19f10e33e6
Replace hardcoded host-side bind-mount paths with env vars so Nomad
jobspecs can reuse the same variables at cutover:
- CLAUDE_BIN_DIR: path to claude CLI binary (resolved at init time)
- CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE: path to .claude.json (default ${HOME}/.claude.json)
- CLAUDE_DIR: path to .claude directory (default ${HOME}/.claude)
- AGENT_SSH_DIR: path to SSH keys (default ${HOME}/.ssh)
- SOPS_AGE_DIR: path to SOPS age keys (default ${HOME}/.config/sops/age)
generators.sh now writes CLAUDE_BIN_DIR to .env instead of sed-replacing
CLAUDE_BIN_PLACEHOLDER in docker-compose.yml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
136 lines
9.8 KiB
Text
136 lines
9.8 KiB
Text
# Disinto — Environment Configuration
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# Copy to .env and fill in your values.
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# NEVER commit .env to the repo.
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#
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# With SOPS + age installed, `disinto init` encrypts secrets into .env.enc
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# and removes plaintext .env. To migrate an existing .env: `disinto secrets migrate`
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#
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# Variables marked [SECRET] are credentials that grant access if leaked.
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# Variables marked [CONFIG] are non-sensitive and safe in plaintext.
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# ── Per-project config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Project-specific settings (FORGE_REPO, PROJECT_REPO_ROOT, PRIMARY_BRANCH,
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# WOODPECKER_REPO_ID) now live in projects/*.toml — see projects/harb.toml
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# for an example. Do NOT set them here; they leak into every session.
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# ── Forge (Forgejo) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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FORGE_URL=http://localhost:3000 # [CONFIG] local Forgejo instance
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# ── Auth tokens ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Each agent has its own Forgejo account and API token (#747).
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# Per-agent tokens fall back to FORGE_TOKEN if not set.
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#
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# Tokens and passwords are auto-generated by `disinto init` and stored in .env.
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# Each bot user gets:
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# - FORGE_TOKEN_<BOT> = API token for REST calls (user identity via /api/v1/user)
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# - FORGE_PASS_<BOT> = password for git HTTP push (#361, Forgejo 11.x limitation)
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#
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# Local-model agents (agents-llama) use FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA / FORGE_PASS_LLAMA
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# with FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA=dev-qwen to ensure correct attribution (#563).
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FORGE_TOKEN= # [SECRET] dev-bot API token (default for all agents)
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FORGE_PASS= # [SECRET] dev-bot password for git HTTP push (#361)
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FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA= # [SECRET] dev-qwen API token (for agents-llama)
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FORGE_PASS_LLAMA= # [SECRET] dev-qwen password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN= # [SECRET] review-bot API token
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FORGE_REVIEW_PASS= # [SECRET] review-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN= # [SECRET] planner-bot API token
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FORGE_PLANNER_PASS= # [SECRET] planner-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN= # [SECRET] gardener-bot API token
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FORGE_GARDENER_PASS= # [SECRET] gardener-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN= # [SECRET] vault-bot API token
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FORGE_VAULT_PASS= # [SECRET] vault-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN= # [SECRET] supervisor-bot API token
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FORGE_SUPERVISOR_PASS= # [SECRET] supervisor-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN= # [SECRET] predictor-bot API token
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FORGE_PREDICTOR_PASS= # [SECRET] predictor-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN= # [SECRET] architect-bot API token
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FORGE_ARCHITECT_PASS= # [SECRET] architect-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_FILER_TOKEN= # [SECRET] filer-bot API token (issues:write on project repo only)
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FORGE_FILER_PASS= # [SECRET] filer-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES=dev-bot,review-bot,planner-bot,gardener-bot,vault-bot,supervisor-bot,predictor-bot,architect-bot,filer-bot
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# ── Backwards compatibility ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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# If CODEBERG_TOKEN is set but FORGE_TOKEN is not, env.sh falls back to
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# CODEBERG_TOKEN automatically (same for REVIEW_BOT_TOKEN, CODEBERG_REPO,
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# CODEBERG_BOT_USERNAMES). No action needed for existing deployments.
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# Per-agent tokens default to FORGE_TOKEN when unset (single-token setups).
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#
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# Note: `disinto init` auto-generates all bot tokens/passwords when you
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# configure [agents.llama] in a project TOML. The credentials are stored
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# in .env.enc (encrypted) or .env (plaintext fallback).
