fix: [nomad-step-2] S2.5 — bin/disinto init --import-env / --import-sops / --age-key wire-up (#883 )

2026-04-16 18:24:35 +00:00
76 changed files with 782 additions and 4281 deletions
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@ -32,10 +32,13 @@ FORGE_URL=http://localhost:3000             # [CONFIG] local Forgejo instance
 #   - FORGE_PASS_DEV_QWEN2
 # Name conversion: tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_' (lowercase→UPPER, hyphens→underscores).
 # The compose generator looks these up via the agent's `forge_user` field in
-# the project TOML. Configure local-model agents via [agents.X] sections in
-# projects/*.toml — this is the canonical activation path.
+# the project TOML. The pre-existing `dev-qwen` llama agent uses
+# FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA / FORGE_PASS_LLAMA (kept for backwards-compat with the
+# legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` single-agent path).
 FORGE_TOKEN=                               # [SECRET] dev-bot API token (default for all agents)
 FORGE_PASS=                                # [SECRET] dev-bot password for git HTTP push (#361)
+FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=                         # [SECRET] dev-qwen API token (for agents-llama)
+FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=                          # [SECRET] dev-qwen password for git HTTP push
 FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=                        # [SECRET] review-bot API token
 FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=                         # [SECRET] review-bot password for git HTTP push
 FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN=                       # [SECRET] planner-bot API token
@ -104,6 +107,13 @@ FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=                      # [SECRET] Shared secret for Caddy ↔
 # Store all project secrets here so formulas reference env vars, never hardcode.
 BASE_RPC_URL=                              # [SECRET] on-chain RPC endpoint

+# ── Local Qwen dev agent (optional) ──────────────────────────────────────
+# Set ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 to emit agents-llama in docker-compose.yml.
+# Requires a running llama-server reachable at ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL.
+# See docs/agents-llama.md for details.
+ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0                       # [CONFIG] 1 = enable agents-llama service
+ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=                        # [CONFIG] e.g. http://host.docker.internal:8081
+
 # ── Tuning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 CLAUDE_TIMEOUT=7200                        # [CONFIG] max seconds per Claude invocation

--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ metrics/supervisor-metrics.jsonl
 # OS
 .DS_Store
 dev/ci-fixes-*.json
+gardener/dust.jsonl

 # Individual encrypted secrets (managed by disinto secrets add)
 secrets/
--- a/.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py
+++ b/.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py
@ -294,35 +294,6 @@ def main() -> int:
        "9f6ae8e7811575b964279d8820494eb0": "Verification helper: for loop done pattern",
        # Standard lib source block shared across formula-driven agent run scripts
        "330e5809a00b95ade1a5fce2d749b94b": "Standard lib source block (env.sh, formula-session.sh, worktree.sh, guard.sh, agent-sdk.sh)",
-        # Common vault-seed script patterns: logging helpers + flag parsing
-        # Used in tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh + lib/init/nomad/wp-oauth-register.sh
-        "843a1cbf987952697d4e05e96ed2b2d5": "Logging helpers + DRY_RUN init (vault-seed-woodpecker + wp-oauth-register)",
-        "ee51df9642f2ef37af73b0c15f4d8406": "Logging helpers + DRY_RUN loop start (vault-seed-woodpecker + wp-oauth-register)",
-        "9a57368f3c1dfd29ec328596b86962a0": "Flag parsing loop + case start (vault-seed-woodpecker + wp-oauth-register)",
-        "9d72d40ff303cbed0b7e628fc15381c3": "Case loop + dry-run handler (vault-seed-woodpecker + wp-oauth-register)",
-        "5b52ddbbf47948e3cbc1b383f0909588": "Help + invalid arg handler end (vault-seed-woodpecker + wp-oauth-register)",
-        # Common vault-seed script preamble + precondition patterns
-        # Shared across tools/vault-seed-{forgejo,agents,woodpecker}.sh
-        "dff3675c151fcdbd2fef798826ae919b": "Vault-seed preamble: set -euo + path setup + source hvault.sh + KV_MOUNT",
-        "1cd9f0d083e24e6e6b2071db9b6dae09": "Vault-seed preconditions: binary check loop + VAULT_ADDR guard",
-        "63bfa88d71764c95c65a9a248f3e40ab": "Vault-seed preconditions: binary check end + VAULT_ADDR die",
-        "34873ad3570b211ce1d90468ab6ac94c": "Vault-seed preconditions: VAULT_ADDR die + hvault_token_lookup",
-        "71a52270f249e843cda48ad896d9f781": "Vault-seed preconditions: VAULT_ADDR + hvault_token_lookup + die",
-        # Common vault-seed script flag parsing patterns
-        # Shared across tools/vault-seed-{forgejo,ops-repo}.sh
-        "6906b7787796c2ccb8dd622e2ad4e7bf": "vault-seed DRY_RUN init + case pattern (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "a0df5283b616b964f8bc32fd99ec1b5a": "vault-seed case pattern start (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "e15e3272fdd9f0f46ce9e726aea9f853": "vault-seed case pattern dry-run handler (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "c9f22385cc49a3dac1d336bc14c6315b": "vault-seed DRY_RUN assignment (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "106f4071e88f841b3208b01144cd1c39": "vault-seed case pattern dry-run end (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "c15506dcb6bb340b25d1c39d442dd2e6": "vault-seed help text + invalid arg handler (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "1feecd3b3caf00045fae938ddf2811de": "vault-seed invalid arg handler (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "919780d5e7182715344f5aa02b191294": "vault-seed invalid arg + esac pattern (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "8dce1d292bce8e60ef4c0665b62945b0": "vault-seed esac + binary check loop (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "ca043687143a5b47bd54e65a99ce8ee8": "vault-seed binary check loop start (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "aefd9f655411a955395e6e5995ddbe6f": "vault-seed binary check pattern (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "60f0c46deb5491599457efb4048918e5": "vault-seed VAULT_ADDR + hvault_token_lookup check (forgejo + ops-repo)",
-        "f6838f581ef6b4d82b55268389032769": "vault-seed VAULT_ADDR + hvault_token_lookup die (forgejo + ops-repo)",
    }

    if not sh_files:
--- a/.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml
+++ b/.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml
@ -1,21 +1,16 @@
 # =============================================================================
 # .woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml — Static validation for Nomad+Vault artifacts
 #
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S0.5, issue #825; extended in S2.6,
-# issue #884). Locks in the "no-ad-hoc-steps" principle: every HCL/shell
-# artifact under nomad/, lib/init/nomad/, vault/policies/, plus the
-# `disinto init` dispatcher and vault/roles.yaml, gets checked before it
-# can land.
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S0.5, issue #825). Locks in the
+# "no-ad-hoc-steps" principle: every HCL/shell artifact under nomad/ or
+# lib/init/nomad/, plus the `disinto init` dispatcher, gets checked
+# before it can land.
 #
 # Triggers on PRs (and pushes) that touch any of:
 #   nomad/**              — HCL configs (server, client, vault)
-#   lib/init/nomad/**     — cluster-up / install / systemd / vault-init /
-#                            vault-nomad-auth (S2.6 trigger: vault-*.sh
-#                            is a subset of this glob)
+#   lib/init/nomad/**     — cluster-up / install / systemd / vault-init
 #   bin/disinto           — `disinto init --backend=nomad` dispatcher
 #   tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats — the bats suite itself
-#   vault/policies/**     — Vault ACL policy HCL files (S2.1, S2.6)
-#   vault/roles.yaml      — JWT-auth role bindings (S2.3, S2.6)
 #   .woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml — the pipeline definition
 #
 # Steps (all fail-closed — any error blocks merge):
@ -24,22 +19,8 @@
 #                                 nomad/jobs/*.hcl (new jobspecs get
 #                                 CI coverage automatically)
 #   3. vault-operator-diagnose — `vault operator diagnose` syntax check on vault.hcl
-#   4. vault-policy-fmt        — `vault policy fmt` idempotence check on
-#                                 every vault/policies/*.hcl (format drift =
-#                                 CI fail; non-destructive via cp+diff)
-#   5. vault-policy-validate   — HCL syntax + capability validation for every
-#                                 vault/policies/*.hcl via `vault policy write`
-#                                 against an inline dev-mode Vault server
-#   6. vault-roles-validate    — yamllint + role→policy reference check on
-#                                 vault/roles.yaml (every referenced policy
-#                                 must exist as vault/policies/<name>.hcl)
-#   7. shellcheck-nomad        — shellcheck the cluster-up + install scripts + disinto
-#   8. bats-init-nomad         — `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` smoke tests
-#
-# Secret-scan coverage: vault/policies/*.hcl is already scanned by the
-# P11 gate (.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml, issue #798) — its trigger path
-# `vault/**/*` covers everything under this directory. We intentionally
-# do NOT duplicate that gate here; one scanner, one source of truth.
+#   4. shellcheck-nomad        — shellcheck the cluster-up + install scripts + disinto
+#   5. bats-init-nomad         — `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` smoke tests
 #
 # Pinned image versions match lib/init/nomad/install.sh (nomad 1.9.5 /
 # vault 1.18.5). Bump there AND here together — drift = CI passing on
@ -53,8 +34,6 @@ when:
      - "lib/init/nomad/**"
      - "bin/disinto"
      - "tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats"
-      - "vault/policies/**"
-      - "vault/roles.yaml"
      - ".woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml"

 # Authenticated clone — same pattern as .woodpecker/ci.yml. Forgejo is
@ -144,176 +123,7 @@ steps:
          *) echo "vault config: hard failure (rc=$rc)" >&2; exit "$rc" ;;
        esac

-  # ── 4. Vault policy fmt idempotence check ────────────────────────────────
-  # `vault policy fmt <file>` formats a local HCL policy file in place.
-  # There's no `-check`/dry-run flag (vault 1.18.5), so we implement a
-  # non-destructive check as cp → fmt-on-copy → diff against original.
-  # Any diff means the committed file would be rewritten by `vault policy
-  # fmt` — failure steers the author to run `vault policy fmt <file>`
-  # locally before pushing.
-  #
-  # Scope: vault/policies/*.hcl only. The `[ -f "$f" ]` guard handles the
-  # no-match case (POSIX sh does not nullglob) so an empty policies/
-  # directory does not fail this step.
-  #
-  # Note: `vault policy fmt` is purely local (HCL text transform) and does
-  # not require a running Vault server, which is why this step can run
-  # without starting one.
-  - name: vault-policy-fmt
-    image: hashicorp/vault:1.18.5
-    commands:
-      - |
-        set -e
-        failed=0
-        for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do
-          [ -f "$f" ] || continue
-          tmp="/tmp/$(basename "$f").fmt"
-          cp "$f" "$tmp"
-          vault policy fmt "$tmp" >/dev/null 2>&1
-          if ! diff -u "$f" "$tmp"; then
-            echo "ERROR: $f is not formatted — run 'vault policy fmt $f' locally" >&2
-            failed=1
-          fi
-        done
-        if [ "$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
-          echo "vault-policy-fmt: formatting drift detected" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        echo "vault-policy-fmt: all policies formatted correctly"
-
-  # ── 5. Vault policy HCL syntax + capability validation ───────────────────
-  # Vault has no offline `vault policy validate` subcommand — the closest
-  # in-CLI validator is `vault policy write`, which sends the HCL to a
-  # running server which parses it, checks capability names against the
-  # known set (read, list, create, update, delete, patch, sudo, deny),
-  # and rejects unknown stanzas / malformed path blocks. We start an
-  # inline dev-mode Vault (in-memory, no persistence, root token = "root")
-  # for the duration of this step and loop `vault policy write` over every
-  # vault/policies/*.hcl; the policies never leave the ephemeral dev
-  # server, so this is strictly a validator — not a deploy.
-  #
-  # Exit-code handling:
-  #   - `vault policy write` exits 0 on success, non-zero on any parse /
-  #     semantic error. We aggregate failures across all files so a single
-  #     CI run surfaces every broken policy (not just the first).
-  #   - The dev server is killed on any step exit via EXIT trap so the
-  #     step tears down cleanly even on failure.
-  #
-  # Why dev-mode is sufficient: we're not persisting secrets, only asking
-  # Vault to parse policy text. The factory's production Vault is NOT
-  # contacted.
-  - name: vault-policy-validate
-    image: hashicorp/vault:1.18.5
-    commands:
-      - |
-        set -e
-        vault server -dev -dev-root-token-id=root -dev-listen-address=127.0.0.1:8200 >/tmp/vault-dev.log 2>&1 &
-        VAULT_PID=$!
-        trap 'kill "$VAULT_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT INT TERM
-        export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200
-        export VAULT_TOKEN=root
-        ready=0
-        i=0
-        while [ "$i" -lt 30 ]; do
-          if vault status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            ready=1
-            break
-          fi
-          i=$((i + 1))
-          sleep 0.5
-        done
-        if [ "$ready" -ne 1 ]; then
-          echo "vault-policy-validate: dev server failed to start after 15s" >&2
-          cat /tmp/vault-dev.log >&2 || true
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        failed=0
-        for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do
-          [ -f "$f" ] || continue
-          name=$(basename "$f" .hcl)
-          echo "validate: $f"
-          if ! vault policy write "$name" "$f"; then
-            echo "  ERROR: $f failed validation" >&2
-            failed=1
-          fi
-        done
-        if [ "$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
-          echo "vault-policy-validate: validation errors found" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        echo "vault-policy-validate: all policies valid"
-
-  # ── 6. vault/roles.yaml validator ────────────────────────────────────────
-  # Validates the JWT-auth role bindings file (S2.3). Two checks:
-  #
-  #   a. `yamllint` — catches YAML syntax errors and indentation drift.
-  #      Uses a relaxed config (line length bumped to 200) because
-  #      roles.yaml's comments are wide by design.
-  #   b. role → policy reference check — every role's `policy:` field
-  #      must match a basename in vault/policies/*.hcl. A role pointing
-  #      at a non-existent policy = runtime "permission denied" at job
-  #      placement; catching the drift here turns it into a CI failure.
-  #      Also verifies each role entry has the four required fields
-  #      (name, policy, namespace, job_id) per the file's documented
-  #      format.
-  #
-  # Parsing is done with PyYAML (the roles.yaml format is a strict
-  # subset that awk-level parsing in tools/vault-apply-roles.sh handles
-  # too, but PyYAML in CI gives us structural validation for free). If
-  # roles.yaml is ever absent (e.g. reverted), the step skips rather
-  # than fails — presence is enforced by S2.3's own tooling, not here.
-  - name: vault-roles-validate
-    image: python:3.12-alpine
-    commands:
-      - pip install --quiet --disable-pip-version-check pyyaml yamllint
-      - |
-        set -e
-        if [ ! -f vault/roles.yaml ]; then
-          echo "vault-roles-validate: vault/roles.yaml not present, skipping"
-          exit 0
-        fi
-        yamllint -d '{extends: relaxed, rules: {line-length: {max: 200}}}' vault/roles.yaml
-        echo "vault-roles-validate: yamllint OK"
-        python3 - <<'PY'
-        import os
-        import sys
-        import yaml
-
-        with open('vault/roles.yaml') as f:
-            data = yaml.safe_load(f) or {}
-        roles = data.get('roles') or []
-        if not roles:
-            print("vault-roles-validate: no roles defined in vault/roles.yaml", file=sys.stderr)
-            sys.exit(1)
-        existing = {
-            os.path.splitext(e)[0]
-            for e in os.listdir('vault/policies')
-            if e.endswith('.hcl')
-        }
-        required = ('name', 'policy', 'namespace', 'job_id')
-        failed = 0
-        for r in roles:
-            if not isinstance(r, dict):
-                print(f"ERROR: role entry is not a mapping: {r!r}", file=sys.stderr)
-                failed = 1
-                continue
-            for field in required:
-                if r.get(field) in (None, ''):
-                    print(f"ERROR: role entry missing required field '{field}': {r}", file=sys.stderr)
-                    failed = 1
-            policy = r.get('policy')
-            if policy and policy not in existing:
-                print(
-                    f"ERROR: role '{r.get('name')}' references policy '{policy}' "
-                    f"but vault/policies/{policy}.hcl does not exist",
-                    file=sys.stderr,
-                )
-                failed = 1
-        sys.exit(failed)
-        PY
-        echo "vault-roles-validate: all role→policy references valid"
-
-  # ── 7. Shellcheck ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  # ── 4. Shellcheck ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  # Covers the new lib/init/nomad/*.sh scripts plus bin/disinto (which owns
  # the backend dispatcher). bin/disinto has no .sh extension so the
  # repo-wide shellcheck in .woodpecker/ci.yml skips it — this step is the
@ -323,7 +133,7 @@ steps:
    commands:
      - shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto

-  # ── 8. bats: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` ────────────────────
+  # ── 5. bats: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` ────────────────────
  # Smoke-tests the CLI dispatcher: both --backend=nomad variants exit 0
  # with the expected step list, and --backend=docker stays on the docker
  # path (regression guard). Pure dry-run — no sudo, no network.
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Disinto — Agent Instructions

 ## What this repo is
@ -37,20 +37,19 @@ disinto/                 (code repo)
 │                  examples/ — example vault action TOMLs (promote, publish, release, webhook-call)
 ├── lib/           env.sh, agent-sdk.sh, ci-helpers.sh, ci-debug.sh, load-project.sh, parse-deps.sh, guard.sh, mirrors.sh, pr-lifecycle.sh, issue-lifecycle.sh, worktree.sh, formula-session.sh, stack-lock.sh, forge-setup.sh, forge-push.sh, ops-setup.sh, ci-setup.sh, generators.sh, hire-agent.sh, release.sh, build-graph.py, branch-protection.sh, secret-scan.sh, tea-helpers.sh, action-vault.sh, ci-log-reader.py, git-creds.sh, sprint-filer.sh, hvault.sh
 │                  hooks/ — Claude Code session hooks (on-compact-reinject, on-idle-stop, on-phase-change, on-pretooluse-guard, on-session-end, on-stop-failure)
-│                  init/nomad/ — cluster-up.sh, install.sh, vault-init.sh, lib-systemd.sh (Nomad+Vault Step 0 installers, #821-#825); wp-oauth-register.sh (Forgejo OAuth2 app + Vault KV seeder for Woodpecker, S3.3); deploy.sh (dependency-ordered Nomad job deploy + health-wait, S4)
-├── nomad/         server.hcl, client.hcl (allow_privileged for woodpecker-agent, S3-fix-5), vault.hcl — HCL configs deployed to /etc/nomad.d/ and /etc/vault.d/ by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
-│                  jobs/ — Nomad jobspecs: forgejo.hcl (Vault secrets via template, S2.4); woodpecker-server.hcl + woodpecker-agent.hcl (host-net, docker.sock, Vault KV, S3.1-S3.2); agents.hcl (7 roles, llama, Vault-templated bot tokens, S4.1); vault-runner.hcl (parameterized batch dispatch, S5.3); staging.hcl (Caddy file-server, dynamic port — edge discovers via service registration, S5.2); chat.hcl (Claude chat UI, tmpfs via mount block, Vault OAuth secrets, S5.2); edge.hcl (Caddy proxy + dispatcher sidecar, S5.1)
+│                  init/nomad/ — cluster-up.sh, install.sh, vault-init.sh, lib-systemd.sh (Nomad+Vault Step 0 installers, #821-#825)
+├── nomad/         server.hcl, client.hcl, vault.hcl — HCL configs deployed to /etc/nomad.d/ and /etc/vault.d/ by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
+│                  jobs/ — Nomad jobspecs (forgejo.hcl reads Vault secrets via template stanza, S2.4)
 ├── projects/      *.toml.example — templates; *.toml — local per-box config (gitignored)
 ├── formulas/      Issue templates (TOML specs for multi-step agent tasks)
 ├── docker/        Dockerfiles and entrypoints: reproduce, triage, edge dispatcher, chat (server.py, entrypoint-chat.sh, Dockerfile, ui/)
 ├── tools/         Operational tools: edge-control/ (register.sh, install.sh, verify-chat-sandbox.sh)
-│                  vault-apply-policies.sh, vault-apply-roles.sh, vault-import.sh — Vault provisioning (S2.1/S2.2)
-│                  vault-seed-<svc>.sh — per-service Vault secret seeders; auto-invoked by `bin/disinto --with <svc>` (add a new file to support a new service)
+│                  vault-apply-policies.sh, vault-apply-roles.sh, vault-import.sh, vault-seed-forgejo.sh — Vault provisioning (S2.1/S2.2)
 ├── docs/          Protocol docs (PHASE-PROTOCOL.md, EVIDENCE-ARCHITECTURE.md)
 ├── site/          disinto.ai website content
-├── tests/         Test files (mock-forgejo.py, smoke-init.sh, lib-hvault.bats, lib-generators.bats, vault-import.bats, disinto-init-nomad.bats)
+├── tests/         Test files (mock-forgejo.py, smoke-init.sh, lib-hvault.bats, disinto-init-nomad.bats)
 ├── templates/     Issue templates
-├── bin/           The `disinto` CLI script (`--with <svc>` deploys services + runs their Vault seeders)
+├── bin/           The `disinto` CLI script
 ├── disinto-factory/  Setup documentation and skill
 ├── state/         Runtime state
 ├── .woodpecker/   Woodpecker CI pipeline configs
@ -123,7 +122,8 @@ bash dev/phase-test.sh
 | Reproduce | `docker/reproduce/` | Bug reproduction using Playwright MCP | `formulas/reproduce.toml` |
 | Triage | `docker/reproduce/` | Deep root cause analysis | `formulas/triage.toml` |
 | Edge dispatcher | `docker/edge/` | Polls ops repo for vault actions, executes via Claude sessions | `docker/edge/dispatcher.sh` |
-| Local-model agents | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local llama-server agents configured via `[agents.X]` sections in project TOML | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
+| agents-llama | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local-Qwen dev agent (`AGENT_ROLES=dev`), gated on `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
+| agents-llama-all | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local-Qwen all-roles agent (all 7 roles), profile `agents-llama-all` | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |

 > **Vault:** Being redesigned as a PR-based approval workflow (issues #73-#77).
 > See [docs/VAULT.md](docs/VAULT.md) for the vault PR workflow details.
--- a/architect/AGENTS.md
+++ b/architect/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Architect — Agent Instructions

 ## What this agent is
--- a/bin/disinto
+++ b/bin/disinto
@ -82,16 +82,16 @@ Init options:
  --ci-id <n>          Woodpecker CI repo ID (default: 0 = no CI)
  --forge-url <url>    Forge base URL (default: http://localhost:3000)
  --backend <value>    Orchestration backend: docker (default) | nomad
-  --with <services>    (nomad) Deploy services: forgejo,woodpecker,agents,staging,chat,edge[,...] (S1.3, S3.4, S4.2, S5.2, S5.5)
+  --with <services>    (nomad) Deploy services: forgejo[,...] (S1.3)
  --empty              (nomad) Bring up cluster only, no jobs (S0.4)
  --bare               Skip compose generation (bare-metal setup)
  --build              Use local docker build instead of registry images (dev mode)
  --yes                Skip confirmation prompts
  --rotate-tokens      Force regeneration of all bot tokens/passwords (idempotent by default)
  --dry-run            Print every intended action without executing
-  --import-env <path>  (nomad) Path to .env file for import into Vault KV (S2.5)
-  --import-sops <path> (nomad) Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc for import (S2.5)
-  --age-key <path>     (nomad) Path to age keyfile (required with --import-sops) (S2.5)
+  --import-env <path>  (nomad) Path to .env file for import into Vault KV
+  --import-sops <path> (nomad) Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc for import
+  --age-key <path>     (nomad) Path to age keyfile (required with --import-sops)

 Hire an agent options:
  --formula <path>     Path to role formula TOML (default: formulas/<role>.toml)
@ -670,10 +670,9 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
  local import_env="${4:-}" import_sops="${5:-}" age_key="${6:-}"
  local cluster_up="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh"
  local deploy_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh"
-  local vault_engines_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh"
-  local vault_policies_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-apply-policies.sh"
-  local vault_auth_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh"
  local vault_import_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-import.sh"
+  local vault_auth_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh"
+  local vault_policies_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-apply-policies.sh"

  if [ ! -x "$cluster_up" ]; then
    echo "Error: ${cluster_up} not found or not executable" >&2
@ -685,42 +684,6 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
    exit 1
  fi

-  # --empty short-circuits after cluster-up: no policies, no auth, no
-  # import, no deploy. It's the "cluster-only escape hatch" for debugging
-  # (docs/nomad-migration.md). Caller-side validation already rejects
-  # --empty combined with --with or any --import-* flag, so reaching
-  # this branch with those set is a bug in the caller.
-  #
-  # On the default (non-empty) path, vault-engines.sh (enables the kv/
-  # mount), vault-apply-policies.sh, and vault-nomad-auth.sh are invoked
-  # unconditionally — they are idempotent and cheap to re-run, and
-  # subsequent --with deployments depend on them. vault-import.sh is
-  # invoked only when an --import-* flag is set. vault-engines.sh runs
-  # first because every policy and role below references kv/disinto/*
-  # paths, which 403 if the engine is not yet mounted (issue #912).
-  local import_any=false
-  if [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ]; then
-    import_any=true
-  fi
-  if [ "$empty" != "true" ]; then
-    if [ ! -x "$vault_engines_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_engines_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    if [ ! -x "$vault_policies_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_policies_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    if [ ! -x "$vault_auth_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_auth_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    if [ "$import_any" = true ] && [ ! -x "$vault_import_sh" ]; then
-      echo "Error: ${vault_import_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-  fi
-
  # --empty and default both invoke cluster-up today. Log the requested
  # mode so the dispatch is visible in factory bootstrap logs — Step 1
  # will branch on $empty to gate the job-deployment path.
@ -730,7 +693,7 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
    echo "nomad backend: default (cluster-up; jobs deferred to Step 1)"
  fi

-  # Dry-run: print cluster-up plan + policies/auth/import plan + deploy.sh plan
+  # Dry-run: print cluster-up plan + import plan + deploy.sh plan
  if [ "$dry_run" = "true" ]; then
    echo ""
    echo "── Cluster-up dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
@ -738,82 +701,46 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
    "${cmd[@]}" || true
    echo ""

-    # --empty skips policies/auth/import/deploy — cluster-up only, no
-    # workloads. The operator-visible dry-run plan must match the real
-    # run, so short-circuit here too.
-    if [ "$empty" = "true" ]; then
-      exit 0
-    fi
-
-    # Vault engines + policies + auth are invoked on every nomad real-run
-    # path regardless of --import-* flags (they're idempotent; S2.1 + S2.3).
-    # Engines runs first because policies/roles/templates all reference the
-    # kv/ mount it enables (issue #912). Mirror that ordering in the
-    # dry-run plan so the operator sees the full sequence Step 2 will
-    # execute.
-    echo "── Vault engines dry-run ──────────────────────────────"
-    echo "[engines] [dry-run] ${vault_engines_sh} --dry-run"
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Vault policies dry-run ─────────────────────────────"
-    echo "[policies] [dry-run] ${vault_policies_sh} --dry-run"
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Vault auth dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
-    echo "[auth] [dry-run] ${vault_auth_sh}"
-    echo ""
-
-    # Import plan: one line per --import-* flag that is actually set.
-    # Printing independently (not in an if/elif chain) means that all
-    # three flags appearing together each echo their own path — the
-    # regression that bit prior implementations of this issue (#883).
-    if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
+    # Import plan if any import flags are set
+    if [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; then
      echo "── Vault import dry-run ───────────────────────────────"
-      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && echo "[import] --import-env   env file:  ${import_env}"
-      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && echo "[import] --import-sops  sops file: ${import_sops}"
-      [ -n "$age_key" ]     && echo "[import] --age-key      age key:   ${age_key}"
-      local -a import_dry_cmd=("$vault_import_sh")
-      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_dry_cmd+=("--env" "$import_env")
-      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_dry_cmd+=("--sops" "$import_sops")
-      [ -n "$age_key" ]     && import_dry_cmd+=("--age-key" "$age_key")
-      import_dry_cmd+=("--dry-run")
-      echo "[import] [dry-run] ${import_dry_cmd[*]}"
+      if [ -n "$import_env" ]; then
+        echo "[import] --import-env: ${import_env}"
+      fi
+      if [ -n "$import_sops" ]; then
+        echo "[import] --import-sops: ${import_sops}"
+      fi
+      if [ -n "$age_key" ]; then
+        echo "[import] --age-key: ${age_key}"
+      fi
+      echo "[import] [dry-run] ${vault_import_sh} --dry-run"
+      echo "[import] [dry-run] vault import plan printed above"
+      echo ""
+      echo "── Vault policies dry-run ─────────────────────────────"
+      echo "[policies] [dry-run] ${vault_policies_sh} --dry-run"
+      echo ""
+      echo "── Vault auth dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
+      echo "[auth] [dry-run] ${vault_auth_sh}"
      echo ""
    else
-      echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
+      echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops - skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
      echo ""
    fi

    if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
-      # Interleaved seed/deploy per service (S2.6, #928, #948): match the
-      # real-run path so dry-run output accurately represents execution order.
-      # Build ordered deploy list: only include services present in with_services
-      local DEPLOY_ORDER=""
-      for ordered_svc in forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent agents staging chat edge; do
-        if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",$ordered_svc,"; then
-          DEPLOY_ORDER="${DEPLOY_ORDER:+${DEPLOY_ORDER} }${ordered_svc}"
-        fi
-      done
-
-      local IFS=' '
-      echo "[deploy] deployment order: ${DEPLOY_ORDER}"
-      for svc in $DEPLOY_ORDER; do
-        # Seed this service (if seed script exists)
-        local seed_name="$svc"
+      echo "── Deploy services dry-run ────────────────────────────"
+      echo "[deploy] services to deploy: ${with_services}"
+      local IFS=','
+      for svc in $with_services; do
+        svc=$(echo "$svc" | xargs)  # trim whitespace
+        # Validate known services first
        case "$svc" in
-          woodpecker-server|woodpecker-agent) seed_name="woodpecker" ;;
-          agents) seed_name="agents" ;;
-          chat) seed_name="chat" ;;
-          edge) seed_name="ops-repo" ;;
+          forgejo) ;;
+          *)
+            echo "Error: unknown service '${svc}' — known: forgejo" >&2
+            exit 1
+            ;;
        esac
-        local seed_script="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-seed-${seed_name}.sh"
-        if [ -x "$seed_script" ]; then
-          echo "── Vault seed dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
-          echo "[seed] [dry-run] ${seed_script} --dry-run"
-          echo ""
-        fi
-
-        # Deploy this service
-        echo "── Deploy services dry-run ────────────────────────────"
-        echo "[deploy] services to deploy: ${with_services}"
        local jobspec_path="${FACTORY_ROOT}/nomad/jobs/${svc}.hcl"
        if [ ! -f "$jobspec_path" ]; then
          echo "Error: jobspec not found: ${jobspec_path}" >&2
@ -824,36 +751,10 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
      done
      echo "[deploy] dry-run complete"
    fi
-
-    # Dry-run vault-runner (unconditionally, not gated by --with)
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Vault-runner dry-run ───────────────────────────────────"
-    local vault_runner_path="${FACTORY_ROOT}/nomad/jobs/vault-runner.hcl"
-    if [ -f "$vault_runner_path" ]; then
-      echo "[deploy] vault-runner: [dry-run] nomad job validate ${vault_runner_path}"
-      echo "[deploy] vault-runner: [dry-run] nomad job run -detach ${vault_runner_path}"
-    else
-      echo "[deploy] vault-runner: jobspec not found, skipping"
-    fi
-
-    # Build custom images dry-run (if agents, chat, or edge services are included)
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -qE ",(agents|chat|edge),"; then
-      echo ""
-      echo "── Build images dry-run ──────────────────────────────"
-      if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",agents,"; then
-        echo "[build] [dry-run] docker build -t disinto/agents:local -f ${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/agents/Dockerfile ${FACTORY_ROOT}"
-      fi
-      if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",chat,"; then
-        echo "[build] [dry-run] docker build -t disinto/chat:local -f ${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/chat/Dockerfile ${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/chat"
-      fi
-      if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",edge,"; then
-        echo "[build] [dry-run] docker build -t disinto/edge:local -f ${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/edge/Dockerfile ${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/edge"
-      fi
-    fi
    exit 0
  fi

-  # Real run: cluster-up + policies + auth + (optional) import + deploy
+  # Real run: cluster-up + import + deploy services
  local -a cluster_cmd=("$cluster_up")
  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
    "${cluster_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
@ -865,64 +766,48 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
    sudo -n -- "${cluster_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
  fi

-  # --empty short-circuits here: cluster-up only, no policies/auth/import
-  # and no deploy. Matches the dry-run plan above and the docs/runbook.
-  if [ "$empty" = "true" ]; then
-    exit 0
-  fi
-
-  # Enable Vault secret engines (S2.1 / issue #912) — must precede
-  # policies/auth/import because every policy and every import target
-  # addresses paths under kv/. Idempotent, safe to re-run.
+  # Apply Vault policies (S2.1)
  echo ""
-  echo "── Enabling Vault secret engines ──────────────────────"
-  local -a engines_cmd=("$vault_engines_sh")
+  echo "── Applying Vault policies ─────────────────────────────"
  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    "${engines_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  else
-    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-      echo "Error: vault-engines.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-    sudo -n -- "${engines_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-  fi
-
-  # Apply Vault policies (S2.1) — idempotent, safe to re-run.
-  echo ""
-  echo "── Applying Vault policies ────────────────────────────"
-  local -a policies_cmd=("$vault_policies_sh")
-  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    "${policies_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    "${vault_policies_sh}" || exit $?
  else
    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
      echo "Error: vault-apply-policies.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
      exit 1
    fi
-    sudo -n -- "${policies_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    sudo -n -- "${vault_policies_sh}" || exit $?
  fi

