caf937f295
All checks were successful
- Promote #910, #914, #867 to backlog with acceptance criteria + affected files - Promote #820 to backlog (already well-structured, dep on #758 gates pickup) - Stage #915 as dust (no-op sed, single-line removal) - Update all AGENTS.md watermarks to HEAD - Root AGENTS.md: document vault-seed-<svc>.sh convention + complete test file list - Track gardener/dust.jsonl in git (remove from .gitignore)
159 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
159 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
<!-- last-reviewed: 8ad5aca6bbee77634b3c63523042b1d39cefa96a -->
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# nomad/ — Agent Instructions
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Nomad + Vault HCL for the factory's single-node cluster. These files are
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the source of truth that `lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` copies onto a
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factory box under `/etc/nomad.d/` and `/etc/vault.d/` at init time.
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This directory covers the **Nomad+Vault migration (Steps 0–2)** —
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see issues #821–#884 for the step breakdown.
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## What lives here
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| File/Dir | Deployed to | Owned by |
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|---|---|---|
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| `server.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl` | agent role, bind, ports, `data_dir` (S0.2) |
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| `client.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/client.hcl` | Docker driver cfg + `host_volume` declarations (S0.2) |
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| `vault.hcl` | `/etc/vault.d/vault.hcl` | Vault storage, listener, UI, `disable_mlock` (S0.3) |
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| `jobs/forgejo.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Forgejo job; reads creds from Vault via consul-template stanza (S2.4) |
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Nomad auto-merges every `*.hcl` under `-config=/etc/nomad.d/`, so the
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split between `server.hcl` and `client.hcl` is for readability, not
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semantics. The top-of-file header in each config documents which blocks
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it owns.
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## Vault ACL policies
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`vault/policies/` holds one `.hcl` file per Vault policy; see
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[`vault/policies/AGENTS.md`](../vault/policies/AGENTS.md) for the naming
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convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).
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## Not yet implemented
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- **Additional jobspecs** (woodpecker, agents, caddy) — Step 1 brought up
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Forgejo; remaining services land in later steps.
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- **TLS, ACLs, gossip encryption** — deliberately absent for now; land
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alongside multi-node support.
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## Adding a jobspec (Step 1 and later)
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1. Drop a file in `nomad/jobs/<service>.hcl`. The `.hcl` suffix is
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load-bearing: `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` globs on exactly that
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suffix to auto-pick up new jobspecs (see step 2 in "How CI validates
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these files" below). Anything else in `nomad/jobs/` is silently
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skipped by CI.
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2. If it needs persistent state, reference a `host_volume` already
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declared in `client.hcl` — *don't* add ad-hoc host paths in the
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jobspec. If a new volume is needed, add it to **both**:
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- `nomad/client.hcl` — the `host_volume "<name>" { path = … }` block
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- `lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` — the `HOST_VOLUME_DIRS` array
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The two must stay in sync or nomad fingerprinting will fail and the
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node stays in "initializing". Note that offline `nomad job validate`
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will NOT catch a typo in the jobspec's `source = "..."` against the
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client.hcl host_volume list (see step 2 below) — the scheduler
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rejects the mismatch at placement time instead.
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3. Pin image tags — `image = "forgejo/forgejo:1.22.5"`, not `:latest`.
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4. No pipeline edit required — step 2 of `nomad-validate.yml` globs
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over `nomad/jobs/*.hcl` and validates every match. Just make sure
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the existing `nomad/**` trigger path still covers your file (it
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does for anything under `nomad/jobs/`).
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## How CI validates these files
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`.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` runs on every PR that touches `nomad/`
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(including `nomad/jobs/`), `lib/init/nomad/`, `bin/disinto`,
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`vault/policies/`, or `vault/roles.yaml`. Eight fail-closed steps:
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1. **`nomad config validate nomad/server.hcl nomad/client.hcl`**
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— parses the HCL, fails on unknown blocks, bad port ranges, invalid
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driver config. Vault HCL is excluded (different tool). Jobspecs are
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excluded too — agent-config and jobspec are disjoint HCL grammars;
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running this step on a jobspec rejects it with "unknown block 'job'".
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2. **`nomad job validate nomad/jobs/*.hcl`** (loop, one call per file)
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— parses each jobspec's HCL, fails on unknown stanzas, missing
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required fields, wrong value types, invalid driver config. Runs
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offline (no Nomad server needed) so CI exit 0 ≠ "this will schedule
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successfully"; it means "the HCL itself is well-formed". What this
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step does NOT catch:
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- cross-file references (`source = "forgejo-data"` typo against the
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`host_volume` list in `client.hcl`) — that's a scheduling-time
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check on the live cluster, not validate-time.
