f700c33a1b
This fixes the issue where agents-llama containers were using the main FORGE_TOKEN (dev-bot) instead of dedicated credentials for the llama bot user. Changes: - forge-setup.sh: Added generation of FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA and FORGE_PASS_LLAMA for local-model bot users (dev-qwen, dev-qwen-nightly). These are created as Forgejo users with their own API tokens and passwords for git push. - generators.sh: Updated agents-llama service to use FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA and FORGE_PASS_LLAMA instead of falling back to dev-bot's credentials. Fixed escaping to defer variable resolution to docker-compose runtime. - docker-compose.yml: Updated to use FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA and FORGE_PASS_LLAMA (renamed from FORGE_TOKEN_DEVQWEN for consistency). - .env.example: Added documentation for all per-bot tokens and passwords. - projects/disinto.toml.example: Documented the auto-credential generation. When a project TOML configures [agents.llama] with forge_user = dev-qwen: 1. disinto init creates the dev-qwen Forgejo user 2. Generates FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA and FORGE_PASS_LLAMA 3. Adds dev-qwen as write collaborator on the project repo 4. The agents-llama container uses these credentials for all Forgejo API calls This ensures issues and PRs created by the llama agent are correctly attributed to dev-qwen instead of dev-bot.
97 lines
6.8 KiB
Text
97 lines
6.8 KiB
Text
# Disinto — Environment Configuration
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# Copy to .env and fill in your values.
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# NEVER commit .env to the repo.
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#
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# With SOPS + age installed, `disinto init` encrypts secrets into .env.enc
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# and removes plaintext .env. To migrate an existing .env: `disinto secrets migrate`
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#
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# Variables marked [SECRET] are credentials that grant access if leaked.
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# Variables marked [CONFIG] are non-sensitive and safe in plaintext.
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# ── Per-project config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Project-specific settings (FORGE_REPO, PROJECT_REPO_ROOT, PRIMARY_BRANCH,
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# WOODPECKER_REPO_ID) now live in projects/*.toml — see projects/harb.toml
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# for an example. Do NOT set them here; they leak into every session.
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# ── Forge (Forgejo) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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FORGE_URL=http://localhost:3000 # [CONFIG] local Forgejo instance
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# ── Auth tokens ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Each agent has its own Forgejo account and API token (#747).
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# Per-agent tokens fall back to FORGE_TOKEN if not set.
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#
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# Tokens and passwords are auto-generated by `disinto init` and stored in .env.
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# Each bot user gets:
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# - FORGE_TOKEN_<BOT> = API token for REST calls (user identity via /api/v1/user)
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# - FORGE_PASS_<BOT> = password for git HTTP push (#361, Forgejo 11.x limitation)
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#
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# Local-model agents (agents-llama) use FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA / FORGE_PASS_LLAMA
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# with FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA=dev-qwen to ensure correct attribution (#563).
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FORGE_TOKEN= # [SECRET] dev-bot API token (default for all agents)
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FORGE_PASS= # [SECRET] dev-bot password for git HTTP push (#361)
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FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA= # [SECRET] dev-qwen API token (for agents-llama)
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FORGE_PASS_LLAMA= # [SECRET] dev-qwen password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN= # [SECRET] review-bot API token
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FORGE_REVIEW_PASS= # [SECRET] review-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN= # [SECRET] planner-bot API token
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FORGE_PLANNER_PASS= # [SECRET] planner-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN= # [SECRET] gardener-bot API token
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FORGE_GARDENER_PASS= # [SECRET] gardener-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN= # [SECRET] vault-bot API token
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FORGE_VAULT_PASS= # [SECRET] vault-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN= # [SECRET] supervisor-bot API token
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FORGE_SUPERVISOR_PASS= # [SECRET] supervisor-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN= # [SECRET] predictor-bot API token
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FORGE_PREDICTOR_PASS= # [SECRET] predictor-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN= # [SECRET] architect-bot API token
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FORGE_ARCHITECT_PASS= # [SECRET] architect-bot password for git HTTP push
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FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES=dev-bot,review-bot,planner-bot,gardener-bot,vault-bot,supervisor-bot,predictor-bot,architect-bot
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# ── Backwards compatibility ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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# If CODEBERG_TOKEN is set but FORGE_TOKEN is not, env.sh falls back to
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# CODEBERG_TOKEN automatically (same for REVIEW_BOT_TOKEN, CODEBERG_REPO,
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# CODEBERG_BOT_USERNAMES). No action needed for existing deployments.
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# Per-agent tokens default to FORGE_TOKEN when unset (single-token setups).
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#
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# Note: `disinto init` auto-generates all bot tokens/passwords when you
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# configure [agents.llama] in a project TOML. The credentials are stored
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# in .env.enc (encrypted) or .env (plaintext fallback).
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# ── Woodpecker CI ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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WOODPECKER_TOKEN= # [SECRET] Woodpecker API token
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WOODPECKER_SERVER=http://localhost:8000 # [CONFIG] Woodpecker server URL
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WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET= # [SECRET] shared secret for server↔agent auth (auto-generated)
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# WOODPECKER_REPO_ID — now per-project, set in projects/*.toml [ci] section
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# Woodpecker Postgres (for direct DB queries)
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WOODPECKER_DB_PASSWORD= # [SECRET] Postgres password
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WOODPECKER_DB_USER=woodpecker # [CONFIG] Postgres user
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WOODPECKER_DB_HOST=127.0.0.1 # [CONFIG] Postgres host
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WOODPECKER_DB_NAME=woodpecker # [CONFIG] Postgres database name
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# ── Vault-only secrets (DO NOT put these in .env) ────────────────────────
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# These tokens grant access to external systems (GitHub, ClawHub, deploy targets).
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# They live ONLY in .env.vault.enc and are injected into the ephemeral runner
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# container at fire time (#745). lib/env.sh explicitly unsets them so agents
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# can never hold them directly — all external actions go through vault dispatch.
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#
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# GITHUB_TOKEN — GitHub API access (publish, deploy, post)
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# CLAWHUB_TOKEN — ClawHub registry credentials (publish)
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# (deploy keys) — SSH keys for deployment targets
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#
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# To manage vault secrets: disinto secrets edit-vault
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# (vault redesign in progress: PR-based approval, see #73-#77)
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# ── Project-specific secrets ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Store all project secrets here so formulas reference env vars, never hardcode.
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BASE_RPC_URL= # [SECRET] on-chain RPC endpoint
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# ── Tuning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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CLAUDE_TIMEOUT=7200 # [CONFIG] max seconds per Claude invocation
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# ── Factory safety ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Disables Claude Code auto-updater, telemetry, error reporting, and bug
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# command. Factory sessions are production processes — they must never phone
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# home or auto-update mid-session. Added after #725 (crash during red-team run).
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CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC=1 # [CONFIG] suppress all non-essential traffic
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