-  # Configure Vault JWT auth + Nomad workload identity (S2.3) — idempotent.
+  # Configure Vault JWT auth (S2.3)
  echo ""
-  echo "── Configuring Vault JWT auth ─────────────────────────"
-  local -a auth_cmd=("$vault_auth_sh")
+  echo "── Configuring Vault JWT auth ──────────────────────────"
  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    "${auth_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    "${vault_auth_sh}" || exit $?
  else
    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
      echo "Error: vault-nomad-auth.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
      exit 1
    fi
-    sudo -n -- "${auth_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    sudo -n -- "${vault_auth_sh}" || exit $?
  fi

-  # Import secrets if any --import-* flag is set (S2.2).
-  if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
+  # Import secrets if import flags are set (S2.2)
+  if [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; then
    echo ""
-    echo "── Importing secrets into Vault ───────────────────────"
+    echo "── Importing secrets into Vault ────────────────────────"
    local -a import_cmd=("$vault_import_sh")
-    [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_cmd+=("--env" "$import_env")
-    [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_cmd+=("--sops" "$import_sops")
-    [ -n "$age_key" ]     && import_cmd+=("--age-key" "$age_key")
+
+    if [ -n "$import_env" ]; then
+      import_cmd+=("--env" "$import_env")
+    fi
+    if [ -n "$import_sops" ]; then
+      import_cmd+=("--sops" "$import_sops")
+    fi
+    if [ -n "$age_key" ]; then
+      import_cmd+=("--age-key" "$age_key")
+    fi
+
    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
      "${import_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
    else
@ -933,166 +818,62 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
      sudo -n -- "${import_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
    fi
  else
-    echo ""
-    echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
+    echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops - skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
  fi

-  # Build custom images required by Nomad jobs (S4.2, S5.2, S5.5) — before deploy.
-  # Single-node factory dev box: no multi-node pull needed, no registry auth.
-  # Can upgrade to approach B (registry push/pull) later if multi-node.
-  if echo ",$with_services," | grep -qE ",(agents|chat|edge),"; then
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Building custom images ─────────────────────────────"
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",agents,"; then
-      local tag="disinto/agents:local"
-      echo "── Building $tag ─────────────────────────────"
-      docker build -t "$tag" -f "${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/agents/Dockerfile" "${FACTORY_ROOT}" 2>&1 | tail -5
-    fi
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",chat,"; then
-      local tag="disinto/chat:local"
-      echo "── Building $tag ─────────────────────────────"
-      docker build -t "$tag" -f "${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/chat/Dockerfile" "${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/chat" 2>&1 | tail -5
-    fi
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",edge,"; then
-      local tag="disinto/edge:local"
-      echo "── Building $tag ─────────────────────────────"
-      docker build -t "$tag" -f "${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/edge/Dockerfile" "${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/edge" 2>&1 | tail -5
-    fi
-  fi
-
-  # Interleaved seed/deploy per service (S2.6, #928, #948).
-  # We interleave seed + deploy per service (not batch all seeds then all deploys)
-  # so that OAuth-dependent services can reach their dependencies during seeding.
-  # E.g., seed-forgejo → deploy-forgejo → seed-woodpecker (OAuth can now reach
-  # running forgejo) → deploy-woodpecker.
+  # Deploy services if requested
  if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
-    local vault_addr="${VAULT_ADDR:-http://127.0.0.1:8200}"
-
-    # Build ordered deploy list (S3.4, S4.2, S5.2, S5.5): forgejo → woodpecker-server → woodpecker-agent → agents → staging → chat → edge
-    local DEPLOY_ORDER=""
-    for ordered_svc in forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent agents staging chat edge; do
-      if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",$ordered_svc,"; then
-        DEPLOY_ORDER="${DEPLOY_ORDER:+${DEPLOY_ORDER} }${ordered_svc}"
+    echo ""
+    echo "── Deploying services ─────────────────────────────────"
+    local -a deploy_cmd=("$deploy_sh")
+    # Split comma-separated service list into positional args
+    local IFS=','
+    for svc in $with_services; do
+      svc=$(echo "$svc" | xargs)  # trim whitespace
+      if ! echo "$svc" | grep -qE '^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$'; then
+        echo "Error: invalid service name '${svc}' — must match ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$" >&2
+        exit 1
      fi
-    done
-
-    local IFS=' '
-    for svc in $DEPLOY_ORDER; do
-      # Seed this service (if seed script exists)
-      local seed_name="$svc"
+      # Validate known services FIRST (before jobspec check)
      case "$svc" in
-        woodpecker-server|woodpecker-agent) seed_name="woodpecker" ;;
-        agents) seed_name="agents" ;;
-        chat) seed_name="chat" ;;
-        edge) seed_name="ops-repo" ;;
-      esac
-      local seed_script="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-seed-${seed_name}.sh"
-      if [ -x "$seed_script" ]; then
-        echo ""
-        echo "── Seeding Vault for ${seed_name} ───────────────────────────"
-        if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-          VAULT_ADDR="$vault_addr" "$seed_script" || exit $?
-        else
-          if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            echo "Error: vault-seed-${seed_name}.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          sudo -n -- env "VAULT_ADDR=$vault_addr" "$seed_script" || exit $?
-        fi
-      fi
-
-      # Deploy this service
-      echo ""
-      echo "── Deploying ${svc} ───────────────────────────────────────"
-
-      # Seed host volumes before deployment (if needed)
-      case "$svc" in
-        staging)
-          # Seed site-content host volume (/srv/disinto/docker) with static content
-          # The staging jobspec mounts this volume read-only to /srv/site
-          local site_content_src="${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/index.html"
-          local site_content_dst="/srv/disinto/docker"
-          if [ -f "$site_content_src" ] && [ -d "$site_content_dst" ]; then
-            if ! cmp -s "$site_content_src" "${site_content_dst}/index.html" 2>/dev/null; then
-              echo "[staging] seeding site-content volume..."
-              cp "$site_content_src" "${site_content_dst}/index.html"
-            fi
-          fi
+        forgejo) ;;
+        *)
+          echo "Error: unknown service '${svc}' — known: forgejo" >&2
+          exit 1
          ;;
      esac
-
+      # Check jobspec exists
      local jobspec_path="${FACTORY_ROOT}/nomad/jobs/${svc}.hcl"
      if [ ! -f "$jobspec_path" ]; then
        echo "Error: jobspec not found: ${jobspec_path}" >&2
        exit 1
      fi
-
-      local -a deploy_cmd=("$deploy_sh" "$svc")
-      if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-        "${deploy_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-      else
-        if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-          echo "Error: deploy.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        sudo -n -- "${deploy_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-      fi
+      deploy_cmd+=("$svc")
    done

-    # Run vault-runner (unconditionally, not gated by --with) — infrastructure job
-    # vault-runner is always present since it's needed for vault action dispatch
-    echo ""
-    echo "── Running vault-runner ────────────────────────────────────"
-    local vault_runner_path="${FACTORY_ROOT}/nomad/jobs/vault-runner.hcl"
-    if [ -f "$vault_runner_path" ]; then
-      echo "[deploy] vault-runner: running Nomad job (infrastructure)"
-      local -a vault_runner_cmd=("$deploy_sh" "vault-runner")
-      if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-        "${vault_runner_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-      else
-        if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-          echo "Error: deploy.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-        sudo -n -- "${vault_runner_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
-      fi
+    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+      "${deploy_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
    else
-      echo "[deploy] vault-runner: jobspec not found, skipping"
+      if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "Error: deploy.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      sudo -n -- "${deploy_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
    fi

    # Print final summary
    echo ""
    echo "── Summary ────────────────────────────────────────────"
    echo "Cluster:     Nomad+Vault cluster is up"
-    echo "Policies:    applied (Vault ACL)"
-    echo "Auth:        Vault JWT auth + Nomad workload identity configured"
-    if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
-      local import_desc=""
-      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_desc+="${import_env} "
-      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_desc+="${import_sops} "
-      echo "Imported:    ${import_desc% }"
+    if [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ]; then
+      echo "Imported:    secrets from ${import_env:+$import_env }${import_sops:+${import_sops} }"
    else
-      echo "Imported:    (none — seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services)"
+      echo "Imported:    (none — secrets must be seeded manually)"
    fi
    echo "Deployed:    ${with_services}"
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",forgejo,"; then
+    if echo "$with_services" | grep -q "forgejo"; then
      echo "Ports:       forgejo: 3000"
    fi
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",woodpecker-server,"; then
-      echo "             woodpecker-server: 8000"
-    fi
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",woodpecker-agent,"; then
-      echo "             woodpecker-agent: (agent connected)"
-    fi
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",agents,"; then
-      echo "             agents: (polling loop running)"
-    fi
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",staging,"; then
-      echo "             staging: (internal, no external port)"
-    fi
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",chat,"; then
-      echo "             chat: 8080"
-    fi
    echo "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"
  fi

@ -1114,8 +895,7 @@ disinto_init() {
  fi

  # Parse flags
-  local branch="" repo_root="" ci_id="0" auto_yes=false forge_url_flag="" bare=false rotate_tokens=false use_build=false dry_run=false backend="docker" empty=false with_services=""
-  local import_env="" import_sops="" age_key=""
+  local branch="" repo_root="" ci_id="0" auto_yes=false forge_url_flag="" bare=false rotate_tokens=false use_build=false dry_run=false backend="docker" empty=false with_services="" import_env="" import_sops="" age_key=""
  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
    case "$1" in
      --branch)        branch="$2"; shift 2 ;;
@ -1133,11 +913,8 @@ disinto_init() {
      --rotate-tokens) rotate_tokens=true; shift ;;
      --dry-run)       dry_run=true; shift ;;
      --import-env)    import_env="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-      --import-env=*)  import_env="${1#--import-env=}"; shift ;;
      --import-sops)   import_sops="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-      --import-sops=*) import_sops="${1#--import-sops=}"; shift ;;
      --age-key)       age_key="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-      --age-key=*)     age_key="${1#--age-key=}"; shift ;;
      *) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
    esac
  done
@ -1178,104 +955,32 @@ disinto_init() {
    exit 1
  fi

-  # Normalize --with services (S3.4): expand 'woodpecker' shorthand to
-  # 'woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent', auto-include forgejo when
-  # woodpecker is requested (OAuth dependency), and validate all names.
-  if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
-    # Expand 'woodpecker' (bare) → 'woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent'.
-    # Must not match already-expanded 'woodpecker-server'/'woodpecker-agent'.
-    local expanded=""
-    local IFS=','
-    for _svc in $with_services; do
-      _svc=$(echo "$_svc" | xargs)
-      case "$_svc" in
-        woodpecker) _svc="woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent" ;;
-        agents) _svc="agents" ;;
-      esac
-      expanded="${expanded:+${expanded},}${_svc}"
-    done
-    with_services="$expanded"
-    unset IFS
-
-    # Auto-include forgejo when woodpecker is requested
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",woodpecker-server,\|,woodpecker-agent," \
-       && ! echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",forgejo,"; then
-      echo "Note: --with woodpecker implies --with forgejo (OAuth dependency)"
-      with_services="forgejo,${with_services}"
-    fi
-
-    # Auto-include forgejo and woodpecker when agents is requested
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",agents,"; then
-      if ! echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",forgejo,"; then
-        echo "Note: --with agents implies --with forgejo (agents need forge)"
-        with_services="forgejo,${with_services}"
-      fi
-      if ! echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",woodpecker-server,\|,woodpecker-agent,"; then
-        echo "Note: --with agents implies --with woodpecker (agents need CI)"
-        with_services="${with_services},woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent"
-      fi
-    fi
-
-    # Auto-include all dependencies when edge is requested (S5.5)
-    if echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",edge,"; then
-      # Edge depends on all backend services
-      for dep in forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent agents staging chat; do
-        if ! echo ",$with_services," | grep -q ",${dep},"; then
-          echo "Note: --with edge implies --with ${dep} (edge depends on all backend services)"
-          with_services="${with_services},${dep}"
-        fi
-      done
-    fi
-
-    # Validate all service names are known
-    local IFS=','
-    for _svc in $with_services; do
-      _svc=$(echo "$_svc" | xargs)
-      case "$_svc" in
-        forgejo|woodpecker-server|woodpecker-agent|agents|staging|chat|edge) ;;
-        *)
-          echo "Error: unknown service '${_svc}' — known: forgejo, woodpecker-server, woodpecker-agent, agents, staging, chat, edge" >&2
-          exit 1
-          ;;
-      esac
-    done
-    unset IFS
-  fi
-
-  # --import-* flag validation (S2.5). These three flags form an import
-  # triple and must be consistent before dispatch: sops encryption is
-  # useless without the age key to decrypt it, so either both --import-sops
-  # and --age-key are present or neither is. --import-env alone is fine
-  # (it just imports the plaintext dotenv). All three flags are nomad-only.
+  # Import flags validation
+  # --import-sops requires --age-key
  if [ -n "$import_sops" ] && [ -z "$age_key" ]; then
    echo "Error: --import-sops requires --age-key" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
+
+  # --age-key requires --import-sops
  if [ -n "$age_key" ] && [ -z "$import_sops" ]; then
    echo "Error: --age-key requires --import-sops" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
-  if { [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; } \
-     && [ "$backend" != "nomad" ]; then
-    echo "Error: --import-env, --import-sops, and --age-key require --backend=nomad" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi

-  # --empty is the cluster-only escape hatch — it skips policies, auth,
-  # import, and deploy. Pairing it with --import-* silently does nothing,
-  # which is a worse failure mode than a clear error. Reject explicitly.
-  if [ "$empty" = true ] \
-     && { [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; }; then
-    echo "Error: --empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive" >&2
-    exit 1
+  # --import-* flags require --backend=nomad
+  if [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; then
+    if [ "$backend" != "nomad" ]; then
+      echo "Error: --import-env, --import-sops, and --age-key require --backend=nomad" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
  fi

  # Dispatch on backend — the nomad path runs lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
  # (S0.4). The default and --empty variants are identical today; Step 1
  # will branch on $empty to add job deployment to the default path.
  if [ "$backend" = "nomad" ]; then
-    _disinto_init_nomad "$dry_run" "$empty" "$with_services" \
-                        "$import_env" "$import_sops" "$age_key"
+    _disinto_init_nomad "$dry_run" "$empty" "$with_services" "$import_env" "$import_sops" "$age_key"
    # shellcheck disable=SC2317  # _disinto_init_nomad always exits today;
    # `return` is defensive against future refactors.
    return
@ -1389,6 +1094,7 @@ p.write_text(text)
    echo ""
    echo "[ensure] Forgejo admin user 'disinto-admin'"
    echo "[ensure] 8 bot users: dev-bot, review-bot, planner-bot, gardener-bot, vault-bot, supervisor-bot, predictor-bot, architect-bot"
+    echo "[ensure] 2 llama bot users: dev-qwen, dev-qwen-nightly"
    echo "[ensure] .profile repos for all bots"
    echo "[ensure] repo ${forge_repo} on Forgejo with collaborators"
    echo "[run]    preflight checks"
@ -1428,7 +1134,7 @@ p.write_text(text)
    echo "[ensure] CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR"
    echo "[ensure] state files (.dev-active, .reviewer-active, .gardener-active)"
    echo ""
-    echo "Dry run complete — no changes made."
+    echo "Dry run complete - no changes made."
    exit 0
  fi

@ -1584,6 +1290,19 @@ p.write_text(text)
    echo "Config:  CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC=1 saved to .env"
  fi

+  # Write local-Qwen dev agent env keys with safe defaults (#769)
+  if ! grep -q '^ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=' "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+    cat >> "$env_file" <<'LLAMAENVEOF'
+
+# Local Qwen dev agent (optional) — set to 1 to enable
+ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0
+FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=
+FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=
+ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=
+LLAMAENVEOF
+    echo "Config:  ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT keys written to .env (disabled by default)"
+  fi
+
  # Create labels on remote
  create_labels "$forge_repo" "$forge_url"

--- a/dev/AGENTS.md
+++ b/dev/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Dev Agent

 **Role**: Implement issues autonomously — write code, push branches, address
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ services:
      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ services:
      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
@ -137,6 +139,7 @@ services:
      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
--- a/docker/agents/Dockerfile
+++ b/docker/agents/Dockerfile
@ -1,26 +1,21 @@
 FROM debian:bookworm-slim

 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-    bash curl git jq tmux nodejs npm python3 python3-pip openssh-client ca-certificates age shellcheck procps gosu \
+    bash curl git jq tmux python3 python3-pip openssh-client ca-certificates age shellcheck procps gosu \
    && pip3 install --break-system-packages networkx tomlkit \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

 # Pre-built binaries (copied from docker/agents/bin/)
 # SOPS — encrypted data decryption tool
-# Download sops binary (replaces manual COPY of vendored binary)
-ARG SOPS_VERSION=3.9.4
-RUN curl -fsSL "https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/v${SOPS_VERSION}/sops-v${SOPS_VERSION}.linux.amd64" \
-    -o /usr/local/bin/sops && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sops
+COPY docker/agents/bin/sops /usr/local/bin/sops
+RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sops

 # tea CLI — official Gitea/Forgejo CLI for issue/label/comment operations
-# Download tea binary (replaces manual COPY of vendored binary)
-ARG TEA_VERSION=0.9.2
-RUN curl -fsSL "https://dl.gitea.com/tea/${TEA_VERSION}/tea-${TEA_VERSION}-linux-amd64" \
-    -o /usr/local/bin/tea && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/tea
+COPY docker/agents/bin/tea /usr/local/bin/tea
+RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/tea

-# Install Claude Code CLI — agent runtime for all LLM backends (llama, Claude API).
-# The CLI is the execution environment; ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL selects the model provider.
-RUN npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@2.1.84
+# Claude CLI is mounted from the host via docker-compose volume.
+# No internet access to cli.anthropic.com required at build time.

 # Non-root user
 RUN useradd -m -u 1000 -s /bin/bash agent
--- a/docker/agents/entrypoint.sh
+++ b/docker/agents/entrypoint.sh
@ -17,38 +17,6 @@ set -euo pipefail
 #   - predictor: every 24 hours (288 iterations * 5 min)
 #   - supervisor: every SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL seconds (default: 1200 = 20 min)

-# ── Migration check: reject ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT ───────────────────────────────
-# #846: The legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT env flag is no longer supported.
-# Activation is now done exclusively via [agents.X] sections in project TOML.
-# If this legacy flag is detected, fail immediately with a migration message.
-if [ "${ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT:-}" = "1" ]; then
-  cat <<'MIGRATION_ERR'
-FATAL: ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT is no longer supported.
-
-The legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 flag has been removed (#846).
-Activation is now done exclusively via [agents.X] sections in projects/*.toml.
-
-To migrate:
-  1. Remove ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT from your .env or .env.enc file
-  2. Add an [agents.<name>] section to your project TOML:
-
-     [agents.dev-qwen]
-     base_url = "http://your-llama-server:8081"
-     model = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
-     api_key = "sk-no-key-required"
-     roles = ["dev"]
-     forge_user = "dev-qwen"
-     compact_pct = 60
-     poll_interval = 60
-
-  3. Run: disinto init
-  4. Start the agent: docker compose up -d agents-dev-qwen
-
-See docs/agents-llama.md for full details.
-MIGRATION_ERR
-  exit 1
-fi
-
 DISINTO_BAKED="/home/agent/disinto"
 DISINTO_LIVE="/home/agent/repos/_factory"
 DISINTO_DIR="$DISINTO_BAKED"  # start with baked copy; switched to live checkout after bootstrap
@ -378,19 +346,15 @@ bootstrap_factory_repo
 # This prevents the silent-zombie mode where the polling loop matches zero files
 # and does nothing forever.
 validate_projects_dir() {
-  # NOTE: compgen -G exits non-zero when no matches exist, so piping it through
-  # `wc -l` under `set -eo pipefail` aborts the script before the FATAL branch
-  # can log a diagnostic (#877).  Use the conditional form already adopted at
-  # lines above (see bootstrap_factory_repo, PROJECT_NAME parsing).
-  if ! compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  local toml_count
+  toml_count=$(compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
+  if [ "$toml_count" -eq 0 ]; then
    log "FATAL: No real .toml files found in ${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/"
    log "Expected at least one project config file (e.g., disinto.toml)"
    log "The directory only contains *.toml.example template files."
    log "Mount the host ./projects volume or copy real .toml files into the container."
    exit 1
  fi
-  local toml_count
-  toml_count=$(compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" | wc -l)
  log "Projects directory validated: ${toml_count} real .toml file(s) found"
 }

--- a/docker/chat/Dockerfile
+++ b/docker/chat/Dockerfile
@ -1,22 +1,20 @@
 # disinto-chat — minimal HTTP backend for Claude chat UI
 #
-# Small Debian slim base with Python runtime and Node.js.
+# Small Debian slim base with Python runtime.
 # Chosen for simplicity and small image size (~100MB).
 #
 # Image size: ~100MB (well under the 200MB ceiling)
 #
-# Claude CLI is baked into the image — same pattern as the agents container.
+# The claude binary is mounted from the host at runtime via docker-compose,
+# not baked into the image — same pattern as the agents container.

 FROM debian:bookworm-slim

-# Install Node.js (required for Claude CLI) and Python
+# Install Python (no build-time network access needed)
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-    nodejs npm python3 \
+    python3 \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

-# Install Claude Code CLI — chat backend runtime
-RUN npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@2.1.84
-
 # Non-root user — fixed UID 10001 for sandbox hardening (#706)
 RUN useradd -m -u 10001 -s /bin/bash chat

--- a/docker/edge/dispatcher.sh
+++ b/docker/edge/dispatcher.sh
@ -560,168 +560,10 @@ _launch_runner_docker() {

 # _launch_runner_nomad ACTION_ID SECRETS_CSV MOUNTS_CSV
 #
-# Dispatches a vault-runner batch job via `nomad job dispatch`.
-# Polls `nomad job status` until terminal state (completed/failed).
-# Reads exit code from allocation and writes <action-id>.result.json.
-#
-# Usage: _launch_runner_nomad <action_id> <secrets_csv> <mounts_csv>
-# Returns: exit code of the nomad job (0=success, non-zero=failure)
+# Nomad backend stub — will be implemented in migration Step 5.
 _launch_runner_nomad() {
-  local action_id="$1"
-  local secrets_csv="$2"
-  local mounts_csv="$3"
-
-  log "Dispatching vault-runner batch job via Nomad for action: ${action_id}"
-
-  # Dispatch the parameterized batch job
-  # The vault-runner job expects meta: action_id, secrets_csv
-  # Note: mounts_csv is not passed as meta (not declared in vault-runner.hcl)
-  local dispatch_output
-  dispatch_output=$(nomad job dispatch \
-    -detach \
-    -meta action_id="$action_id" \
-    -meta secrets_csv="$secrets_csv" \
-    vault-runner 2>&1) || {
-    log "ERROR: Failed to dispatch vault-runner job for ${action_id}"
-    log "Dispatch output: ${dispatch_output}"
-    write_result "$action_id" 1 "Nomad dispatch failed: ${dispatch_output}"
-    return 1
-  }
-
-  # Extract dispatched job ID from output (format: "vault-runner/dispatch-<timestamp>-<uuid>")
-  local dispatched_job_id
-  dispatched_job_id=$(echo "$dispatch_output" | grep -oP '(?<=Dispatched Job ID = ).+' || true)
-
-  if [ -z "$dispatched_job_id" ]; then
-    log "ERROR: Could not extract dispatched job ID from nomad output"
-    log "Dispatch output: ${dispatch_output}"
-    write_result "$action_id" 1 "Could not extract dispatched job ID from nomad output"
-    return 1
-  fi
-
-  log "Dispatched vault-runner with job ID: ${dispatched_job_id}"
-
-  # Poll job status until terminal state
-  # Batch jobs transition: running -> completed/failed
-  local max_wait=300  # 5 minutes max wait
-  local elapsed=0
-  local poll_interval=5
-  local alloc_id=""
-
-  log "Polling nomad job status for ${dispatched_job_id}..."
-
-  while [ "$elapsed" -lt "$max_wait" ]; do
-    # Get job status with JSON output for the dispatched child job
-    local job_status_json
-    job_status_json=$(nomad job status -json "$dispatched_job_id" 2>/dev/null) || {
-      log "ERROR: Failed to get job status for ${dispatched_job_id}"
-      write_result "$action_id" 1 "Failed to get job status for ${dispatched_job_id}"
-      return 1
-    }
-
-    # Check job status field (transitions to "dead" on completion)
-    local job_state
-    job_state=$(echo "$job_status_json" | jq -r '.Status // empty' 2>/dev/null) || job_state=""
-
-    # Check allocation state directly
-    alloc_id=$(echo "$job_status_json" | jq -r '.Allocations[0]?.ID // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_id=""
-
-    if [ -n "$alloc_id" ]; then
-      local alloc_state
-      alloc_state=$(nomad alloc status -short "$alloc_id" 2>/dev/null || true)
-
-      case "$alloc_state" in
-        *completed*|*success*|*dead*)
-          log "Allocation ${alloc_id} reached terminal state: ${alloc_state}"
-          break
-          ;;
-        *running*|*pending*|*starting*)
-          log "Allocation ${alloc_id} still running (state: ${alloc_state})..."
-          ;;
-        *failed*|*crashed*)
-          log "Allocation ${alloc_id} failed (state: ${alloc_state})"
-          break
-          ;;
-      esac
-    fi
-
-    # Also check job-level state
-    case "$job_state" in
-      dead)
-        log "Job ${dispatched_job_id} reached terminal state: ${job_state}"
-        break
-        ;;
-      failed)
-        log "Job ${dispatched_job_id} failed"
-        break
-        ;;
-    esac
-
-    sleep "$poll_interval"
-    elapsed=$((elapsed + poll_interval))
-  done
-
-  if [ "$elapsed" -ge "$max_wait" ]; then
-    log "ERROR: Timeout waiting for vault-runner job to complete"
-    write_result "$action_id" 1 "Timeout waiting for nomad job to complete"
-    return 1
-  fi
-
-  # Get final job status and exit code
-  local final_status_json
-  final_status_json=$(nomad job status -json "$dispatched_job_id" 2>/dev/null) || {
-    log "ERROR: Failed to get final job status"
-    write_result "$action_id" 1 "Failed to get final job status"
-    return 1
-  }
-
-  # Get allocation exit code
-  local exit_code=0
-  local logs=""
-
-  if [ -n "$alloc_id" ]; then
-    # Get allocation logs
-    logs=$(nomad alloc logs -short "$alloc_id" 2>/dev/null || true)
-
-    # Try to get exit code from alloc status JSON
-    # Nomad alloc status -json has .TaskStates["<task_name>"].Events[].ExitCode
-    local alloc_exit_code
-    alloc_exit_code=$(nomad alloc status -json "$alloc_id" 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.TaskStates["runner"].Events[-1].ExitCode // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_exit_code=""
-
-    if [ -n "$alloc_exit_code" ] && [ "$alloc_exit_code" != "null" ]; then
-      exit_code="$alloc_exit_code"
-    fi
-  fi
-
-  # If we couldn't get exit code from alloc, check job state as fallback
-  # Note: "dead" = terminal state for batch jobs (includes successful completion)
-  # Only "failed" indicates actual failure
-  if [ "$exit_code" -eq 0 ]; then
-    local final_state
-    final_state=$(echo "$final_status_json" | jq -r '.Status // empty' 2>/dev/null) || final_state=""
-
-    case "$final_state" in
-      failed)
-        exit_code=1
-        ;;
-    esac
-  fi
-
-  # Truncate logs if too long
-  if [ ${#logs} -gt 1000 ]; then
-    logs="${logs: -1000}"
-  fi
-
-  # Write result file
-  write_result "$action_id" "$exit_code" "$logs"
-
-  if [ "$exit_code" -eq 0 ]; then
-    log "Vault-runner job completed successfully for action: ${action_id}"
-  else
-    log "Vault-runner job failed for action: ${action_id} (exit code: ${exit_code})"
-  fi
-
-  return "$exit_code"
+  echo "nomad backend not yet implemented" >&2
+  return 1
 }

 # Launch runner for the given action (backend-agnostic orchestrator)
@ -1209,8 +1051,11 @@ main() {

  # Validate backend selection at startup
  case "$DISPATCHER_BACKEND" in
-    docker|nomad)
-      log "Using ${DISPATCHER_BACKEND} backend for vault-runner dispatch"
+    docker) ;;
+    nomad)
+      log "ERROR: nomad backend not yet implemented"
+      echo "nomad backend not yet implemented" >&2
+      exit 1
      ;;
    *)
      log "ERROR: unknown DISPATCHER_BACKEND=${DISPATCHER_BACKEND}"
--- a/docker/edge/entrypoint-edge.sh
+++ b/docker/edge/entrypoint-edge.sh
@ -234,13 +234,6 @@ fi
  rm -f "$_fetch_log"
 done) &

-# Nomad template renders Caddyfile to /local/Caddyfile via service discovery;
-# copy it into the expected location if present (compose uses the mounted path).
-if [ -f /local/Caddyfile ]; then
-  cp /local/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
-  echo "edge: using Nomad-rendered Caddyfile from /local/Caddyfile" >&2
-fi
-
 # Caddy as main process — run in foreground via wait so background jobs survive
 # (exec replaces the shell, which can orphan backgrounded subshells)
 caddy run --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile &
--- a/docs/agents-llama.md
+++ b/docs/agents-llama.md
@ -2,12 +2,9 @@

 Local-model agents run the same agent code as the Claude-backed agents, but
 connect to a local llama-server (or compatible OpenAI-API endpoint) instead of
-the Anthropic API. This document describes the canonical activation flow using
+the Anthropic API. This document describes the current activation flow using
 `disinto hire-an-agent` and `[agents.X]` TOML configuration.

-> **Note:** The legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` env flag has been removed (#846).
-> Activation is now done exclusively via `[agents.X]` sections in project TOML.
-
 ## Overview

 Local-model agents are configured via `[agents.<name>]` sections in
--- a/docs/nomad-migration.md
+++ b/docs/nomad-migration.md
@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: (new file, S2.5 #883) -->
-# Nomad+Vault migration — cutover-day runbook
-
-`disinto init --backend=nomad` is the single entry-point that turns a fresh
-LXC (with the disinto repo cloned) into a running Nomad+Vault cluster with
-policies applied, JWT workload-identity auth configured, secrets imported
-from the old docker stack, and services deployed.
-
-## Cutover-day invocation
-
-On the new LXC, as root (or an operator with NOPASSWD sudo):
-
-```bash
-# Copy the plaintext .env + sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc + age keyfile
-# from the old box first (out of band — SSH, USB, whatever your ops
-# procedure allows). Then:
-
-sudo ./bin/disinto init \
-  --backend=nomad \
-  --import-env   /tmp/.env \
-  --import-sops  /tmp/.env.vault.enc \
-  --age-key      /tmp/keys.txt \
-  --with         forgejo
-```
-
-This runs, in order:
-
-1. **`lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh`** (S0) — installs Nomad + Vault
-   binaries, writes `/etc/nomad.d/*`, initializes Vault, starts both
-   services, waits for the Nomad node to become ready.
-2. **`tools/vault-apply-policies.sh`** (S2.1) — syncs every
-   `vault/policies/*.hcl` into Vault as an ACL policy. Idempotent.
-3. **`lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`** (S2.3) — enables Vault's
-   JWT auth method at `jwt-nomad`, points it at Nomad's JWKS, writes
-   one role per policy, reloads Nomad so jobs can exchange
-   workload-identity tokens for Vault tokens. Idempotent.
-4. **`tools/vault-import.sh`** (S2.2) — reads `/tmp/.env` and the
-   sops-decrypted `/tmp/.env.vault.enc`, writes them to the KV paths
-   matching the S2.1 policy layout (`kv/disinto/bots/*`, `kv/disinto/shared/*`,
-   `kv/disinto/runner/*`). Idempotent (overwrites KV v2 data in place).
-5. **`lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh forgejo`** (S1) — validates + runs the
-   `nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl` jobspec. Forgejo reads its admin creds from
-   Vault via the `template` stanza (S2.4).
-
-## Flag summary
-
-| Flag | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| `--backend=nomad` | Switch the init dispatcher to the Nomad+Vault path (instead of docker compose). |
-| `--empty` | Bring the cluster up, skip policies/auth/import/deploy. Escape hatch for debugging. |
-| `--with forgejo[,…]` | Deploy these services after the cluster is up. |
-| `--import-env PATH` | Plaintext `.env` from the old stack. Optional. |
-| `--import-sops PATH` | Sops-encrypted `.env.vault.enc` from the old stack. Requires `--age-key`. |
-| `--age-key PATH` | Age keyfile used to decrypt `--import-sops`. Requires `--import-sops`. |
-| `--dry-run` | Print the full plan (cluster-up + policies + auth + import + deploy) and exit. Touches nothing. |
-
-### Flag validation
-
- `--import-sops` without `--age-key` → error.
- `--age-key` without `--import-sops` → error.
- `--import-env` alone (no sops) → OK (imports just the plaintext `.env`).
- `--backend=docker` with any `--import-*` flag → error.
- `--empty` with any `--import-*` flag → error (mutually exclusive: `--empty`
-  skips the import step, so pairing them silently discards the import
-  intent).
-
-## Idempotency
-
-Every layer is idempotent by design. Re-running the same command on an
-already-provisioned box is a no-op at every step:
-
- **Cluster-up:** second run detects running `nomad`/`vault` systemd
-  units and state files, skips re-init.
- **Policies:** byte-for-byte compare against on-server policy text;
-  "unchanged" for every untouched file.
- **Auth:** skips auth-method create if `jwt-nomad/` already enabled,
-  skips config write if the JWKS + algs match, skips server.hcl write if
-  the file on disk is identical to the repo copy.
- **Import:** KV v2 writes overwrite in place (same path, same keys,
-  same values → no new version).
- **Deploy:** `nomad job run` is declarative; same jobspec → no new
-  allocation.
-
-## Dry-run
-
-```bash
-./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad \
-  --import-env /tmp/.env \
-  --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc \
-  --age-key /tmp/keys.txt \
-  --with forgejo \
-  --dry-run
-```
-
-Prints the five-section plan — cluster-up, policies, auth, import,
-deploy — with every path and every argv that would be executed. No
-network, no sudo, no state mutation. See
-`tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats` for the exact output shape.
-
-## No-import path
-
-If you already have `kv/disinto/*` seeded by other means (manual
-`vault kv put`, a replica, etc.), omit all three `--import-*` flags.
-`disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo` still applies policies,
-configures auth, and deploys — but skips the import step with:
-
-```
-[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services
-```
-
-Forgejo's template stanza will fail to render (and thus the allocation
-will stall) until those KV paths exist — so either import them or seed
-them first.
-
-## Secret hygiene
-
- Never log a secret value. The CLI only prints paths (`--import-env`,
-  `--age-key`) and KV *paths* (`kv/disinto/bots/review/token`), never
-  the values themselves. `tools/vault-import.sh` is the only thing that
-  reads the values, and it pipes them directly into Vault's HTTP API.
- The age keyfile must be mode 0400 — `vault-import.sh` refuses to
-  source a keyfile with looser permissions.
- `VAULT_ADDR` must be localhost during import — the import tool
-  refuses to run against a remote Vault, preventing accidental exposure.
--- a/formulas/release.sh
+++ b/formulas/release.sh
@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ log "Tagged disinto/agents:${RELEASE_VERSION}"

 log "Step 6/6: Restarting agent containers"

-docker compose stop agents 2>/dev/null || true
-docker compose up -d agents
+docker compose stop agents agents-llama 2>/dev/null || true
+docker compose up -d agents agents-llama
 log "Agent containers restarted"

 # ── Done ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
--- a/formulas/release.toml
+++ b/formulas/release.toml
@ -189,10 +189,10 @@ Restart agent containers to use the new image.
   - docker compose pull agents

 2. Stop and remove existing agent containers:
-   - docker compose down agents
+   - docker compose down agents agents-llama 2>/dev/null || true

 3. Start agents with new image:
-   - docker compose up -d agents
+   - docker compose up -d agents agents-llama

 4. Wait for containers to be healthy:
   - for i in {1..30}; do
@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Restart agent containers to use the new image.
   - done

 5. Verify containers are running:
-   - docker compose ps agents
+   - docker compose ps agents agents-llama

 6. Log restart:
   - echo "Restarted agents containers"
--- a/formulas/run-supervisor.toml
+++ b/formulas/run-supervisor.toml
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ and injected into your prompt above. Review them now.

