fix: Secure action runtime — ephemeral container with vault-injected secrets (#748)

Split secrets into two SOPS-encrypted files:
- .env.enc for agent secrets (FORGE_TOKEN, CLAUDE_API_KEY, etc.)
- .env.vault.enc for vault secrets (GITHUB_TOKEN, deploy keys, etc.)

Add ephemeral vault-runner container (profiles: ["vault"]) that receives
only vault secrets at runtime. Agents never see vault secrets; vault-runner
never sees agent secrets.

Key changes:
- bin/disinto: vault-run subcommand, dual-file secrets management,
  vault-runner service in compose template
- vault/vault-fire.sh: delegates action execution to vault-runner
  container via disinto vault-run (bare-metal fallback preserved)
- vault/vault-poll.sh: new phase 5 detects vault-bot authorized
  comments on issues with action label
- vault/vault-run-action.sh: entrypoint for ephemeral container,
  dispatches to action handlers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
openhands 2026-03-26 16:41:27 +00:00
parent ac4eaf93d6
commit cb5252588c
6 changed files with 326 additions and 82 deletions

3
.gitignore vendored
View file

@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
# Plaintext secrets (never commit)
.env
# Encrypted secrets — safe to commit (.env.enc is SOPS-encrypted)
# Encrypted secrets — safe to commit (SOPS-encrypted with age)
!.env.enc
!.env.vault.enc
!.sops.yaml
# Per-box project config (generated by disinto init)