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- image reachability — `image = "codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0"`
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is accepted even if the registry is down or the tag is wrong.
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New jobspecs are picked up automatically by the glob — no pipeline
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edit needed as long as the file is named `<name>.hcl`.
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3. **`vault operator diagnose -config=nomad/vault.hcl -skip=storage -skip=listener`**
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— Vault's equivalent syntax + schema check. `-skip=storage/listener`
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disables the runtime checks (CI containers don't have
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`/var/lib/vault/data` or port 8200). Exit 2 (advisory warnings only,
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e.g. TLS-disabled listener) is tolerated; exit 1 blocks merge.
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4. **`vault policy fmt` idempotence check on every `vault/policies/*.hcl`**
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(S2.6) — `vault policy fmt` has no `-check` flag in 1.18.5, so the
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step copies each file to `/tmp`, runs `vault policy fmt` on the copy,
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and diffs against the original. Any non-empty diff means the
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committed file would be rewritten by `fmt` and the step fails — the
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author is pointed at `vault policy fmt <file>` to heal the drift.
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5. **`vault policy write`-based validation against an inline dev-mode Vault**
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(S2.6) — Vault 1.18.5 has no offline `policy validate` subcommand;
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the CI step starts a dev-mode server, loops `vault policy write
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<basename> <file>` over each `vault/policies/*.hcl`, and aggregates
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failures so one CI run surfaces every broken policy. The server is
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ephemeral and torn down on step exit — no persistence, no real
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secrets. Catches unknown capability names (e.g. `"frobnicate"`),
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malformed `path` blocks, and other semantic errors `fmt` does not.
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6. **`vault/roles.yaml` validator** (S2.6) — yamllint + a PyYAML-based
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check that every role's `policy:` field matches a basename under
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`vault/policies/`, and that every role entry carries all four
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required fields (`name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id`). Drift
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between the two directories is a scheduling-time "permission denied"
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in production; this step turns it into a CI failure at PR time.
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7. **`shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto`**
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— all init/dispatcher shell clean. `bin/disinto` has no `.sh`
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extension so the repo-wide shellcheck in `.woodpecker/ci.yml` skips
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it — this is the one place it gets checked.
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8. **`bats tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats`**
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— exercises the dispatcher: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run`,
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`… --empty --dry-run`, and the `--backend=docker` regression guard.
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**Secret-scan coverage.** Policy HCL files under `vault/policies/` are
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already swept by the P11 secret-scan gate
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(`.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml`, #798), whose `vault/**/*` trigger path
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covers everything in this directory. `nomad-validate.yml` intentionally
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does NOT duplicate that gate — one scanner, one source of truth.
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If a PR breaks `nomad/server.hcl` (e.g. typo in a block name), step 1
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fails with a clear error; if it breaks a jobspec (e.g. misspells
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`task` as `tsak`, or adds a `volume` stanza without a `source`), step
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2 fails; a typo in a `path "..."` block in a vault policy fails step 5
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with the Vault parser's error; a `roles.yaml` entry that points at a
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policy basename that does not exist fails step 6. PRs that don't touch
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any of the trigger paths skip this pipeline entirely.
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## Version pinning
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Nomad + Vault versions are pinned in **two** places — bumping one
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without the other is a CI-caught drift:
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- `lib/init/nomad/install.sh` — the apt-installed versions on factory
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boxes (`NOMAD_VERSION`, `VAULT_VERSION`).
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- `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — the `hashicorp/nomad:…` and
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`hashicorp/vault:…` image tags used for static validation.
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Bump both in the same PR. The CI pipeline will fail if the pinned
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image's `config validate` rejects syntax the installed runtime would
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accept (or vice versa).
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## Related
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- `lib/init/nomad/` — installer + systemd units + cluster-up orchestrator.
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- `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — this directory's CI pipeline.
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- `vault/policies/` — Vault ACL policy HCL files (S2.1); the
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`vault-policy-fmt` / `vault-policy-validate` CI steps above enforce
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their shape. See [`../vault/policies/AGENTS.md`](../vault/policies/AGENTS.md)
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for the policy lifecycle, CI enforcement details, and common failure
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modes.
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- `vault/roles.yaml` — JWT-auth role → policy bindings (S2.3); the
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`vault-roles-validate` CI step above keeps it in lockstep with the
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policies directory.
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- Top-of-file headers in `server.hcl` / `client.hcl` / `vault.hcl`
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document the per-file ownership contract.
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