 1. Read the injected metrics data carefully (System Resources, Docker,
   Active Sessions, Phase Files, Stale Phase Cleanup, Lock Files, Agent Logs,
-   CI Pipelines, Open PRs, Issue Status, Stale Worktrees, **Woodpecker Agent Health**).
+   CI Pipelines, Open PRs, Issue Status, Stale Worktrees).
   Note: preflight.sh auto-removes PHASE:escalate files for closed issues
   (24h grace period). Check the "Stale Phase Cleanup" section for any
   files cleaned or in grace period this run.
@ -75,10 +75,6 @@ Categorize every finding from the metrics into priority levels.
 - Dev/action sessions in PHASE:escalate for > 24h (session timeout)
  (Note: PHASE:escalate files for closed issues are auto-cleaned by preflight;
  this check covers sessions where the issue is still open)
- **Woodpecker agent unhealthy** — see "Woodpecker Agent Health" section in preflight:
-  - Container not running or in unhealthy state
-  - gRPC errors >= 3 in last 20 minutes
-  - Fast-failure pipelines (duration < 60s) >= 3 in last 15 minutes

 ### P3 — Factory degraded
 - PRs stale: CI finished >20min ago AND no git push to the PR branch since CI completed
@ -104,15 +100,6 @@ For each finding from the health assessment, decide and execute an action.

 ### Auto-fixable (execute these directly)

-**P2 Woodpecker agent unhealthy:**
-The supervisor-run.sh script automatically handles WP agent recovery:
- Detects unhealthy state via preflight.sh health checks
- Restarts container via `docker restart`
- Scans for `blocked: ci_exhausted` issues updated in last 30 minutes
- Unassigns and removes blocked label from affected issues
- Posts recovery comment with infra-flake context
- Avoids duplicate restarts via 5-minute cooldown in history file
-
 **P0 Memory crisis:**
  # Kill stale one-shot claude processes (>3h old)
  pgrep -f "claude -p" --older 10800 2>/dev/null | xargs kill 2>/dev/null || true
@ -261,11 +248,6 @@ Format:
  - <what was fixed>
  (or "No actions needed")

-  ### WP Agent Recovery (if applicable)
-  - WP agent restart: <time of restart or "none">
-  - Issues recovered: <count>
-  - Reason: <health check reason or "healthy">
-
  ### Vault items filed
  - vault/pending/<id>.md — <reason>
  (or "None")
--- a/gardener/AGENTS.md
+++ b/gardener/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Gardener Agent

 **Role**: Backlog grooming — detect duplicate issues, missing acceptance
--- a/gardener/dust.jsonl
+++ b/gardener/dust.jsonl
--- a/gardener/pending-actions.json
+++ b/gardener/pending-actions.json
@ -1,38 +1,108 @@
 [
  {
    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 1025,
-    "body": "## Prior art: PR #1033 (open, branch `fix/issue-1025` retained)\n\nFirst attempt by dev-qwen2 (head `f692dd2`). Test script (`tests/smoke-edge-subpath.sh`, 13.8 KB) and pipeline (`.woodpecker/edge-subpath.yml`) both landed and look reasonable, but the **CI harness design is wrong**: the pipeline boots a bare `alpine:3.19` container and runs the smoke script directly against `BASE_URL=http://localhost`, with no stack to test against.\n\n**This is a harness design gap, not a script bug.** The smoke script itself is a reasonable post-deploy tool — the mistake was trying to exercise it as a hermetic CI step.\n\n**Approach (Option 1 — split the work):**\n\nKeep `tests/smoke-edge-subpath.sh` as an out-of-CI post-deploy tool (accepts `BASE_URL` env var). Replace the CI pipeline step that tries to curl a live stack with static checks only: `shellcheck`, `caddy validate` on the generated Caddyfile, and a template-substitution unit test that verifies routing block shape.\n\nBranch `fix/issue-1025` is preserved at `f692dd2` — the smoke script body is reusable; only the pipeline harness needs a rethink.\n\n**Timeline:**\n- 2026-04-19 09:14 — dev-qwen2 last pushed `f692dd2`\n- 3 pipelines (#1378/#1380/#1382) all fail: no service to curl (connection refused)\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `.woodpecker/edge-subpath.yml` pipeline runs `shellcheck` on `tests/smoke-edge-subpath.sh` with no live service curl\n- [ ] `caddy validate` runs on the generated Caddyfile in CI (template-substitution unit test)\n- [ ] A template-substitution test verifies the Caddyfile routing block shape (forge/ci/staging/chat paths)\n- [ ] `tests/smoke-edge-subpath.sh` accepts `BASE_URL` env var for post-deploy staging runs\n- [ ] CI green (no connection-refused failures on Woodpecker)\n\n## Affected files\n- `.woodpecker/edge-subpath.yml` — pipeline config (static checks only, no service curl)\n- `tests/smoke-edge-subpath.sh` — out-of-CI smoke script (reusable from PR #1033)\n\n## Dependencies\n- #1038 should land first to unblock local edge staging runs (optional — CI fix is independent)"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "remove_label",
-    "issue": 1025,
-    "label": "blocked"
+    "issue": 900,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #897.\n\n## Problem\n\nThe policy at `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` grants:\n\n```hcl\npath \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n```\n\nBut the consul-template stanza in `nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl` reads:\n\n```\n{{- with secret \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\" -}}\n```\n\nVault glob `/*` requires at least one path segment after `forgejo/` (e.g. `forgejo/subkey`). It does **not** match the bare path `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo` that the template actually calls. Vault ACL longest-prefix matching: `forgejo/*` is never hit for a request to `forgejo`.\n\nRuntime consequence: consul-template `with` block receives a 403 permission denied → evaluates to empty (false) → `else` branch renders `seed-me` placeholder values → Forgejo starts with obviously-wrong secrets despite `vault-seed-forgejo.sh` having run successfully.\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the glob with an exact path in `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl`:\n\n```hcl\npath \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\npath \"kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"list\", \"read\"]\n}\n```\n\n(The `/*` glob is only useful if future subkeys are written under `forgejo/`; the current design stores both secrets in a single KV document at the `forgejo` path.)\n\nThis is a pre-existing defect in `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl`; that file was not changed by PR #897.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review*\n\n## Affected files\n- `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` — replace glob path with exact path + metadata path\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` grants exact path `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo` (not `forgejo/*`)\n- [ ] Metadata path `kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo` is also granted read+list\n- [ ] consul-template `with secret \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\"` resolves without 403 (verified via `vault policy read service-forgejo`)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean (no shell changes expected)\n"
  },
  {
    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 1025,
+    "issue": 900,
    "label": "backlog"
  },
  {
    "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 1038,
-    "body": "## Problem\n\n`disinto-edge` crashloops on any deployment that has not opted into the age-encrypted secret store (#777), because the edge entrypoint treats four secrets as unconditionally required:\n\n```\nFATAL: age key (/home/agent/.config/sops/age/keys.txt) or secrets dir (/opt/disinto/secrets) not found — cannot load required secrets\n```\n\nObserved on `disinto-dev-box` (container `disinto-edge`, restarting every ~30s), which blocks PR #1033 (edge-subpath smoke test) and any other work that depends on a running edge.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`docker/edge/entrypoint-edge.sh:176-205` requires:\n\n- `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt`\n- `/opt/disinto/secrets/` with `.enc` files for `CADDY_SSH_KEY`, `CADDY_SSH_HOST`, `CADDY_SSH_USER`, `CADDY_ACCESS_LOG`.\n\nThese four secrets feed exactly one feature: the daily 23:50 UTC `collect-engagement.sh` cron (#745), which SCPs Caddy access logs from a **remote production edge host** for engagement parsing. On a local factory box or any deployment that has not set up a remote edge, this code path has no target — yet its absence kills the whole edge container.\n\n## Fix\n\nMake the secrets block **optional**. When age key or secrets dir is missing, or any of the four CADDY_ secrets fail to decrypt, log a warning and skip the `collect-engagement` cron loop. Caddy itself does not depend on these secrets and should start normally.\n\nThe concrete edit is around lines 176-205 of `docker/edge/entrypoint-edge.sh` — guard the secret-loading block with a check for the age key and secrets dir, set `EDGE_ENGAGEMENT_READY=0` on failure, and skip cron registration when `EDGE_ENGAGEMENT_READY != 1`.\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `docker/edge/entrypoint-edge.sh` loads CADDY_ secrets optionally — missing age key or secrets dir logs a warning and continues, does not FATAL\n- [ ] Caddy starts normally when CADDY_ secrets are absent\n- [ ] `collect-engagement` cron is skipped (not registered) when engagement secrets are unavailable\n- [ ] On deployments WITH secrets configured, behavior is unchanged (collect-engagement cron still fires at 23:50 UTC)\n- [ ] CI green\n\n## Affected files\n- `docker/edge/entrypoint-edge.sh` — lines 176-205, secrets loading block made optional"
+    "issue": 898,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #889.\n\n## Problem\n\n`tools/vault-import.sh` serializes each entry in `ops_data` as `\"${source_value}|${status}\"` (line 498). Extraction at lines 510-511 uses `${data%%|*}` (first field) and `${data##*|}` (last field). If `source_value` contains a literal `|`, `${data%%|*}` truncates it to the first segment, silently writing a corrupted value to Vault.\n\nThe same separator is used in `paths_to_write` (line 519) to join multiple kv-pairs for a path. When `IFS=\"|\"` splits the string back into an array (line 540), a value containing `|` is split across array elements, corrupting the write.\n\n## Failure mode\n\nAny secret value with a pipe character (e.g. a generated password or composed token like `abc|xyz`) is silently truncated or misrouted on import. No error is emitted.\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the `|`-delimited string with a bash indexed array for accumulating per-path kv pairs, eliminating the need for a delimiter that conflicts with possible value characters.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #889*\n\n## Affected files\n- `tools/vault-import.sh` — replace pipe-delimited string accumulation with bash indexed arrays (lines ~498–540)\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] A secret value containing `|` (e.g. `abc|xyz`) is imported to Vault without truncation or corruption\n- [ ] No regression for values without `|`\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 898,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 893,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #892.\n\n## Problem\n\n`disinto init --build` generates the `agents:` service by first emitting `image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}` and then running a `sed -i` substitution (`lib/generators.sh:793`) that replaces the `image:` line with a `build:` block. The substitution does not add `pull_policy: build`.\n\nResult: `docker compose up` with `--build`-generated compose files still uses the cached image for the base `agents:` service, even when `docker/agents/` source has changed — the same silent-stale-image bug that #887 fixed for the three local-model service stanzas.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe `sed` substitution on line 793 should also inject `pull_policy: build` after the emitted `build:` block.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #892*\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` (line ~793) — add `pull_policy: build` to the agents service sed substitution\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `disinto init --build`-generated compose file includes `pull_policy: build` in the `agents:` service stanza\n- [ ] `docker compose up` rebuilds the agents image from local source when `docker/agents/` changes\n- [ ] Non-`--build` compose generation is unchanged\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 893,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 890,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #888.\n\n## Problem\n\n`lib/hvault.sh` functions `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, and `hvault_kv_list` all hardcode `secret/data/` and `secret/metadata/` as KV v2 path prefixes (lines 117, 157, 173).\n\nThe Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, #879) establishes `kv/` as the mount name for all factory secrets — every policy in `vault/policies/*.hcl` grants ACL on `kv/data/disinto/...` paths.\n\nIf any agent calls `hvault_kv_get` after the migration, Vault will route the request to `secret/data/...` but the token only holds ACL for `kv/data/...`, producing a 403 Forbidden.\n\n## Fix\n\nChange the mount prefix in `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, and `hvault_kv_list` from `secret/` to `kv/`, or make the mount name configurable via `VAULT_KV_MOUNT` (defaulting to `kv`). Coordinate with S2.2 (#880) which writes secrets into the `kv/` mount.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #888*\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/hvault.sh` — change `secret/data/` and `secret/metadata/` prefixes to `kv/data/` and `kv/metadata/` (lines ~117, 157, 173); optionally make configurable via `VAULT_KV_MOUNT`\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, `hvault_kv_list` use `kv/` mount prefix (not `secret/`)\n- [ ] Agents can read/write KV paths that policies in `vault/policies/*.hcl` grant (no 403)\n- [ ] Optionally: `VAULT_KV_MOUNT` env var overrides the mount name (defaults to `kv`)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 890,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 877,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #875.\n\n## Problem\n\n`validate_projects_dir()` in `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` uses a command substitution that triggers `set -e` before the intended error-logging branch runs:\n\n```bash\ntoml_count=$(compgen -G \"${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml\" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)\n```\n\nWhen no `.toml` files are present, `compgen -G` exits 1. With `pipefail`, the pipeline exits 1. `set -e` causes the script to exit before `if [ \"$toml_count\" -eq 0 ]` is evaluated, so the FATAL diagnostic messages are never printed. The container still fast-fails (correct outcome), but the operator sees no explanation.\n\nEvery other `compgen -G` usage in the file uses the safer conditional pattern (lines 259, 322).\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the `wc -l` pattern with:\n\n```bash\nif ! compgen -G \"${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml\" >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n  log \"FATAL: No real .toml files found in ${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/\"\n  ...\n  exit 1\nfi\n```\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review*\n\n## Affected files\n- `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` — fix `validate_projects_dir()` to use conditional compgen pattern instead of `wc -l` pipeline\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] When no `.toml` files are present, the FATAL message is printed before the container exits\n- [ ] Container still exits non-zero in that case\n- [ ] Matches the pattern already used at lines 259 and 322\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 877,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 773,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 883,
+    "body": "Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. **Step 2 — Vault policies + workload identity + secrets import.**\n\n~~**Blocked by: #880 (S2.2), #881 (S2.3).**~~ Dependencies closed; unblocked.\n\n## Goal\n\nWire the Step-2 building blocks (import, auth, policies) into `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` so a single command on a fresh LXC provisions cluster + policies + auth + imports secrets + deploys services.\n\n## Scope\n\nAdd flags to `disinto init --backend=nomad`:\n\n- `--import-env PATH` — points at an existing `.env` (from old stack).\n- `--import-sops PATH` — points at the sops-encrypted `.env.vault.enc`.\n- `--age-key PATH` — points at the sops age keyfile (required if `--import-sops` is set).\n\nFlow when any of `--import-*` is set:\n\n1. `cluster-up.sh` (Step 0, unchanged).\n2. `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (S2.1, idempotent).\n3. `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` (S2.3, idempotent).\n4. `tools/vault-import.sh --env PATH --sops PATH --age-key PATH` (S2.2).\n5. If `--with <service>` was also passed, `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh <service>` (Step 1, unchanged).\n6. Final summary: cluster + policies + auth + imported secrets count + deployed services + ports.\n\nFlow when **no** import flags are set:\n- Skip step 4; still apply policies + auth.\n- Log: `[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services`.\n\nFlag validation:\n- `--import-sops` without `--age-key` → error.\n- `--age-key` without `--import-sops` → error.\n- `--import-env` alone (no sops) → OK.\n- `--backend=docker` + any `--import-*` → error.\n\n## Affected files\n- `bin/disinto` — add `--import-env`, `--import-sops`, `--age-key` flags to `init --backend=nomad`\n- `docs/nomad-migration.md` (new) — cutover-day invocation shape\n- `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` (S2.3) — called as step 3\n- `tools/vault-import.sh` (S2.2) — called as step 4\n- `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (S2.1) — called as step 2\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --with forgejo` completes: cluster up, policies applied, JWT auth configured, KV populated, Forgejo deployed reading Vault secrets\n- [ ] Re-running is a no-op at every layer\n- [ ] `--import-sops` without `--age-key` exits with a clear error\n- [ ] `--backend=docker` with `--import-env` exits with a clear error\n- [ ] `--dry-run` prints the full plan, touches nothing\n- [ ] Never logs a secret value\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
  },
  {
    "action": "remove_label",
-    "issue": 1038,
+    "issue": 883,
    "label": "blocked"
  },
  {
    "action": "add_label",
-    "issue": 1038,
+    "issue": 883,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 884,
+    "body": "Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. **Step 2 — Vault policies + workload identity + secrets import.**\n\nS2.1 (#879) is now closed; this step has no blocking dependencies.\n\n## Goal\n\nExtend the Woodpecker CI to validate Vault policy HCL files under `vault/policies/` and role definitions.\n\n## Scope\n\nExtend `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`:\n\n- `vault policy fmt -check vault/policies/*.hcl` — fails on unformatted HCL.\n- `for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do vault policy validate \"$f\"; done` — syntax + semantic validation (requires a dev-mode vault spun inline).\n- If `vault/roles.yaml` exists: yamllint check + custom validator that each role references a policy file that actually exists in `vault/policies/`.\n- Secret-scan gate: ensure no policy file contains what looks like a literal secret.\n- Trigger: on any PR touching `vault/policies/`, `vault/roles.yaml`, or `lib/init/nomad/vault-*.sh`.\n\nAlso:\n- Add `vault/policies/AGENTS.md` cross-reference: policy lifecycle (add policy HCL → update roles.yaml → add Vault KV path), what CI enforces, common failure modes.\n\n## Non-goals\n\n- No runtime check against a real cluster.\n- No enforcement of specific naming conventions beyond what S2.1 docs describe.\n\n## Affected files\n- `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — add vault policy fmt + validate + roles.yaml gates\n- `vault/policies/AGENTS.md` (new) — policy lifecycle documentation\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] Deliberately broken policy HCL (typo in `path` block) fails CI with the vault-fmt error\n- [ ] Policy that references a non-existent capability (e.g. `\"frobnicate\"`) fails validation\n- [ ] `vault/roles.yaml` referencing a policy not in `vault/policies/` fails CI\n- [ ] Clean PRs pass within normal pipeline time budget\n- [ ] Existing S0.5 + S1.4 CI gates unaffected\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean on any shell added\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "remove_label",
+    "issue": 884,
+    "label": "blocked"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 884,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 846,
+    "body": "## Problem\n\nLlama-backed sidecar agents can be activated through two different mechanisms:\n\n1. **Legacy:** `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` env flag toggles a hardcoded `agents-llama` service block in `docker-compose.yml`.\n2. **Modern:** `[agents.X]` TOML block consumed by `hire-an-agent`, emitting a service per block.\n\nNeither the docs nor the CLI explain which path wins. Setting both produces a YAML `mapping key \"agents-llama\" already defined` error from compose because the service block is duplicated.\n\n## Sub-symptom: env-var naming collision\n\nThe two paths key secrets differently:\n\n- Legacy: `FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA`, `FORGE_PASS_LLAMA`.\n- Modern: `FORGE_TOKEN_<FORGE_USER_UPPER>` — e.g. `FORGE_TOKEN_DEV_QWEN`.\n\nA user migrating between paths ends up with two sets of secrets in `.env`, neither cleanly mapped to the currently-active service block. Silent auth failures (401 from Forgejo) follow.\n\n## Proposal\n\n- Pick the TOML `[agents.X]` path as canonical.\n- Remove the `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` branch and its hardcoded service block from the generator.\n- Detection of `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` in `.env` at `disinto up` time: hard-fail immediately with a migration message (option (a) — simpler, no external consumers depend on this flag).\n\n~~Dependencies: #845, #847~~ — both now closed; unblocked.\n\nRelated: #845, #847.\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` — remove `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` branch and hardcoded `agents-llama:` service block\n- `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` — detect `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` in env, emit migration error\n- `.env.example` — remove `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT`\n- `docs/agents-llama.md` — update to document TOML `[agents.X]` as the one canonical path\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] One documented activation path: TOML `[agents.X]` block\n- [ ] `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` removed from compose generator; presence in `.env` at startup triggers a clear migration error naming the replacement\n- [ ] `.env.example` and `docs/agents-llama.md` updated\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "remove_label",
+    "issue": 846,
+    "label": "blocked"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 846,
    "label": "backlog"
  },
  {
    "action": "edit_body",
    "issue": 850,
-    "body": "## Problem\n\nWhen the compose generator emits the same service name twice — e.g. both the legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` branch and a matching `[agents.llama]` TOML block produce an `agents-llama:` key — the failure is deferred all the way to `docker compose` YAML parsing:\n\n```\nfailed to parse /home/johba/disinto/docker-compose.yml: yaml: construct errors:\n  line 4: line 431: mapping key \"agents-llama\" already defined at line 155\n```\n\nBy then, the user has already paid the cost of: pre-build binary downloads, generator run, Caddyfile regeneration. The only hint about what went wrong is a line number in a generated file. Root cause (dual activation) is not surfaced.\n\n## Fix\n\nAdd a generate-time guard to `lib/generators.sh`:\n\n- After collecting all service blocks to emit, compare the set of service names against duplicates.\n- If a duplicate is detected, abort with a clear message naming both sources of truth (e.g. `\"agents-llama\" emitted twice — from ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 and from [agents.llama] in projects/disinto.toml; remove one`).\n\n## Prior art: PR #872 (closed, branch `fix/issue-850` retained)\n\ndev-qwen's first attempt (`db009e3`) landed the dup-detection logic in `lib/generators.sh` correctly (unit test `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` passes all 3 cases), but the smoke test fails on CI.\n\n**Why the smoke test fails:** sections 1-7 of `smoke-init.sh` already run `bin/disinto init`, materializing `docker-compose.yml`. Section 8 re-invokes `bin/disinto init` to verify the dup guard fires — but `_generate_compose_impl` early-returns with `\"Compose: already exists, skipping\"` before reaching the dup-check.\n\n**Suggested fix:** in `tests/smoke-init.sh` section 8 (around line 452, before the second `bin/disinto init` invocation), add:\n\n```bash\nrm -f \"${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml\"\n```\n\nso the generator actually runs and the dup-detection path is exercised. Do **not** hoist the dup-check above the early-return.\n\nThe branch `fix/issue-850` is preserved as a starting point — pick up from `db009e3` and patch the smoke-test cleanup.\n\nRelated: #846.\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `bin/disinto init` with a config that would produce duplicate service names aborts with a clear error message naming both sources (e.g. `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` and `[agents.llama]` TOML block)\n- [ ] `tests/smoke-init.sh` section 8 removes `docker-compose.yml` before re-invoking `disinto init` so the dup guard is exercised\n- [ ] Unit test `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` passes all 3 cases\n- [ ] CI green (smoke-init.sh section 8 no longer skips dup detection)\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` — duplicate service name check after collecting all service blocks\n- `tests/smoke-init.sh` — section 8: add `rm -f \\${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml` before second `disinto init`"
+    "body": "## Problem\n\nWhen the compose generator emits the same service name twice — e.g. both the legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` branch and a matching `[agents.llama]` TOML block produce an `agents-llama:` key — the failure is deferred all the way to `docker compose` YAML parsing:\n\n```\nfailed to parse /home/johba/disinto/docker-compose.yml: yaml: construct errors:\n  line 4: line 431: mapping key \"agents-llama\" already defined at line 155\n```\n\nBy then, the user has already paid the cost of: pre-build binary downloads, generator run, Caddyfile regeneration. The only hint about what went wrong is a line number in a generated file. Root cause (dual activation) is not surfaced.\n\n## Fix\n\nAdd a generate-time guard to `lib/generators.sh`:\n\n- After collecting all service blocks to emit, compare the set of service names against duplicates.\n- If a duplicate is detected, abort with a clear message naming both source of truth (e.g. `\"agents-llama\" emitted twice — from ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 and from [agents.llama] in projects/disinto.toml; remove one`).\n\nEven after #846 resolves (one canonical activation path), this guard remains valuable as a safety net against future regressions or user misconfiguration (e.g. two TOML blocks with same `forge_user`).\n\n## Prior art: PR #872 (closed, branch `fix/issue-850` retained)\n\ndev-qwen's first attempt (`db009e3`) landed the dup-detection logic in `lib/generators.sh` correctly (unit test `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` passes all 3 cases), but the smoke test fails on CI.\n\n**Why the smoke test fails:** sections 1-7 of `smoke-init.sh` already run `bin/disinto init`, materializing `docker-compose.yml`. Section 8 re-invokes `bin/disinto init` to verify the dup guard fires — but `_generate_compose_impl` early-returns with `\"Compose: already exists, skipping\"` before reaching the dup-check.\n\n**Suggested fix:** in `tests/smoke-init.sh` section 8 (around line 452, before the second `bin/disinto init` invocation), add:\n\n```bash\nrm -f \"${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml\"\n```\n\nso the generator actually runs and the dup-detection path is exercised. Do **not** hoist the dup-check above the early-return.\n\nThe branch `fix/issue-850` is preserved as a starting point — pick up from `db009e3` and patch the smoke-test cleanup.\n\nRelated: #846.\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` — duplicate service name check after collecting all service blocks\n- `tests/smoke-init.sh` — section 8: add `rm -f docker-compose.yml` before second `disinto init`\n- `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` (likely already correct from prior art)\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] Running `disinto up` with a known duplicate activation produces a clear generator-time error naming both conflicting sources\n- [ ] Exit code non-zero before `docker compose` is invoked\n- [ ] Smoke test section 8 passes on CI (dup guard is actually exercised)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
  },
  {
    "action": "remove_label",
@ -43,10 +113,5 @@
    "action": "add_label",
    "issue": 850,
    "label": "backlog"
-  },
-  {
-    "action": "comment",
-    "issue": 758,
-    "body": "This issue is the critical path blocker for #820 (ops repo re-seed) and #982 (collect-engagement commit fix). Both are in the backlog and ready to merge, but cannot run until ops repo branch protection is resolved. Needs admin/human action to change Forgejo branch protection settings on disinto-ops — no code change can unblock this."
  }
 ]
--- a/lib/AGENTS.md
+++ b/lib/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 0bb04545d47fb43b2cab0a1f4406c2a2b57f4eba -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Shared Helpers (`lib/`)

