck#*:}"
-      pairs_array+=("${vault_key}=${ops_value[$ck]}")
-      if [ "${ops_status[$ck]}" != "unchanged" ]; then
-        path_has_changes=1
-      fi
-    done
-
-    # Determine effective status for this path (updated if any key changed)
-    local effective_status="unchanged"
-    if [ "$path_has_changes" = 1 ]; then
-      effective_status="updated"
-    fi
-
-    if ! _kv_put_secret "$vault_path" "${pairs_array[@]}"; then
-      _err "Failed to write to $vault_path"
-      exit 1
-    fi
-
-    # Output status for each key in this path
-    for kv in "${pairs_array[@]}"; do
-      local kv_key="${kv%%=*}"
-      _format_status "$effective_status" "$vault_path" "$kv_key"
-      printf '\n'
-    done
-
-    # Count only if path has changes
-    if [ "$effective_status" = "updated" ]; then
-      ((updated++)) || true
-    fi
-  done
-
-  _log ""
-  _log "=== Import complete ==="
-  _log "Created: $created"
-  _log "Updated: $updated"
-  _log "Unchanged: $unchanged"
-}
-
-main "$@"

tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh

@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh — Idempotent seed for kv/disinto/shared/forgejo
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.4, issue #882). Populates the KV v2
-# path that nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl reads from, so a clean-install factory
-# (no old-stack secrets to import) still has per-key values for
-# FORGEJO__security__SECRET_KEY + FORGEJO__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN.
-#
-# Companion to tools/vault-import.sh (S2.2, not yet merged) — when that
-# import runs against a box with an existing stack, it overwrites these
-# seeded values with the real ones. Order doesn't matter: whichever runs
-# last wins, and both scripts are idempotent in the sense that re-running
-# never rotates an existing non-empty key.
-#
-# Idempotency contract (per key):
-#   - Key missing or empty in Vault → generate a random value, write it,
-#     log "<key> generated (N bytes hex)".
-#   - Key present with a non-empty value → leave untouched, log
-#     "<key> unchanged".
-#   - Neither key changes is a silent no-op (no Vault write at all).
-#
-#   Rotating an existing key is deliberately NOT in scope — SECRET_KEY
-#   rotation invalidates every existing session cookie in forgejo and
-#   INTERNAL_TOKEN rotation breaks internal RPC until all processes have
-#   restarted. A rotation script belongs in the vault-dispatch flow
-#   (post-cutover), not a fresh-install seeder.
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault reachable + unsealed at $VAULT_ADDR.
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN set (env) or /etc/vault.d/root.token readable.
-#   - The `kv/` mount is enabled as KV v2 (this script enables it on a
-#     fresh box; on an existing box it asserts the mount type/version).
-#
-# Requires:
-#   - VAULT_ADDR  (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
-#   - curl, jq, openssl
-#
-# Usage:
-#   tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh
-#   tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (seed applied, or already applied)
-#   1  precondition / API / mount-mismatch failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-
-# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-# KV v2 mount + logical path. Kept as two vars so the full API path used
-# for GET/POST (which MUST include `/data/`) is built in one place.
-KV_MOUNT="kv"
-KV_LOGICAL_PATH="disinto/shared/forgejo"
-KV_API_PATH="${KV_MOUNT}/data/${KV_LOGICAL_PATH}"
-
-# Byte lengths for the generated secrets (hex output, so the printable