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# ── Woodpecker CI ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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WOODPECKER_TOKEN= # [SECRET] Woodpecker API token
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WOODPECKER_SERVER=http://localhost:8000 # [CONFIG] Woodpecker server URL
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WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET= # [SECRET] shared secret for server↔agent auth (auto-generated)
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# Woodpecker privileged-plugin allowlist — comma-separated image names
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# Add plugins/docker (and others) here to allow privileged execution
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WOODPECKER_PLUGINS_PRIVILEGED=plugins/docker
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# WOODPECKER_REPO_ID — now per-project, set in projects/*.toml [ci] section
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# Woodpecker Postgres (for direct DB queries)
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WOODPECKER_DB_PASSWORD= # [SECRET] Postgres password
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WOODPECKER_DB_USER=woodpecker # [CONFIG] Postgres user
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WOODPECKER_DB_HOST=127.0.0.1 # [CONFIG] Postgres host
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WOODPECKER_DB_NAME=woodpecker # [CONFIG] Postgres database name
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# ── Chat OAuth (#708) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID= # [SECRET] Chat OAuth2 client ID (auto-generated by init)
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CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET= # [SECRET] Chat OAuth2 client secret (auto-generated by init)
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DISINTO_CHAT_ALLOWED_USERS= # [CONFIG] CSV of allowed usernames (disinto-admin always allowed)
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FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET= # [SECRET] Shared secret for Caddy ↔ chat forward_auth (#709)
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# ── Vault-only secrets (DO NOT put these in .env) ────────────────────────
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# These tokens grant access to external systems (GitHub, ClawHub, deploy targets).
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# They live ONLY in secrets/<NAME>.enc (age-encrypted, one file per key) and are
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# decrypted into the ephemeral runner container at fire time (#745, #777).
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# lib/env.sh explicitly unsets them so agents can never hold them directly —
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# all external actions go through vault dispatch.
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#
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# GITHUB_TOKEN — GitHub API access (publish, deploy, post)
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# CLAWHUB_TOKEN — ClawHub registry credentials (publish)
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# CADDY_SSH_KEY — SSH key for Caddy log collection
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# (deploy keys) — SSH keys for deployment targets
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#
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# To manage secrets: disinto secrets add/show/remove/list
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# ── Project-specific secrets ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Store all project secrets here so formulas reference env vars, never hardcode.
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BASE_RPC_URL= # [SECRET] on-chain RPC endpoint
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# ── Local Qwen dev agent (optional) ──────────────────────────────────────
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# Set ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 to emit agents-llama in docker-compose.yml.
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# Requires a running llama-server reachable at ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL.
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# See docs/agents-llama.md for details.
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ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0 # [CONFIG] 1 = enable agents-llama service
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ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL= # [CONFIG] e.g. http://host.docker.internal:8081
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# ── Tuning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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CLAUDE_TIMEOUT=7200 # [CONFIG] max seconds per Claude invocation
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# ── Host paths (Nomad-portable) ────────────────────────────────────────────
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# These env vars externalize host-side bind-mount paths from docker-compose.yml.
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# At cutover, Nomad jobspecs reference the same vars — no path translation.
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# Defaults point at current paths so an empty .env override still works.
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CLAUDE_BIN_DIR=/usr/local/bin/claude # [CONFIG] host path to claude CLI binary (resolved by `disinto init`)
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CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE=${HOME}/.claude.json # [CONFIG] host path to claude config JSON file
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CLAUDE_DIR=${HOME}/.claude # [CONFIG] host path to .claude directory (reproduce/edge)
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AGENT_SSH_DIR=${HOME}/.ssh # [CONFIG] host path to SSH keys directory
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SOPS_AGE_DIR=${HOME}/.config/sops/age # [CONFIG] host path to SOPS age key directory
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# ── Claude Code shared OAuth state ─────────────────────────────────────────
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# Shared directory used by every factory container so Claude Code's internal
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# proper-lockfile-based OAuth refresh lock works across containers. Both
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# values must live outside $HOME (so docker bind mounts don't depend on UID
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# mapping) and must be the same absolute path on host and inside each
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# container. See docs/CLAUDE-AUTH-CONCURRENCY.md.
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CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR=/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared
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CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR}/config
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# ── Factory safety ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Disables Claude Code auto-updater, telemetry, error reporting, and bug
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# command. Factory sessions are production processes — they must never phone
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# home or auto-update mid-session. Added after #725 (crash during red-team run).
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CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC=1 # [CONFIG] suppress all non-essential traffic
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