 All agents source `lib/env.sh` as their first action. Additional helpers are
@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ sourced as needed.
 | `lib/git-creds.sh` | Shared git credential helper configuration. `configure_git_creds([HOME_DIR] [RUN_AS_CMD])` — writes a static credential helper script and configures git globally to use password-based HTTP auth (Forgejo 11.x rejects API tokens for `git push`, #361). **Retry on cold boot (#741)**: resolves bot username from `FORGE_TOKEN` with 5 retries (exponential backoff 1-5s); fails loudly and returns 1 if Forgejo is unreachable — never falls back to a wrong hardcoded default (exports `BOT_USER` on success). `repair_baked_cred_urls([--as RUN_AS_CMD] DIR ...)` — rewrites any git remote URLs that have credentials baked in to use clean URLs instead; uses `safe.directory` bypass for root-owned repos (#671). Requires `FORGE_PASS`, `FORGE_URL`, `FORGE_TOKEN`. | entrypoints (agents, edge) |
 | `lib/ops-setup.sh` | `setup_ops_repo()` — creates ops repo on Forgejo if it doesn't exist, configures bot collaborators, clones/initializes ops repo locally, seeds directory structure (vault, knowledge, evidence, sprints). Evidence subdirectories seeded: engagement/, red-team/, holdout/, evolution/, user-test/. Also seeds sprints/ for architect output. Exports `_ACTUAL_OPS_SLUG`. `migrate_ops_repo(ops_root, [primary_branch])` — idempotent migration helper that seeds missing directories and .gitkeep files on existing ops repos (pre-#407 deployments). | bin/disinto (init) |
 | `lib/ci-setup.sh` | `_install_cron_impl()` — installs crontab entries for bare-metal deployments (compose mode uses polling loop instead). `_create_forgejo_oauth_app()` — generic helper to create an OAuth2 app on Forgejo (shared by Woodpecker and chat). `_create_woodpecker_oauth_impl()` — creates Woodpecker OAuth2 app (thin wrapper). `_create_chat_oauth_impl()` — creates disinto-chat OAuth2 app, writes `CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`/`CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET` to `.env` (#708). `_generate_woodpecker_token_impl()` — auto-generates WOODPECKER_TOKEN via OAuth2 flow. `_activate_woodpecker_repo_impl()` — activates repo in Woodpecker. All gated by `_load_ci_context()` which validates required env vars. | bin/disinto (init) |
-| `lib/generators.sh` | Template generation for `disinto init`: `generate_compose()` — docker-compose.yml (uses `codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0` tag; `CLAUDE_BIN_DIR` volume mount removed from agents/llama services — only `reproduce` and `edge` still use the host-mounted CLI (#992); adds `security_opt: [apparmor:unconfined]` to all services for rootless container compatibility; Forgejo includes a healthcheck so dependent services use `condition: service_healthy` — fixes cold-start races, #665; adds `chat` service block with isolated `chat-config` named volume and `CHAT_HISTORY_DIR` bind-mount for per-user NDJSON history persistence (#710); injects `FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET` for Caddy↔chat defense-in-depth auth (#709); cost-cap env vars `CHAT_MAX_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`, `CHAT_MAX_REQUESTS_PER_DAY`, `CHAT_MAX_TOKENS_PER_DAY` (#711); subdomain fallback comment for `EDGE_TUNNEL_FQDN_*` vars (#713); all `depends_on` now use `condition: service_healthy/started` instead of bare service names; all services now include `restart: unless-stopped` including the edge service — #768; agents service now uses `image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}` instead of `build:` (#429); `WOODPECKER_PLUGINS_PRIVILEGED` env var added to woodpecker service (#779); agents-llama conditional block gated on `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` (#769); `agents-llama-all` compose service (profile `agents-llama-all`, all 7 roles: review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor) added by #801; agents service gains volume mounts for `./projects`, `./.env`, `./state`), `generate_caddyfile()` — Caddyfile (routes: `/forge/*` → forgejo:3000, `/woodpecker/*` → woodpecker:8000, `/staging/*` → staging:80; `/chat/login` and `/chat/oauth/callback` bypass `forward_auth` so unauthenticated users can reach the OAuth flow; `/chat/*` gated by `forward_auth` on `chat:8080/chat/auth/verify` which stamps `X-Forwarded-User` (#709); root `/` redirects to `/forge/`), `generate_staging_index()` — staging index, `generate_deploy_pipelines()` — Woodpecker deployment pipeline configs. Requires `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PROJECT_NAME`, `PRIMARY_BRANCH`. | bin/disinto (init) |
+| `lib/generators.sh` | Template generation for `disinto init`: `generate_compose()` — docker-compose.yml (uses `codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0` tag; adds `security_opt: [apparmor:unconfined]` to all services for rootless container compatibility; Forgejo includes a healthcheck so dependent services use `condition: service_healthy` — fixes cold-start races, #665; adds `chat` service block with isolated `chat-config` named volume and `CHAT_HISTORY_DIR` bind-mount for per-user NDJSON history persistence (#710); injects `FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET` for Caddy↔chat defense-in-depth auth (#709); cost-cap env vars `CHAT_MAX_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`, `CHAT_MAX_REQUESTS_PER_DAY`, `CHAT_MAX_TOKENS_PER_DAY` (#711); subdomain fallback comment for `EDGE_TUNNEL_FQDN_*` vars (#713); all `depends_on` now use `condition: service_healthy/started` instead of bare service names; all services now include `restart: unless-stopped` including the edge service — #768; agents service now uses `image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}` instead of `build:` (#429); `WOODPECKER_PLUGINS_PRIVILEGED` env var added to woodpecker service (#779); agents-llama conditional block gated on `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` (#769); `agents-llama-all` compose service (profile `agents-llama-all`, all 7 roles: review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor) added by #801; agents service gains volume mounts for `./projects`, `./.env`, `./state`), `generate_caddyfile()` — Caddyfile (routes: `/forge/*` → forgejo:3000, `/woodpecker/*` → woodpecker:8000, `/staging/*` → staging:80; `/chat/login` and `/chat/oauth/callback` bypass `forward_auth` so unauthenticated users can reach the OAuth flow; `/chat/*` gated by `forward_auth` on `chat:8080/chat/auth/verify` which stamps `X-Forwarded-User` (#709); root `/` redirects to `/forge/`), `generate_staging_index()` — staging index, `generate_deploy_pipelines()` — Woodpecker deployment pipeline configs. Requires `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PROJECT_NAME`, `PRIMARY_BRANCH`. | bin/disinto (init) |
 | `lib/sprint-filer.sh` | Post-merge sub-issue filer for sprint PRs. Invoked by the `.woodpecker/ops-filer.yml` pipeline after a sprint PR merges to ops repo `main`. Parses `<!-- filer:begin --> ... <!-- filer:end -->` blocks from sprint PR bodies to extract sub-issue definitions, creates them on the project repo using `FORGE_FILER_TOKEN` (narrow-scope `filer-bot` identity with `issues:write` only), adds `in-progress` label to the parent vision issue, and handles vision lifecycle closure when all sub-issues are closed. Uses `filer_api_all()` for paginated fetches. Idempotent: uses `<!-- decomposed-from: #<vision>, sprint: <slug>, id: <id> -->` markers to skip already-filed issues. Requires `FORGE_FILER_TOKEN`, `FORGE_API`, `FORGE_API_BASE`, `FORGE_OPS_REPO`. | `.woodpecker/ops-filer.yml` (CI pipeline on ops repo) |
 | `lib/hire-agent.sh` | `disinto_hire_an_agent()` — user creation, `.profile` repo setup, formula copying, branch protection, and state marker creation for hiring a new agent. Requires `FORGE_URL`, `FORGE_TOKEN`, `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PROJECT_NAME`. Extracted from `bin/disinto`. | bin/disinto (hire) |
 | `lib/release.sh` | `disinto_release()` — vault TOML creation, branch setup on ops repo, PR creation, and auto-merge request for a versioned release. `_assert_release_globals()` validates required env vars. Requires `FORGE_URL`, `FORGE_TOKEN`, `FORGE_OPS_REPO`, `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PRIMARY_BRANCH`. Extracted from `bin/disinto`. | bin/disinto (release) |
-| `lib/hvault.sh` | HashiCorp Vault helper module. `hvault_kv_get(PATH, [KEY])` — read KV v2 secret, optionally extract one key. `hvault_kv_put(PATH, KEY=VAL ...)` — write KV v2 secret. `hvault_kv_list(PATH)` — list keys at a KV path. `hvault_get_or_empty(PATH)` — GET /v1/PATH; 200→raw body, 404→empty, else structured error + return 1 (used by sync scripts to distinguish "absent, create" from hard failure without tripping errexit, #881). `hvault_ensure_kv_v2(MOUNT, [LOG_PREFIX])` — idempotent KV v2 mount assertion: enables mount if absent, fails loudly if present as wrong type/version. Extracted from all `vault-seed-*.sh` scripts to eliminate dup-detector violations. Respects `DRY_RUN=1`. `hvault_policy_apply(NAME, FILE)` — idempotent policy upsert. `hvault_jwt_login(ROLE, JWT)` — exchange JWT for short-lived token. `hvault_token_lookup()` — returns TTL/policies/accessor for current token. `_hvault_seed_key(PATH, KEY, [GENERATOR])` — seed one KV key if absent; reads existing data and merges to preserve sibling keys (KV v2 replaces atomically); returns 0=created, 1=unchanged, 2=API error (#992). All functions use `VAULT_ADDR` + `VAULT_TOKEN` from env (fallback: `/etc/vault.d/root.token`), emit structured JSON errors to stderr on failure. Tests: `tests/lib-hvault.bats` (requires `vault server -dev`). | `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh`, `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`, `tools/vault-seed-*.sh` |
-| `lib/init/nomad/` | Nomad+Vault installer scripts. `cluster-up.sh` — idempotent Step-0 orchestrator that runs all steps in order (installs packages, writes HCL, enables systemd units, unseals Vault); uses `poll_until_healthy()` helper for deduped readiness polling; `HOST_VOLUME_DIRS` array now includes `/srv/disinto/docker` (for staging file-server, S5.2, #989, #992). `install.sh` — installs pinned Nomad+Vault apt packages. `vault-init.sh` — initializes Vault (unseal keys → `/etc/vault.d/`), creates dev-persisted unseal unit. `lib-systemd.sh` — shared systemd unit helpers. `systemd-nomad.sh`, `systemd-vault.sh` — write and enable service units. `vault-nomad-auth.sh` — Step-2 script that enables Vault's JWT auth at path `jwt-nomad`, writes the JWKS/algs config pointing at Nomad's workload-identity signer, delegates role sync to `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, installs `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl`, and SIGHUPs `nomad.service` if the file changed (#881). `wp-oauth-register.sh` — S3.3 script that creates the Woodpecker OAuth2 app in Forgejo and stores `forgejo_client`/`forgejo_secret` in Vault KV v2 at `kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker`; idempotent (skips if app or secrets already present); called by `bin/disinto --with woodpecker`. `deploy.sh` — S4 dependency-ordered Nomad job deploy + health-wait; takes a list of jobspec basenames, submits each to Nomad and polls until healthy before proceeding to the next; supports `--dry-run` and per-job timeout overrides via `JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_<JOBNAME>`; global default timeout `JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS` is 360s (raised from 240s for chat cold-start, #1036); invoked by `bin/disinto --with <svc>` and `cluster-up.sh`; deploy order now covers staging, chat, edge (S5.5, #992). Idempotent: each step checks current state before acting. Sourced and called by `cluster-up.sh`; not sourced by agents. | `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` |
+| `lib/hvault.sh` | HashiCorp Vault helper module. `hvault_kv_get(PATH, [KEY])` — read KV v2 secret, optionally extract one key. `hvault_kv_put(PATH, KEY=VAL ...)` — write KV v2 secret. `hvault_kv_list(PATH)` — list keys at a KV path. `hvault_get_or_empty(PATH)` — GET /v1/PATH; 200→raw body, 404→empty, else structured error + return 1 (used by sync scripts to distinguish "absent, create" from hard failure without tripping errexit, #881). `hvault_policy_apply(NAME, FILE)` — idempotent policy upsert. `hvault_jwt_login(ROLE, JWT)` — exchange JWT for short-lived token. `hvault_token_lookup()` — returns TTL/policies/accessor for current token. All functions use `VAULT_ADDR` + `VAULT_TOKEN` from env (fallback: `/etc/vault.d/root.token`), emit structured JSON errors to stderr on failure. Tests: `tests/lib-hvault.bats` (requires `vault server -dev`). | `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh`, `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` |
+| `lib/init/nomad/` | Nomad+Vault installer scripts. `cluster-up.sh` — idempotent Step-0 orchestrator that runs all steps in order (installs packages, writes HCL, enables systemd units, unseals Vault); uses `poll_until_healthy()` helper for deduped readiness polling. `install.sh` — installs pinned Nomad+Vault apt packages. `vault-init.sh` — initializes Vault (unseal keys → `/etc/vault.d/`), creates dev-persisted unseal unit. `lib-systemd.sh` — shared systemd unit helpers. `systemd-nomad.sh`, `systemd-vault.sh` — write and enable service units. `vault-nomad-auth.sh` — Step-2 script that enables Vault's JWT auth at path `jwt-nomad`, writes the JWKS/algs config pointing at Nomad's workload-identity signer, delegates role sync to `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, installs `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl`, and SIGHUPs `nomad.service` if the file changed (#881). Idempotent: each step checks current state before acting. Sourced and called by `cluster-up.sh`; not sourced by agents. | `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` |
--- a/lib/action-vault.sh
+++ b/lib/action-vault.sh
@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ vault_request() {
  # Validate TOML content
  local tmp_toml
  tmp_toml=$(mktemp /tmp/vault-XXXXXX.toml)
+  trap 'rm -f "$tmp_toml"' RETURN

  printf '%s' "$toml_content" > "$tmp_toml"

@ -135,7 +136,6 @@ vault_request() {
  local vault_env="${FACTORY_ROOT:-$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)}/action-vault/vault-env.sh"
  if [ ! -f "$vault_env" ]; then
    echo "ERROR: vault-env.sh not found at $vault_env" >&2
-    rm -f "$tmp_toml"
    return 1
  fi

@ -145,15 +145,11 @@ vault_request() {
  if ! source "$vault_env"; then
    FORGE_TOKEN="${_saved_forge_token:-}"
    echo "ERROR: failed to source vault-env.sh" >&2
-    rm -f "$tmp_toml"
    return 1
  fi
  # Restore caller's FORGE_TOKEN after validation
  FORGE_TOKEN="${_saved_forge_token:-}"

-  # Set trap AFTER sourcing vault-env.sh to avoid RETURN trap firing during source
-  trap 'rm -f "$tmp_toml"' RETURN
-
  # Run validation
  if ! validate_vault_action "$tmp_toml"; then
    echo "ERROR: TOML validation failed" >&2
--- a/lib/forge-setup.sh
+++ b/lib/forge-setup.sh
@ -356,6 +356,16 @@ setup_forge() {
    [predictor-bot]="FORGE_PREDICTOR_PASS"
    [architect-bot]="FORGE_ARCHITECT_PASS"
  )
+  # Llama bot users (local-model agents) — separate from main agents
+  # Each llama agent gets its own Forgejo user, token, and password
+  local -A llama_token_vars=(
+    [dev-qwen]="FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA"
+    [dev-qwen-nightly]="FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA_NIGHTLY"
+  )
+  local -A llama_pass_vars=(
+    [dev-qwen]="FORGE_PASS_LLAMA"
+    [dev-qwen-nightly]="FORGE_PASS_LLAMA_NIGHTLY"
+  )

  local bot_user bot_pass token token_var pass_var

@ -505,12 +515,159 @@ setup_forge() {
    fi
  done

+  # Create llama bot users and tokens (local-model agents)
+  # These are separate from the main agents and get their own credentials
+  echo ""
+  echo "── Setting up llama bot users ────────────────────────────"
+
+  local llama_user llama_pass llama_token llama_token_var llama_pass_var
+  for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
+    llama_token_var="${llama_token_vars[$llama_user]}"
+    llama_pass_var="${llama_pass_vars[$llama_user]}"
+
+    # Check if token already exists in .env
+    local token_exists=false
+    if _token_exists_in_env "$llama_token_var" "$env_file"; then
+      token_exists=true
+    fi
+
+    # Check if password already exists in .env
+    local pass_exists=false
+    if _pass_exists_in_env "$llama_pass_var" "$env_file"; then
+      pass_exists=true
+    fi
+
+    # Check if llama bot user exists on Forgejo
+    local llama_user_exists=false
+    if curl -sf --max-time 5 \
+      -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token}" \
+      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      llama_user_exists=true
+    fi
+
+    # Skip token/password regeneration if both exist in .env and not forcing rotation
+    if [ "$token_exists" = true ] && [ "$pass_exists" = true ] && [ "$rotate_tokens" = false ]; then
+      echo "  ${llama_user} token and password preserved (use --rotate-tokens to force)"
+      # Still export the existing token for use within this run
+      local existing_token existing_pass
+      existing_token=$(grep "^${llama_token_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
+      existing_pass=$(grep "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
+      export "${llama_token_var}=${existing_token}"
+      export "${llama_pass_var}=${existing_pass}"
+      continue
+    fi
+
+    # Generate new credentials if:
+    # - Token doesn't exist (first run)
+    # - Password doesn't exist (first run)
+    # - --rotate-tokens flag is set (explicit rotation)
+    if [ "$llama_user_exists" = false ]; then
+      # User doesn't exist - create it
+      llama_pass="llama-$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | head -c 20)"
+      echo "Creating llama bot user: ${llama_user}"
+      local create_output
+      if ! create_output=$(_forgejo_exec forgejo admin user create \
+        --username "${llama_user}" \
+        --password "${llama_pass}" \
+        --email "${llama_user}@disinto.local" \
+        --must-change-password=false 2>&1); then
+        echo "Error: failed to create llama bot user '${llama_user}':" >&2
+        echo "  ${create_output}" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      # Forgejo 11.x ignores --must-change-password=false on create;
+      # explicitly clear the flag so basic-auth token creation works.
+      _forgejo_exec forgejo admin user change-password \
+        --username "${llama_user}" \
+        --password "${llama_pass}" \
+        --must-change-password=false
+
+      # Verify llama bot user was actually created
+      if ! curl -sf --max-time 5 \
+        -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token}" \
+        "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "Error: llama bot user '${llama_user}' not found after creation" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      echo "  ${llama_user} user created"
+    else
+      # User exists - reset password if needed
+      echo "  ${llama_user} user exists"
+      if [ "$rotate_tokens" = true ] || [ "$pass_exists" = false ]; then
+        llama_pass="llama-$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | head -c 20)"
+        _forgejo_exec forgejo admin user change-password \
+          --username "${llama_user}" \
+          --password "${llama_pass}" \
+          --must-change-password=false || {
+          echo "Error: failed to reset password for existing llama bot user '${llama_user}'" >&2
+          exit 1
+        }
+        echo "  ${llama_user} password reset for token generation"
+      else
+        # Password exists, get it from .env
+        llama_pass=$(grep "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    # Generate token via API (basic auth as the llama user)
+    # First, delete any existing tokens to avoid name collision
+    local existing_llama_token_ids
+    existing_llama_token_ids=$(curl -sf \
+      -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
+      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens" 2>/dev/null \
+      | jq -r '.[].id // empty' 2>/dev/null) || existing_llama_token_ids=""
+
+    # Delete any existing tokens for this user
+    if [ -n "$existing_llama_token_ids" ]; then
+      while IFS= read -r tid; do
+        [ -n "$tid" ] && curl -sf -X DELETE \
+          -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
+          "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens/${tid}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+      done <<< "$existing_llama_token_ids"
+    fi
+
+    llama_token=$(curl -sf -X POST \
+      -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
+      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens" \
+      -d "{\"name\":\"disinto-${llama_user}-token\",\"scopes\":[\"all\"]}" 2>/dev/null \
+      | jq -r '.sha1 // empty') || llama_token=""
+
+    if [ -z "$llama_token" ]; then
+      echo "Error: failed to create API token for '${llama_user}'" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+
+    # Store token in .env under the llama-specific variable name
+    if grep -q "^${llama_token_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+      sed -i "s|^${llama_token_var}=.*|${llama_token_var}=${llama_token}|" "$env_file"
+    else
+      printf '%s=%s\n' "$llama_token_var" "$llama_token" >> "$env_file"
+    fi
+    export "${llama_token_var}=${llama_token}"
+    echo "  ${llama_user} token generated and saved (${llama_token_var})"
+
+    # Store password in .env for git HTTP push (#361)
+    # Forgejo 11.x API tokens don't work for git push; password auth does.
+    if grep -q "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+      sed -i "s|^${llama_pass_var}=.*|${llama_pass_var}=${llama_pass}|" "$env_file"
+    else
+      printf '%s=%s\n' "$llama_pass_var" "$llama_pass" >> "$env_file"
+    fi
+    export "${llama_pass_var}=${llama_pass}"
+    echo "  ${llama_user} password saved (${llama_pass_var})"
+  done
+
  # Create .profile repos for all bot users (if they don't already exist)
  # This runs the same logic as hire-an-agent Step 2-3 for idempotent setup
  echo ""
  echo "── Setting up .profile repos ────────────────────────────"

  local -a bot_users=(dev-bot review-bot planner-bot gardener-bot vault-bot supervisor-bot predictor-bot architect-bot)
+  # Add llama bot users to .profile repo creation
+  for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
+    bot_users+=("$llama_user")
+  done
  local bot_user

  for bot_user in "${bot_users[@]}"; do
@ -618,6 +775,15 @@ setup_forge() {
        -d "{\"permission\":\"${bot_perm}\"}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
    done

+    # Add llama bot users as write collaborators for local-model agents
+    for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
+      curl -sf -X PUT \
+        -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token:-${FORGE_TOKEN}}" \
+        -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+        "${forge_url}/api/v1/repos/${repo_slug}/collaborators/${llama_user}" \
+        -d '{"permission":"write"}' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    done
+
    # Add disinto-admin as admin collaborator
    curl -sf -X PUT \
      -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token:-${FORGE_TOKEN}}" \
--- a/lib/generators.sh
+++ b/lib/generators.sh
@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
      - project-repos-${service_name}:/home/agent/repos
      - \${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:\${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
      - \${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-\${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - \${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
      - \${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-\${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
      - ./projects:/home/agent/disinto/projects:ro
      - ./.env:/home/agent/disinto/.env:ro
@ -381,6 +382,7 @@ services:
      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
@ -436,6 +438,136 @@ services:

 COMPOSEEOF

+  # ── Conditional agents-llama block (ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1) ──────────────
+  # Local-Qwen dev agent — gated on ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT so factories without
+  # a local llama endpoint don't try to start it.  See docs/agents-llama.md.
+  if [ "${ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+    cat >> "$compose_file" <<'LLAMAEOF'
+
+  agents-llama:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
+    # Rebuild on every up (#887): makes docker/agents/ source changes reach this
+    # container without a manual \`docker compose build\`. Cache-fast when clean.
+    pull_policy: build
+    container_name: disinto-agents-llama
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    security_opt:
+      - apparmor=unconfined
+    volumes:
+      - agent-data:/home/agent/data
+      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
+      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
+      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
+      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
+      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
+      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
+    environment:
+      FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
+      FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
+      FORGE_TOKEN: ${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_PASS: ${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES: ${FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES:-}
+      WOODPECKER_TOKEN: ${WOODPECKER_TOKEN:-}
+      CLAUDE_TIMEOUT: ${CLAUDE_TIMEOUT:-7200}
+      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC: ${CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC:-1}
+      CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE: "60"
+      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: ${ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL:-}
+      FORGE_ADMIN_PASS: ${FORGE_ADMIN_PASS:-}
+      DISINTO_CONTAINER: "1"
+      PROJECT_NAME: ${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
+      WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "PLACEHOLDER_WP_REPO_ID"
+      CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared/config}
+      POLL_INTERVAL: ${POLL_INTERVAL:-300}
+      AGENT_ROLES: dev
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "pgrep", "-f", "entrypoint.sh"]
+      interval: 60s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3
+      start_period: 30s
+    depends_on:
+      forgejo:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    networks:
+      - disinto-net
+
+  agents-llama-all:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
+    # Rebuild on every up (#887): makes docker/agents/ source changes reach this
+    # container without a manual \`docker compose build\`. Cache-fast when clean.
+    pull_policy: build
+    container_name: disinto-agents-llama-all
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    profiles: ["agents-llama-all"]
+    security_opt:
+      - apparmor=unconfined
+    volumes:
+      - agent-data:/home/agent/data
+      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
+      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
+      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
+      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
+      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
+      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
+      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
+    environment:
+      FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
+      FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
+      FORGE_TOKEN: ${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_PASS: ${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}
+      FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN: ${FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN: ${FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN: ${FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN: ${FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN: ${FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_FILER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_FILER_TOKEN:-}
+      FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES: ${FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES:-}
+      WOODPECKER_TOKEN: ${WOODPECKER_TOKEN:-}
+      CLAUDE_TIMEOUT: ${CLAUDE_TIMEOUT:-7200}
+      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC: ${CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC:-1}
+      CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE: "60"
+      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_BETAS: "1"
+      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
+      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: ${ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL:-}
+      FORGE_ADMIN_PASS: ${FORGE_ADMIN_PASS:-}
+      DISINTO_CONTAINER: "1"
+      PROJECT_NAME: ${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
+      WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
+      WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "PLACEHOLDER_WP_REPO_ID"
+      CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared/config}
+      POLL_INTERVAL: ${POLL_INTERVAL:-300}
+      GARDENER_INTERVAL: ${GARDENER_INTERVAL:-21600}
+      ARCHITECT_INTERVAL: ${ARCHITECT_INTERVAL:-21600}
+      PLANNER_INTERVAL: ${PLANNER_INTERVAL:-43200}
+      SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL: ${SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL:-1200}
+      AGENT_ROLES: review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "pgrep", "-f", "entrypoint.sh"]
+      interval: 60s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3
+      start_period: 30s
+    depends_on:
+      forgejo:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      woodpecker:
+        condition: service_started
+    networks:
+      - disinto-net
+LLAMAEOF
+  fi
+
  # Resume the rest of the compose file (runner onward)
  cat >> "$compose_file" <<'COMPOSEEOF'

@ -634,13 +766,13 @@ COMPOSEEOF
  _generate_local_model_services "$compose_file"

  # Resolve the Claude CLI binary path and persist as CLAUDE_BIN_DIR in .env.
-  # Only used by reproduce and edge services which still use host-mounted CLI.
+  # docker-compose.yml references ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR} so the value must be set.
  local claude_bin
  claude_bin="$(command -v claude 2>/dev/null || true)"
  if [ -n "$claude_bin" ]; then
    claude_bin="$(readlink -f "$claude_bin")"
  else
-    echo "Warning: claude CLI not found in PATH — reproduce/edge services will fail to start" >&2
+    echo "Warning: claude CLI not found in PATH — set CLAUDE_BIN_DIR in .env manually" >&2
    claude_bin="/usr/local/bin/claude"
  fi
  # Persist CLAUDE_BIN_DIR into .env so docker-compose can resolve it.
@ -657,8 +789,9 @@ COMPOSEEOF

  # In build mode, replace image: with build: for locally-built images
  if [ "$use_build" = true ]; then
-    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/agents:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/agents:.*|build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile\n    pull_policy: build|}' "$compose_file"
-    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/edge:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/edge:.*|build: ./docker/edge\n    pull_policy: build|}' "$compose_file"
+    sed -i 's|^\(  agents:\)|\1|' "$compose_file"
+    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/agents:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/agents:.*|build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile|}' "$compose_file"
+    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/edge:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/edge:.*|build: ./docker/edge|}' "$compose_file"
  fi

  echo "Created: ${compose_file}"
--- a/lib/hvault.sh
+++ b/lib/hvault.sh
@ -38,30 +38,6 @@ _hvault_resolve_token() {
  return 1
 }

-# _hvault_default_env — set the local-cluster Vault env if unset
-#
-# Idempotent helper used by every Vault-touching script that runs during
-# `disinto init` (S2). On the local-cluster common case, operators (and
-# the init dispatcher in bin/disinto) have not exported VAULT_ADDR or
-# VAULT_TOKEN — the server is reachable on localhost:8200 and the root
-# token lives at /etc/vault.d/root.token. Scripts must Just Work in that
-# shape.
-#
-#   - If VAULT_ADDR is unset, defaults to http://127.0.0.1:8200.
-#   - If VAULT_TOKEN is unset, resolves from /etc/vault.d/root.token via
-#     _hvault_resolve_token. A missing token file is not an error here —
-#     downstream hvault_token_lookup() probes connectivity and emits the
-#     operator-facing "VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN" diagnostic.
-#
-# Centralised to keep the defaulting stanza in one place — copy-pasting
-# the 5-line block into each init script trips the repo-wide 5-line
-# sliding-window duplicate detector (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py).
-_hvault_default_env() {
-  VAULT_ADDR="${VAULT_ADDR:-http://127.0.0.1:8200}"
-  export VAULT_ADDR
-  _hvault_resolve_token || :
-}
-
 # _hvault_check_prereqs — validate VAULT_ADDR and VAULT_TOKEN are set
 # Args: caller function name
 _hvault_check_prereqs() {
@ -124,65 +100,6 @@ _hvault_request() {

 # ── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

-# VAULT_KV_MOUNT — KV v2 mount point (default: "kv")
-#   Override with: export VAULT_KV_MOUNT=secret
-#   Used by: hvault_kv_get, hvault_kv_put, hvault_kv_list
-: "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:=kv}"
-
-# hvault_ensure_kv_v2 MOUNT [LOG_PREFIX]
-#   Assert that the given KV mount is present and KV v2. If absent, enable
-#   it. If present as wrong type/version, exit 1. Callers must have already
-#   checked VAULT_ADDR / VAULT_TOKEN.
-#
-#   DRY_RUN (env, default 0): when 1, log intent without writing.
-#   LOG_PREFIX (optional): label for log lines, e.g. "[vault-seed-forgejo]".
-#
-#   Extracted here because every vault-seed-*.sh script needs this exact
-#   sequence, and the 5-line sliding-window dup detector flags the
-#   copy-paste. One place, one implementation.
-hvault_ensure_kv_v2() {
-  local mount="${1:?hvault_ensure_kv_v2: MOUNT required}"
-  local prefix="${2:-[hvault]}"
-  local dry_run="${DRY_RUN:-0}"
-  local mounts_json mount_exists mount_type mount_version
-
-  mounts_json="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
-    || { printf '%s ERROR: failed to list Vault mounts\n' "$prefix" >&2; return 1; }
-
-  mount_exists=false
-  if printf '%s' "$mounts_json" | jq -e --arg m "${mount}/" '.[$m]' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    mount_exists=true
-  fi
-
-  if [ "$mount_exists" = true ]; then
-    mount_type="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
-      | jq -r --arg m "${mount}/" '.[$m].type // ""')"
-    mount_version="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
-      | jq -r --arg m "${mount}/" '.[$m].options.version // "1"')"
-    if [ "$mount_type" != "kv" ]; then
-      printf '%s ERROR: %s/ is mounted as type=%q, expected kv — refuse to re-mount\n' \
-        "$prefix" "$mount" "$mount_type" >&2
-      return 1
-    fi
-    if [ "$mount_version" != "2" ]; then
-      printf '%s ERROR: %s/ is KV v%s, expected v2 — refuse to upgrade in place\n' \
-        "$prefix" "$mount" "$mount_version" >&2
-      return 1
-    fi
-    printf '%s %s/ already mounted (kv v2) — skipping enable\n' "$prefix" "$mount"
-  else
-    if [ "$dry_run" -eq 1 ]; then
-      printf '%s [dry-run] would enable %s/ as kv v2\n' "$prefix" "$mount"
-    else
-      local payload
-      payload="$(jq -n '{type:"kv",options:{version:"2"},description:"disinto shared KV v2 (S2.4)"}')"
-      _hvault_request POST "sys/mounts/${mount}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
-        || { printf '%s ERROR: failed to enable %s/ as kv v2\n' "$prefix" "$mount" >&2; return 1; }
-      printf '%s %s/ enabled as kv v2\n' "$prefix" "$mount"
-    fi
-  fi
-}
-
 # hvault_kv_get PATH [KEY]
 #   Read a KV v2 secret at PATH, optionally extract a single KEY.
 #   Outputs: JSON value (full data object, or single key value)
@ -197,7 +114,7 @@ hvault_kv_get() {
  _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_kv_get" || return 1

  local response
-  response="$(_hvault_request GET "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/data/${path}")" || return 1
+  response="$(_hvault_request GET "secret/data/${path}")" || return 1

  if [ -n "$key" ]; then
    printf '%s' "$response" | jq -e -r --arg key "$key" '.data.data[$key]' 2>/dev/null || {
@ -237,7 +154,7 @@ hvault_kv_put() {
    payload="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | jq --arg k "$k" --arg v "$v" '.data[$k] = $v')"
  done

-  _hvault_request POST "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/data/${path}" "$payload" >/dev/null
+  _hvault_request POST "secret/data/${path}" "$payload" >/dev/null
 }

 # hvault_kv_list PATH
@ -253,7 +170,7 @@ hvault_kv_list() {
  _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_kv_list" || return 1

  local response
-  response="$(_hvault_request LIST "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/metadata/${path}")" || return 1
+  response="$(_hvault_request LIST "secret/metadata/${path}")" || return 1

  printf '%s' "$response" | jq -e '.data.keys' 2>/dev/null || {
    _hvault_err "hvault_kv_list" "failed to parse response" "path=$path"
@ -405,36 +322,3 @@ hvault_token_lookup() {
    return 1
  }
 }
-
-# _hvault_seed_key — Seed a single KV key if it doesn't exist.
-# Reads existing data and merges to preserve sibling keys (KV v2 replaces
-# .data atomically). Returns 0=created, 1=unchanged, 2=API error.
-# Args:
-#   path:      KV v2 logical path (e.g. "disinto/shared/chat")
-#   key:       key name within the path (e.g. "chat_oauth_client_id")
-#   generator: shell command that outputs a random value (default: openssl rand -hex 32)
-# Usage:
-#   _hvault_seed_key "disinto/shared/chat" "chat_oauth_client_id"
-#   rc=$?  # 0=created, 1=unchanged
-_hvault_seed_key() {
-  local path="$1" key="$2" generator="${3:-openssl rand -hex 32}"
-  local existing
-  existing=$(hvault_kv_get "$path" "$key" 2>/dev/null) || true
-  if [ -n "$existing" ]; then
-    return 1  # unchanged
-  fi
-
-  local value
-  value=$(eval "$generator")
-
-  # Read existing data to preserve sibling keys (KV v2 replaces atomically)
-  local kv_api="${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/data/${path}"
-  local raw existing_data payload
-  raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "$kv_api")" || return 2
-  existing_data="{}"
-  [ -n "$raw" ] && existing_data="$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq '.data.data // {}')"
-  payload="$(printf '%s' "$existing_data" \
-    | jq --arg k "$key" --arg v "$value" '{data: (. + {($k): $v})}')"
-  _hvault_request POST "$kv_api" "$payload" >/dev/null
-  return 0  # created
-}
--- a/lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
+++ b/lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ HOST_VOLUME_DIRS=(
  "/srv/disinto/agent-data"
  "/srv/disinto/project-repos"
  "/srv/disinto/caddy-data"
-  "/srv/disinto/docker"
  "/srv/disinto/chat-history"
  "/srv/disinto/ops-repo"
 )
@ -117,7 +116,7 @@ if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
 [dry-run] Step 4/9: create host-volume dirs under /srv/disinto/
 EOF
  for d in "${HOST_VOLUME_DIRS[@]}"; do
-    printf '  → install -d -m 0777 %s\n' "$d"
+    printf '  → install -d -m 0755 %s\n' "$d"
  done
  cat <<EOF

@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ EOF
  → export VAULT_ADDR=${VAULT_ADDR_DEFAULT}
  → export NOMAD_ADDR=${NOMAD_ADDR_DEFAULT}

-Dry run complete — no changes made.
+Dry run complete - no changes made.
 EOF
  exit 0
 fi
@ -281,10 +280,8 @@ for d in "${HOST_VOLUME_DIRS[@]}"; do
    log "unchanged: ${d}"
  else
    log "creating: ${d}"
-    install -d -m 0777 -o root -g root "$d"
+    install -d -m 0755 -o root -g root "$d"
  fi
-  # Ensure correct permissions (fixes pre-existing 0755 dirs on re-run)
-  chmod 0777 "$d"
 done

 # ── Step 5/9: /etc/nomad.d/server.hcl + client.hcl ───────────────────────────
--- a/lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh
+++ b/lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # Environment:
 #   REPO_ROOT              — absolute path to repo root (defaults to parent of
 #                            this script's parent directory)
-#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS — poll timeout in seconds (default: 360)
+#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS — poll timeout in seconds (default: 240)
 #   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_<JOBNAME> — per-job timeout override (e.g.,
 #                            JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_FORGEJO=300)
 #
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ set -euo pipefail
 # ── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 SCRIPT_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 REPO_ROOT="${REPO_ROOT:-$(cd "${SCRIPT_ROOT}/../../.." && pwd)}"
-JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS="${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS:-360}"
+JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS="${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS:-240}"

 DRY_RUN=0

@ -177,8 +177,7 @@ for job_name in "${JOBS[@]}"; do
  fi

  # Per-job timeout override: JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_<UPPERCASE_JOBNAME>
-  # Sanitize job name: replace hyphens with underscores (bash vars can't have hyphens)
-  job_upper=$(printf '%s' "$job_name" | tr '[:lower:]-' '[:upper:]_' | tr ' ' '_')
+  job_upper=$(printf '%s' "$job_name" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')
  timeout_var="JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_${job_upper}"
  job_timeout="${!timeout_var:-$JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS}"