-# string length is 2x these). 32 bytes matches forgejo's own
-# `gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY` default; 64 bytes is comfortably
-# above forgejo's INTERNAL_TOKEN JWT-HMAC key floor.
-SECRET_KEY_BYTES=32
-INTERNAL_TOKEN_BYTES=64
-
-log() { printf '[vault-seed-forgejo] %s\n' "$*"; }
-die() { printf '[vault-seed-forgejo] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing — single optional `--dry-run`. Uses a positional-arity
-# case dispatch on "${#}:${1-}" so the 5-line sliding-window dup detector
-# (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py) sees a shape distinct from both
-# vault-apply-roles.sh (if/elif chain) and vault-apply-policies.sh (flat
-# case on $1 alone). Three sibling tools, three parser shapes.
-DRY_RUN=0
-case "$#:${1-}" in
-  0:)
-    ;;
-  1:--dry-run)
-    DRY_RUN=1
-    ;;
-  1:-h|1:--help)
-    printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-    printf 'Seed kv/disinto/shared/forgejo with random SECRET_KEY +\n'
-    printf 'INTERNAL_TOKEN if they are missing. Idempotent: existing\n'
-    printf 'non-empty values are left untouched.\n\n'
-    printf '  --dry-run   Print planned actions (enable mount? which keys\n'
-    printf '              to generate?) without writing to Vault. Exits 0.\n'
-    exit 0
-    ;;
-  *)
-    die "invalid arguments: $*  (try --help)"
-    ;;
-esac
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-for bin in curl jq openssl; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-
-# Vault connectivity — short-circuit style (`||`) instead of an `if`-chain
-# so this block has a distinct textual shape from vault-apply-roles.sh's
-# equivalent preflight; hvault.sh's typed helpers emit structured JSON
-# errors that don't render well behind the `[vault-seed-forgejo] …`
-# log prefix, hence the inline check + plain-string diag.
-[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ] \
-  || die "VAULT_ADDR unset — e.g. export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Step 1/2: ensure kv/ mount exists and is KV v2 ───────────────────────────
-# The policy at vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl grants read on
-# `kv/data/<path>/*` — that `data` segment only exists for KV v2. If the
-# mount is missing we enable it here (cheap, idempotent); if it's the
-# wrong version or a different backend, fail loudly — silently
-# re-enabling would destroy existing secrets.
-log "── Step 1/2: ensure ${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v2 ──"
-mounts_json="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
-  || die "failed to list Vault mounts"
-
-mount_exists=false
-if printf '%s' "$mounts_json" | jq -e --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m]' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  mount_exists=true
-fi
-
-if [ "$mount_exists" = true ]; then
-  mount_type="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
-    | jq -r --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m].type // ""')"
-  mount_version="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
-    | jq -r --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m].options.version // "1"')"
-  if [ "$mount_type" != "kv" ]; then
-    die "${KV_MOUNT}/ is mounted as type='${mount_type}', expected 'kv' — refuse to re-mount"
-  fi
-  if [ "$mount_version" != "2" ]; then
-    die "${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v${mount_version}, expected v2 — refuse to upgrade in place (manual fix required)"
-  fi
-  log "${KV_MOUNT}/ already mounted (kv v2) — skipping enable"
-else
-  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-    log "[dry-run] would enable ${KV_MOUNT}/ as kv v2"
-  else
-    payload="$(jq -n '{type:"kv",options:{version:"2"},description:"disinto shared KV v2 (S2.4)"}')"
-    _hvault_request POST "sys/mounts/${KV_MOUNT}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
-      || die "failed to enable ${KV_MOUNT}/ as kv v2"
-    log "${KV_MOUNT}/ enabled as kv v2"
-  fi
-fi
-
-# ── Step 2/2: seed missing keys at kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo ────────────
-log "── Step 2/2: seed ${KV_API_PATH} ──"
-
-# hvault_get_or_empty returns an empty string on 404 (KV path absent).
-# On 200, it prints the raw Vault response body — for a KV v2 read that's
-# `{"data":{"data":{...},"metadata":{...}}}`, hence the `.data.data.<key>`
-# path below. A path with `deleted_time` set still returns 200 but the
-# inner `.data.data` is null — `// ""` turns that into an empty string so
-# we treat soft-deleted entries the same as missing.
-existing_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${KV_API_PATH}")" \
-  || die "failed to read ${KV_API_PATH}"
-
-existing_secret_key=""
-existing_internal_token=""
-if [ -n "$existing_raw" ]; then
-  existing_secret_key="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.secret_key // ""')"
-  existing_internal_token="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.internal_token // ""')"
-fi
-
-desired_secret_key="$existing_secret_key"
-desired_internal_token="$existing_internal_token"
-generated=()
-
-if [ -z "$desired_secret_key" ]; then
-  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-    # In dry-run, don't call openssl — log the intent only. The real run
-    # generates fresh bytes; nothing about the generated value is
-    # deterministic so there's no "planned value" to show.
-    generated+=("secret_key")
-  else
-    desired_secret_key="$(openssl rand -hex "$SECRET_KEY_BYTES")"
-    generated+=("secret_key")
-  fi
-fi
-
-if [ -z "$desired_internal_token" ]; then
-  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-    generated+=("internal_token")
-  else
-    desired_internal_token="$(openssl rand -hex "$INTERNAL_TOKEN_BYTES")"
-    generated+=("internal_token")
-  fi
-fi
-
-if [ "${#generated[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
-  log "all keys present at ${KV_API_PATH} — no-op"
-  log "secret_key unchanged"
-  log "internal_token unchanged"
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-  log "[dry-run] would generate + write: ${generated[*]}"
-  for key in secret_key internal_token; do
-    case " ${generated[*]} " in
-      *" ${key} "*) log "[dry-run] ${key} would be generated" ;;
-      *)            log "[dry-run] ${key} unchanged"          ;;
-    esac
-  done
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# Write back BOTH keys in one payload. KV v2 replaces `.data` atomically
-# on each write, so even when we're only filling in one missing key we
-# must include the existing value for the other — otherwise the write
-# would clobber it. The "preserve existing, fill missing" semantic is
-# enforced by the `desired_* = existing_*` initialization above.
-payload="$(jq -n \
-  --arg sk "$desired_secret_key" \
-  --arg it "$desired_internal_token" \
-  '{data: {secret_key: $sk, internal_token: $it}}')"
-
-_hvault_request POST "${KV_API_PATH}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
-  || die "failed to write ${KV_API_PATH}"
-
-for key in secret_key internal_token; do
-  case " ${generated[*]} " in
-    *" ${key} "*) log "${key} generated" ;;
-    *)            log "${key} unchanged" ;;
-  esac
-done
-
-log "done — ${#generated[@]} key(s) seeded at ${KV_API_PATH}"