--- a/lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh
+++ b/lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh
@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh — Enable required Vault secret engines
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, issue #912). Enables the KV v2
-# secret engine at the `kv/` path, which is required by every file under
-# vault/policies/*.hcl, every role in vault/roles.yaml, every write done
-# by tools/vault-import.sh, and every template read done by
-# nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl — all of which address paths under kv/disinto/…
-# and 403 if the mount is absent.
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   - kv/ already enabled at path=kv version=2 → log "already enabled", exit 0
-#     without touching Vault.
-#   - kv/ enabled at a different type/version → die (manual intervention).
-#   - kv/ not enabled → POST sys/mounts/kv to enable kv-v2, log "enabled".
-#   - Second run on a fully-configured box is a silent no-op.
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault is unsealed and reachable (VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN set OR
-#     defaultable to the local-cluster shape via _hvault_default_env).
-#   - Must run AFTER cluster-up.sh (unseal complete) but BEFORE
-#     vault-apply-policies.sh (policies reference kv/* paths).
-#
-# Environment:
-#   VAULT_ADDR  — default http://127.0.0.1:8200 via _hvault_default_env.
-#   VAULT_TOKEN — env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token (resolved by lib/hvault.sh).
-#
-# Usage:
-#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh
-#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (kv enabled, or already so)
-#   1  precondition / API failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"
-
-# shellcheck source=../../hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-log() { printf '[vault-engines] %s\n' "$*"; }
-die() { printf '[vault-engines] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing (single optional flag) ─────────────────────────────────────
-# Shape: while/shift loop. Deliberately NOT a flat `case "${1:-}"` like
-# tools/vault-apply-policies.sh nor an if/elif ladder like
-# tools/vault-apply-roles.sh — each sibling uses a distinct parser shape
-# so the repo-wide 5-line sliding-window duplicate detector
-# (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py) does not flag three identical
-# copies of the same argparse boilerplate.
-print_help() {
-  cat <<EOF
-Usage: $(basename "$0") [--dry-run]
-
-Enable the KV v2 secret engine at kv/. Required by all Vault policies,
-roles, and Nomad job templates that reference kv/disinto/* paths.
-Idempotent: an already-enabled kv/ is reported and left untouched.
-
-  --dry-run   Probe state and print the action without contacting Vault
-              in a way that mutates it.
-EOF
-}
-dry_run=false
-while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
-  case "$1" in
-    --dry-run) dry_run=true; shift ;;
-    -h|--help) print_help; exit 0 ;;
-    *)         die "unknown flag: $1" ;;
-  esac
-done
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-for bin in curl jq; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-
-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN). Shared
-# with the rest of the init-time Vault scripts — see lib/hvault.sh header.
-_hvault_default_env
-
-# ── Dry-run: probe existing state and print plan ─────────────────────────────
-if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
-  # Probe connectivity with the same helper the live path uses. If auth
-  # fails in dry-run, the operator gets the same diagnostic as a real
-  # run — no silent "would enable" against an unreachable Vault.
-  hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-    || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-  mounts_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
-    || die "failed to list secret engines"
-  if [ -n "$mounts_raw" ] \
-     && printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -e '."kv/"' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    log "[dry-run] kv-v2 at kv/ already enabled"
-  else
-    log "[dry-run] would enable kv-v2 at kv/"
-  fi
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Check if kv/ is already enabled ──────────────────────────────────────────
-# sys/mounts returns an object keyed by "<path>/" for every enabled secret
-# engine (trailing slash is Vault's on-disk form). hvault_get_or_empty
-# returns the raw body on 200; sys/mounts is always present on a live
-# Vault, so we never see the 404-empty path here.
-log "checking existing secret engines"
-mounts_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
-  || die "failed to list secret engines"
-
-if [ -n "$mounts_raw" ] \
-   && printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -e '."kv/"' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  # kv/ exists — verify it's kv-v2 on the right path shape. Vault returns
-  # the option as a string ("2") on GET, never an integer.
-  kv_type="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -r '."kv/".type // ""')"
-  kv_version="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -r '."kv/".options.version // ""')"
-  if [ "$kv_type" = "kv" ] && [ "$kv_version" = "2" ]; then
-    log "kv-v2 at kv/ already enabled (type=${kv_type}, version=${kv_version})"
-    exit 0
-  fi
-  die "kv/ exists but is not kv-v2 (type=${kv_type:-<unset>}, version=${kv_version:-<unset>}) — manual intervention required"
-fi
-
-# ── Enable kv-v2 at path=kv ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# POST sys/mounts/<path> with type=kv + options.version=2 is the
-# HTTP-API equivalent of `vault secrets enable -path=kv -version=2 kv`.
-# Keeps the script vault-CLI-free (matches the policy-apply + nomad-auth
-# scripts; their headers explain why a CLI dep would die on client-only
-# nodes).
-log "enabling kv-v2 at path=kv"
-enable_payload="$(jq -n '{type:"kv",options:{version:"2"}}')"
-_hvault_request POST "sys/mounts/kv" "$enable_payload" >/dev/null \
-  || die "failed to enable kv-v2 secret engine"
-log "kv-v2 enabled at kv/"
--- a/lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh
+++ b/lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh
@ -49,14 +49,12 @@ APPLY_ROLES_SH="${REPO_ROOT}/tools/vault-apply-roles.sh"
 SERVER_HCL_SRC="${REPO_ROOT}/nomad/server.hcl"
 SERVER_HCL_DST="/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl"

+VAULT_ADDR="${VAULT_ADDR:-http://127.0.0.1:8200}"
+export VAULT_ADDR
+
 # shellcheck source=../../hvault.sh
 source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"

-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
-# Called from `disinto init` which does not export VAULT_ADDR/VAULT_TOKEN in
-# the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912). Must run after hvault.sh is sourced.
-_hvault_default_env
-
 log() { printf '[vault-auth] %s\n' "$*"; }
 die() { printf '[vault-auth] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }

--- a/lib/init/nomad/wp-oauth-register.sh
+++ b/lib/init/nomad/wp-oauth-register.sh
@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# lib/init/nomad/wp-oauth-register.sh — Forgejo OAuth2 app registration for Woodpecker
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S3.3, issue #936). Creates the Woodpecker
-# OAuth2 application in Forgejo and stores the client ID + secret in Vault
-# at kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker (forgejo_client + forgejo_secret keys).
-#
-# The script is idempotent — re-running after success is a no-op.
-#
-# Scope:
-#   - Checks if OAuth2 app named 'woodpecker' already exists via GET
-#     /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2
-#   - If not: POST /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2 with name=woodpecker,
-#     redirect_uris=["http://localhost:8000/authorize"]
-#   - Writes forgejo_client + forgejo_secret to Vault KV
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   - OAuth2 app 'woodpecker' exists → skip creation, log
-#     "[wp-oauth] woodpecker OAuth app already registered"
-#   - forgejo_client + forgejo_secret already in Vault → skip write, log
-#     "[wp-oauth] credentials already in Vault"
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Forgejo reachable at $FORGE_URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:3000)
-#   - Forgejo admin token at $FORGE_TOKEN (from Vault kv/disinto/shared/forge/token
-#     or env fallback)
-#   - Vault reachable + unsealed at $VAULT_ADDR
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN set (env) or /etc/vault.d/root.token readable
-#
-# Requires:
-#   - curl, jq
-#
-# Usage:
-#   lib/init/nomad/wp-oauth-register.sh
-#   lib/init/nomad/wp-oauth-register.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (OAuth app registered + credentials seeded, or already done)
-#   1  precondition / API / Vault failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# Source the hvault module for Vault helpers
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"
-# shellcheck source=../../../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-# Configuration
-FORGE_URL="${FORGE_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:3000}"
-FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME="woodpecker"
-FORGE_REDIRECT_URIS='["http://localhost:8000/authorize"]'
-KV_MOUNT="${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:-kv}"
-KV_PATH="disinto/shared/woodpecker"
-KV_API_PATH="${KV_MOUNT}/data/${KV_PATH}"
-
-LOG_TAG="[wp-oauth]"
-log() { printf '%s %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*"; }
-die() { printf '%s ERROR: %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-DRY_RUN="${DRY_RUN:-0}"
-for arg in "$@"; do
-  case "$arg" in
-    --dry-run) DRY_RUN=1 ;;
-    -h|--help)
-      printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-      printf 'Register Woodpecker OAuth2 app in Forgejo and store credentials\n'
-      printf 'in Vault. Idempotent: re-running is a no-op.\n\n'
-      printf '  --dry-run   Print planned actions without writing to Vault.\n'
-      exit 0
-      ;;
-    *) die "invalid argument: ${arg}  (try --help)" ;;
-  esac
-done
-
-# ── Step 1/3: Resolve Forgejo token ─────────────────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1/3: resolve Forgejo token ──"
-
-# Default FORGE_URL if not set
-if [ -z "${FORGE_URL:-}" ]; then
-  FORGE_URL="http://127.0.0.1:3000"
-  export FORGE_URL
-fi
-
-# Try to get FORGE_TOKEN from Vault first, then env fallback
-FORGE_TOKEN="${FORGE_TOKEN:-}"
-if [ -z "$FORGE_TOKEN" ]; then
-  log "reading FORGE_TOKEN from Vault at kv/${KV_PATH}/token"
-  token_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${KV_MOUNT}/data/disinto/shared/forge/token")" || {
-    die "failed to read forge token from Vault"
-  }
-  if [ -n "$token_raw" ]; then
-    FORGE_TOKEN="$(printf '%s' "$token_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.token // empty')"
-    if [ -z "$FORGE_TOKEN" ]; then
-      die "forge token not found at kv/disinto/shared/forge/token"
-    fi
-    log "forge token loaded from Vault"
-  fi
-fi
-
-if [ -z "$FORGE_TOKEN" ]; then
-  die "FORGE_TOKEN not set and not found in Vault"
-fi
-
-# ── Step 2/3: Check/create OAuth2 app in Forgejo ────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 2/3: ensure OAuth2 app '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}' in Forgejo ──"
-
-# Check if OAuth2 app already exists
-log "checking for existing OAuth2 app '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}'"
-oauth_apps_raw=$(curl -sf --max-time 10 \
-  -H "Authorization: token ${FORGE_TOKEN}" \
-  "${FORGE_URL}/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2" 2>/dev/null) || {
-  die "failed to list Forgejo OAuth2 apps"
-}
-
-oauth_app_exists=false
-existing_client_id=""
-forgejo_secret=""
-
-# Parse the OAuth2 apps list
-if [ -n "$oauth_apps_raw" ]; then
-  existing_client_id=$(printf '%s' "$oauth_apps_raw" \
-    | jq -r --arg name "$FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME" \
-    '.[] | select(.name == $name) | .client_id // empty' 2>/dev/null) || true
-
-  if [ -n "$existing_client_id" ]; then
-    oauth_app_exists=true
-    log "OAuth2 app '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}' already exists (client_id: ${existing_client_id:0:8}...)"
-  fi
-fi
-
-if [ "$oauth_app_exists" = false ]; then
-  log "creating OAuth2 app '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}'"
-
-  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-    log "[dry-run] would create OAuth2 app with redirect_uris: ${FORGE_REDIRECT_URIS}"
-  else
-    # Create the OAuth2 app
-    oauth_response=$(curl -sf --max-time 10 -X POST \
-      -H "Authorization: token ${FORGE_TOKEN}" \
-      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-      "${FORGE_URL}/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2" \
-      -d "{\"name\":\"${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}\",\"redirect_uris\":${FORGE_REDIRECT_URIS}}" 2>/dev/null) || {
-      die "failed to create OAuth2 app in Forgejo"
-    }
-
-    # Extract client_id and client_secret from response
-    existing_client_id=$(printf '%s' "$oauth_response" | jq -r '.client_id // empty')
-    forgejo_secret=$(printf '%s' "$oauth_response" | jq -r '.client_secret // empty')
-
-    if [ -z "$existing_client_id" ] || [ -z "$forgejo_secret" ]; then
-      die "failed to extract OAuth2 credentials from Forgejo response"
-    fi
-
-    log "OAuth2 app '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}' created"
-    log "OAuth2 app '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}' registered (client_id: ${existing_client_id:0:8}...)"
-  fi
-else
-  # App exists — we need to get the client_secret from Vault or re-fetch
-  # Actually, OAuth2 client_secret is only returned at creation time, so we
-  # need to generate a new one if the app already exists but we don't have
-  # the secret. For now, we'll use a placeholder and note this in the log.
-  if [ -z "${forgejo_secret:-}" ]; then
-    # Generate a new secret for the existing app
-    # Note: This is a limitation — we can't retrieve the original secret
-    # from Forgejo API, so we generate a new one and update Vault
-    log "OAuth2 app exists but secret not available — generating new secret"
-    forgejo_secret="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
-  fi
-fi
-
-# ── Step 3/3: Write credentials to Vault ────────────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 3/3: write credentials to Vault ──"
-
-# Read existing Vault data to preserve other keys
-existing_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${KV_API_PATH}")" || {
-  die "failed to read ${KV_API_PATH}"
-}
-
-existing_data="{}"
-existing_client_id_in_vault=""
-existing_secret_in_vault=""
-
-if [ -n "$existing_raw" ]; then
-  existing_data="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq '.data.data // {}')"
-  existing_client_id_in_vault="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.forgejo_client // ""')"
-  existing_secret_in_vault="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.forgejo_secret // ""')"
-fi
-
-# Idempotency check: if Vault already has credentials for this app, use them
-# This handles the case where the OAuth app exists but we don't have the secret
-if [ "$existing_client_id_in_vault" = "$existing_client_id" ] && [ -n "$existing_secret_in_vault" ]; then
-  log "credentials already in Vault for '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}'"
-  log "done — OAuth2 app registered + credentials in Vault"
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# Use existing secret from Vault if available (app exists, secret in Vault)
-if [ -n "$existing_secret_in_vault" ]; then
-  log "using existing secret from Vault for '${FORGE_OAUTH_APP_NAME}'"
-  forgejo_secret="$existing_secret_in_vault"
-fi
-
-# Prepare the payload with new credentials
-payload="$(printf '%s' "$existing_data" \
-  | jq --arg cid "$existing_client_id" \
-       --arg sec "$forgejo_secret" \
-       '{data: (. + {forgejo_client: $cid, forgejo_secret: $sec})}')"
-
-if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-  log "[dry-run] would write forgejo_client + forgejo_secret to ${KV_API_PATH}"
-  log "done — [dry-run] complete"
-else
-  _hvault_request POST "${KV_API_PATH}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
-    || die "failed to write ${KV_API_PATH}"
-
-  log "forgejo_client + forgejo_secret written to Vault"
-  log "done — OAuth2 app registered + credentials in Vault"
-fi
--- a/nomad/AGENTS.md
+++ b/nomad/AGENTS.md
@ -1,27 +1,21 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 0bb04545d47fb43b2cab0a1f4406c2a2b57f4eba -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # nomad/ — Agent Instructions

 Nomad + Vault HCL for the factory's single-node cluster. These files are
 the source of truth that `lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` copies onto a
 factory box under `/etc/nomad.d/` and `/etc/vault.d/` at init time.

-This directory covers the **Nomad+Vault migration (Steps 0–5)** —
-see issues #821–#992 for the step breakdown.
+This directory covers the **Nomad+Vault migration (Steps 0–2)** —
+see issues #821–#884 for the step breakdown.

 ## What lives here

 | File/Dir | Deployed to | Owned by |
 |---|---|---|
 | `server.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl` | agent role, bind, ports, `data_dir` (S0.2) |
-| `client.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/client.hcl` | Docker driver cfg + `host_volume` declarations (S0.2); `allow_privileged = true` for woodpecker-agent Docker-in-Docker (S3-fix-5, #961) |
+| `client.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/client.hcl` | Docker driver cfg + `host_volume` declarations (S0.2) |
 | `vault.hcl`  | `/etc/vault.d/vault.hcl`  | Vault storage, listener, UI, `disable_mlock` (S0.3) |
 | `jobs/forgejo.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Forgejo job; reads creds from Vault via consul-template stanza (S2.4) |
-| `jobs/woodpecker-server.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Woodpecker CI server; host networking, Vault KV for `WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET` + Forgejo OAuth creds (S3.1) |
-| `jobs/woodpecker-agent.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Woodpecker CI agent; host networking, `docker.sock` mount, Vault KV for `WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET`; `WOODPECKER_SERVER` uses `${attr.unique.network.ip-address}:9000` (Nomad interpolation) — port binds to LXC alloc IP, not localhost (S3.2, S3-fix-6, #964) |
-| `jobs/agents.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | All 7 agent roles (dev, review, gardener, planner, predictor, supervisor, architect) + llama variant; Vault-templated bot tokens via `service-agents` policy; `force_pull = false` — image is built locally by `bin/disinto --with agents`, no registry (S4.1, S4-fix-2, S4-fix-5, #955, #972, #978) |
-| `jobs/staging.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Caddy file-server mounting `docker/` as `/srv/site:ro`; no Vault integration; **dynamic host port** (no static 80 — edge owns 80/443, collision fixed in S5-fix-7 #1018); edge discovers via Nomad service registration (S5.2, #989) |
-| `jobs/chat.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Claude chat UI; custom `disinto/chat:local` image; sandbox hardening (cap_drop ALL, **tmpfs via mount block** not `tmpfs=` arg — S5-fix-5 #1012, pids_limit 128); Vault-templated OAuth secrets via `service-chat` policy (S5.2, #989) |
-| `jobs/edge.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Caddy reverse proxy + dispatcher sidecar; routes /forge, /woodpecker, /staging, /chat; uses `disinto/edge:local` image built by `bin/disinto --with edge`; **both Caddy and dispatcher tasks use `network_mode = "host"`** — upstreams are `127.0.0.1:<port>` (forgejo :3000, woodpecker :8000, chat :8080), not Docker hostnames (#1031, #1034); `FORGE_URL` rendered via Nomad service discovery template (not static env) to handle bridge vs. host network differences (#1034); dispatcher Vault secret path changed to `kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo` (#1041); Vault-templated ops-repo creds via `service-dispatcher` policy (S5.1, #988) |

 Nomad auto-merges every `*.hcl` under `-config=/etc/nomad.d/`, so the
 split between `server.hcl` and `client.hcl` is for readability, not
@ -36,6 +30,8 @@ convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).

 ## Not yet implemented

+- **Additional jobspecs** (woodpecker, agents, caddy) — Step 1 brought up
+  Forgejo; remaining services land in later steps.
 - **TLS, ACLs, gossip encryption** — deliberately absent for now; land
  alongside multi-node support.

@ -65,8 +61,8 @@ convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).
 ## How CI validates these files

 `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` runs on every PR that touches `nomad/`
-(including `nomad/jobs/`), `lib/init/nomad/`, `bin/disinto`,
-`vault/policies/`, or `vault/roles.yaml`. Eight fail-closed steps:
+(including `nomad/jobs/`), `lib/init/nomad/`, or `bin/disinto`. Five
+fail-closed steps:

 1. **`nomad config validate nomad/server.hcl nomad/client.hcl`**
   — parses the HCL, fails on unknown blocks, bad port ranges, invalid
@ -91,47 +87,19 @@ convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).
   disables the runtime checks (CI containers don't have
   `/var/lib/vault/data` or port 8200). Exit 2 (advisory warnings only,
   e.g. TLS-disabled listener) is tolerated; exit 1 blocks merge.
-4. **`vault policy fmt` idempotence check on every `vault/policies/*.hcl`**
-   (S2.6) — `vault policy fmt` has no `-check` flag in 1.18.5, so the
-   step copies each file to `/tmp`, runs `vault policy fmt` on the copy,
-   and diffs against the original. Any non-empty diff means the
-   committed file would be rewritten by `fmt` and the step fails — the
-   author is pointed at `vault policy fmt <file>` to heal the drift.
-5. **`vault policy write`-based validation against an inline dev-mode Vault**
-   (S2.6) — Vault 1.18.5 has no offline `policy validate` subcommand;
-   the CI step starts a dev-mode server, loops `vault policy write
-   <basename> <file>` over each `vault/policies/*.hcl`, and aggregates
-   failures so one CI run surfaces every broken policy. The server is
-   ephemeral and torn down on step exit — no persistence, no real
-   secrets. Catches unknown capability names (e.g. `"frobnicate"`),
-   malformed `path` blocks, and other semantic errors `fmt` does not.
-6. **`vault/roles.yaml` validator** (S2.6) — yamllint + a PyYAML-based
-   check that every role's `policy:` field matches a basename under
-   `vault/policies/`, and that every role entry carries all four
-   required fields (`name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id`). Drift
-   between the two directories is a scheduling-time "permission denied"
-   in production; this step turns it into a CI failure at PR time.
-7. **`shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto`**
+4. **`shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto`**
   — all init/dispatcher shell clean. `bin/disinto` has no `.sh`
   extension so the repo-wide shellcheck in `.woodpecker/ci.yml` skips
   it — this is the one place it gets checked.
-8. **`bats tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats`**
+5. **`bats tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats`**
   — exercises the dispatcher: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run`,
   `… --empty --dry-run`, and the `--backend=docker` regression guard.

-**Secret-scan coverage.** Policy HCL files under `vault/policies/` are
-already swept by the P11 secret-scan gate
-(`.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml`, #798), whose `vault/**/*` trigger path
-covers everything in this directory. `nomad-validate.yml` intentionally
-does NOT duplicate that gate — one scanner, one source of truth.
-
 If a PR breaks `nomad/server.hcl` (e.g. typo in a block name), step 1
 fails with a clear error; if it breaks a jobspec (e.g. misspells
 `task` as `tsak`, or adds a `volume` stanza without a `source`), step
-2 fails; a typo in a `path "..."` block in a vault policy fails step 5
-with the Vault parser's error; a `roles.yaml` entry that points at a
-policy basename that does not exist fails step 6. PRs that don't touch
-any of the trigger paths skip this pipeline entirely.
+2 fails instead. The fix makes it pass. PRs that don't touch any of
+the trigger paths skip this pipeline entirely.

 ## Version pinning

@ -151,13 +119,5 @@ accept (or vice versa).

 - `lib/init/nomad/` — installer + systemd units + cluster-up orchestrator.
 - `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — this directory's CI pipeline.
- `vault/policies/` — Vault ACL policy HCL files (S2.1); the
-  `vault-policy-fmt` / `vault-policy-validate` CI steps above enforce
-  their shape. See [`../vault/policies/AGENTS.md`](../vault/policies/AGENTS.md)
-  for the policy lifecycle, CI enforcement details, and common failure
-  modes.
- `vault/roles.yaml` — JWT-auth role → policy bindings (S2.3); the
-  `vault-roles-validate` CI step above keeps it in lockstep with the
-  policies directory.
 - Top-of-file headers in `server.hcl` / `client.hcl` / `vault.hcl`
  document the per-file ownership contract.
--- a/nomad/client.hcl
+++ b/nomad/client.hcl
@ -49,12 +49,6 @@ client {
    read_only = false
  }

-  # staging static content (docker/ directory with images, HTML, etc.)
-  host_volume "site-content" {
-    path      = "/srv/disinto/docker"
-    read_only = true
-  }
-
  # disinto chat transcripts + attachments.
  host_volume "chat-history" {
    path      = "/srv/disinto/chat-history"
@ -70,11 +64,11 @@ client {

 # Docker task driver. `volumes.enabled = true` is required so jobspecs
 # can mount host_volume declarations defined above. `allow_privileged`
-# is true — woodpecker-agent requires `privileged = true` to access
-# docker.sock and spawn CI pipeline containers.
+# stays false — no factory workload needs privileged containers today,
+# and flipping it is an audit-worthy change.
 plugin "docker" {
  config {
-    allow_privileged = true
+    allow_privileged = false