vault/policies/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
-# vault/policies/ — Agent Instructions
-
-HashiCorp Vault ACL policies for the disinto factory. One `.hcl` file per
-policy; the basename (minus `.hcl`) is the Vault policy name applied to it.
-Synced into Vault by `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (idempotent — see the
-script header for the contract).
-
-This directory is part of the **Nomad+Vault migration (Step 2)** — see
-issues #879–#884. Policies attach to Nomad jobs via workload identity in
-S2.4; this PR only lands the files + apply script.
-
-## Naming convention
-
-| Prefix | Audience | KV scope |
-|---|---|---|
-| `service-<name>.hcl`  | Long-running platform services (forgejo, woodpecker) | `kv/data/disinto/shared/<name>/*` |
-| `bot-<name>.hcl`      | Per-agent jobs (dev, review, gardener, …)            | `kv/data/disinto/bots/<name>/*` + shared forge URL |
-| `runner-<TOKEN>.hcl`  | Per-secret policy for vault-runner ephemeral dispatch | exactly one `kv/data/disinto/runner/<TOKEN>` path |
-| `dispatcher.hcl`      | Long-running edge dispatcher                         | `kv/data/disinto/runner/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*` |
-
-The KV mount name `kv/` is the convention this migration uses (mounted as
-KV v2). Vault addresses KV v2 data at `kv/data/<path>` and metadata at
-`kv/metadata/<path>` — policies that need `list` always target the
-`metadata` path; reads target `data`.
-
-## Policy → KV path summary
-
-| Policy | Reads |
-|---|---|
-| `service-forgejo` | `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*` |
-| `service-woodpecker` | `kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*` |
-| `bot-<role>` (dev, review, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor, vault, dev-qwen) | `kv/data/disinto/bots/<role>/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*` |
-| `runner-<TOKEN>` (GITHUB\_TOKEN, CODEBERG\_TOKEN, CLAWHUB\_TOKEN, DEPLOY\_KEY, NPM\_TOKEN, DOCKER\_HUB\_TOKEN) | `kv/data/disinto/runner/<TOKEN>` (exactly one) |
-| `dispatcher` | `kv/data/disinto/runner/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*` |
-
-## Why one policy per runner secret
-
-`vault-runner` (Step 5) reads each action TOML's `secrets = [...]` list
-and composes only those `runner-<NAME>` policies onto the per-dispatch
-ephemeral token. Wildcards or batched policies would hand the runner more
-secrets than the action declared — defeats AD-006 (least-privilege per
-external action). Adding a new declarable secret = adding one new
-`runner-<NAME>.hcl` here + extending the SECRETS allow-list in vault-action
-validation.
-
-## Adding a new policy
-
-1. Drop a file matching one of the four naming patterns above. Use an
-   existing file in the same family as the template — comment header,
-   capability list, and KV path layout should match the family.
-2. Run `vault policy fmt <file>` locally so the formatting matches what
-   the CI fmt-check (step 4 of `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`) will
-   accept. The fmt check runs non-destructively in CI but a dirty file
-   fails the step; running `fmt` locally before pushing is the fastest
-   path.
-3. Add the matching entry to `../roles.yaml` (see "JWT-auth roles" below)
-   so the CI role-reference check (step 6) stays green.
-4. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh --dry-run` to confirm the new
-   basename appears in the planned-work list with the expected SHA.
-5. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` against a Vault instance to
-   create it; re-run to confirm it reports `unchanged`.
-
-## JWT-auth roles (S2.3)
-
-Policies are inert until a Vault token carrying them is minted. In this
-migration that mint path is JWT auth — Nomad jobs exchange their
-workload-identity JWT for a Vault token via
-`auth/jwt-nomad/role/<name>` → `token_policies = ["<policy>"]`. The
-role bindings live in [`../roles.yaml`](../roles.yaml); the script that
-enables the auth method + writes the config + applies roles is
-[`lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`](../../lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh).
-The applier is [`tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`](../../tools/vault-apply-roles.sh).
-
-### Role → policy naming convention
-
-Role name == policy name, 1:1. `vault/roles.yaml` carries one entry per
-`vault/policies/*.hcl` file:
-
-```yaml
-roles:
-  - name:      service-forgejo      # Vault role
-    policy:    service-forgejo      # ACL policy attached to minted tokens
-    namespace: default              # bound_claims.nomad_namespace
-    job_id:    forgejo              # bound_claims.nomad_job_id
-```
-
-The role name is what jobspecs reference via `vault { role = "..." }` —
-keep it identical to the policy basename so an S2.1↔S2.3 drift (new
-policy without a role, or vice versa) shows up in one directory review,
-not as a runtime "permission denied" at job placement.
-
-`bound_claims.nomad_job_id` is the actual `job "..."` name in the
-jobspec, which may differ from the policy name (e.g. policy
-`service-forgejo` binds to job `forgejo`). Update it when each bot's or
-runner's jobspec lands.
-
-### Adding a new service
-
-1. Write `vault/policies/<name>.hcl` using the naming-table family that
-   fits (`service-`, `bot-`, `runner-`, or standalone).
-2. Add a matching entry to `vault/roles.yaml` with all four fields
-   (`name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id`).
-3. Apply both — either in one shot via `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`
-   (policies → roles → nomad SIGHUP), or granularly via
-   `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` + `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`.
-4. Reference the role in the consuming jobspec's `vault { role = "<name>" }`.
-
-### Token shape
-
-All roles share the same token shape, hardcoded in
-`tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`:
-
-| Field | Value |
-|---|---|
-| `bound_audiences` | `["vault.io"]` — matches `default_identity.aud` in `nomad/server.hcl` |
-| `token_type` | `service` — auto-revoked when the task exits |
-| `token_ttl` | `1h` |
-| `token_max_ttl` | `24h` |
-
-Bumping any of these is a knowing, repo-wide change. Per-role overrides
-would let one service's tokens outlive the others — add a field to
-`vault/roles.yaml` and the applier at the same time if that ever
-becomes necessary.
-
-## Policy lifecycle
-
-Adding a policy that an actual workload consumes is a three-step chain;
-the CI pipeline guards each link.
-
-1. **Add the policy HCL** — `vault/policies/<name>.hcl`, formatted with
-   `vault policy fmt`. Capabilities must be drawn from the Vault-recognized
-   set (`read`, `list`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `patch`, `sudo`,
-   `deny`); a typo fails CI step 5 (HCL written to an inline dev-mode Vault
-   via `vault policy write` — a real parser, not a regex).
-2. **Update `../roles.yaml`** — add a JWT-auth role entry whose `policy:`
-   field matches the new basename (without `.hcl`). CI step 6 re-checks
-   every role in this file against the policy set, so a drift between the
-   two directories fails the step.
-3. **Reference from a Nomad jobspec** — add `vault { role = "<name>" }` in
-   `nomad/jobs/<service>.hcl` (owned by S2.4). Policies do not take effect
-   until a Nomad job asks for a token via that role.
-
-See the "Adding a new service" walkthrough below for the applier-script
-flow once steps 1–3 are committed.
-
-## CI enforcement (`.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`)
-
-The pipeline triggers on any PR touching `vault/policies/**`,
-`vault/roles.yaml`, or `lib/init/nomad/vault-*.sh` and runs four
-vault-scoped checks (in addition to the nomad-scoped steps already in
-place):
-
-| Step | Tool | What it catches |
-|---|---|---|
-| 4. `vault-policy-fmt` | `vault policy fmt` + `diff` | formatting drift — trailing whitespace, wrong indentation, missing newlines |
-| 5. `vault-policy-validate` | `vault policy write` against inline dev Vault | HCL syntax errors, unknown stanzas, invalid capability names (e.g. `"frobnicate"`), malformed `path "..." {}` blocks |
-| 6. `vault-roles-validate` | yamllint + PyYAML | roles.yaml syntax drift, missing required fields, role→policy references with no matching `.hcl` |
-| P11 | `lib/secret-scan.sh` via `.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml` | literal secret leaked into a policy HCL (rare copy-paste mistake) — already covers `vault/**/*`, no duplicate step here |
-
-All four steps are fail-closed — any error blocks merge. The pipeline
-pins `hashicorp/vault:1.18.5` (matching `lib/init/nomad/install.sh`);
-bumping the runtime version without bumping the CI image is a CI-caught
-drift.
-
-## Common failure modes
-
-| Symptom in CI logs | Root cause | Fix |
-|---|---|---|
-| `vault-policy-fmt: … is not formatted — run 'vault policy fmt <file>'` | Trailing whitespace / mixed indent in an HCL file | `vault policy fmt <file>` locally and re-commit |
-| `vault-policy-validate: … failed validation` plus a `policy` error from Vault | Unknown capability (e.g. `"frobnicate"`), unknown stanza, malformed `path` block | Fix the HCL; valid capabilities are `read`, `list`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `patch`, `sudo`, `deny` |
-| `vault-roles-validate: ERROR: role 'X' references policy 'Y' but vault/policies/Y.hcl does not exist` | A role's `policy:` field does not match any file basename in `vault/policies/` | Either add the missing policy HCL or fix the typo in `roles.yaml` |
-| `vault-roles-validate: ERROR: role entry missing required field 'Z'` | A role in `roles.yaml` is missing one of `name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id` | Add the field; all four are required |
-| P11 `secret-scan: detected potential secret …` on a `.hcl` file | A literal token/password was pasted into a policy | Policies must name KV paths, not carry secret values — move the literal into KV (S2.2) and have the policy grant `read` on the path |
-
-## What this directory does NOT own
-
-- **Attaching policies to Nomad jobs.** That's S2.4 (#882) via the
-  jobspec `template { vault { policies = […] } }` stanza — the role
-  name in `vault { role = "..." }` is what binds the policy.
-- **Writing the secret values themselves.** That's S2.2 (#880) via
-  `tools/vault-import.sh`.