    volumes {
      enabled = true
--- a/nomad/jobs/agents.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/agents.hcl
@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/agents.hcl — All-role agent polling loop (Nomad service job)
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S4.1, issue #955). Runs the main bot
-# polling loop with all 7 agent roles (review, dev, gardener, architect,
-# planner, predictor, supervisor) against the local llama server.
-#
-# Host_volume contract:
-#   This job mounts agent-data, project-repos, and ops-repo from
-#   nomad/client.hcl. Paths under /srv/disinto/* are created by
-#   lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh before any job references them.
-#
-# Vault integration (S4.1):
-#   - vault { role = "service-agents" } at group scope — workload-identity
-#     JWT exchanged for a Vault token carrying the composite service-agents
-#     policy (vault/policies/service-agents.hcl), which grants read access
-#     to all 7 bot KV namespaces + vault bot + shared forge config.
-#   - template stanza renders per-bot FORGE_*_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS from Vault
-#     KV v2 at kv/disinto/bots/<role>.
-#   - Seeded on fresh boxes by tools/vault-seed-agents.sh.
-#
-# Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
-# until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S4.2 can wire
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad --with agents` to `nomad job run` it.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "agents" {
-  type        = "service"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  group "agents" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # ── Vault workload identity (S4.1, issue #955) ───────────────────────────
-    # Composite role covering all 7 bot identities + vault bot. Role defined
-    # in vault/roles.yaml, policy in vault/policies/service-agents.hcl.
-    # Bound claim pins nomad_job_id = "agents".
-    vault {
-      role = "service-agents"
-    }
-
-    # No network port — agents are outbound-only (poll forgejo, call llama).
-    # No service discovery block — nothing health-checks agents over HTTP.
-
-    volume "agent-data" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "agent-data"
-      read_only = false
-    }
-
-    volume "project-repos" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "project-repos"
-      read_only = false
-    }
-
-    volume "ops-repo" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "ops-repo"
-      read_only = true
-    }
-
-    # Conservative restart — fail fast to the scheduler.
-    restart {
-      attempts = 3
-      interval = "5m"
-      delay    = "15s"
-      mode     = "delay"
-    }
-
-    # ── Service registration ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    # Agents are outbound-only (poll forgejo, call llama) — no HTTP/TCP
-    # endpoint to probe. The Nomad native provider only supports tcp/http
-    # checks, not script checks. Registering without a check block means
-    # Nomad tracks health via task lifecycle: task running = healthy,
-    # task dead = service deregistered. This matches the docker-compose
-    # pgrep healthcheck semantics (process alive = healthy).
-    service {
-      name     = "agents"
-      provider = "nomad"
-    }
-
-    task "agents" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        image      = "disinto/agents:local"
-        force_pull = false
-
-        # apparmor=unconfined matches docker-compose — Claude Code needs
-        # ptrace for node.js inspector and /proc access.
-        security_opt = ["apparmor=unconfined"]
-      }
-
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "agent-data"
-        destination = "/home/agent/data"
-        read_only   = false
-      }
-
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "project-repos"
-        destination = "/home/agent/repos"
-        read_only   = false
-      }
-
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "ops-repo"
-        destination = "/home/agent/repos/_factory/disinto-ops"
-        read_only   = true
-      }
-
-      # ── Non-secret env ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-      env {
-        FORGE_URL          = "http://forgejo:3000"
-        FORGE_REPO         = "disinto-admin/disinto"
-        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
-        ANTHROPIC_API_KEY  = "sk-no-key-required"
-        CLAUDE_MODEL       = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
-        AGENT_ROLES        = "review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor"
-        POLL_INTERVAL      = "300"
-        DISINTO_CONTAINER  = "1"
-        PROJECT_NAME       = "project"
-        PROJECT_REPO_ROOT  = "/home/agent/repos/project"
-        CLAUDE_TIMEOUT     = "7200"
-
-        # llama-specific Claude Code tuning
-        CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC = "1"
-        CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_BETAS   = "1"
-        CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE          = "60"
-      }
-
-      # ── Vault-templated bot tokens (S4.1, issue #955) ─────────────────────
-      # Renders per-bot FORGE_*_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS from Vault KV v2.
-      # Each `with secret ...` block reads one bot's KV path; the `else`
-      # branch emits short placeholders on fresh installs where the path
-      # is absent. Seed with tools/vault-seed-agents.sh.
-      #
-      # Placeholder values kept < 16 chars to avoid secret-scan CI failures.
-      # error_on_missing_key = false prevents template-pending hangs.
-      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/bots.env"
-        env                  = true
-        change_mode          = "restart"
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
-{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev" -}}
-FORGE_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-FORGE_PASS={{ .Data.data.pass }}
-{{- else -}}
-# WARNING: run tools/vault-seed-agents.sh
-FORGE_TOKEN=seed-me
-FORGE_PASS=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/review" -}}
-FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/gardener" -}}
-FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/architect" -}}
-FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/planner" -}}
-FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/predictor" -}}
-FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/supervisor" -}}
-FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/bots/vault" -}}
-FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      # Agents run Claude/llama sessions — need CPU + memory headroom.
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 500
-        memory = 1024
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
--- a/nomad/jobs/chat.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/chat.hcl
@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/chat.hcl — Claude chat UI (Nomad service job)
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S5.2, issue #989). Lightweight service
-# job for the Claude chat UI with sandbox hardening (#706).
-#
-# Build:
-#   Custom image built from docker/chat/Dockerfile as disinto/chat:local
-#   (same :local pattern as disinto/agents:local).
-#
-# Sandbox hardening (#706):
-#   - Read-only root filesystem (enforced via entrypoint)
-#   - tmpfs /tmp:size=64m for runtime temp files
-#   - cap_drop ALL (no Linux capabilities)
-#   - pids_limit 128 (prevent fork bombs)
-#   - mem_limit 512m (matches compose sandbox hardening)
-#
-# Vault integration:
-#   - vault { role = "service-chat" } at group scope
-#   - Template stanza renders CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET,
-#     FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET from kv/disinto/shared/chat
-#   - Seeded on fresh boxes by tools/vault-seed-chat.sh
-#
-# Host volume:
-#   - chat-history → /var/lib/chat/history (persists conversation history)
-#
-# Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
-# until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S5.2 can wire
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad --with chat` to `nomad job run` it.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "chat" {
-  type        = "service"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  group "chat" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # ── Vault workload identity (S5.2, issue #989) ───────────────────────────
-    # Role `service-chat` defined in vault/roles.yaml, policy in
-    # vault/policies/service-chat.hcl. Bound claim pins nomad_job_id = "chat".
-    vault {
-      role = "service-chat"
-    }
-
-    # ── Network ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    # External port 8080 for chat UI access (via edge proxy or direct).
-    network {
-      port "http" {
-        static = 8080
-        to     = 8080
-      }
-    }
-
-    # ── Host volumes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    # chat-history volume: declared in nomad/client.hcl, path
-    # /srv/disinto/chat-history on the factory box.
-    volume "chat-history" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "chat-history"
-      read_only = false
-    }
-
-    # ── Restart policy ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    restart {
-      attempts = 3
-      interval = "5m"
-      delay    = "15s"
-      mode     = "delay"
-    }
-
-    # ── Service registration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    service {
-      name     = "chat"
-      port     = "http"
-      provider = "nomad"
-
-      check {
-        type     = "http"
-        path     = "/health"
-        interval = "10s"
-        timeout  = "3s"
-      }
-    }
-
-    task "chat" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        image      = "disinto/chat:local"
-        force_pull = false
-        # Sandbox hardening (#706): cap_drop ALL, pids_limit 128, tmpfs /tmp
-        # ReadonlyRootfs enforced via entrypoint script (fails if running as root)
-        cap_drop   = ["ALL"]
-        pids_limit = 128
-        mount {
-          type     = "tmpfs"
-          target   = "/tmp"
-          readonly = false
-          tmpfs_options {
-            size = 67108864  # 64MB in bytes
-          }
-        }
-        # Security options for sandbox hardening
-        # apparmor=unconfined needed for Claude CLI ptrace access
-        # no-new-privileges prevents privilege escalation
-        security_opt = ["apparmor=unconfined", "no-new-privileges"]
-      }
-
-      # ── Volume mounts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-      # Mount chat-history for conversation persistence
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "chat-history"
-        destination = "/var/lib/chat/history"
-        read_only   = false
-      }
-
-      # ── Environment: secrets from Vault (S5.2) ──────────────────────────────
-      # CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET
-      # rendered from kv/disinto/shared/chat via template stanza.
-      env {
-        FORGE_URL                      = "http://forgejo:3000"
-        CHAT_MAX_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR     = "60"
-        CHAT_MAX_REQUESTS_PER_DAY      = "1000"
-      }
-
-      # ── Vault-templated secrets (S5.2, issue #989) ─────────────────────────
-      # Renders chat-secrets.env from Vault KV v2 at kv/disinto/shared/chat.
-      # Placeholder values kept < 16 chars to avoid secret-scan CI failures.
-      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/chat-secrets.env"
-        env                  = true
-        change_mode          = "restart"
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
-{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/shared/chat" -}}
-CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID={{ .Data.data.chat_oauth_client_id }}
-CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET={{ .Data.data.chat_oauth_client_secret }}
-FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET={{ .Data.data.forward_auth_secret }}
-{{- else -}}
-# WARNING: run tools/vault-seed-chat.sh
-CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=seed-me
-CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=seed-me
-FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=seed-me
-{{- end -}}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      # ── Sandbox hardening (S5.2, #706) ────────────────────────────────────
-      # Memory = 512MB (matches docker-compose sandbox hardening)
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 200
-        memory = 512
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
--- a/nomad/jobs/edge.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/edge.hcl
@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/edge.hcl — Edge proxy (Caddy + dispatcher sidecar) (Nomad service job)
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S5.1, issue #988). Caddy reverse proxy
-# routes traffic to Forgejo, Woodpecker, staging, and chat services. The
-# dispatcher sidecar polls disinto-ops for vault actions and dispatches them
-# via Nomad batch jobs.
-#
-# Host networking (issue #1031):
-#   Caddy uses network_mode = "host" so upstreams are reached at
-#   127.0.0.1:<port> (forgejo :3000, woodpecker :8000, chat :8080).
-#   Staging uses Nomad service discovery (S5-fix-7, issue #1018).
-#
-# Host_volume contract:
-#   This job mounts caddy-data from nomad/client.hcl. Path
-#   /srv/disinto/caddy-data is created by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh before
-#   any job references it. Keep the `source = "caddy-data"` below in sync
-#   with the host_volume stanza in client.hcl.
-#
-# Build step (S5.1):
-#   docker/edge/Dockerfile is custom (adds bash, jq, curl, git, docker-cli,
-#   python3, openssh-client, autossh to caddy:latest). Build as
-#   disinto/edge:local using the same pattern as disinto/agents:local.
-#   Command: docker build -t disinto/edge:local -f docker/edge/Dockerfile docker/edge
-#
-# Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
-# until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S5.2 can wire
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad --with edge` to `nomad job run` it.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "edge" {
-  type        = "service"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  group "edge" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # ── Vault workload identity for dispatcher (S5.1, issue #988) ──────────
-    # Service role for dispatcher task to fetch vault actions from KV v2.
-    # Role defined in vault/roles.yaml, policy in vault/policies/dispatcher.hcl.
-    vault {
-      role = "service-dispatcher"
-    }
-
-    # ── Network ports (S5.1, issue #988) ──────────────────────────────────
-    # Caddy listens on :80 and :443. Expose both on the host.
-    network {
-      port "http" {
-        static = 80
-        to     = 80
-      }
-
-      port "https" {
-        static = 443
-        to     = 443
-      }
-    }
-
-    # ── Host-volume mounts (S5.1, issue #988) ─────────────────────────────
-    # caddy-data: ACME certificates, Caddy config state.
-    volume "caddy-data" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "caddy-data"
-      read_only = false
-    }
-
-    # ops-repo: disinto-ops clone for vault actions polling.
-    volume "ops-repo" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "ops-repo"
-      read_only = false
-    }
-
-    # ── Conservative restart policy ───────────────────────────────────────
-    # Caddy should be stable; dispatcher may restart on errors.
-    restart {
-      attempts = 3
-      interval = "5m"
-      delay    = "15s"
-      mode     = "delay"
-    }
-
-    # ── Service registration ───────────────────────────────────────────────
-    # Caddy is an HTTP reverse proxy — health check on port 80.
-    service {
-      name     = "edge"
-      port     = "http"
-      provider = "nomad"
-
-      check {
-        type     = "http"
-        path     = "/"
-        interval = "10s"
-        timeout  = "3s"
-      }
-    }
-
-    # ── Caddy task (S5.1, issue #988) ─────────────────────────────────────
-    task "caddy" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        # Use pre-built disinto/edge:local image (custom Dockerfile adds
-        # bash, jq, curl, git, docker-cli, python3, openssh-client, autossh).
-        image        = "disinto/edge:local"
-        force_pull   = false
-        network_mode = "host"
-        ports        = ["http", "https"]
-
-        # apparmor=unconfined matches docker-compose — needed for autossh
-        # in the entrypoint script.
-        security_opt = ["apparmor=unconfined"]
-      }
-
-      # Mount caddy-data volume for ACME state and config directory.
-      # Caddyfile is mounted at /etc/caddy/Caddyfile by entrypoint-edge.sh.
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "caddy-data"
-        destination = "/data"
-        read_only   = false
-      }
-
-      # ── Caddyfile via Nomad service discovery (S5-fix-7, issue #1018) ────
-      # Renders staging upstream from Nomad service registration instead of
-      # hardcoded staging:80. Caddy picks up /local/Caddyfile via entrypoint.
-      # Forge URL via Nomad service discovery (issue #1034) — resolves forgejo
-      # service address/port dynamically for bridge network compatibility.
-      template {
-        destination = "local/forge.env"
-        env         = true
-        change_mode = "restart"
-        data        = <<EOT
-{{ range service "forgejo" -}}
-FORGE_URL=http://{{ .Address }}:{{ .Port }}
-{{- end }}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      template {
-        destination = "local/Caddyfile"
-        change_mode = "restart"
-        data        = <<EOT
-# Caddyfile — edge proxy configuration (Nomad-rendered)
-# Staging upstream discovered via Nomad service registration.
-
-:80 {
-    # Redirect root to Forgejo
-    handle / {
-        redir /forge/ 302
-    }
-
-    # Reverse proxy to Forgejo
-    handle /forge/* {
-        reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:3000
-    }
-
-    # Reverse proxy to Woodpecker CI
-    handle /ci/* {
-        reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8000
-    }
-
-    # Reverse proxy to staging — dynamic port via Nomad service discovery
-    handle /staging/* {
-{{ range nomadService "staging" }}        reverse_proxy {{ .Address }}:{{ .Port }}
-{{ end }}    }
-
-    # Chat service — reverse proxy to disinto-chat backend (#705)
-    # OAuth routes bypass forward_auth — unauthenticated users need these (#709)
-    handle /chat/login {
-        reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
-    }
-    handle /chat/oauth/callback {
-        reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
-    }
-    # Defense-in-depth: forward_auth stamps X-Forwarded-User from session (#709)
-    handle /chat/* {
-        forward_auth 127.0.0.1:8080 {
-            uri /chat/auth/verify
-            copy_headers X-Forwarded-User
-            header_up X-Forward-Auth-Secret {$FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET}
-        }
-        reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
-    }
-}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      # ── Non-secret env ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
-      env {
-        FORGE_REPO        = "disinto-admin/disinto"
-        DISINTO_CONTAINER = "1"
-        PROJECT_NAME      = "disinto"
-      }
-
-      # Caddy needs CPU + memory headroom for reverse proxy work.
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 200
-        memory = 256
-      }
-    }
-
-    # ── Dispatcher task (S5.1, issue #988) ────────────────────────────────
-    task "dispatcher" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        # Use same disinto/agents:local image as other agents.
-        image        = "disinto/agents:local"
-        force_pull   = false
-        network_mode = "host"
-
-        # apparmor=unconfined matches docker-compose.
-        security_opt = ["apparmor=unconfined"]
-
-        # Mount docker.sock via bind-volume (not host volume) for legacy
-        # docker backend compat. Nomad host volumes require named volumes
-        # from client.hcl; socket files cannot be host volumes.
-        volumes = ["/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro"]
-      }
-
-      # Mount ops-repo for vault actions polling.
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "ops-repo"
-        destination = "/home/agent/repos/disinto-ops"
-        read_only   = false
-      }
-
-      # ── Forge URL via Nomad service discovery (issue #1034) ──────────
-      # Resolves forgejo service address/port dynamically for bridge network
-      # compatibility. Template-scoped to dispatcher task (Nomad doesn't
-      # propagate templates across tasks).
-      template {
-        destination = "local/forge.env"
-        env         = true
-        change_mode = "restart"
-        data        = <<EOT
-{{ range service "forgejo" -}}
-FORGE_URL=http://{{ .Address }}:{{ .Port }}
-{{- end }}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      # ── Vault-templated secrets (S5.1, issue #988) ──────────────────────
-      # Renders FORGE_TOKEN from Vault KV v2 for ops repo access.
-      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/dispatcher.env"
-        env                  = true
-        change_mode          = "restart"
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
-{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo" -}}
-FORGE_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.token }}
-{{- else -}}
-# WARNING: kv/disinto/shared/ops-repo is empty — run tools/vault-seed-ops-repo.sh
-FORGE_TOKEN=seed-me
-{{- end }}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      # ── Non-secret env ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
-      env {
-        DISPATCHER_BACKEND   = "nomad"
-        FORGE_REPO           = "disinto-admin/disinto"
-        FORGE_OPS_REPO       = "disinto-admin/disinto-ops"
-        PRIMARY_BRANCH       = "main"
-        DISINTO_CONTAINER    = "1"
-        OPS_REPO_ROOT        = "/home/agent/repos/disinto-ops"
-        FORGE_ADMIN_USERS    = "vault-bot,admin"
-      }
-
-      # Dispatcher is lightweight — minimal CPU + memory.
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 100
-        memory = 256
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
--- a/nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl
@ -154,18 +154,11 @@ job "forgejo" {
      # this file. "seed-me" is < 16 chars and still distinctive enough
      # to surface in a `grep FORGEJO__security__` audit. The template
      # comment below carries the operator-facing fix pointer.
-      # `error_on_missing_key = false` stops consul-template from blocking
-      # the alloc on template-pending when the Vault KV path exists but a
-      # referenced key is absent (or the path itself is absent and the
-      # else-branch placeholders are used). Without this, a fresh-LXC
-      # `disinto init --with forgejo` against an empty Vault hangs on
-      # template-pending until deploy.sh times out (issue #912, bug #4).
      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/forgejo.env"
-        env                  = true
-        change_mode          = "restart"
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
+        destination = "secrets/forgejo.env"
+        env         = true
+        change_mode = "restart"
+        data        = <<EOT
 {{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo" -}}
 FORGEJO__security__SECRET_KEY={{ .Data.data.secret_key }}
 FORGEJO__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.internal_token }}
--- a/nomad/jobs/staging.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/staging.hcl
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/staging.hcl — Staging file server (Nomad service job)
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S5.2, issue #989). Lightweight service job
-# for the staging file server using Caddy as a static file server.
-#
-# Mount contract:
-#   This job mounts the `docker/` directory as `/srv/site` (read-only).
-#   The docker/ directory contains static content (images, HTML, etc.)
-#   served to staging environment users.
-#
-# Network:
-#   Dynamic host port — edge discovers via Nomad service registration.
-#   No static port to avoid collisions with edge (which owns 80/443).
-#
-# Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
-# until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S5.2 can wire
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad --with staging` to `nomad job run` it.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "staging" {
-  type        = "service"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  group "staging" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # No Vault integration needed — no secrets required (static file server)
-
-    # Internal service — dynamic host port. Edge discovers via Nomad service.
-    network {
-      port "http" {
-        to = 80
-      }
-    }
-
-    volume "site-content" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "site-content"
-      read_only = true
-    }
-
-    restart {
-      attempts = 3
-      interval = "5m"
-      delay    = "15s"
-      mode     = "delay"
-    }
-
-    service {
-      name     = "staging"
-      port     = "http"
-      provider = "nomad"
-
-      check {
-        type     = "http"
-        path     = "/"
-        interval = "10s"
-        timeout  = "3s"
-      }
-    }
-
-    task "staging" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        image   = "caddy:alpine"
-        ports   = ["http"]
-        command = "caddy"
-        args    = ["file-server", "--root", "/srv/site"]
-      }
-
-      # Mount docker/ directory as /srv/site:ro (static content)
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "site-content"
-        destination = "/srv/site"
-        read_only   = true
-      }
-
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 100
-        memory = 256
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
--- a/nomad/jobs/vault-runner.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/vault-runner.hcl
@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/vault-runner.hcl — Parameterized batch job for vault action dispatch
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S5.3, issue #990). Replaces the
-# `docker run --rm vault-runner-${action_id}` pattern in dispatcher.sh with
-# a Nomad-native parameterized batch job. Dispatched by the edge dispatcher
-# (S5.4) via `nomad job dispatch`.
-#
-# Parameterized meta:
-#   action_id   — vault action identifier (used by entrypoint-runner.sh)
-#   secrets_csv — comma-separated secret names (e.g. "GITHUB_TOKEN,DEPLOY_KEY")
-#
-# Vault integration (approach A — pre-defined templates):
-#   All 6 known runner secrets are rendered via template stanzas with
-#   error_on_missing_key = false. Secrets not granted by the dispatch's
-#   Vault policies render as empty strings. The dispatcher (S5.4) sets
-#   vault { policies = [...] } per-dispatch based on the action TOML's
-#   secrets=[...] list, scoping access to only the declared secrets.
-#
-# Cleanup: Nomad garbage-collects completed batch dispatches automatically.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "vault-runner" {
-  type        = "batch"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  parameterized {
-    meta_required = ["action_id", "secrets_csv"]
-  }
-
-  group "runner" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # ── Vault workload identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-    # Per-dispatch policies are composed by the dispatcher (S5.4) based on the
-    # action TOML's secrets=[...] list. Each policy grants read access to
-    # exactly one kv/data/disinto/runner/<NAME> path. Roles defined in
-    # vault/roles.yaml (runner-<NAME>), policies in vault/policies/.
-    vault {}
-
-    volume "ops-repo" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "ops-repo"
-      read_only = true
-    }
-
-    # No restart for batch — fail fast, let the dispatcher handle retries.
-    restart {
-      attempts = 0
-      mode     = "fail"
-    }
-
-    task "runner" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        image      = "disinto/agents:local"
-        force_pull = false
-        entrypoint = ["bash"]
-        args       = [
-          "/home/agent/disinto/docker/runner/entrypoint-runner.sh",
-          "${NOMAD_META_action_id}",
-        ]
-      }
-
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "ops-repo"
-        destination = "/home/agent/ops"
-        read_only   = true
-      }
-
-      # ── Non-secret env ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-      env {
-        DISINTO_CONTAINER = "1"
-        FACTORY_ROOT      = "/home/agent/disinto"
-        OPS_REPO_ROOT     = "/home/agent/ops"
-      }
-
-      # ── Vault-templated runner secrets (approach A) ────────────────────────
-      # Pre-defined templates for all 6 known runner secrets. Each renders
-      # from kv/data/disinto/runner/<NAME>. Secrets not granted by the
-      # dispatch's Vault policies produce empty env vars (harmless).
-      # error_on_missing_key = false prevents template-pending hangs when
-      # a secret path is absent or the policy doesn't grant access.
-      #
-      # Placeholder values kept < 16 chars to avoid secret-scan CI failures.
-      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/runner.env"
-        env                  = true
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
-{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/runner/GITHUB_TOKEN" -}}
-GITHUB_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.value }}
-{{- else -}}
-GITHUB_TOKEN=
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/runner/CODEBERG_TOKEN" -}}
-CODEBERG_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.value }}
-{{- else -}}
-CODEBERG_TOKEN=
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/runner/CLAWHUB_TOKEN" -}}
-CLAWHUB_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.value }}
-{{- else -}}
-CLAWHUB_TOKEN=
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/runner/DEPLOY_KEY" -}}
-DEPLOY_KEY={{ .Data.data.value }}
-{{- else -}}
-DEPLOY_KEY=
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/runner/NPM_TOKEN" -}}
-NPM_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.value }}
-{{- else -}}
-NPM_TOKEN=
-{{- end }}
-
-{{ with secret "kv/data/disinto/runner/DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN" -}}
-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.value }}
-{{- else -}}
-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN=
-{{- end }}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      # Formula execution headroom — matches agents.hcl baseline.
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 500
-        memory = 1024
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
--- a/nomad/jobs/woodpecker-agent.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/woodpecker-agent.hcl
@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/woodpecker-agent.hcl — Woodpecker CI agent (Nomad service job)
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S3.2, issue #935).
-# Drop-in for the current docker-compose setup with host networking +
-# docker.sock mount, enabling the agent to spawn containers via the
-# mounted socket.
-#
-# Host networking:
-#   Uses network_mode = "host" to match the compose setup. The Woodpecker
-#   server gRPC endpoint is addressed via Nomad service discovery using
-#   the host's IP address (10.10.10.x:9000), since the server's port
-#   binding in Nomad binds to the allocation's IP, not localhost.
-#
-# Vault integration:
-#   - vault { role = "service-woodpecker-agent" } at the group scope — the
-#     task's workload-identity JWT is exchanged for a Vault token carrying
-#     the policy named on that role. Role + policy are defined in
-#     vault/roles.yaml + vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl.
-#   - template stanza pulls WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET from Vault KV v2
-#     at kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker and writes it to secrets/agent.env.
-#     Seeded on fresh boxes by tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "woodpecker-agent" {
-  type        = "service"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  group "woodpecker-agent" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # ── Vault workload identity ─────────────────────────────────────────
-    # `role = "service-woodpecker-agent"` is defined in vault/roles.yaml and
-    # applied by tools/vault-apply-roles.sh. The role's bound
-    # claim pins nomad_job_id = "woodpecker-agent" — renaming this
-    # jobspec's `job "woodpecker-agent"` without updating vault/roles.yaml
-    # will make token exchange fail at placement with a "claim mismatch"
-    # error.
-    vault {
-      role = "service-woodpecker-agent"
-    }
-
-    # Health check port: static 3333 for Nomad service discovery. The agent
-    # exposes :3333/healthz for Nomad to probe.
-    network {
-      port "healthz" {
-        static = 3333
-      }
-    }
-
-    # Native Nomad service discovery for the health check endpoint.
-    service {
-      name     = "woodpecker-agent"
-      port     = "healthz"
-      provider = "nomad"
-
-      check {
-        type     = "http"
-        path     = "/healthz"
-        interval = "15s"
-        timeout  = "3s"
-      }
-    }
-
-    # Conservative restart policy — fail fast to the scheduler instead of
-    # spinning on a broken image/config. 3 attempts over 5m, then back off.
-    restart {
-      attempts = 3
-      interval = "5m"
-      delay    = "15s"
-      mode     = "delay"
-    }
-
-    task "woodpecker-agent" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        image     = "woodpeckerci/woodpecker-agent:v3"
-        network_mode = "host"
-        privileged = true
-        volumes   = ["/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"]
-      }
-
-      # Non-secret env — server address, gRPC security, concurrency limit,
-      # and health check endpoint. Nothing sensitive here.
-      #
-      # WOODPECKER_SERVER uses Nomad's attribute template to get the host's
-      # IP address (10.10.10.x). The server's gRPC port 9000 is bound via
-      # Nomad's port stanza to the allocation's IP (not localhost), so the
-      # agent must use the LXC's eth0 IP, not 127.0.0.1.
-      env {
-        WOODPECKER_SERVER         = "${attr.unique.network.ip-address}:9000"
-        WOODPECKER_GRPC_SECURE    = "false"
-        WOODPECKER_MAX_WORKFLOWS  = "1"
-        WOODPECKER_HEALTHCHECK_ADDR = ":3333"
-      }
-
-      # ── Vault-templated agent secret ──────────────────────────────────
-      # Renders <task-dir>/secrets/agent.env (per-alloc secrets dir,
-      # never on disk on the host root filesystem, never in `nomad job
-      # inspect` output). `env = true` merges WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET
-      # from the file into the task environment.
-      #
-      # Vault path: `kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker`. The literal
-      # `/data/` segment is required by consul-template for KV v2 mounts.
-      #
-      # Empty-Vault fallback (`with ... else ...`): on a fresh LXC where
-      # the KV path is absent, consul-template's `with` short-circuits to
-      # the `else` branch. Emitting a visible placeholder means the
-      # container still boots, but with an obviously-bad secret that an
-      # operator will spot — better than the agent failing silently with
-      # auth errors. Seed the path with tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh
-      # to replace the placeholder.
-      #
-      # Placeholder values are kept short on purpose: the repo-wide
-      # secret-scan (.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml → lib/secret-scan.sh)
-      # flags `TOKEN=<16+ non-space chars>` as a plaintext secret, so a
-      # descriptive long placeholder would fail CI on every PR that touched
-      # this file. "seed-me" is < 16 chars and still distinctive enough
-      # to surface in a `grep WOODPECKER` audit.
-      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/agent.env"
-        env                  = true
-        change_mode          = "restart"
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
-{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker" -}}
-WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET={{ .Data.data.agent_secret }}
-{{- else -}}
-# WARNING: kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker is empty — run tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh
-WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET=seed-me
-{{- end -}}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      # Baseline — tune once we have real usage numbers under nomad.
-      # Conservative limits so an unhealthy agent can't starve the node.
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 200
-        memory = 256
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
--- a/nomad/jobs/woodpecker-server.hcl
+++ b/nomad/jobs/woodpecker-server.hcl
@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/woodpecker-server.hcl — Woodpecker CI server (Nomad service job)
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S3.1, issue #934).
-# Runs the Woodpecker CI web UI + gRPC endpoint as a Nomad service job,
-# reading its Forgejo OAuth + agent secret from Vault via workload identity.
-#
-# Host_volume contract:
-#   This job mounts the `woodpecker-data` host_volume declared in
-#   nomad/client.hcl. That volume is backed by /srv/disinto/woodpecker-data
-#   on the factory box, created by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh before any
-#   job references it. Keep the `source = "woodpecker-data"` below in sync
-#   with the host_volume stanza in client.hcl — drift = scheduling failures.
-#
-# Vault integration (S2.4 pattern):
-#   - vault { role = "service-woodpecker" } at the group scope — the task's
-#     workload-identity JWT is exchanged for a Vault token carrying the
-#     policy named on that role. Role + policy are defined in
-#     vault/roles.yaml + vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl.
-#   - template { destination = "secrets/wp.env" env = true } pulls
-#     WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET, WOODPECKER_FORGEJO_CLIENT, and
-#     WOODPECKER_FORGEJO_SECRET out of Vault KV v2 at
-#     kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker and merges them into the task env.
-#     Agent secret seeded by tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh; OAuth
-#     client/secret seeded by S3.3 (wp-oauth-register.sh).
-#   - Non-secret env (DB driver, Forgejo URL, host URL, open registration)
-#     stays inline below — not sensitive, not worth round-tripping through
-#     Vault.
-#
-# Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
-# until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S3.4 can wire
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad --with woodpecker` to `nomad job run` it.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "woodpecker-server" {
-  type        = "service"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  group "woodpecker-server" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # ── Vault workload identity (S2.4 pattern) ──────────────────────────────
-    # `role = "service-woodpecker"` is defined in vault/roles.yaml and
-    # applied by tools/vault-apply-roles.sh (S2.3). The role's bound
-    # claim pins nomad_job_id = "woodpecker" — note the job_id in
-    # vault/roles.yaml is "woodpecker" (matching the roles.yaml entry),
-    # but the actual Nomad job name here is "woodpecker-server". Update
-    # vault/roles.yaml job_id to "woodpecker-server" if the bound claim
-    # enforces an exact match at placement.
-    vault {
-      role = "service-woodpecker"
-    }
-
-    # HTTP UI (:8000) + gRPC agent endpoint (:9000). Static ports match
-    # docker-compose's published ports so the rest of the factory keeps
-    # reaching woodpecker at the same host:port during and after cutover.
-    network {
-      port "http" {
-        static = 8000
-        to     = 8000
-      }
-      port "grpc" {
-        static = 9000
-        to     = 9000
-      }
-    }
-
-    # Host-volume mount: declared in nomad/client.hcl, path
-    # /srv/disinto/woodpecker-data on the factory box.
-    volume "woodpecker-data" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "woodpecker-data"
-      read_only = false
-    }
-
-    # Conservative restart policy — fail fast to the scheduler instead of
-    # spinning on a broken image/config. 3 attempts over 5m, then back off.
-    restart {
-      attempts = 3
-      interval = "5m"
-      delay    = "15s"
-      mode     = "delay"
-    }
-
-    # Native Nomad service discovery (no Consul in this factory cluster).
-    # Health check gates the service as healthy only after the HTTP API is
-    # up; initial_status is deliberately unset so Nomad waits for the first
-    # probe to pass before marking the allocation healthy on boot.
-    service {
-      name     = "woodpecker"
-      port     = "http"
-      provider = "nomad"
-
-      check {
-        type     = "http"
-        path     = "/healthz"
-        interval = "10s"
-        timeout  = "3s"
-      }
-    }
-
-    task "woodpecker-server" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        image = "woodpeckerci/woodpecker-server:v3"
-        ports = ["http", "grpc"]
-      }
-
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "woodpecker-data"
-        destination = "/var/lib/woodpecker"
-        read_only   = false
-      }
-
-      # Non-secret env — Forgejo integration flags, public URL, DB driver.
-      # Nothing sensitive here, so this stays inline. Secret-bearing env
-      # (agent secret, OAuth client/secret) lives in the template stanza
-      # below and is merged into task env.
-      env {
-        WOODPECKER_FORGEJO              = "true"
-        WOODPECKER_FORGEJO_URL          = "http://forgejo:3000"
-        WOODPECKER_HOST                 = "http://woodpecker:8000"
-        WOODPECKER_OPEN                 = "true"
-        WOODPECKER_DATABASE_DRIVER      = "sqlite3"
-        WOODPECKER_DATABASE_DATASOURCE  = "/var/lib/woodpecker/woodpecker.sqlite"
-      }
-
-      # ── Vault-templated secrets env (S2.4 pattern) ─────────────────────────
-      # Renders `<task-dir>/secrets/wp.env` (per-alloc secrets dir, never on
-      # disk on the host root filesystem). `env = true` merges every KEY=VAL
-      # line into the task environment. `change_mode = "restart"` re-runs the
-      # task whenever a watched secret's value in Vault changes.
-      #
-      # Vault path: `kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker`. The literal `/data/`
-      # segment is required by consul-template for KV v2 mounts.
-      #
-      # Empty-Vault fallback (`with ... else ...`): on a fresh LXC where
-      # the KV path is absent, consul-template's `with` short-circuits to
-      # the `else` branch. Emitting visible placeholders means the container
-      # still boots, but with obviously-bad secrets. Seed the path with
-      # tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh (agent_secret) and S3.3's
-      # wp-oauth-register.sh (forgejo_client, forgejo_secret).
-      #
-      # Placeholder values are kept short on purpose: the repo-wide
-      # secret-scan flags `TOKEN=<16+ non-space chars>` as a plaintext
-      # secret; "seed-me" is < 16 chars and still distinctive.
-      template {
-        destination          = "secrets/wp.env"
-        env                  = true
-        change_mode          = "restart"
-        error_on_missing_key = false
-        data                 = <<EOT
-{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker" -}}
-WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET={{ .Data.data.agent_secret }}
-WOODPECKER_FORGEJO_CLIENT={{ .Data.data.forgejo_client }}
-WOODPECKER_FORGEJO_SECRET={{ .Data.data.forgejo_secret }}
-{{- else -}}
-# WARNING: kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker is empty — run tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh + S3.3
-WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET=seed-me
-WOODPECKER_FORGEJO_CLIENT=seed-me
-WOODPECKER_FORGEJO_SECRET=seed-me
-{{- end -}}
-EOT
-      }
-
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 300
-        memory = 512
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
--- a/planner/AGENTS.md
+++ b/planner/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Planner Agent

 **Role**: Strategic planning using a Prerequisite Tree (Theory of Constraints),
--- a/predictor/AGENTS.md
+++ b/predictor/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Predictor Agent

 **Role**: Abstract adversary (the "goblin"). Runs a 2-step formula
--- a/review/AGENTS.md
+++ b/review/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Review Agent

 **Role**: AI-powered PR review — post structured findings and formal
--- a/supervisor/AGENTS.md
+++ b/supervisor/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Supervisor Agent

 **Role**: Health monitoring and auto-remediation, executed as a formula-driven
@ -24,18 +24,10 @@ Both invoke the same `supervisor-run.sh`. Sources `lib/guard.sh` and calls `chec
  files for `PHASE:escalate` entries and auto-removes any whose linked issue
  is confirmed closed (24h grace period after closure to avoid races). Reports
  **stale crashed worktrees** (worktrees preserved after crash) — supervisor
-  housekeeping removes them after 24h. Collects **Woodpecker agent health**
-  (added #933): container `disinto-woodpecker-agent` health/running status,
-  gRPC error count in last 20 min, fast-failure pipeline count (<60s, last 15 min),
-  and overall health verdict (healthy/unhealthy). Unhealthy verdict triggers
-  automatic container restart + `blocked:ci_exhausted` issue recovery in
-  `supervisor-run.sh` before the Claude session starts.
+  housekeeping removes them after 24h
 - `formulas/run-supervisor.toml` — Execution spec: five steps (preflight review,
  health-assessment, decide-actions, report, journal) with `needs` dependencies.
-  Claude evaluates all metrics and takes actions in a single interactive session.
-  Health-assessment now includes P2 **Woodpecker agent unhealthy** classification
-  (container not running, ≥3 gRPC errors/20m, or ≥3 fast-failure pipelines/15m);
-  decide-actions documents the pre-session auto-recovery path
+  Claude evaluates all metrics and takes actions in a single interactive session
 - `$OPS_REPO_ROOT/knowledge/*.md` — Domain-specific remediation guides (memory,
  disk, CI, git, dev-agent, review-agent, forge)

@ -55,6 +47,5 @@ P3 (degraded PRs, circular deps, stale deps), P4 (housekeeping).
 - Logs a WARNING message at startup indicating degraded mode

 **Lifecycle**: supervisor-run.sh (invoked by polling loop every 20min, `check_active supervisor`)
-→ lock + memory guard → run preflight.sh (collect metrics) → **WP agent health recovery**
-(if unhealthy: restart container + recover ci_exhausted issues) → load formula + context → run
+→ lock + memory guard → run preflight.sh (collect metrics) → load formula + context → run
 claude -p via agent-sdk.sh → Claude assesses health, auto-fixes, writes journal → `PHASE:done`.
--- a/supervisor/preflight.sh
+++ b/supervisor/preflight.sh
@ -224,108 +224,3 @@ for _vf in "${_va_root}"/*.md; do
 done
 [ "$_found_vault" = false ] && echo "  None"
 echo ""
-
-# ── Woodpecker Agent Health ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-echo "## Woodpecker Agent Health"
-
-# Check WP agent container health status
-_wp_container="disinto-woodpecker-agent"
-_wp_health_status="unknown"
-_wp_health_start=""
-
-if command -v docker &>/dev/null; then
-  # Get health status via docker inspect
-  _wp_health_status=$(docker inspect "$_wp_container" --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "not_found")
-  if [ "$_wp_health_status" = "not_found" ] || [ -z "$_wp_health_status" ]; then
-    # Container may not exist or not have health check configured
-    _wp_health_status=$(docker inspect "$_wp_container" --format '{{.State.Status}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "not_found")
-  fi
-
-  # Get container start time for age calculation
-  _wp_start_time=$(docker inspect "$_wp_container" --format '{{.State.StartedAt}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-  if [ -n "$_wp_start_time" ] && [ "$_wp_start_time" != "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z" ]; then
-    _wp_health_start=$(date -d "$_wp_start_time" '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC' 2>/dev/null || echo "$_wp_start_time")
-  fi
-fi
-
-echo "Container: $_wp_container"
-echo "Status: $_wp_health_status"
-[ -n "$_wp_health_start" ] && echo "Started: $_wp_health_start"
-
-# Check for gRPC errors in agent logs (last 20 minutes)
-_wp_grpc_errors=0
-if [ "$_wp_health_status" != "not_found" ] && [ -n "$_wp_health_status" ]; then
-  _wp_grpc_errors=$(docker logs --since 20m "$_wp_container" 2>&1 | grep -c 'grpc error' || echo "0")
-  echo "gRPC errors (last 20m): $_wp_grpc_errors"
-fi
-
-# Fast-failure heuristic: check for pipelines completing in <60s
-_wp_fast_failures=0
-_wp_recent_failures=""
-if [ -n "${WOODPECKER_REPO_ID:-}" ] && [ "${WOODPECKER_REPO_ID}" != "0" ]; then
-  _now=$(date +%s)
-  _pipelines=$(woodpecker_api "/repos/${WOODPECKER_REPO_ID}/pipelines?perPage=100" 2>/dev/null || echo '[]')
-
-  # Count failures with duration < 60s in last 15 minutes
-  _wp_fast_failures=$(echo "$_pipelines" | jq --argjson now "$_now" '
-    [.[] | select(.status == "failure") | select((.finished - .started) < 60) | select(($now - .finished) < 900)]
-    | length' 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
-
-  if [ "$_wp_fast_failures" -gt 0 ]; then
-    _wp_recent_failures=$(echo "$_pipelines" | jq -r --argjson now "$_now" '
-      [.[] | select(.status == "failure") | select((.finished - .started) < 60) | select(($now - .finished) < 900)]
-      | .[] | "\(.number)\t\((.finished - .started))s"' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-  fi
-fi
-
-echo "Fast-fail pipelines (<60s, last 15m): $_wp_fast_failures"
-if [ -n "$_wp_recent_failures" ] && [ "$_wp_fast_failures" -gt 0 ]; then
-  echo "Recent failures:"
-  echo "$_wp_recent_failures" | while IFS=$'\t' read -r _num _dur; do
-    echo "  #$_num: ${_dur}"
-  done
-fi
-
-# Determine overall WP agent health
-_wp_agent_healthy=true
-_wp_health_reason=""
-
-if [ "$_wp_health_status" = "not_found" ]; then
-  _wp_agent_healthy=false
-  _wp_health_reason="Container not running"
-elif [ "$_wp_health_status" = "unhealthy" ]; then
-  _wp_agent_healthy=false
-  _wp_health_reason="Container health check failed"
-elif [ "$_wp_health_status" != "running" ]; then
-  _wp_agent_healthy=false
-  _wp_health_reason="Container not in running state: $_wp_health_status"
-elif [ "$_wp_grpc_errors" -ge 3 ]; then
-  _wp_agent_healthy=false
-  _wp_health_reason="High gRPC error count (>=3 in 20m)"
-elif [ "$_wp_fast_failures" -ge 3 ]; then
-  _wp_agent_healthy=false
-  _wp_health_reason="High fast-failure count (>=3 in 15m)"
-fi
-
-echo ""
-echo "WP Agent Health: $([ "$_wp_agent_healthy" = true ] && echo "healthy" || echo "UNHEALTHY")"
-[ -n "$_wp_health_reason" ] && echo "Reason: $_wp_health_reason"
-echo ""
-
-# ── WP Agent Health History (for idempotency) ──────────────────────────────
-
-echo "## WP Agent Health History"
-# Track last restart timestamp to avoid duplicate restarts in same run
-_WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE="${DISINTO_LOG_DIR}/supervisor/wp-agent-health.history"
-_wp_last_restart="never"
-_wp_last_restart_ts=0
-
-if [ -f "$_WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE" ]; then
-  _wp_last_restart_ts=$(grep -m1 '^LAST_RESTART_TS=' "$_WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || echo "0")
-  if [ -n "$_wp_last_restart_ts" ] && [ "$_wp_last_restart_ts" -gt 0 ] 2>/dev/null; then
-    _wp_last_restart=$(date -d "@$_wp_last_restart_ts" '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC' 2>/dev/null || echo "$_wp_last_restart_ts")
-  fi
-fi
-echo "Last restart: $_wp_last_restart"
-echo ""
--- a/supervisor/supervisor-run.sh
+++ b/supervisor/supervisor-run.sh
@ -47,9 +47,6 @@ SID_FILE="/tmp/supervisor-session-${PROJECT_NAME}.sid"
 SCRATCH_FILE="/tmp/supervisor-${PROJECT_NAME}-scratch.md"
 WORKTREE="/tmp/${PROJECT_NAME}-supervisor-run"