vault/policies/bot-architect.hcl

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-architect.hcl
-#
-# Architect agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
-# Attached to the architect-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/architect/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/architect/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-dev-qwen.hcl

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-dev-qwen.hcl
-#
-# Local-Qwen dev agent (agents-llama profile): reads its own bot KV
-# namespace + the shared forge URL. Attached to the dev-qwen Nomad job
-# via workload identity (S2.4). KV path mirrors the bot basename:
-# kv/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-dev.hcl

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-dev.hcl
-#
-# Dev agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
-# Attached to the dev-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-gardener.hcl

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-gardener.hcl
-#
-# Gardener agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
-# Attached to the gardener-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/gardener/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/gardener/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-planner.hcl

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-planner.hcl
-#
-# Planner agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
-# Attached to the planner-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/planner/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/planner/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-predictor.hcl

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-predictor.hcl
-#
-# Predictor agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
-# Attached to the predictor-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/predictor/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/predictor/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-review.hcl

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-review.hcl
-#
-# Review agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
-# Attached to the review-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/review/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/review/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-supervisor.hcl

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-supervisor.hcl
-#
-# Supervisor agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
-# Attached to the supervisor-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/supervisor/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/supervisor/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/bot-vault.hcl

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/bot-vault.hcl
-#
-# Vault agent (the legacy edge dispatcher / vault-action runner): reads its
-# own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL. Attached to the vault-agent
-# Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-#
-# NOTE: distinct from the runner-* policies, which gate per-secret access
-# for vault-runner ephemeral dispatches (Step 5).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/vault/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/vault/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/dispatcher.hcl

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/dispatcher.hcl
-#
-# Edge dispatcher policy: needs to enumerate the runner secret namespace
-# (to check secret presence before dispatching) and read the shared
-# ops-repo credentials (token + clone URL) it uses to fetch action TOMLs.
-#
-# Scope:
-#   - kv/disinto/runner/*       — read all per-secret values + list keys
-#   - kv/disinto/shared/ops-repo/* — read the ops-repo creds bundle
-#
-# The actual ephemeral runner container created per dispatch gets the
-# narrow runner-<NAME> policies, NOT this one. This policy stays bound
-# to the long-running dispatcher only.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/runner/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}

vault/policies/runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN.hcl
-#
-# Per-secret runner policy: ClawHub token for skill-registry publish.
-# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
-# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
-# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/CLAWHUB_TOKEN" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN.hcl
-#
-# Per-secret runner policy: Codeberg PAT for upstream-repo mirror push.
-# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
-# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
-# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/CODEBERG_TOKEN" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/runner-DEPLOY_KEY.hcl

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/runner-DEPLOY_KEY.hcl
-#
-# Per-secret runner policy: SSH deploy key for git push to a release target.
-# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
-# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
-# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/DEPLOY_KEY" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN.hcl
-#
-# Per-secret runner policy: Docker Hub access token for image push.
-# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
-# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
-# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/runner-GITHUB_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/runner-GITHUB_TOKEN.hcl
-#
-# Per-secret runner policy: GitHub PAT for cross-mirror push / API calls.
-# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
-# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
-# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/GITHUB_TOKEN" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/runner-NPM_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/runner-NPM_TOKEN.hcl
-#
-# Per-secret runner policy: npm registry auth token for package publish.
-# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
-# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
-# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/NPM_TOKEN" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}

vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl
-#
-# Read-only access to shared Forgejo secrets (admin password, OAuth client
-# config). Attached to the Forgejo Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-#
-# Scope: kv/disinto/shared/forgejo — entries owned by the operator and
-# shared between forgejo + the chat OAuth client (issue #855 lineage).
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}

vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl
-#
-# Read-only access to shared Woodpecker secrets (agent secret, forge OAuth
-# client). Attached to the Woodpecker Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
-#
-# Scope: kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker/* — entries owned by the operator
-# and consumed by woodpecker-server + woodpecker-agent.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}