-# WP agent container name (configurable via env var)
-export WP_AGENT_CONTAINER_NAME="${WP_AGENT_CONTAINER_NAME:-disinto-woodpecker-agent}"
-
 # Override LOG_AGENT for consistent agent identification
 # shellcheck disable=SC2034  # consumed by agent-sdk.sh and env.sh log()
 LOG_AGENT="supervisor"
@ -169,160 +166,6 @@ ${FORMULA_CONTENT}
 ${SCRATCH_INSTRUCTION}
 ${PROMPT_FOOTER}"

-# ── WP Agent Health Recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Check preflight output for WP agent health issues and trigger recovery if needed
-_WP_HEALTH_CHECK_FILE="${DISINTO_LOG_DIR}/supervisor/wp-agent-health-check.md"
-echo "$PREFLIGHT_OUTPUT" > "$_WP_HEALTH_CHECK_FILE"
-
-# Extract WP agent health status from preflight output
-# Note: match exact "healthy" not "UNHEALTHY" (substring issue)
-_wp_agent_healthy=$(grep "^WP Agent Health: healthy$" "$_WP_HEALTH_CHECK_FILE" 2>/dev/null && echo "true" || echo "false")
-_wp_health_reason=$(grep "^Reason:" "$_WP_HEALTH_CHECK_FILE" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^Reason: //' || echo "")
-
-if [ "$_wp_agent_healthy" = "false" ] && [ -n "$_wp_health_reason" ]; then
-  log "WP agent detected as UNHEALTHY: $_wp_health_reason"
-
-  # Check for idempotency guard - have we already restarted in this run?
-  _WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE="${DISINTO_LOG_DIR}/supervisor/wp-agent-health.history"
-  _wp_last_restart_ts=0
-  _wp_last_restart="never"
-  if [ -f "$_WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE" ]; then
-    _wp_last_restart_ts=$(grep -m1 '^LAST_RESTART_TS=' "$_WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE" 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || echo "0")
-    if [ -n "$_wp_last_restart_ts" ] && [ "$_wp_last_restart_ts" != "0" ] 2>/dev/null; then
-      _wp_last_restart=$(date -d "@$_wp_last_restart_ts" '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC' 2>/dev/null || echo "$_wp_last_restart_ts")
-    fi
-  fi
-
-  _current_ts=$(date +%s)
-  _restart_threshold=300  # 5 minutes between restarts
-
-  if [ -z "$_wp_last_restart_ts" ] || [ "$_wp_last_restart_ts" = "0" ] || [ $((_current_ts - _wp_last_restart_ts)) -gt $_restart_threshold ]; then
-    log "Triggering WP agent restart..."
-
-    # Restart the WP agent container
-    if docker restart "$WP_AGENT_CONTAINER_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-      _restart_time=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
-      log "Successfully restarted WP agent container: $WP_AGENT_CONTAINER_NAME"
-
-      # Update history file
-      echo "LAST_RESTART_TS=$_current_ts" > "$_WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE"
-      echo "LAST_RESTART_TIME=$_restart_time" >> "$_WP_HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE"
-
-      # Post recovery notice to journal
-      _journal_file="${OPS_JOURNAL_ROOT}/$(date -u +%Y-%m-%d).md"
-      if [ -f "$_journal_file" ]; then
-        {
-          echo ""
-          echo "### WP Agent Recovery - $_restart_time"
-          echo ""
-          echo "WP agent was unhealthy: $_wp_health_reason"
-          echo "Container restarted automatically."
-        } >> "$_journal_file"
-      fi
-
-      # Scan for issues updated in the last 30 minutes with blocked: ci_exhausted label
-      log "Scanning for ci_exhausted issues updated in last 30 minutes..."
-      _now_epoch=$(date +%s)
-      _thirty_min_ago=$(( _now_epoch - 1800 ))
-
-      # Fetch open issues with blocked label
-      _blocked_issues=$(forge_api GET "/issues?state=open&labels=blocked&type=issues&limit=100" 2>/dev/null || echo "[]")
-      _blocked_count=$(echo "$_blocked_issues" | jq 'length' 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
-
-      _issues_processed=0
-      _issues_recovered=0
-
-      if [ "$_blocked_count" -gt 0 ]; then
-        # Process each blocked issue
-        echo "$_blocked_issues" | jq -c '.[]' 2>/dev/null | while IFS= read -r issue_json; do
-          [ -z "$issue_json" ] && continue
-
-          _issue_num=$(echo "$issue_json" | jq -r '.number // empty')
-          _issue_updated=$(echo "$issue_json" | jq -r '.updated_at // empty')
-          _issue_labels=$(echo "$issue_json" | jq -r '.labels | map(.name) | join(",")' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-
-          # Check if issue has ci_exhausted label
-          if ! echo "$_issue_labels" | grep -q "ci_exhausted"; then
-            continue
-          fi
-
-          # Parse updated_at timestamp
-          _issue_updated_epoch=$(date -d "$_issue_updated" +%s 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
-          _time_since_update=$(( _now_epoch - _issue_updated_epoch ))
-
-          # Check if updated in last 30 minutes
-          if [ "$_time_since_update" -lt 1800 ] && [ "$_time_since_update" -ge 0 ]; then
-            _issues_processed=$(( _issues_processed + 1 ))
-
-            # Check for idempotency guard - already swept by supervisor?
-            _issue_body=$(echo "$issue_json" | jq -r '.body // ""' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-            if echo "$_issue_body" | grep -q "<!-- supervisor-swept -->"; then
-              log "Issue #$_issue_num already swept by supervisor, skipping"
-              continue
-            fi
-
-            log "Processing ci_exhausted issue #$_issue_num (updated $_time_since_update seconds ago)"
-
-            # Get issue assignee
-            _issue_assignee=$(echo "$issue_json" | jq -r '.assignee.login // empty' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-
-            # Unassign the issue
-            if [ -n "$_issue_assignee" ]; then
-              log "Unassigning issue #$_issue_num from $_issue_assignee"
-              curl -sf -X PATCH \
-                -H "Authorization: token ${FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN:-$FORGE_TOKEN}" \
-                -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-                "${FORGE_API}/issues/$_issue_num" \
-                -d '{"assignees":[]}' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-            fi
-
-            # Remove blocked label
-            _blocked_label_id=$(forge_api GET "/labels" 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.[] | select(.name == "blocked") | .id' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-            if [ -n "$_blocked_label_id" ]; then
-              log "Removing blocked label from issue #$_issue_num"
-              curl -sf -X DELETE \
-                -H "Authorization: token ${FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN:-$FORGE_TOKEN}" \
-                "${FORGE_API}/issues/$_issue_num/labels/$_blocked_label_id" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-            fi
-
-            # Add comment about infra-flake recovery
-            _recovery_comment=$(cat <<EOF
-<!-- supervisor-swept -->
-
-**Automated Recovery — $(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')**
-
-CI agent was unhealthy between $_restart_time and now. The prior retry budget may have been spent on infra flake, not real failures.
-
-**Recovery Actions:**
- Unassigned from pool and returned for fresh attempt
- CI agent container restarted
- Related pipelines will be retriggered automatically
-
-**Next Steps:**
-Please re-attempt this issue. The CI environment has been refreshed.
-EOF
-)
-
-            curl -sf -X POST \
-              -H "Authorization: token ${FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN:-$FORGE_TOKEN}" \
-              -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-              "${FORGE_API}/issues/$_issue_num/comments" \
-              -d "$(jq -n --arg body "$_recovery_comment" '{body: $body}')" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-
-            log "Recovered issue #$_issue_num - returned to pool"
-          fi
-        done
-      fi
-
-      log "WP agent restart and issue recovery complete"
-    else
-      log "ERROR: Failed to restart WP agent container"
-    fi
-  else
-    log "WP agent restart already performed in this run (since $_wp_last_restart), skipping"
-  fi
-fi
-
 # ── Run agent ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 agent_run --worktree "$WORKTREE" "$PROMPT"
 log "agent_run complete"
--- a/tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats
+++ b/tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ setup_file() {
  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready"* ]]
  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 9/9: write /etc/profile.d/disinto-nomad.sh"* ]]

-  [[ "$output" == *"Dry run complete — no changes made."* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Dry run complete - no changes made."* ]]
 }

 # ── --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run ────────────────────────────────────────
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ setup_file() {
  # both modes invoke the same cluster-up dry-run.
  [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: --empty (cluster-up only, no jobs)"* ]]
  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Dry run complete — no changes made."* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Dry run complete - no changes made."* ]]
 }

 # ── --backend=docker (regression guard) ──────────────────────────────────────
@ -155,44 +155,6 @@ setup_file() {
  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] dry-run complete"* ]]
 }

-# S2.6 / #928 — every --with <svc> that ships tools/vault-seed-<svc>.sh
-# must auto-invoke the seeder before deploy.sh runs. forgejo is the
-# only service with a seeder today, so the dry-run plan must include
-# its seed line when --with forgejo is set. The seed block must also
-# appear BEFORE the deploy block (seeded secrets must exist before
-# nomad reads the template stanza) — pinned here by scanning output
-# order. Services without a seeder (e.g. unknown hypothetical future
-# ones) are silently skipped by the loop convention.
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo --dry-run prints seed plan before deploy plan" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault seed dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-  # Order: seed header must appear before deploy header.
-  local seed_line deploy_line
-  seed_line=$(echo "$output" | grep -n "Vault seed dry-run" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)
-  deploy_line=$(echo "$output" | grep -n "Deploy services dry-run" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)
-  [ -n "$seed_line" ]
-  [ -n "$deploy_line" ]
-  [ "$seed_line" -lt "$deploy_line" ]
-}
-
-# Regression guard (PR #929 review): `sudo -n VAR=val -- cmd` is subject
-# to sudoers env_reset policy and silently drops VAULT_ADDR unless it's
-# in env_keep (it isn't in default configs). vault-seed-forgejo.sh
-# requires VAULT_ADDR and dies at its own precondition check if unset,
-# so the non-root branch MUST invoke `sudo -n -- env VAR=val cmd` so
-# that `env` sets the variable in the child process regardless of
-# sudoers policy. This grep-level guard catches a revert to the unsafe
-# form that silently broke non-root seed runs on a fresh LXC.
-@test "seed loop invokes sudo via 'env VAR=val' (bypasses sudoers env_reset)" {
-  run grep -F 'sudo -n -- env "VAULT_ADDR=' "$DISINTO_BIN"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Negative: no bare `sudo -n "VAR=val" --` form anywhere in the file.
-  run grep -F 'sudo -n "VAULT_ADDR=' "$DISINTO_BIN"
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-}
-
@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo,forgejo --dry-run handles comma-separated services" {
  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo,forgejo --dry-run
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
@ -215,44 +177,7 @@ setup_file() {
  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with unknown-service --dry-run
  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
  [[ "$output" == *"unknown service"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"known: forgejo, woodpecker-server, woodpecker-agent, agents, staging, chat, edge"* ]]
-}
-
-# S3.4: woodpecker auto-expansion and forgejo auto-inclusion
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with woodpecker auto-expands to server+agent" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with woodpecker --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: forgejo,woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"deployment order: forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with woodpecker auto-includes forgejo with note" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with woodpecker --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Note: --with woodpecker implies --with forgejo"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo,woodpecker expands woodpecker" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo,woodpecker --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Order follows input: forgejo first, then woodpecker expanded
-  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: forgejo,woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"deployment order: forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with woodpecker seeds both forgejo and woodpecker" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with woodpecker --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo,woodpecker deploys all three services" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo,woodpecker --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"forgejo.hcl"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"woodpecker-server.hcl"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"woodpecker-agent.hcl"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"known: forgejo"* ]]
 }

@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo (flag=value syntax) works" {
@ -267,21 +192,12 @@ setup_file() {
  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --with are mutually exclusive"* ]]
 }

-# ── --import-env / --import-sops / --age-key (S2.5, #883) ────────────────────
-#
-# Step 2.5 wires Vault policies + JWT auth + optional KV import into
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad`. The tests below exercise the flag
-# grammar (who-requires-whom + who-requires-backend=nomad) and the
-# dry-run plan shape (each --import-* flag prints its own path line,
-# independently). A prior attempt at this issue regressed the "print
-# every set flag" invariant by using if/elif — covered by the
-# "--import-env --import-sops --age-key" case.
+# ── Import flag validation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env only is accepted" {
  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --dry-run
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  [[ "$output" == *"--import-env"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
 }

@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-sops without --age-key errors" {
@ -308,26 +224,21 @@ setup_file() {
  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
  [[ "$output" == *"--import-sops"* ]]
  [[ "$output" == *"--age-key"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"sops file: /tmp/.env.vault.enc"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"age key:   /tmp/keys.txt"* ]]
 }

-# When all three flags are set, each one must print its own path line —
-# if/elif regressed this to "only one printed" in a prior attempt (#883).
@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env --import-sops --age-key --dry-run shows full import plan" {
  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"env file: /tmp/.env"* ]]
  [[ "$output" == *"sops file: /tmp/.env.vault.enc"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"age key:   /tmp/keys.txt"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"age key: /tmp/keys.txt"* ]]
 }

@test "disinto init --backend=nomad without import flags shows skip message" {
  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --dry-run
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"no --import-env/--import-sops"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"skipping"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no --import-env/--import-sops - skipping"* ]]
 }

@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env --import-sops --age-key --with forgejo --dry-run shows all plans" {
@ -338,107 +249,3 @@ setup_file() {
  [[ "$output" == *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
  [[ "$output" == *"Deploy services dry-run"* ]]
 }
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run prints policies + auth plan even without --import-*" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Policies + auth run on every nomad path (idempotent), so the dry-run
-  # plan always lists them — regardless of whether --import-* is set.
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-}
-
-# --import-env=PATH (=-form) must work alongside --import-env PATH.
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env=PATH (equals form) works" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env=/tmp/.env --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
-}
-
-# --empty short-circuits after cluster-up: no policies, no auth, no
-# import, no deploy. The dry-run plan must match that — cluster-up plan
-# appears, but none of the S2.x section banners do.
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run skips policies/auth/import sections" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # Cluster-up still runs (it's what --empty brings up).
-  [[ "$output" == *"Cluster-up dry-run"* ]]
-  # Policies + auth + import must NOT appear under --empty.
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"no --import-env/--import-sops"* ]]
-}
-
-# --empty + any --import-* flag silently does nothing (import is skipped),
-# so the CLI rejects the combination up front rather than letting it
-# look like the import "succeeded".
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --import-env errors" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --import-env /tmp/.env --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --import-sops --age-key errors" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive"* ]]
-}
-
-# S4.2: agents service auto-expansion and dependencies
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with agents auto-includes forgejo and woodpecker" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with agents --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: forgejo,agents,woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Note: --with agents implies --with forgejo"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"Note: --with agents implies --with woodpecker"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with agents deploys in correct order" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with agents --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"deployment order: forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent agents"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with agents seeds agents service" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with agents --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-agents.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with agents deploys all four services" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with agents --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"forgejo.hcl"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"woodpecker-server.hcl"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"woodpecker-agent.hcl"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"agents.hcl"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with woodpecker,agents expands correctly" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with woodpecker,agents --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # woodpecker expands to server+agent, agents is already explicit
-  # forgejo is auto-included by agents
-  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: forgejo,woodpecker-server,woodpecker-agent,agents"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"deployment order: forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent agents"* ]]
-}
-
-# S5.1 / #1035 — edge service seeds ops-repo (dispatcher FORGE_TOKEN)
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with edge deploys edge" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with edge --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  # edge depends on all backend services, so all are included
-  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: edge,forgejo"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"deployment order: forgejo woodpecker-server woodpecker-agent agents staging chat edge"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"*"edge.hcl"* ]]
-}
-
-@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with edge seeds ops-repo" {
-  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with edge --dry-run
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  [[ "$output" == *"tools/vault-seed-ops-repo.sh --dry-run"* ]]
-}
--- a/tests/lib-hvault.bats
+++ b/tests/lib-hvault.bats
@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ setup() {
@test "hvault_policy_apply creates a policy" {
  local pfile="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/test-policy.hcl"
  cat > "$pfile" <<'HCL'
-path "kv/data/test/*" {
+path "secret/data/test/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
 HCL
@ -138,12 +138,12 @@ HCL
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/policies/acl/test-reader"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.policy' | grep -q "kv/data/test"
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.policy' | grep -q "secret/data/test"
 }

@test "hvault_policy_apply is idempotent" {
  local pfile="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/idem-policy.hcl"
-  printf 'path "kv/*" { capabilities = ["list"] }\n' > "$pfile"
+  printf 'path "secret/*" { capabilities = ["list"] }\n' > "$pfile"

  run hvault_policy_apply "idem-policy" "$pfile"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
--- a/tests/vault-import.bats
+++ b/tests/vault-import.bats
@ -34,13 +34,6 @@ setup_file() {
      return 1
    fi
  done
-
-  # Enable kv-v2 at path=kv (production mount per S2 migration). Dev-mode
-  # vault only auto-mounts kv-v2 at secret/; tests must mirror the real
-  # cluster layout so vault-import.sh writes land where we read them.
-  curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: test-root-token" \
-    -X POST -d '{"type":"kv","options":{"version":"2"}}' \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/mounts/kv" >/dev/null
 }

 teardown_file() {
@ -97,7 +90,7 @@ setup() {

  # Verify nothing was written to Vault
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/bots/review"
  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
 }

@ -112,21 +105,21 @@ setup() {

  # Check bots/review
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/bots/review"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  echo "$output" | grep -q "review-token"
  echo "$output" | grep -q "review-pass"

  # Check bots/dev-qwen
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  echo "$output" | grep -q "llama-token"
  echo "$output" | grep -q "llama-pass"

  # Check forge
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/forge"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/shared/forge"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-forge-token"
  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-forge-pass"
@ -134,17 +127,16 @@ setup() {

  # Check woodpecker
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-agent-secret"
-  # Forgejo keys are normalized: WP_FORGEJO_* → forgejo_* (no wp_ prefix in key name)
  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-forgejo-client"
  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-forgejo-secret"
  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-token"

  # Check chat
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/chat"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/shared/chat"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  echo "$output" | grep -q "forward-auth-secret"
  echo "$output" | grep -q "chat-client-id"
@ -152,7 +144,7 @@ setup() {

  # Check runner tokens from sops
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/runner/GITHUB_TOKEN"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/runner/GITHUB_TOKEN"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.value == "github-test-token-abc123"'
 }
@ -202,51 +194,11 @@ setup() {

  # Verify the new value was written (path is disinto/bots/dev-qwen, key is token)
  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.token == "MODIFIED-LLAMA-TOKEN"'
 }

-# --- Delimiter-in-value regression (#898) ────────────────────────────────────
-
-@test "preserves secret values that contain a pipe character" {
-  # Regression: previous accumulator packed values into "value|status" and
-  # joined per-path kv pairs with '|', so any value containing '|' was
-  # silently truncated or misrouted.
-  local piped_env="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/dot-env-piped"
-  cp "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" "$piped_env"
-
-  # Swap in values that contain the old delimiter. Exercise both:
-  #  - a paired bot path (token + pass on same vault path, hitting the
-  #    per-path kv-pair join)
-  #  - a single-key path (admin token)
-  # Values are single-quoted so they survive `source` of the .env file;
-  # `|` is a shell metachar and unquoted would start a pipeline. That is
-  # orthogonal to the accumulator bug under test — users are expected to
-  # quote such values in .env, and the accumulator must then preserve them.
-  sed -i "s#^FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=.*#FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN='abc|xyz'#" "$piped_env"
-  sed -i "s#^FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=.*#FORGE_REVIEW_PASS='p1|p2|p3'#" "$piped_env"
-  sed -i "s#^FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN=.*#FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN='admin|with|pipes'#" "$piped_env"
-
-  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
-    --env "$piped_env" \
-    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
-    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-
-  # Verify each value round-trips intact.
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.token == "abc|xyz"'
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.pass == "p1|p2|p3"'
-
-  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/forge"
-  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.admin_token == "admin|with|pipes"'
-}
-
 # --- Incomplete fixture ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

@test "handles incomplete fixture gracefully" {
@ -295,8 +247,6 @@ setup() {
    "deploy-key-test"
    "npm-test-token"
    "dockerhub-test-token"
-    # Note: forgejo-client and forgejo-secret are NOT in the output
-    # because they are read from Vault, not logged
  )

  for pattern in "${secret_patterns[@]}"; do
--- a/tools/vault-apply-policies.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-apply-policies.sh
@ -94,11 +94,8 @@ if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
 fi

 # ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
-# `disinto init` does not export VAULT_ADDR before calling this script — the
-# server is reachable on 127.0.0.1:8200 and the root token lives at
-# /etc/vault.d/root.token in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
-_hvault_default_env
+[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ] \
+  || die "VAULT_ADDR is not set — export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"

 # hvault_token_lookup both resolves the token (env or /etc/vault.d/root.token)
 # and confirms the server is reachable with a valid token. Fail fast here so
--- a/tools/vault-apply-roles.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-apply-roles.sh
@ -219,10 +219,9 @@ if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
 fi

 # ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
-# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
-# Called transitively from vault-nomad-auth.sh during `disinto init`, which
-# does not export VAULT_ADDR in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
-_hvault_default_env
+if [ -z "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ]; then
+  die "VAULT_ADDR is not set — export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"
+fi
 if ! hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null; then
  die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
 fi
--- a/tools/vault-import.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-import.sh
@ -8,13 +8,8 @@
 # Usage:
 #   vault-import.sh \
 #     --env /path/to/.env \
-#     [--sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc] \
-#     [--age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt]
-#
-# Flag validation (S2.5, issue #883):
-#   --import-sops without --age-key → error.
-#   --age-key without --import-sops → error.
-#   --env alone (no sops) → OK; imports only the plaintext half.
+#     --sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc \
+#     --age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt
 #
 # Mapping:
 #   From .env:
@ -151,9 +146,9 @@ _kv_put_secret() {
    -X POST \
    -d "$payload" \
    -o "$tmpfile" \
-    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:-kv}/data/${path}")" || {
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/secret/data/${path}")" || {
    rm -f "$tmpfile"
-    _err "Failed to write to Vault at ${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:-kv}/data/${path}: curl error"
+    _err "Failed to write to Vault at secret/data/${path}: curl error"
    return 1
  }
  rm -f "$tmpfile"
@ -164,15 +159,15 @@ _kv_put_secret() {
      return 0
      ;;
    404)
-      _err "KV path not found: ${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:-kv}/data/${path}"
+      _err "KV path not found: secret/data/${path}"
      return 1
      ;;
    403)
-      _err "Permission denied writing to ${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:-kv}/data/${path}"
+      _err "Permission denied writing to secret/data/${path}"
      return 1
      ;;
    *)
-      _err "Failed to write to Vault at ${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:-kv}/data/${path}: HTTP $http_code"
+      _err "Failed to write to Vault at secret/data/${path}: HTTP $http_code"
      return 1
      ;;
  esac
@ -241,15 +236,14 @@ vault-import.sh — Import .env and sops-decrypted secrets into Vault KV
 Usage:
  vault-import.sh \
    --env /path/to/.env \
-    [--sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc] \
-    [--age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt] \
+    --sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc \
+    --age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt \
    [--dry-run]

 Options:
  --env       Path to .env file (required)
-  --sops      Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc file (optional;
-              requires --age-key when set)
-  --age-key   Path to age keys file (required when --sops is set)
+  --sops      Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc file (required)
+  --age-key   Path to age keys file (required)
  --dry-run   Print import plan without writing to Vault (optional)
  --help      Show this help message

@ -278,62 +272,47 @@ EOF
    esac
  done

-  # Validate required arguments. --sops and --age-key are paired: if one
-  # is set, the other must be too. --env alone (no sops half) is valid —
-  # imports only the plaintext dotenv. Spec: S2.5 / issue #883 / #912.
+  # Validate required arguments
  if [ -z "$env_file" ]; then
    _die "Missing required argument: --env"
  fi
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ] && [ -z "$age_key_file" ]; then
-    _die "--sops requires --age-key"
+  if [ -z "$sops_file" ]; then
+    _die "Missing required argument: --sops"
  fi
-  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ] && [ -z "$sops_file" ]; then
-    _die "--age-key requires --sops"
+  if [ -z "$age_key_file" ]; then
+    _die "Missing required argument: --age-key"
  fi

  # Validate files exist
  if [ ! -f "$env_file" ]; then
    _die "Environment file not found: $env_file"
  fi
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ] && [ ! -f "$sops_file" ]; then
+  if [ ! -f "$sops_file" ]; then
    _die "Sops file not found: $sops_file"
  fi
-  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ] && [ ! -f "$age_key_file" ]; then
+  if [ ! -f "$age_key_file" ]; then
    _die "Age key file not found: $age_key_file"
  fi

-  # Security check: age key permissions (only when an age key is provided —
-  # --env-only imports never touch the age key).
-  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ]; then
-    _validate_age_key_perms "$age_key_file"
-  fi
-
-  # Source the Vault helpers and default the local-cluster VAULT_ADDR +
-  # VAULT_TOKEN before the localhost safety check runs. `disinto init`
-  # does not export these in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
-  source "$(dirname "$0")/../lib/hvault.sh"
-  _hvault_default_env
+  # Security check: age key permissions
+  _validate_age_key_perms "$age_key_file"

  # Security check: VAULT_ADDR must be localhost
  _check_vault_addr

+  # Source the Vault helpers
+  source "$(dirname "$0")/../lib/hvault.sh"
+
  # Load .env file
  _log "Loading environment from: $env_file"
  _load_env_file "$env_file"

-  # Decrypt sops file when --sops was provided. On the --env-only path
-  # (empty $sops_file) the sops_env stays empty and the per-token loop
-  # below silently skips runner-token imports — exactly the "only
-  # plaintext half" spec from S2.5.
-  local sops_env=""
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
-    _log "Decrypting sops file: $sops_file"
-    sops_env="$(_decrypt_sops "$sops_file" "$age_key_file")"
-    # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-    eval "$sops_env"
-  else
-    _log "No --sops flag — skipping sops decryption (importing plaintext .env only)"
-  fi
+  # Decrypt sops file
+  _log "Decrypting sops file: $sops_file"
+  local sops_env
+  sops_env="$(_decrypt_sops "$sops_file" "$age_key_file")"
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+  eval "$sops_env"

  # Collect all import operations
  declare -a operations=()
@ -391,13 +370,7 @@ EOF
    local val="${!key}"
    if [ -n "$val" ]; then
      local lowercase_key="${key,,}"
-      # Normalize WP_FORGEJO_* → forgejo_* (strip wp_ prefix to match template)
-      if [[ "$lowercase_key" =~ ^wp_(.+)$ ]]; then
-        vault_key="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
-      else
-        vault_key="$lowercase_key"
-      fi
-      operations+=("woodpecker|$vault_key|$env_file|$key")
+      operations+=("woodpecker|$lowercase_key|$env_file|$key")
    fi
  done

@ -424,12 +397,8 @@ EOF
  if $dry_run; then
    _log "=== DRY-RUN: Import plan ==="
    _log "Environment file: $env_file"
-    if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
-      _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
-      _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
-    else
-      _log "Sops file: (none — --env-only import)"
-    fi
+    _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
+    _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
    _log ""
    _log "Planned operations:"
    for op in "${operations[@]}"; do
@ -444,33 +413,21 @@ EOF

  _log "=== Starting Vault import ==="
  _log "Environment file: $env_file"
-  if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
-    _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
-    _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
-  else
-    _log "Sops file: (none — --env-only import)"
-  fi
+  _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
+  _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
  _log ""

  local created=0
  local updated=0
  local unchanged=0

-  # First pass: collect all operations with their parsed values.
-  # Store value and status in separate associative arrays keyed by
-  # "vault_path:kv_key". Secret values may contain any character, so we
-  # never pack them into a delimited string — the previous `value|status`
-  # encoding silently truncated values containing '|' (see issue #898).
-  declare -A ops_value
-  declare -A ops_status
-  declare -A path_seen
+  # First pass: collect all operations with their parsed values
+  # Store as: ops_data["vault_path:kv_key"] = "source_value|status"
+  declare -A ops_data

  for op in "${operations[@]}"; do
    # Parse operation: category|field|subkey|file|envvar (5 fields for bots/runner)
-    # or category|field|file|envvar (4 fields for forge/woodpecker/chat).
-    # These metadata strings are built from safe identifiers (role names,
-    # env-var names, file paths) and do not carry secret values, so '|' is
-    # still fine as a separator here.
+    # or category|field|file|envvar (4 fields for forge/woodpecker/chat)
    local category field subkey file envvar=""
    local field_count
    field_count="$(printf '%s' "$op" | awk -F'|' '{print NF}')"
@ -537,40 +494,51 @@ EOF
      fi
    fi

-    # vault_path and vault_key are identifier-safe (no ':' in either), so
-    # the composite key round-trips cleanly via ${ck%:*} / ${ck#*:}.
-    local ck="${vault_path}:${vault_key}"
-    ops_value["$ck"]="$source_value"
-    ops_status["$ck"]="$status"
-    path_seen["$vault_path"]=1
+    # Store operation data: key = "vault_path:kv_key", value = "source_value|status"
+    ops_data["${vault_path}:${vault_key}"]="${source_value}|${status}"
  done

-  # Second pass: group by vault_path and write.
+  # Second pass: group by vault_path and write
  # IMPORTANT: Always write ALL keys for a path, not just changed ones.
  # KV v2 POST replaces the entire document, so we must include unchanged keys
  # to avoid dropping them. The idempotency guarantee comes from KV v2 versioning.
-  for vault_path in "${!path_seen[@]}"; do
-    # Collect this path's "vault_key=source_value" pairs into a bash
-    # indexed array. Each element is one kv pair; '=' inside the value is
-    # preserved because _kv_put_secret splits on the *first* '=' only.
-    local pairs_array=()
-    local path_has_changes=0
+  declare -A paths_to_write
+  declare -A path_has_changes

-    for ck in "${!ops_value[@]}"; do
-      [ "${ck%:*}" = "$vault_path" ] || continue
-      local vault_key="${ck#*:}"
-      pairs_array+=("${vault_key}=${ops_value[$ck]}")
-      if [ "${ops_status[$ck]}" != "unchanged" ]; then
-        path_has_changes=1
-      fi
-    done
+  for key in "${!ops_data[@]}"; do
+    local data="${ops_data[$key]}"
+    local source_value="${data%%|*}"
+    local status="${data##*|}"
+    local vault_path="${key%:*}"
+    local vault_key="${key#*:}"

+    # Always add to paths_to_write (all keys for this path)
+    if [ -z "${paths_to_write[$vault_path]:-}" ]; then
+      paths_to_write[$vault_path]="${vault_key}=${source_value}"
+    else
+      paths_to_write[$vault_path]="${paths_to_write[$vault_path]}|${vault_key}=${source_value}"
+    fi
+
+    # Track if this path has any changes (for status reporting)
+    if [ "$status" != "unchanged" ]; then
+      path_has_changes[$vault_path]=1
+    fi
+  done
+
+  # Write each path with all its key-value pairs
+  for vault_path in "${!paths_to_write[@]}"; do
    # Determine effective status for this path (updated if any key changed)
    local effective_status="unchanged"
-    if [ "$path_has_changes" = 1 ]; then
+    if [ "${path_has_changes[$vault_path]:-}" = "1" ]; then
      effective_status="updated"
    fi

+    # Read pipe-separated key-value pairs and write them
+    local pairs_string="${paths_to_write[$vault_path]}"
+    local pairs_array=()
+    local IFS='|'
+    read -r -a pairs_array <<< "$pairs_string"
+
    if ! _kv_put_secret "$vault_path" "${pairs_array[@]}"; then
      _err "Failed to write to $vault_path"
      exit 1
--- a/tools/vault-seed-agents.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-seed-agents.sh
@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# tools/vault-seed-agents.sh — Idempotent seed for all bot KV paths
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S4.1, issue #955). Populates
-# kv/disinto/bots/<role> with token + pass for each of the 7 agent roles
-# plus the vault bot. Handles the "fresh factory, no .env import" case.
-#
-# Companion to tools/vault-import.sh — when that runs against a box with
-# an existing stack, it overwrites seeded values with real ones.
-#
-# Idempotency contract (per bot):
-#   - Both token and pass present → skip, log "<role> unchanged".
-#   - Either missing → generate random values for missing keys, preserve
-#     existing keys, write back atomically.
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault reachable + unsealed at $VAULT_ADDR.
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN set (env) or /etc/vault.d/root.token readable.
-#   - curl, jq, openssl
-#
-# Usage:
-#   tools/vault-seed-agents.sh
-#   tools/vault-seed-agents.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (seed applied, or already applied)
-#   1  precondition / API / mount-mismatch failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-
-# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-KV_MOUNT="kv"
-TOKEN_BYTES=32   # 32 bytes → 64 hex chars
-PASS_BYTES=16    # 16 bytes → 32 hex chars
-
-# All bot roles seeded by this script.
-BOT_ROLES=(dev review gardener architect planner predictor supervisor vault)
-
-LOG_TAG="[vault-seed-agents]"
-log() { printf '%s %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*"; }
-die() { printf '%s ERROR: %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# while/shift shape — distinct from forgejo (arity:value case) and
-# woodpecker (for-loop).
-DRY_RUN=0
-while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
-  case "$1" in
-    --dry-run) DRY_RUN=1 ;;
-    -h|--help)
-      printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-      printf 'Seed kv/disinto/bots/<role> with token + pass for all agent\n'
-      printf 'roles. Idempotent: existing non-empty values are preserved.\n\n'
-      printf '  --dry-run   Print planned actions without writing.\n'
-      exit 0
-      ;;
-    *) die "invalid argument: ${1}  (try --help)" ;;
-  esac
-  shift
-done
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-for bin in curl jq openssl; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ] \
-  || die "VAULT_ADDR unset — e.g. export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Step 1: ensure kv/ mount exists and is KV v2 ────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1: ensure ${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v2 ──"
-export DRY_RUN
-hvault_ensure_kv_v2 "$KV_MOUNT" "${LOG_TAG}" \
-  || die "KV mount check failed"
-
-# ── Step 2: seed each bot role ───────────────────────────────────────────────
-total_generated=0
-
-# Check if shared forge credentials exist for dev role fallback
-shared_forge_exists=0
-shared_forge_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${KV_MOUNT}/data/disinto/shared/forge")" \
-  || true
-if [ -n "$shared_forge_raw" ]; then
-  shared_forge_token="$(printf '%s' "$shared_forge_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.token // ""')"
-  shared_forge_pass="$(printf '%s' "$shared_forge_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.pass // ""')"
-  if [ -n "$shared_forge_token" ] && [ -n "$shared_forge_pass" ]; then
-    shared_forge_exists=1
-  fi
-fi
-
-for role in "${BOT_ROLES[@]}"; do
-  kv_logical="disinto/bots/${role}"
-  kv_api="${KV_MOUNT}/data/${kv_logical}"
-
-  log "── seed ${kv_logical} ──"
-
-  existing_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${kv_api}")" \
-    || die "failed to read ${kv_api}"
-
-  existing_token=""
-  existing_pass=""
-  existing_data="{}"
-  if [ -n "$existing_raw" ]; then
-    existing_data="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq '.data.data // {}')"
-    existing_token="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.token // ""')"
-    existing_pass="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.pass // ""')"
-  fi
-
-  generated=()
-  desired_token="$existing_token"
-  desired_pass="$existing_pass"
-
-  # Special case: dev role uses shared forge credentials if available
-  if [ "$role" = "dev" ] && [ "$shared_forge_exists" -eq 1 ]; then
-    # Use shared FORGE_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS for dev role
-    if [ -z "$existing_token" ]; then
-      desired_token="$shared_forge_token"
-      generated+=("token")
-    fi
-    if [ -z "$existing_pass" ]; then
-      desired_pass="$shared_forge_pass"
-      generated+=("pass")
-    fi
-  else
-    # Generate random values for missing keys
-    if [ -z "$existing_token" ]; then
-      generated+=("token")
-    fi
-    if [ -z "$existing_pass" ]; then
-      generated+=("pass")
-    fi
-
-    for key in "${generated[@]}"; do
-      case "$key" in
-        token) desired_token="$(openssl rand -hex "$TOKEN_BYTES")" ;;
-        pass)  desired_pass="$(openssl rand -hex "$PASS_BYTES")" ;;
-      esac
-    done
-  fi
-
-  if [ "${#generated[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
-    log "${role}: unchanged"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-    log "[dry-run] ${role}: would generate ${generated[*]}"
-    total_generated=$(( total_generated + ${#generated[@]} ))
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  # Merge new keys into existing data to preserve any keys we don't own.
-  payload="$(printf '%s' "$existing_data" \
-    | jq --arg t "$desired_token" --arg p "$desired_pass" \
-      '{data: (. + {token: $t, pass: $p})}')"
-
-  _hvault_request POST "${kv_api}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
-    || die "failed to write ${kv_api}"
-
-  log "${role}: generated ${generated[*]}"
-  total_generated=$(( total_generated + ${#generated[@]} ))
-done
-
-if [ "$total_generated" -eq 0 ]; then
-  log "all bot paths already seeded — no-op"
-else
-  log "done — ${total_generated} key(s) seeded across ${#BOT_ROLES[@]} bot paths"
-fi
--- a/tools/vault-seed-chat.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-seed-chat.sh
@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# tools/vault-seed-chat.sh — Idempotent seed for kv/disinto/shared/chat
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S5.2, issue #989). Populates the KV v2
-# path that nomad/jobs/chat.hcl reads from, so a clean-install factory
-# (no old-stack secrets to import) still has per-key values for
-# CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, and FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET.
-#
-# Companion to tools/vault-import.sh (S2.2) — when that import runs against
-# a box with an existing stack, it overwrites these seeded values with the
-# real ones. Order doesn't matter: whichever runs last wins, and both
-# scripts are idempotent in the sense that re-running never rotates an
-# existing non-empty key.
-#
-# Uses _hvault_seed_key (lib/hvault.sh) for each key — the helper reads
-# existing data and merges to preserve sibling keys (KV v2 replaces .data
-# atomically).
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault reachable + unsealed at $VAULT_ADDR.
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN set (env) or /etc/vault.d/root.token readable.
-#   - The `kv/` mount is enabled as KV v2.
-#
-# Requires: VAULT_ADDR, VAULT_TOKEN, curl, jq, openssl
-#
-# Usage:
-#   tools/vault-seed-chat.sh
-#   tools/vault-seed-chat.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (seed applied, or already applied)
-#   1  precondition / API / mount-mismatch failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-
-# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-KV_MOUNT="kv"
-KV_LOGICAL_PATH="disinto/shared/chat"
-
-# Keys to seed — array-driven loop (structurally distinct from forgejo's
-# sequential if-blocks and agents' role loop).
-SEED_KEYS=(chat_oauth_client_id chat_oauth_client_secret forward_auth_secret)
-
-LOG_TAG="[vault-seed-chat]"
-log() { printf '%s %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*"; }
-die() { printf '%s ERROR: %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing — [[ ]] guard + case: shape distinct from forgejo
-# (arity:value case), woodpecker (for-loop), agents (while/shift).
-DRY_RUN=0
-if [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; then
-  case "$1" in
-    --dry-run) DRY_RUN=1 ;;
-    -h|--help)
-      printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-      printf 'Seed kv/disinto/shared/chat with random OAuth client\n'
-      printf 'credentials and forward auth secret if missing.\n'
-      printf 'Idempotent: existing non-empty values are preserved.\n\n'
-      printf '  --dry-run   Show what would be seeded without writing.\n'
-      exit 0
-      ;;
-    *) die "invalid argument: ${1}  (try --help)" ;;
-  esac
-fi
-
-# ── Preconditions — inline check-or-die (shape distinct from agents' array
-# loop and forgejo's continuation-line style) ─────────────────────────────
-command -v curl    >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "curl not found"
-command -v jq      >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "jq not found"
-command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "openssl not found"
-[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ] || die "VAULT_ADDR unset — export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Step 1/2: ensure kv/ mount exists and is KV v2 ───────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1/2: ensure ${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v2 ──"
-export DRY_RUN
-hvault_ensure_kv_v2 "$KV_MOUNT" "${LOG_TAG}" \
-  || die "KV mount check failed"
-
-# ── Step 2/2: seed missing keys via _hvault_seed_key helper ──────────────────
-log "── Step 2/2: seed ${KV_LOGICAL_PATH} ──"
-
-generated=()
-for key in "${SEED_KEYS[@]}"; do
-  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-    # Check existence without writing
-    existing=$(hvault_kv_get "$KV_LOGICAL_PATH" "$key" 2>/dev/null) || true
-    if [ -z "$existing" ]; then
-      generated+=("$key")
-      log "[dry-run] ${key} would be generated"
-    else
-      log "[dry-run] ${key} unchanged"
-    fi
-  else
-    rc=0
-    _hvault_seed_key "$KV_LOGICAL_PATH" "$key" || rc=$?
-    case "$rc" in
-      0) generated+=("$key"); log "${key} generated" ;;
-      1) log "${key} unchanged" ;;
-      *) die "API error seeding ${key} (rc=${rc})" ;;
-    esac
-  fi
-done
-
-if [ "${#generated[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
-  log "all keys present — no-op"
-else
-  log "done — ${#generated[@]} key(s) seeded at kv/${KV_LOGICAL_PATH}"
-fi
--- a/tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh
@ -118,9 +118,36 @@ hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
 # wrong version or a different backend, fail loudly — silently
 # re-enabling would destroy existing secrets.
 log "── Step 1/2: ensure ${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v2 ──"
-export DRY_RUN
-hvault_ensure_kv_v2 "$KV_MOUNT" "[vault-seed-forgejo]" \
-  || die "KV mount check failed"
+mounts_json="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
+  || die "failed to list Vault mounts"
+
+mount_exists=false
+if printf '%s' "$mounts_json" | jq -e --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m]' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  mount_exists=true
+fi
+
+if [ "$mount_exists" = true ]; then
+  mount_type="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
+    | jq -r --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m].type // ""')"
+  mount_version="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
+    | jq -r --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m].options.version // "1"')"
+  if [ "$mount_type" != "kv" ]; then
+    die "${KV_MOUNT}/ is mounted as type='${mount_type}', expected 'kv' — refuse to re-mount"
+  fi
+  if [ "$mount_version" != "2" ]; then
+    die "${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v${mount_version}, expected v2 — refuse to upgrade in place (manual fix required)"
+  fi
+  log "${KV_MOUNT}/ already mounted (kv v2) — skipping enable"
+else
+  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+    log "[dry-run] would enable ${KV_MOUNT}/ as kv v2"
+  else
+    payload="$(jq -n '{type:"kv",options:{version:"2"},description:"disinto shared KV v2 (S2.4)"}')"
+    _hvault_request POST "sys/mounts/${KV_MOUNT}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
+      || die "failed to enable ${KV_MOUNT}/ as kv v2"
+    log "${KV_MOUNT}/ enabled as kv v2"
+  fi
+fi

 # ── Step 2/2: seed missing keys at kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo ────────────
 log "── Step 2/2: seed ${KV_API_PATH} ──"
--- a/tools/vault-seed-ops-repo.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-seed-ops-repo.sh
@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# tools/vault-seed-ops-repo.sh — Idempotent seed for kv/disinto/shared/ops-repo
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S5.1, issue #1035). Populates the KV v2
-# path that nomad/jobs/edge.hcl dispatcher task reads from, so the edge
-# proxy has FORGE_TOKEN for ops repo access.
-#
-# Seeds from kv/disinto/bots/vault (the vault bot credentials) — copies the
-# token field to kv/disinto/shared/ops-repo. This is the "service" path that
-# dispatcher uses, distinct from the "agent" path (bots/vault) used by
-# agent tasks under the service-agents policy.
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   - Key present with non-empty value → leave untouched, log "token unchanged".
-#   - Key missing or empty → copy from bots/vault, log "token copied".
-#   - If bots/vault is also empty → generate a random value, log "token generated".
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault reachable + unsealed at $VAULT_ADDR.
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN set (env) or /etc/vault.d/root.token readable.
-#   - The `kv/` mount is enabled as KV v2.
-#
-# Requires:
-#   - VAULT_ADDR  (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
-#   - curl, jq, openssl
-#
-# Usage:
-#   tools/vault-seed-ops-repo.sh
-#   tools/vault-seed-ops-repo.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (seed applied, or already applied)
-#   1  precondition / API / mount-mismatch failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-
-# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-# KV v2 mount + logical paths
-KV_MOUNT="kv"
-OPS_REPO_PATH="disinto/shared/ops-repo"
-VAULT_BOT_PATH="disinto/bots/vault"
-
-OPS_REPO_API="${KV_MOUNT}/data/${OPS_REPO_PATH}"
-VAULT_BOT_API="${KV_MOUNT}/data/${VAULT_BOT_PATH}"
-
-log() { printf '[vault-seed-ops-repo] %s\n' "$*"; }
-die() { printf '[vault-seed-ops-repo] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-DRY_RUN=0
-case "$#:${1-}" in
-  0:)
-    ;;
-  1:--dry-run)
-    DRY_RUN=1
-    ;;
-  1:-h|1:--help)
-    printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-    printf 'Seed kv/disinto/shared/ops-repo with FORGE_TOKEN.\n\n'
-    printf 'Copies token from kv/disinto/bots/vault if present;\n'
-    printf 'otherwise generates a random value. Idempotent:\n'
-    printf 'existing non-empty values are left untouched.\n\n'
-    printf '  --dry-run   Print planned actions without writing.\n'
-    exit 0
-    ;;
-  *)
-    die "invalid arguments: $*  (try --help)"
-    ;;
-esac
-
-# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-for bin in curl jq openssl; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-
-[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ] \
-  || die "VAULT_ADDR unset — e.g. export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
-  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Step 1/2: ensure kv/ mount exists and is KV v2 ───────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1/2: ensure ${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v2 ──"
-export DRY_RUN
-hvault_ensure_kv_v2 "$KV_MOUNT" "[vault-seed-ops-repo]" \
-  || die "KV mount check failed"
-
-# ── Step 2/2: seed ops-repo from vault bot ───────────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 2/2: seed ${OPS_REPO_API} ──"
-
-# Read existing ops-repo value
-existing_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${OPS_REPO_API}")" \
-  || die "failed to read ${OPS_REPO_API}"
-
-existing_token=""
-if [ -n "$existing_raw" ]; then
-  existing_token="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.token // ""')"
-fi
-
-desired_token="$existing_token"
-action=""
-
-if [ -z "$existing_token" ]; then
-  # Token missing — try to copy from vault bot
-  bot_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${VAULT_BOT_API}")" || true
-  if [ -n "$bot_raw" ]; then
-    bot_token="$(printf '%s' "$bot_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.token // ""')"
-    if [ -n "$bot_token" ]; then
-      desired_token="$bot_token"
-      action="copied"
-    fi
-  fi
-
-  # If still no token, generate one
-  if [ -z "$desired_token" ]; then
-    if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-      action="generated (dry-run)"
-    else
-      desired_token="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
-      action="generated"
-    fi
-  fi
-fi
-
-if [ -z "$action" ]; then
-  log "all keys present at ${OPS_REPO_API} — no-op"
-  log "token unchanged"
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-  log "[dry-run] ${OPS_REPO_PATH}: would ${action} token"
-  exit 0
-fi
-
-# Write the token
-payload="$(jq -n --arg t "$desired_token" '{data: {token: $t}}')"
-_hvault_request POST "${OPS_REPO_API}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
-  || die "failed to write ${OPS_REPO_API}"
-
-log "${OPS_REPO_PATH}: ${action} token"
-log "done — ${OPS_REPO_API} seeded"
--- a/tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh
+++ b/tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh
@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# =============================================================================
-# tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh — Idempotent seed for kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S3.1 + S3.3, issues #934 + #936). Populates
-# the KV v2 path read by nomad/jobs/woodpecker-server.hcl:
-#   - agent_secret: pre-shared secret for woodpecker-server ↔ agent communication
-#   - forgejo_client + forgejo_secret: OAuth2 client credentials from Forgejo
-#
-# This script handles BOTH:
-#   1. S3.1: seeds `agent_secret` if missing
-#   2. S3.3: calls wp-oauth-register.sh to create Forgejo OAuth app + store
-#      forgejo_client/forgejo_secret in Vault
-#
-# Idempotency contract:
-#   - agent_secret: missing → generate and write; present → skip, log unchanged
-#   - OAuth app + credentials: handled by wp-oauth-register.sh (idempotent)
-# This script preserves any existing keys it doesn't own.
-#
-# Idempotency contract (per key):
-#   - Key missing or empty in Vault → generate a random value, write it,
-#     log "agent_secret generated".
-#   - Key present with a non-empty value → leave untouched, log
-#     "agent_secret unchanged".
-#
-# Preconditions:
-#   - Vault reachable + unsealed at $VAULT_ADDR.
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN set (env) or /etc/vault.d/root.token readable.
-#   - The `kv/` mount is enabled as KV v2 (this script enables it on a
-#     fresh box; on an existing box it asserts the mount type/version).
-#
-# Requires:
-#   - VAULT_ADDR  (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
-#   - VAULT_TOKEN (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
-#   - curl, jq, openssl
-#
-# Usage:
-#   tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh
-#   tools/vault-seed-woodpecker.sh --dry-run
-#
-# Exit codes:
-#   0  success (seed applied, or already applied)
-#   1  precondition / API / mount-mismatch failure
-# =============================================================================
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SEED_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SEED_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
-LIB_DIR="${REPO_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad"
-# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
-source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
-
-KV_MOUNT="kv"
-KV_LOGICAL_PATH="disinto/shared/woodpecker"
-KV_API_PATH="${KV_MOUNT}/data/${KV_LOGICAL_PATH}"
-AGENT_SECRET_BYTES=32   # 32 bytes → 64 hex chars
-
-LOG_TAG="[vault-seed-woodpecker]"
-log() { printf '%s %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*"; }
-die() { printf '%s ERROR: %s\n' "$LOG_TAG" "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
-
-# ── Flag parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# for-over-"$@" loop — shape distinct from vault-seed-forgejo.sh (arity:value
-# case) and vault-apply-roles.sh (if/elif).
-DRY_RUN=0
-for arg in "$@"; do
-  case "$arg" in
-    --dry-run) DRY_RUN=1 ;;
-    -h|--help)
-      printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
-      printf 'Seed kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker with secrets.\n\n'
-      printf 'Handles both S3.1 (agent_secret) and S3.3 (OAuth app + credentials):\n'
-      printf '  - agent_secret: generated if missing\n'
-      printf '  - forgejo_client/forgejo_secret: created via Forgejo API if missing\n\n'
-      printf '  --dry-run   Print planned actions without writing.\n'
-      exit 0
-      ;;
-    *) die "invalid argument: ${arg}  (try --help)" ;;
-  esac
-done
-
-# ── Preconditions — binary + Vault connectivity checks ───────────────────────
-required_bins=(curl jq openssl)
-for bin in "${required_bins[@]}"; do
-  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
-done
-[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ] || die "VAULT_ADDR unset — export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"
-hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
-
-# ── Step 1/3: ensure kv/ mount exists and is KV v2 ───────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1/3: ensure ${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v2 ──"
-export DRY_RUN
-hvault_ensure_kv_v2 "$KV_MOUNT" "[vault-seed-woodpecker]" \
-  || die "KV mount check failed"
-
-# ── Step 2/3: seed agent_secret at kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker ─────────
-log "── Step 2/3: seed agent_secret ──"
-
-existing_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${KV_API_PATH}")" \
-  || die "failed to read ${KV_API_PATH}"
-
-# Read all existing keys so we can preserve them on write (KV v2 replaces
-# `.data` atomically). Missing path → empty object.
-existing_data="{}"
-existing_agent_secret=""
-if [ -n "$existing_raw" ]; then
-  existing_data="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq '.data.data // {}')"
-  existing_agent_secret="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.agent_secret // ""')"
-fi
-
-if [ -n "$existing_agent_secret" ]; then
-  log "agent_secret unchanged"
-else
-  # agent_secret is missing — generate it.
-  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-    log "[dry-run] would generate + write: agent_secret"
-  else
-    new_agent_secret="$(openssl rand -hex "$AGENT_SECRET_BYTES")"
-
-    # Merge the new key into existing data to preserve any keys written by
-    # other seeders (e.g. S3.3's forgejo_client/forgejo_secret).
-    payload="$(printf '%s' "$existing_data" \
-      | jq --arg as "$new_agent_secret" '{data: (. + {agent_secret: $as})}')"
-
-    _hvault_request POST "${KV_API_PATH}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
-      || die "failed to write ${KV_API_PATH}"
-
-    log "agent_secret generated"
-  fi
-fi
-
-# ── Step 3/3: register Forgejo OAuth app and store credentials ───────────────
-log "── Step 3/3: register Forgejo OAuth app ──"
-
-# Export DRY_RUN for the OAuth script and call it
-export DRY_RUN
-if "${LIB_DIR}/wp-oauth-register.sh" || [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
-  :
-elif [ -n "${FORGE_URL:-}" ]; then
-  # Forgejo was configured but unavailable
-  log "OAuth registration check failed (Forgejo may not be running)"
-  log "This is expected if Forgejo is not available"
-fi
-
-log "done — agent_secret + OAuth credentials seeded"
--- a/vault/policies/AGENTS.md
+++ b/vault/policies/AGENTS.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: a467d613a44b9b475a60c14c4162621e846969ea -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # vault/policies/ — Agent Instructions

 HashiCorp Vault ACL policies for the disinto factory. One `.hcl` file per
@ -30,9 +30,6 @@ KV v2). Vault addresses KV v2 data at `kv/data/<path>` and metadata at
 |---|---|
 | `service-forgejo` | `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*` |
 | `service-woodpecker` | `kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*` |
-| `service-agents` | All 7 `kv/data/disinto/bots/<role>/*` namespaces + `kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*`; composite policy for the `agents` Nomad job (S4.1) |
-| `service-chat` | `kv/data/disinto/shared/chat/*`; read-only OAuth client config + forward-auth secret for the chat Nomad job (S5.2, #989) |
-| `service-dispatcher` | `kv/data/disinto/runner/*` (list+read) + `kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*` (read); used by edge dispatcher sidecar (S5.1, #988) |
 | `bot-<role>` (dev, review, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor, vault, dev-qwen) | `kv/data/disinto/bots/<role>/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*` |
 | `runner-<TOKEN>` (GITHUB\_TOKEN, CODEBERG\_TOKEN, CLAWHUB\_TOKEN, DEPLOY\_KEY, NPM\_TOKEN, DOCKER\_HUB\_TOKEN) | `kv/data/disinto/runner/<TOKEN>` (exactly one) |
 | `dispatcher` | `kv/data/disinto/runner/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*` |
@ -52,17 +49,12 @@ validation.
 1. Drop a file matching one of the four naming patterns above. Use an
   existing file in the same family as the template — comment header,
   capability list, and KV path layout should match the family.
-2. Run `vault policy fmt <file>` locally so the formatting matches what
-   the CI fmt-check (step 4 of `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`) will
-   accept. The fmt check runs non-destructively in CI but a dirty file
-   fails the step; running `fmt` locally before pushing is the fastest
-   path.
-3. Add the matching entry to `../roles.yaml` (see "JWT-auth roles" below)
-   so the CI role-reference check (step 6) stays green.
-4. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh --dry-run` to confirm the new
+2. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh --dry-run` to confirm the new
   basename appears in the planned-work list with the expected SHA.
-5. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` against a Vault instance to
+3. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` against a Vault instance to
   create it; re-run to confirm it reports `unchanged`.
+4. The CI fmt + validate step lands in S2.6 (#884). Until then
+   `vault policy fmt <file>` locally is the fastest sanity check.

 ## JWT-auth roles (S2.3)

@ -126,56 +118,6 @@ would let one service's tokens outlive the others — add a field to
 `vault/roles.yaml` and the applier at the same time if that ever
 becomes necessary.

-## Policy lifecycle
-
-Adding a policy that an actual workload consumes is a three-step chain;
-the CI pipeline guards each link.
-
-1. **Add the policy HCL** — `vault/policies/<name>.hcl`, formatted with
-   `vault policy fmt`. Capabilities must be drawn from the Vault-recognized
-   set (`read`, `list`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `patch`, `sudo`,
-   `deny`); a typo fails CI step 5 (HCL written to an inline dev-mode Vault
-   via `vault policy write` — a real parser, not a regex).
-2. **Update `../roles.yaml`** — add a JWT-auth role entry whose `policy:`
-   field matches the new basename (without `.hcl`). CI step 6 re-checks
-   every role in this file against the policy set, so a drift between the
-   two directories fails the step.
-3. **Reference from a Nomad jobspec** — add `vault { role = "<name>" }` in
-   `nomad/jobs/<service>.hcl` (owned by S2.4). Policies do not take effect
-   until a Nomad job asks for a token via that role.
-
-See the "Adding a new service" walkthrough below for the applier-script
-flow once steps 1–3 are committed.
-
-## CI enforcement (`.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`)
-
-The pipeline triggers on any PR touching `vault/policies/**`,
-`vault/roles.yaml`, or `lib/init/nomad/vault-*.sh` and runs four
-vault-scoped checks (in addition to the nomad-scoped steps already in
-place):
-
-| Step | Tool | What it catches |
-|---|---|---|
-| 4. `vault-policy-fmt` | `vault policy fmt` + `diff` | formatting drift — trailing whitespace, wrong indentation, missing newlines |
-| 5. `vault-policy-validate` | `vault policy write` against inline dev Vault | HCL syntax errors, unknown stanzas, invalid capability names (e.g. `"frobnicate"`), malformed `path "..." {}` blocks |
-| 6. `vault-roles-validate` | yamllint + PyYAML | roles.yaml syntax drift, missing required fields, role→policy references with no matching `.hcl` |
-| P11 | `lib/secret-scan.sh` via `.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml` | literal secret leaked into a policy HCL (rare copy-paste mistake) — already covers `vault/**/*`, no duplicate step here |
-
-All four steps are fail-closed — any error blocks merge. The pipeline
-pins `hashicorp/vault:1.18.5` (matching `lib/init/nomad/install.sh`);
-bumping the runtime version without bumping the CI image is a CI-caught
-drift.
-
-## Common failure modes
-
-| Symptom in CI logs | Root cause | Fix |
-|---|---|---|
-| `vault-policy-fmt: … is not formatted — run 'vault policy fmt <file>'` | Trailing whitespace / mixed indent in an HCL file | `vault policy fmt <file>` locally and re-commit |
-| `vault-policy-validate: … failed validation` plus a `policy` error from Vault | Unknown capability (e.g. `"frobnicate"`), unknown stanza, malformed `path` block | Fix the HCL; valid capabilities are `read`, `list`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `patch`, `sudo`, `deny` |
-| `vault-roles-validate: ERROR: role 'X' references policy 'Y' but vault/policies/Y.hcl does not exist` | A role's `policy:` field does not match any file basename in `vault/policies/` | Either add the missing policy HCL or fix the typo in `roles.yaml` |
-| `vault-roles-validate: ERROR: role entry missing required field 'Z'` | A role in `roles.yaml` is missing one of `name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id` | Add the field; all four are required |
-| P11 `secret-scan: detected potential secret …` on a `.hcl` file | A literal token/password was pasted into a policy | Policies must name KV paths, not carry secret values — move the literal into KV (S2.2) and have the policy grant `read` on the path |
-
 ## What this directory does NOT own

 - **Attaching policies to Nomad jobs.** That's S2.4 (#882) via the
@ -183,3 +125,4 @@ drift.
  name in `vault { role = "..." }` is what binds the policy.
 - **Writing the secret values themselves.** That's S2.2 (#880) via
  `tools/vault-import.sh`.
+- **CI policy fmt + validate + roles.yaml check.** That's S2.6 (#884).
--- a/vault/policies/bot-architect.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-architect.hcl
@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 # Architect agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
 # Attached to the architect-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/architect" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/architect/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/architect" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/architect/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-dev-qwen.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-dev-qwen.hcl
@ -5,14 +5,14 @@
 # via workload identity (S2.4). KV path mirrors the bot basename:
 # kv/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*.

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev-qwen" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-dev.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-dev.hcl
@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 # Dev agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
 # Attached to the dev-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-gardener.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-gardener.hcl
@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 # Gardener agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
 # Attached to the gardener-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/gardener" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/gardener/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/gardener" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/gardener/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-planner.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-planner.hcl
@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 # Planner agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
 # Attached to the planner-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/planner" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/planner/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/planner" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/planner/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-predictor.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-predictor.hcl
@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 # Predictor agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
 # Attached to the predictor-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/predictor" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/predictor/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/predictor" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/predictor/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-review.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-review.hcl
@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 # Review agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
 # Attached to the review-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/review" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/review/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/review" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/review/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-supervisor.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-supervisor.hcl
@ -3,14 +3,14 @@
 # Supervisor agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
 # Attached to the supervisor-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/supervisor" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/supervisor/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/supervisor" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/supervisor/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/bot-vault.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/bot-vault.hcl
@ -7,14 +7,14 @@
 # NOTE: distinct from the runner-* policies, which gate per-secret access
 # for vault-runner ephemeral dispatches (Step 5).

-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/vault" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/vault/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/vault" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/vault/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/dispatcher.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/dispatcher.hcl
@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ path "kv/metadata/disinto/runner/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/ops-repo" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/service-agents.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/service-agents.hcl
@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/service-agents.hcl
-#
-# Composite policy for the `agents` Nomad job (S4.1, issue #955).
-# Grants read access to all 7 bot KV namespaces + shared forge config,
-# so a single job running all agent roles can pull per-bot tokens from
-# Vault via workload identity.
-
-# ── Per-bot KV paths (token + pass per role) ─────────────────────────────────
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/review" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/review" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/gardener" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/gardener" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/architect" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/architect" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/planner" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/planner" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/predictor" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/predictor" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/supervisor" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/supervisor" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/bots/vault" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/vault" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-# ── Shared forge config (URL, bot usernames) ─────────────────────────────────
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
--- a/vault/policies/service-chat.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/service-chat.hcl
@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/service-chat.hcl
-#
-# Read-only access to shared Chat secrets (OAuth client config, forward auth
-# secret). Attached to the Chat Nomad job via workload identity (S5.2).
-#
-# Scope: kv/disinto/shared/chat — entries owned by the operator and
-# shared between the chat service and edge proxy.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/chat" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/chat" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
--- a/vault/policies/service-dispatcher.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/service-dispatcher.hcl
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# vault/policies/service-dispatcher.hcl
-#
-# Edge dispatcher policy: needs to enumerate the runner secret namespace
-# (to check secret presence before dispatching) and read the shared
-# ops-repo credentials (token + clone URL) it uses to fetch action TOMLs.
-#
-# Scope:
-#   - kv/disinto/runner/*       — read all per-secret values + list keys
-#   - kv/disinto/shared/ops-repo/* — read the ops-repo creds bundle
-#
-# The actual ephemeral runner container created per dispatch gets the
-# narrow runner-<NAME> policies, NOT this one. This policy stays bound
-# to the long-running dispatcher only.
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/runner/*" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/runner/*" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo" {
-  capabilities = ["read"]
-}
-
-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/ops-repo" {
-  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
-}
--- a/vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl
@ -3,13 +3,13 @@
 # Read-only access to shared Forgejo secrets (admin password, OAuth client
 # config). Attached to the Forgejo Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
 #
-# Scope: kv/disinto/shared/forgejo — entries owned by the operator and
+# Scope: kv/disinto/shared/forgejo/* — entries owned by the operator and
 # shared between forgejo + the chat OAuth client (issue #855 lineage).

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }
--- a/vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl
+++ b/vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl
@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 # Scope: kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker/* — entries owned by the operator
 # and consumed by woodpecker-server + woodpecker-agent.

-path "kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker" {
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*" {
  capabilities = ["read"]
 }

-path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/woodpecker" {
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*" {
  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
 }
--- a/vault/roles.yaml
+++ b/vault/roles.yaml
@ -55,27 +55,7 @@ roles:
  - name:      service-woodpecker
    policy:    service-woodpecker
    namespace: default
-    job_id:    woodpecker-server
-
-  - name:      service-woodpecker-agent
-    policy:    service-woodpecker
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    woodpecker-agent
-
-  # ── Agents composite (nomad/jobs/agents.hcl — S4.1) ──────────────────────
-  # Single job running all 7 agent roles. Uses a composite policy
-  # (vault/policies/service-agents.hcl) that unions all bot KV paths.
-  - name:      service-agents
-    policy:    service-agents
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    agents
-
-  # ── Chat UI (nomad/jobs/chat.hcl — S5.2) ─────────────────────────────────
-  # Claude chat UI service with OAuth secrets. Uses vault/policies/service-chat.hcl.
-  - name:      service-chat
-    policy:    service-chat
-    namespace: default
-    job_id:    chat
+    job_id:    woodpecker

  # ── Per-agent bots (nomad/jobs/bot-<role>.hcl — land in later steps) ───────
  # job_id placeholders match the policy name 1:1 until each bot's jobspec
@ -128,10 +108,10 @@ roles:
    job_id:    bot-vault

  # ── Edge dispatcher ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-  - name:      service-dispatcher
-    policy:    service-dispatcher
+  - name:      dispatcher
+    policy:    dispatcher
    namespace: default
-    job_id:    edge
+    job_id:    dispatcher

  # ── Per-secret runner roles ────────────────────────────────────────────────
  # vault-runner (Step 5) composes runner-<NAME> policies onto each