vault/roles.yaml

@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# vault/roles.yaml — Vault JWT-auth role bindings for Nomad workload identity
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.3, issue #881). One entry per
-# vault/policies/*.hcl policy. Each entry pairs:
-#
-#   - the Vault role name (what a Nomad job references via
-#     `vault { role = "..." }` in its jobspec), with
-#   - the ACL policy attached to tokens it mints, and
-#   - the bound claims that gate which Nomad workloads may authenticate
-#     through that role (prevents a jobspec named "woodpecker" from
-#     asking for role "service-forgejo").
-#
-# The source of truth for *what* secrets each role's token can read is
-# vault/policies/<policy>.hcl. This file only wires role→policy→claims.
-# Keeping the two side-by-side in the repo means an S2.1↔S2.3 drift
-# (new policy without a role, or vice versa) shows up in one directory
-# review, not as a runtime "permission denied" at job placement.
-#
-# All roles share the same constants (hardcoded in tools/vault-apply-roles.sh):
-#   - bound_audiences = ["vault.io"]      — Nomad's default workload-identity aud
-#   - token_type      = "service"         — revoked when task exits
-#   - token_ttl       = "1h"              — token lifetime
-#   - token_max_ttl   = "24h"             — hard cap across renewals
-#
-# Format (strict — parsed line-by-line by tools/vault-apply-roles.sh with
-# awk; keep the "- name:" prefix + two-space nested indent exactly as
-# shown below):
-#
-#   roles:
-#     - name:      <vault-role-name>    # path: auth/jwt-nomad/role/<name>
-#       policy:    <acl-policy-name>    # must match vault/policies/<name>.hcl
-#       namespace: <nomad-namespace>    # bound_claims.nomad_namespace
-#       job_id:    <nomad-job-id>       # bound_claims.nomad_job_id
-#
-# All four fields are required. Comments (#) and blank lines are ignored.
-#
-# Adding a new role:
-#   1. Land the companion vault/policies/<name>.hcl in S2.1 style.
-#   2. Add a block here with all four fields.
-#   3. Run tools/vault-apply-roles.sh to upsert it.
-#   4. Re-run to confirm "role <name> unchanged".
-# =============================================================================
-roles:
-  # ── Long-running services (nomad/jobs/<name>.hcl) ──────────────────────────
-  # The jobspec's nomad job name is the bound job_id, e.g. `job "forgejo"`
-  # in nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl → job_id: forgejo. The policy name stays
-  # `service-<name>` so the directory layout under vault/policies/ groups
-  # platform services under a single prefix.
-  - name:      service-forgejo
-    policy:    service-forgejo
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    forgejo
-
-  - name:      service-woodpecker
-    policy:    service-woodpecker
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    woodpecker
-
-  # ── Per-agent bots (nomad/jobs/bot-<role>.hcl — land in later steps) ───────
-  # job_id placeholders match the policy name 1:1 until each bot's jobspec
-  # lands. When a bot's jobspec is added under nomad/jobs/, update the
-  # corresponding job_id here to match the jobspec's `job "<name>"` — and
-  # CI's S2.6 roles.yaml check will confirm the pairing.
-  - name:      bot-dev
-    policy:    bot-dev
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-dev
-
-  - name:      bot-dev-qwen
-    policy:    bot-dev-qwen
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-dev-qwen
-
-  - name:      bot-review
-    policy:    bot-review
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-review
-
-  - name:      bot-gardener
-    policy:    bot-gardener
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-gardener
-
-  - name:      bot-planner
-    policy:    bot-planner
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-planner
-
-  - name:      bot-predictor
-    policy:    bot-predictor
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-predictor
-
-  - name:      bot-supervisor
-    policy:    bot-supervisor
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-supervisor
-
-  - name:      bot-architect
-    policy:    bot-architect
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-architect
-
-  - name:      bot-vault
-    policy:    bot-vault
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    bot-vault
-
-  # ── Edge dispatcher ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-  - name:      dispatcher
-    policy:    dispatcher
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    dispatcher
-
-  # ── Per-secret runner roles ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-  # vault-runner (Step 5) composes runner-<NAME> policies onto each
-  # ephemeral dispatch token based on the action TOML's `secrets = [...]`.
-  # The per-dispatch runner jobspec job_id follows the same `runner-<NAME>`
-  # convention (one jobspec per secret, minted per dispatch) so the bound
-  # claim matches the role name directly.
-  - name:      runner-GITHUB_TOKEN
-    policy:    runner-GITHUB_TOKEN
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    runner-GITHUB_TOKEN
-
-  - name:      runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN
-    policy:    runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN
-
-  - name:      runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN
-    policy:    runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN
-
-  - name:      runner-DEPLOY_KEY
-    policy:    runner-DEPLOY_KEY
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    runner-DEPLOY_KEY
-
-  - name:      runner-NPM_TOKEN
-    policy:    runner-NPM_TOKEN
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    runner-NPM_TOKEN
-
-  - name:      runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
-    policy:    runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN