Merge pull request 'fix: [nomad-step-2] S2-fix-E — vault-import.sh still writes to secret/data/ not kv/data/ (#926)' (#927) from fix/issue-926 into main

The S2 Nomad+Vault migration switched the KV v2 mount from `secret/` to
`kv/` in policies, roles, templates, and lib/hvault.sh. tools/vault-import.sh
was missed — its curl URL and 4 error messages still hardcoded `secret/data/`,
so `disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo` hit 404 from vault on the
first write (issue body reproduces it with the gardener bot path).

Five call sites in _kv_put_secret flipped to `kv/data/`: the POST URL (L154)
and the curl-error / 404 / 403 / non-2xx branches (L156, L167, L171, L175).
The read helper is hvault_kv_get from lib/hvault.sh, which already resolves
through VAULT_KV_MOUNT (default `kv`), so no change needed there.

tests/vault-import.bats also updated: dev-mode vault only auto-mounts kv-v2
at secret/, so the test harness now enables a parallel kv-v2 mount at path=kv
during setup_file to mirror the production cluster layout. Test-side URLs
that assert round-trip reads all follow the same secret/ → kv/ rename.

shellcheck clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -32,13 +32,10 @@ FORGE_URL=http://localhost:3000             # [CONFIG] local Forgejo instance
 #   - FORGE_PASS_DEV_QWEN2
 # Name conversion: tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_' (lowercase→UPPER, hyphens→underscores).
 # The compose generator looks these up via the agent's `forge_user` field in
-# the project TOML. The pre-existing `dev-qwen` llama agent uses
-# FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA / FORGE_PASS_LLAMA (kept for backwards-compat with the
-# legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` single-agent path).
+# the project TOML. Configure local-model agents via [agents.X] sections in
+# projects/*.toml — this is the canonical activation path.
 FORGE_TOKEN=                               # [SECRET] dev-bot API token (default for all agents)
 FORGE_PASS=                                # [SECRET] dev-bot password for git HTTP push (#361)
-FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=                         # [SECRET] dev-qwen API token (for agents-llama)
-FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=                          # [SECRET] dev-qwen password for git HTTP push
 FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=                        # [SECRET] review-bot API token
 FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=                         # [SECRET] review-bot password for git HTTP push
 FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN=                       # [SECRET] planner-bot API token
@@ -107,13 +104,6 @@ FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=                      # [SECRET] Shared secret for Caddy ↔
 # Store all project secrets here so formulas reference env vars, never hardcode.
 BASE_RPC_URL=                              # [SECRET] on-chain RPC endpoint
 
-# ── Local Qwen dev agent (optional) ──────────────────────────────────────
-# Set ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 to emit agents-llama in docker-compose.yml.
-# Requires a running llama-server reachable at ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL.
-# See docs/agents-llama.md for details.
-ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0                       # [CONFIG] 1 = enable agents-llama service
-ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=                        # [CONFIG] e.g. http://host.docker.internal:8081
-
 # ── Tuning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 CLAUDE_TIMEOUT=7200                        # [CONFIG] max seconds per Claude invocation
 

.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml

@@ -1,26 +1,45 @@
 # =============================================================================
 # .woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml — Static validation for Nomad+Vault artifacts
 #
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S0.5, issue #825). Locks in the
-# "no-ad-hoc-steps" principle: every HCL/shell artifact under nomad/ or
-# lib/init/nomad/, plus the `disinto init` dispatcher, gets checked
-# before it can land.
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S0.5, issue #825; extended in S2.6,
+# issue #884). Locks in the "no-ad-hoc-steps" principle: every HCL/shell
+# artifact under nomad/, lib/init/nomad/, vault/policies/, plus the
+# `disinto init` dispatcher and vault/roles.yaml, gets checked before it
+# can land.
 #
 # Triggers on PRs (and pushes) that touch any of:
 #   nomad/**              — HCL configs (server, client, vault)
-#   lib/init/nomad/**     — cluster-up / install / systemd / vault-init
+#   lib/init/nomad/**     — cluster-up / install / systemd / vault-init /
+#                            vault-nomad-auth (S2.6 trigger: vault-*.sh
+#                            is a subset of this glob)
 #   bin/disinto           — `disinto init --backend=nomad` dispatcher
 #   tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats — the bats suite itself
+#   vault/policies/**     — Vault ACL policy HCL files (S2.1, S2.6)
+#   vault/roles.yaml      — JWT-auth role bindings (S2.3, S2.6)
 #   .woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml — the pipeline definition
 #
 # Steps (all fail-closed — any error blocks merge):
 #   1. nomad-config-validate   — `nomad config validate` on server + client HCL
 #   2. nomad-job-validate      — `nomad job validate` looped over every
-#                                 nomad/jobs/*.nomad.hcl (new jobspecs get
+#                                 nomad/jobs/*.hcl (new jobspecs get
 #                                 CI coverage automatically)
 #   3. vault-operator-diagnose — `vault operator diagnose` syntax check on vault.hcl
-#   4. shellcheck-nomad        — shellcheck the cluster-up + install scripts + disinto
-#   5. bats-init-nomad         — `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` smoke tests
+#   4. vault-policy-fmt        — `vault policy fmt` idempotence check on
+#                                 every vault/policies/*.hcl (format drift =
+#                                 CI fail; non-destructive via cp+diff)
+#   5. vault-policy-validate   — HCL syntax + capability validation for every
+#                                 vault/policies/*.hcl via `vault policy write`
+#                                 against an inline dev-mode Vault server
+#   6. vault-roles-validate    — yamllint + role→policy reference check on
+#                                 vault/roles.yaml (every referenced policy
+#                                 must exist as vault/policies/<name>.hcl)
+#   7. shellcheck-nomad        — shellcheck the cluster-up + install scripts + disinto
+#   8. bats-init-nomad         — `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` smoke tests
+#
+# Secret-scan coverage: vault/policies/*.hcl is already scanned by the
+# P11 gate (.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml, issue #798) — its trigger path
+# `vault/**/*` covers everything under this directory. We intentionally
+# do NOT duplicate that gate here; one scanner, one source of truth.
 #
 # Pinned image versions match lib/init/nomad/install.sh (nomad 1.9.5 /
 # vault 1.18.5). Bump there AND here together — drift = CI passing on
@@ -34,6 +53,8 @@ when:
       - "lib/init/nomad/**"
       - "bin/disinto"
       - "tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats"
+      - "vault/policies/**"
+      - "vault/roles.yaml"
       - ".woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml"
 
 # Authenticated clone — same pattern as .woodpecker/ci.yml. Forgejo is
@@ -57,6 +78,7 @@ steps:
   - name: nomad-config-validate
     image: hashicorp/nomad:1.9.5
     commands:
+      - nomad version
       - nomad config validate nomad/server.hcl nomad/client.hcl
 
   # ── 2. Nomad jobspec HCL syntax check ────────────────────────────────────
@@ -68,15 +90,15 @@ steps:
   #
   # Validation is offline: no running Nomad server is required (exit 0 on
   # valid HCL, 1 on syntax/semantic error). The CLI takes a single path
-  # argument so we loop over every `*.nomad.hcl` file under nomad/jobs/ —
+  # argument so we loop over every `*.hcl` file under nomad/jobs/ —
   # that way a new jobspec PR gets CI coverage automatically (no separate
-  # "edit the pipeline" step to forget). The `.nomad.hcl` suffix is the
-  # naming convention documented in nomad/AGENTS.md; anything else in
-  # nomad/jobs/ is deliberately not validated by this step.
+  # "edit the pipeline" step to forget). The `.hcl` suffix is the naming
+  # convention: anything else in nomad/jobs/ is deliberately not validated
+  # by this step.
   #
   # `[ -f "$f" ]` guards against the no-match case: POSIX sh does not
   # nullglob, so an empty jobs/ directory would leave the literal glob in
-  # "$f" and fail. Today forgejo.nomad.hcl exists, but the guard keeps the
+  # "$f" and fail. Today forgejo.hcl exists, but the guard keeps the
   # step safe during any future transient empty state.
   #
   # Scope note: offline validate catches jobspec-level errors (unknown
@@ -91,7 +113,7 @@ steps:
     commands:
       - |
         set -e
-        for f in nomad/jobs/*.nomad.hcl; do
+        for f in nomad/jobs/*.hcl; do
           [ -f "$f" ] || continue
           echo "validating jobspec: $f"
           nomad job validate "$f"
@@ -122,7 +144,176 @@ steps:
           *) echo "vault config: hard failure (rc=$rc)" >&2; exit "$rc" ;;
         esac
 
-  # ── 4. Shellcheck ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  # ── 4. Vault policy fmt idempotence check ────────────────────────────────
+  # `vault policy fmt <file>` formats a local HCL policy file in place.
+  # There's no `-check`/dry-run flag (vault 1.18.5), so we implement a
+  # non-destructive check as cp → fmt-on-copy → diff against original.
+  # Any diff means the committed file would be rewritten by `vault policy
+  # fmt` — failure steers the author to run `vault policy fmt <file>`
+  # locally before pushing.
+  #
+  # Scope: vault/policies/*.hcl only. The `[ -f "$f" ]` guard handles the
+  # no-match case (POSIX sh does not nullglob) so an empty policies/
+  # directory does not fail this step.
+  #
+  # Note: `vault policy fmt` is purely local (HCL text transform) and does
+  # not require a running Vault server, which is why this step can run
+  # without starting one.
+  - name: vault-policy-fmt
+    image: hashicorp/vault:1.18.5
+    commands:
+      - |
+        set -e
+        failed=0
+        for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do
+          [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+          tmp="/tmp/$(basename "$f").fmt"
+          cp "$f" "$tmp"
+          vault policy fmt "$tmp" >/dev/null 2>&1
+          if ! diff -u "$f" "$tmp"; then
+            echo "ERROR: $f is not formatted — run 'vault policy fmt $f' locally" >&2
+            failed=1
+          fi
+        done
+        if [ "$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
+          echo "vault-policy-fmt: formatting drift detected" >&2
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        echo "vault-policy-fmt: all policies formatted correctly"
+
+  # ── 5. Vault policy HCL syntax + capability validation ───────────────────
+  # Vault has no offline `vault policy validate` subcommand — the closest
+  # in-CLI validator is `vault policy write`, which sends the HCL to a
+  # running server which parses it, checks capability names against the
+  # known set (read, list, create, update, delete, patch, sudo, deny),
+  # and rejects unknown stanzas / malformed path blocks. We start an
+  # inline dev-mode Vault (in-memory, no persistence, root token = "root")
+  # for the duration of this step and loop `vault policy write` over every
+  # vault/policies/*.hcl; the policies never leave the ephemeral dev
+  # server, so this is strictly a validator — not a deploy.
+  #
+  # Exit-code handling:
+  #   - `vault policy write` exits 0 on success, non-zero on any parse /
+  #     semantic error. We aggregate failures across all files so a single
+  #     CI run surfaces every broken policy (not just the first).
+  #   - The dev server is killed on any step exit via EXIT trap so the
+  #     step tears down cleanly even on failure.
+  #
+  # Why dev-mode is sufficient: we're not persisting secrets, only asking
+  # Vault to parse policy text. The factory's production Vault is NOT
+  # contacted.
+  - name: vault-policy-validate
+    image: hashicorp/vault:1.18.5
+    commands:
+      - |
+        set -e
+        vault server -dev -dev-root-token-id=root -dev-listen-address=127.0.0.1:8200 >/tmp/vault-dev.log 2>&1 &
+        VAULT_PID=$!
+        trap 'kill "$VAULT_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT INT TERM
+        export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200
+        export VAULT_TOKEN=root
+        ready=0
+        i=0
+        while [ "$i" -lt 30 ]; do
+          if vault status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            ready=1
+            break
+          fi
+          i=$((i + 1))
+          sleep 0.5
+        done
+        if [ "$ready" -ne 1 ]; then
+          echo "vault-policy-validate: dev server failed to start after 15s" >&2
+          cat /tmp/vault-dev.log >&2 || true
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        failed=0
+        for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do
+          [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+          name=$(basename "$f" .hcl)
+          echo "validate: $f"
+          if ! vault policy write "$name" "$f"; then
+            echo "  ERROR: $f failed validation" >&2
+            failed=1
+          fi
+        done
+        if [ "$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
+          echo "vault-policy-validate: validation errors found" >&2
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        echo "vault-policy-validate: all policies valid"
+
+  # ── 6. vault/roles.yaml validator ────────────────────────────────────────
+  # Validates the JWT-auth role bindings file (S2.3). Two checks:
+  #
+  #   a. `yamllint` — catches YAML syntax errors and indentation drift.
+  #      Uses a relaxed config (line length bumped to 200) because
+  #      roles.yaml's comments are wide by design.
+  #   b. role → policy reference check — every role's `policy:` field
+  #      must match a basename in vault/policies/*.hcl. A role pointing
+  #      at a non-existent policy = runtime "permission denied" at job
+  #      placement; catching the drift here turns it into a CI failure.
+  #      Also verifies each role entry has the four required fields
+  #      (name, policy, namespace, job_id) per the file's documented
+  #      format.
+  #
+  # Parsing is done with PyYAML (the roles.yaml format is a strict
+  # subset that awk-level parsing in tools/vault-apply-roles.sh handles
+  # too, but PyYAML in CI gives us structural validation for free). If
+  # roles.yaml is ever absent (e.g. reverted), the step skips rather
+  # than fails — presence is enforced by S2.3's own tooling, not here.
+  - name: vault-roles-validate
+    image: python:3.12-alpine
+    commands:
+      - pip install --quiet --disable-pip-version-check pyyaml yamllint
+      - |
+        set -e
+        if [ ! -f vault/roles.yaml ]; then
+          echo "vault-roles-validate: vault/roles.yaml not present, skipping"
+          exit 0
+        fi
+        yamllint -d '{extends: relaxed, rules: {line-length: {max: 200}}}' vault/roles.yaml
+        echo "vault-roles-validate: yamllint OK"
+        python3 - <<'PY'
+        import os
+        import sys
+        import yaml
+
+        with open('vault/roles.yaml') as f:
+            data = yaml.safe_load(f) or {}
+        roles = data.get('roles') or []
+        if not roles:
+            print("vault-roles-validate: no roles defined in vault/roles.yaml", file=sys.stderr)
+            sys.exit(1)
+        existing = {
+            os.path.splitext(e)[0]
+            for e in os.listdir('vault/policies')
+            if e.endswith('.hcl')
+        }
+        required = ('name', 'policy', 'namespace', 'job_id')
+        failed = 0
+        for r in roles:
+            if not isinstance(r, dict):
+                print(f"ERROR: role entry is not a mapping: {r!r}", file=sys.stderr)
+                failed = 1
+                continue
+            for field in required:
+                if r.get(field) in (None, ''):
+                    print(f"ERROR: role entry missing required field '{field}': {r}", file=sys.stderr)
+                    failed = 1
+            policy = r.get('policy')
+            if policy and policy not in existing:
+                print(
+                    f"ERROR: role '{r.get('name')}' references policy '{policy}' "
+                    f"but vault/policies/{policy}.hcl does not exist",
+                    file=sys.stderr,
+                )
+                failed = 1
+        sys.exit(failed)
+        PY
+        echo "vault-roles-validate: all role→policy references valid"
+
+  # ── 7. Shellcheck ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   # Covers the new lib/init/nomad/*.sh scripts plus bin/disinto (which owns
   # the backend dispatcher). bin/disinto has no .sh extension so the
   # repo-wide shellcheck in .woodpecker/ci.yml skips it — this step is the
@@ -132,7 +323,7 @@ steps:
     commands:
       - shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto
 
-  # ── 5. bats: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` ────────────────────
+  # ── 8. bats: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run` ────────────────────
   # Smoke-tests the CLI dispatcher: both --backend=nomad variants exit 0
   # with the expected step list, and --backend=docker stays on the docker
   # path (regression guard). Pure dry-run — no sudo, no network.

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Disinto — Agent Instructions
 
 ## What this repo is
@@ -39,10 +39,12 @@ disinto/                 (code repo)
 │                  hooks/ — Claude Code session hooks (on-compact-reinject, on-idle-stop, on-phase-change, on-pretooluse-guard, on-session-end, on-stop-failure)
 │                  init/nomad/ — cluster-up.sh, install.sh, vault-init.sh, lib-systemd.sh (Nomad+Vault Step 0 installers, #821-#825)
 ├── nomad/         server.hcl, client.hcl, vault.hcl — HCL configs deployed to /etc/nomad.d/ and /etc/vault.d/ by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
+│                  jobs/ — Nomad jobspecs (forgejo.hcl reads Vault secrets via template stanza, S2.4)
 ├── projects/      *.toml.example — templates; *.toml — local per-box config (gitignored)
 ├── formulas/      Issue templates (TOML specs for multi-step agent tasks)
 ├── docker/        Dockerfiles and entrypoints: reproduce, triage, edge dispatcher, chat (server.py, entrypoint-chat.sh, Dockerfile, ui/)
 ├── tools/         Operational tools: edge-control/ (register.sh, install.sh, verify-chat-sandbox.sh)
+│                  vault-apply-policies.sh, vault-apply-roles.sh, vault-import.sh, vault-seed-forgejo.sh — Vault provisioning (S2.1/S2.2)
 ├── docs/          Protocol docs (PHASE-PROTOCOL.md, EVIDENCE-ARCHITECTURE.md)
 ├── site/          disinto.ai website content
 ├── tests/         Test files (mock-forgejo.py, smoke-init.sh, lib-hvault.bats, disinto-init-nomad.bats)
@@ -120,8 +122,7 @@ bash dev/phase-test.sh
 | Reproduce | `docker/reproduce/` | Bug reproduction using Playwright MCP | `formulas/reproduce.toml` |
 | Triage | `docker/reproduce/` | Deep root cause analysis | `formulas/triage.toml` |
 | Edge dispatcher | `docker/edge/` | Polls ops repo for vault actions, executes via Claude sessions | `docker/edge/dispatcher.sh` |
-| agents-llama | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local-Qwen dev agent (`AGENT_ROLES=dev`), gated on `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
-| agents-llama-all | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local-Qwen all-roles agent (all 7 roles), profile `agents-llama-all` | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
+| Local-model agents | `docker/agents/` (same image) | Local llama-server agents configured via `[agents.X]` sections in project TOML | [docs/agents-llama.md](docs/agents-llama.md) |
 
 > **Vault:** Being redesigned as a PR-based approval workflow (issues #73-#77).
 > See [docs/VAULT.md](docs/VAULT.md) for the vault PR workflow details.
@@ -192,9 +193,7 @@ Humans write these. Agents read and enforce them.
 
 ## Phase-Signaling Protocol
 
-When running as a persistent tmux session, Claude must signal the orchestrator
-at each phase boundary by writing to a phase file (e.g.
-`/tmp/dev-session-{project}-{issue}.phase`).
+When running as a persistent tmux session, Claude must signal the orchestrator at each phase boundary by writing to a phase file (e.g. `/tmp/dev-session-{project}-{issue}.phase`).
 
 Key phases: `PHASE:awaiting_ci` → `PHASE:awaiting_review` → `PHASE:done`. Also: `PHASE:escalate` (needs human input), `PHASE:failed`.
 See [docs/PHASE-PROTOCOL.md](docs/PHASE-PROTOCOL.md) for the complete spec, orchestrator reaction matrix, sequence diagram, and crash recovery.

architect/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Architect — Agent Instructions
 
 ## What this agent is

bin/disinto

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Usage:
                                      Read CI logs from Woodpecker SQLite
   disinto release <version>            Create vault PR for release (e.g., v1.2.0)
   disinto hire-an-agent <agent-name> <role> [--formula <path>] [--local-model <url>] [--model <name>]
-                                     Hire a new agent (create user + .profile repo)
+                                     Hire a new agent (create user + .profile repo; re-run to rotate credentials)
   disinto agent <subcommand>           Manage agent state (enable/disable)
   disinto edge <verb> [options]        Manage edge tunnel registrations
 
@@ -82,12 +82,16 @@ Init options:
   --ci-id <n>          Woodpecker CI repo ID (default: 0 = no CI)
   --forge-url <url>    Forge base URL (default: http://localhost:3000)
   --backend <value>    Orchestration backend: docker (default) | nomad
+  --with <services>    (nomad) Deploy services: forgejo[,...] (S1.3)
   --empty              (nomad) Bring up cluster only, no jobs (S0.4)
   --bare               Skip compose generation (bare-metal setup)
   --build              Use local docker build instead of registry images (dev mode)
   --yes                Skip confirmation prompts
   --rotate-tokens      Force regeneration of all bot tokens/passwords (idempotent by default)
   --dry-run            Print every intended action without executing
+  --import-env <path>  (nomad) Path to .env file for import into Vault KV (S2.5)
+  --import-sops <path> (nomad) Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc for import (S2.5)
+  --age-key <path>     (nomad) Path to age keyfile (required with --import-sops) (S2.5)
 
 Hire an agent options:
   --formula <path>     Path to role formula TOML (default: formulas/<role>.toml)
@@ -662,14 +666,61 @@ prompt_admin_password() {
 # init run); operators running without sudo-NOPASSWD should invoke
 # `sudo disinto init ...` directly.
 _disinto_init_nomad() {
-  local dry_run="${1:-false}" empty="${2:-false}"
+  local dry_run="${1:-false}" empty="${2:-false}" with_services="${3:-}"
+  local import_env="${4:-}" import_sops="${5:-}" age_key="${6:-}"
   local cluster_up="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh"
+  local deploy_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh"
+  local vault_engines_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh"
+  local vault_policies_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-apply-policies.sh"
+  local vault_auth_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh"
+  local vault_import_sh="${FACTORY_ROOT}/tools/vault-import.sh"
 
   if [ ! -x "$cluster_up" ]; then
     echo "Error: ${cluster_up} not found or not executable" >&2
     exit 1
   fi
 
+  if [ -n "$with_services" ] && [ ! -x "$deploy_sh" ]; then
+    echo "Error: ${deploy_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # --empty short-circuits after cluster-up: no policies, no auth, no
+  # import, no deploy. It's the "cluster-only escape hatch" for debugging
+  # (docs/nomad-migration.md). Caller-side validation already rejects
+  # --empty combined with --with or any --import-* flag, so reaching
+  # this branch with those set is a bug in the caller.
+  #
+  # On the default (non-empty) path, vault-engines.sh (enables the kv/
+  # mount), vault-apply-policies.sh, and vault-nomad-auth.sh are invoked
+  # unconditionally — they are idempotent and cheap to re-run, and
+  # subsequent --with deployments depend on them. vault-import.sh is
+  # invoked only when an --import-* flag is set. vault-engines.sh runs
+  # first because every policy and role below references kv/disinto/*
+  # paths, which 403 if the engine is not yet mounted (issue #912).
+  local import_any=false
+  if [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ]; then
+    import_any=true
+  fi
+  if [ "$empty" != "true" ]; then
+    if [ ! -x "$vault_engines_sh" ]; then
+      echo "Error: ${vault_engines_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    if [ ! -x "$vault_policies_sh" ]; then
+      echo "Error: ${vault_policies_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    if [ ! -x "$vault_auth_sh" ]; then
+      echo "Error: ${vault_auth_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    if [ "$import_any" = true ] && [ ! -x "$vault_import_sh" ]; then
+      echo "Error: ${vault_import_sh} not found or not executable" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+  fi
+
   # --empty and default both invoke cluster-up today. Log the requested
   # mode so the dispatch is visible in factory bootstrap logs — Step 1
   # will branch on $empty to gate the job-deployment path.
@@ -679,31 +730,231 @@ _disinto_init_nomad() {
     echo "nomad backend: default (cluster-up; jobs deferred to Step 1)"
   fi
 
-  # Dry-run forwards straight through; cluster-up.sh prints its own step
-  # list and exits 0 without touching the box.
-  local -a cmd=("$cluster_up")
+  # Dry-run: print cluster-up plan + policies/auth/import plan + deploy.sh plan
   if [ "$dry_run" = "true" ]; then
-    cmd+=("--dry-run")
-    "${cmd[@]}"
-    exit $?
+    echo ""
+    echo "── Cluster-up dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
+    local -a cmd=("$cluster_up" "--dry-run")
+    "${cmd[@]}" || true
+    echo ""
+
+    # --empty skips policies/auth/import/deploy — cluster-up only, no
+    # workloads. The operator-visible dry-run plan must match the real
+    # run, so short-circuit here too.
+    if [ "$empty" = "true" ]; then
+      exit 0
+    fi
+
+    # Vault engines + policies + auth are invoked on every nomad real-run
+    # path regardless of --import-* flags (they're idempotent; S2.1 + S2.3).
+    # Engines runs first because policies/roles/templates all reference the
+    # kv/ mount it enables (issue #912). Mirror that ordering in the
+    # dry-run plan so the operator sees the full sequence Step 2 will
+    # execute.
+    echo "── Vault engines dry-run ──────────────────────────────"
+    echo "[engines] [dry-run] ${vault_engines_sh} --dry-run"
+    echo ""
+    echo "── Vault policies dry-run ─────────────────────────────"
+    echo "[policies] [dry-run] ${vault_policies_sh} --dry-run"
+    echo ""
+    echo "── Vault auth dry-run ─────────────────────────────────"
+    echo "[auth] [dry-run] ${vault_auth_sh}"
+    echo ""
+
+    # Import plan: one line per --import-* flag that is actually set.
+    # Printing independently (not in an if/elif chain) means that all
+    # three flags appearing together each echo their own path — the
+    # regression that bit prior implementations of this issue (#883).
+    if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
+      echo "── Vault import dry-run ───────────────────────────────"
+      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && echo "[import] --import-env   env file:  ${import_env}"
+      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && echo "[import] --import-sops  sops file: ${import_sops}"
+      [ -n "$age_key" ]     && echo "[import] --age-key      age key:   ${age_key}"
+      local -a import_dry_cmd=("$vault_import_sh")
+      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_dry_cmd+=("--env" "$import_env")
+      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_dry_cmd+=("--sops" "$import_sops")
+      [ -n "$age_key" ]     && import_dry_cmd+=("--age-key" "$age_key")
+      import_dry_cmd+=("--dry-run")
+      echo "[import] [dry-run] ${import_dry_cmd[*]}"
+      echo ""
+    else
+      echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
+      echo ""
+    fi
+
+    if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
+      echo "── Deploy services dry-run ────────────────────────────"
+      echo "[deploy] services to deploy: ${with_services}"
+      local IFS=','
+      for svc in $with_services; do
+        svc=$(echo "$svc" | xargs)  # trim whitespace
+        # Validate known services first
+        case "$svc" in
+          forgejo) ;;
+          *)
+            echo "Error: unknown service '${svc}' — known: forgejo" >&2
+            exit 1
+            ;;
+        esac
+        local jobspec_path="${FACTORY_ROOT}/nomad/jobs/${svc}.hcl"
+        if [ ! -f "$jobspec_path" ]; then
+          echo "Error: jobspec not found: ${jobspec_path}" >&2
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        echo "[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate ${jobspec_path}"
+        echo "[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job run -detach ${jobspec_path}"
+      done
+      echo "[deploy] dry-run complete"
+    fi
+    exit 0
   fi
 
-  # Real run — needs root. Invoke via sudo if we're not already root so
-  # the command's exit code propagates directly. We don't distinguish
-  # "sudo denied" from "cluster-up.sh failed" here; both surface as a
-  # non-zero exit, and cluster-up.sh's own error messages cover the
-  # latter case.
-  local rc=0
+  # Real run: cluster-up + policies + auth + (optional) import + deploy
+  local -a cluster_cmd=("$cluster_up")
   if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    "${cmd[@]}" || rc=$?
+    "${cluster_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
   else
     if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
       echo "Error: cluster-up.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
       exit 1
     fi
-    sudo -n -- "${cmd[@]}" || rc=$?
+    sudo -n -- "${cluster_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
   fi
-  exit "$rc"
+
+  # --empty short-circuits here: cluster-up only, no policies/auth/import
+  # and no deploy. Matches the dry-run plan above and the docs/runbook.
+  if [ "$empty" = "true" ]; then
+    exit 0
+  fi
+
+  # Enable Vault secret engines (S2.1 / issue #912) — must precede
+  # policies/auth/import because every policy and every import target
+  # addresses paths under kv/. Idempotent, safe to re-run.
+  echo ""
+  echo "── Enabling Vault secret engines ──────────────────────"
+  local -a engines_cmd=("$vault_engines_sh")
+  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+    "${engines_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+  else
+    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      echo "Error: vault-engines.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    sudo -n -- "${engines_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+  fi
+
+  # Apply Vault policies (S2.1) — idempotent, safe to re-run.
+  echo ""
+  echo "── Applying Vault policies ────────────────────────────"
+  local -a policies_cmd=("$vault_policies_sh")
+  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+    "${policies_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+  else
+    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      echo "Error: vault-apply-policies.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    sudo -n -- "${policies_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+  fi
+
+  # Configure Vault JWT auth + Nomad workload identity (S2.3) — idempotent.
+  echo ""
+  echo "── Configuring Vault JWT auth ─────────────────────────"
+  local -a auth_cmd=("$vault_auth_sh")
+  if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+    "${auth_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+  else
+    if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      echo "Error: vault-nomad-auth.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    sudo -n -- "${auth_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+  fi
+
+  # Import secrets if any --import-* flag is set (S2.2).
+  if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
+    echo ""
+    echo "── Importing secrets into Vault ───────────────────────"
+    local -a import_cmd=("$vault_import_sh")
+    [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_cmd+=("--env" "$import_env")
+    [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_cmd+=("--sops" "$import_sops")
+    [ -n "$age_key" ]     && import_cmd+=("--age-key" "$age_key")
+    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+      "${import_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    else
+      if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "Error: vault-import.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      sudo -n -- "${import_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    fi
+  else
+    echo ""
+    echo "[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services"
+  fi
+
+  # Deploy services if requested
+  if [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
+    echo ""
+    echo "── Deploying services ─────────────────────────────────"
+    local -a deploy_cmd=("$deploy_sh")
+    # Split comma-separated service list into positional args
+    local IFS=','
+    for svc in $with_services; do
+      svc=$(echo "$svc" | xargs)  # trim whitespace
+      if ! echo "$svc" | grep -qE '^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$'; then
+        echo "Error: invalid service name '${svc}' — must match ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      # Validate known services FIRST (before jobspec check)
+      case "$svc" in
+        forgejo) ;;
+        *)
+          echo "Error: unknown service '${svc}' — known: forgejo" >&2
+          exit 1
+          ;;
+      esac
+      # Check jobspec exists
+      local jobspec_path="${FACTORY_ROOT}/nomad/jobs/${svc}.hcl"
+      if [ ! -f "$jobspec_path" ]; then
+        echo "Error: jobspec not found: ${jobspec_path}" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      deploy_cmd+=("$svc")
+    done
+
+    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+      "${deploy_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    else
+      if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "Error: deploy.sh must run as root and sudo is not installed" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      sudo -n -- "${deploy_cmd[@]}" || exit $?
+    fi
+
+    # Print final summary
+    echo ""
+    echo "── Summary ────────────────────────────────────────────"
+    echo "Cluster:     Nomad+Vault cluster is up"
+    echo "Policies:    applied (Vault ACL)"
+    echo "Auth:        Vault JWT auth + Nomad workload identity configured"
+    if [ "$import_any" = true ]; then
+      local import_desc=""
+      [ -n "$import_env" ]  && import_desc+="${import_env} "
+      [ -n "$import_sops" ] && import_desc+="${import_sops} "
+      echo "Imported:    ${import_desc% }"
+    else
+      echo "Imported:    (none — seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services)"
+    fi
+    echo "Deployed:    ${with_services}"
+    if echo "$with_services" | grep -q "forgejo"; then
+      echo "Ports:       forgejo: 3000"
+    fi
+    echo "────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"
+  fi
+
+  exit 0
 }
 
 disinto_init() {
@@ -721,7 +972,8 @@ disinto_init() {
   fi
 
   # Parse flags
-  local branch="" repo_root="" ci_id="0" auto_yes=false forge_url_flag="" bare=false rotate_tokens=false use_build=false dry_run=false backend="docker" empty=false
+  local branch="" repo_root="" ci_id="0" auto_yes=false forge_url_flag="" bare=false rotate_tokens=false use_build=false dry_run=false backend="docker" empty=false with_services=""
+  local import_env="" import_sops="" age_key=""
   while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
     case "$1" in
       --branch)        branch="$2"; shift 2 ;;
@@ -730,12 +982,20 @@ disinto_init() {
       --forge-url)     forge_url_flag="$2"; shift 2 ;;
       --backend)       backend="$2"; shift 2 ;;
       --backend=*)     backend="${1#--backend=}"; shift ;;
+      --with)          with_services="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+      --with=*)        with_services="${1#--with=}"; shift ;;
       --bare)          bare=true; shift ;;
       --build)         use_build=true; shift ;;
       --empty)         empty=true; shift ;;
       --yes)           auto_yes=true; shift ;;
       --rotate-tokens) rotate_tokens=true; shift ;;
       --dry-run)       dry_run=true; shift ;;
+      --import-env)    import_env="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+      --import-env=*)  import_env="${1#--import-env=}"; shift ;;
+      --import-sops)   import_sops="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+      --import-sops=*) import_sops="${1#--import-sops=}"; shift ;;
+      --age-key)       age_key="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+      --age-key=*)     age_key="${1#--age-key=}"; shift ;;
       *) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
     esac
   done
@@ -764,11 +1024,52 @@ disinto_init() {
     exit 1
   fi
 
+  # --with requires --backend=nomad
+  if [ -n "$with_services" ] && [ "$backend" != "nomad" ]; then
+    echo "Error: --with requires --backend=nomad" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # --empty and --with are mutually exclusive
+  if [ "$empty" = true ] && [ -n "$with_services" ]; then
+    echo "Error: --empty and --with are mutually exclusive" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # --import-* flag validation (S2.5). These three flags form an import
+  # triple and must be consistent before dispatch: sops encryption is
+  # useless without the age key to decrypt it, so either both --import-sops
+  # and --age-key are present or neither is. --import-env alone is fine
+  # (it just imports the plaintext dotenv). All three flags are nomad-only.
+  if [ -n "$import_sops" ] && [ -z "$age_key" ]; then
+    echo "Error: --import-sops requires --age-key" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$age_key" ] && [ -z "$import_sops" ]; then
+    echo "Error: --age-key requires --import-sops" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if { [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; } \
+     && [ "$backend" != "nomad" ]; then
+    echo "Error: --import-env, --import-sops, and --age-key require --backend=nomad" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # --empty is the cluster-only escape hatch — it skips policies, auth,
+  # import, and deploy. Pairing it with --import-* silently does nothing,
+  # which is a worse failure mode than a clear error. Reject explicitly.
+  if [ "$empty" = true ] \
+     && { [ -n "$import_env" ] || [ -n "$import_sops" ] || [ -n "$age_key" ]; }; then
+    echo "Error: --empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
   # Dispatch on backend — the nomad path runs lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh
   # (S0.4). The default and --empty variants are identical today; Step 1
   # will branch on $empty to add job deployment to the default path.
   if [ "$backend" = "nomad" ]; then
-    _disinto_init_nomad "$dry_run" "$empty"
+    _disinto_init_nomad "$dry_run" "$empty" "$with_services" \
+                        "$import_env" "$import_sops" "$age_key"
     # shellcheck disable=SC2317  # _disinto_init_nomad always exits today;
     # `return` is defensive against future refactors.
     return
@@ -882,7 +1183,6 @@ p.write_text(text)
     echo ""
     echo "[ensure] Forgejo admin user 'disinto-admin'"
     echo "[ensure] 8 bot users: dev-bot, review-bot, planner-bot, gardener-bot, vault-bot, supervisor-bot, predictor-bot, architect-bot"
-    echo "[ensure] 2 llama bot users: dev-qwen, dev-qwen-nightly"
     echo "[ensure] .profile repos for all bots"
     echo "[ensure] repo ${forge_repo} on Forgejo with collaborators"
     echo "[run]    preflight checks"
@@ -1078,19 +1378,6 @@ p.write_text(text)
     echo "Config:  CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC=1 saved to .env"
   fi
 
-  # Write local-Qwen dev agent env keys with safe defaults (#769)
-  if ! grep -q '^ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=' "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
-    cat >> "$env_file" <<'LLAMAENVEOF'
-
-# Local Qwen dev agent (optional) — set to 1 to enable
-ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0
-FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=
-FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=
-ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=
-LLAMAENVEOF
-    echo "Config:  ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT keys written to .env (disabled by default)"
-  fi
-
   # Create labels on remote
   create_labels "$forge_repo" "$forge_url"
 
@@ -1757,6 +2044,118 @@ _regen_file() {
   fi
 }
 
+# Validate that required environment variables are present for all services
+# that reference them in docker-compose.yml
+_validate_env_vars() {
+  local env_file="${FACTORY_ROOT}/.env"
+  local errors=0
+  local -a missing_vars=()
+
+  # Load env vars from .env file into associative array
+  declare -A env_vars
+  if [ -f "$env_file" ]; then
+    while IFS='=' read -r key value; do
+      # Skip empty lines and comments
+      [[ -z "$key" || "$key" =~ ^[[:space:]]*# ]] && continue
+      env_vars["$key"]="$value"
+    done < "$env_file"
+  fi
+
+  # Check for local-model agent services
+  # Each [agents.*] section in projects/*.toml requires:
+  # - FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>
+  # - FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>
+  # - ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL (local model) OR ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (Anthropic backend)
+
+  # Parse projects/*.toml for [agents.*] sections
+  local projects_dir="${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects"
+  for toml in "${projects_dir}"/*.toml; do
+    [ -f "$toml" ] || continue
+
+    # Extract agent config using Python
+    while IFS='|' read -r service_name forge_user base_url _api_key; do
+      [ -n "$service_name" ] || continue
+      [ -n "$forge_user" ] || continue
+
+      # Derive variable names (user -> USER_UPPER)
+      local user_upper
+      user_upper=$(echo "$forge_user" | tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_')
+      local token_var="FORGE_TOKEN_${user_upper}"
+      local pass_var="FORGE_PASS_${user_upper}"
+
+      # Check token
+      if [ -z "${env_vars[$token_var]:-}" ]; then
+        missing_vars+=("$token_var (for agent ${service_name}/${forge_user})")
+        errors=$((errors + 1))
+      fi
+
+      # Check password
+      if [ -z "${env_vars[$pass_var]:-}" ]; then
+        missing_vars+=("$pass_var (for agent ${service_name}/${forge_user})")
+        errors=$((errors + 1))
+      fi
+
+      # Check backend URL or API key (conditional based on base_url presence)
+      if [ -n "$base_url" ]; then
+        # Local model: needs ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL
+        if [ -z "${env_vars[ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL]:-}" ]; then
+          missing_vars+=("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL (for agent ${service_name})")
+          errors=$((errors + 1))
+        fi
+      else
+        # Anthropic backend: needs ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
+        if [ -z "${env_vars[ANTHROPIC_API_KEY]:-}" ]; then
+          missing_vars+=("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (for agent ${service_name})")
+          errors=$((errors + 1))
+        fi
+      fi
+
+    done < <(python3 -c '
+import sys, tomllib, re
+
+with open(sys.argv[1], "rb") as f:
+    cfg = tomllib.load(f)
+
+agents = cfg.get("agents", {})
+for name, config in agents.items():
+    if not isinstance(config, dict):
+        continue
+
+    base_url = config.get("base_url", "")
+    model = config.get("model", "")
+    api_key = config.get("api_key", "")
+    forge_user = config.get("forge_user", f"{name}-bot")
+
+    safe_name = name.lower()
+    safe_name = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]", "-", safe_name)
+
+    print(f"{safe_name}|{forge_user}|{base_url}|{api_key}")
+' "$toml" 2>/dev/null)
+  done
+
+  # Check for legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT services
+  if [ "${env_vars[ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT]:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+    if [ -z "${env_vars[FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA]:-}" ]; then
+      missing_vars+=("FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA (ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1)")
+      errors=$((errors + 1))
+    fi
+    if [ -z "${env_vars[FORGE_PASS_LLAMA]:-}" ]; then
+      missing_vars+=("FORGE_PASS_LLAMA (ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1)")
+      errors=$((errors + 1))
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  if [ "$errors" -gt 0 ]; then
+    echo "Error: missing required environment variables:" >&2
+    for var in "${missing_vars[@]}"; do
+      echo "  - $var" >&2
+    done
+    echo "" >&2
+    echo "Run 'disinto hire-an-agent <name> <role>' to create the agent and write credentials to .env" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
 disinto_up() {
   local compose_file="${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml"
   local caddyfile="${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker/Caddyfile"
@@ -1766,6 +2165,9 @@ disinto_up() {
     exit 1
   fi
 
+  # Validate environment variables before proceeding
+  _validate_env_vars
+
   # Parse --no-regen flag; remaining args pass through to docker compose
   local no_regen=false
   local -a compose_args=()

dev/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Dev Agent
 
 **Role**: Implement issues autonomously — write code, push branches, address

dev/dev-agent.sh

@@ -254,7 +254,11 @@ agent_recover_session
 # WORKTREE SETUP
 # =============================================================================
 status "setting up worktree"
-cd "$REPO_ROOT"
+if ! cd "$REPO_ROOT"; then
+  log "ERROR: REPO_ROOT=${REPO_ROOT} does not exist — cannot cd"
+  log "Check PROJECT_REPO_ROOT vs compose PROJECT_NAME vs TOML name mismatch"
+  exit 1
+fi
 
 # Determine forge remote by matching FORGE_URL host against git remotes
 _forge_host=$(printf '%s' "$FORGE_URL" | sed 's|https\?://||; s|/.*||')

docker/agents/Dockerfile

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ FROM debian:bookworm-slim
 
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
     bash curl git jq tmux python3 python3-pip openssh-client ca-certificates age shellcheck procps gosu \
-    && pip3 install --break-system-packages networkx \
+    && pip3 install --break-system-packages networkx tomlkit \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # Pre-built binaries (copied from docker/agents/bin/)

docker/agents/entrypoint.sh

@@ -17,6 +17,38 @@ set -euo pipefail
 #   - predictor: every 24 hours (288 iterations * 5 min)
 #   - supervisor: every SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL seconds (default: 1200 = 20 min)
 
+# ── Migration check: reject ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT ───────────────────────────────
+# #846: The legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT env flag is no longer supported.
+# Activation is now done exclusively via [agents.X] sections in project TOML.
+# If this legacy flag is detected, fail immediately with a migration message.
+if [ "${ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT:-}" = "1" ]; then
+  cat <<'MIGRATION_ERR'
+FATAL: ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT is no longer supported.
+
+The legacy ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 flag has been removed (#846).
+Activation is now done exclusively via [agents.X] sections in projects/*.toml.
+
+To migrate:
+  1. Remove ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT from your .env or .env.enc file
+  2. Add an [agents.<name>] section to your project TOML:
+
+     [agents.dev-qwen]
+     base_url = "http://your-llama-server:8081"
+     model = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
+     api_key = "sk-no-key-required"
+     roles = ["dev"]
+     forge_user = "dev-qwen"
+     compact_pct = 60
+     poll_interval = 60
+
+  3. Run: disinto init
+  4. Start the agent: docker compose up -d agents-dev-qwen
+
+See docs/agents-llama.md for full details.
+MIGRATION_ERR
+  exit 1
+fi
+
 DISINTO_BAKED="/home/agent/disinto"
 DISINTO_LIVE="/home/agent/repos/_factory"
 DISINTO_DIR="$DISINTO_BAKED"  # start with baked copy; switched to live checkout after bootstrap
@@ -315,6 +347,24 @@ _setup_git_creds
 configure_git_identity
 configure_tea_login
 
+# Parse first available project TOML to get the project name for cloning.
+# This ensures PROJECT_NAME matches the TOML 'name' field, not the compose
+# default of 'project'. The clone will land at /home/agent/repos/<toml_name>
+# and subsequent env exports in the main loop will be consistent.
+if compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  _first_toml=$(compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" | head -1)
+  _pname=$(python3 -c "
+import sys, tomllib
+with open(sys.argv[1], 'rb') as f:
+    print(tomllib.load(f).get('name', ''))
+" "$_first_toml" 2>/dev/null) || _pname=""
+  if [ -n "$_pname" ]; then
+    export PROJECT_NAME="$_pname"
+    export PROJECT_REPO_ROOT="/home/agent/repos/${_pname}"
+    log "Parsed PROJECT_NAME=${PROJECT_NAME} from ${_first_toml}"
+  fi
+fi
+
 # Clone project repo on first run (makes agents self-healing, #589)
 ensure_project_clone
 
@@ -324,9 +374,32 @@ bootstrap_ops_repos
 # Bootstrap factory repo — switch DISINTO_DIR to live checkout (#593)
 bootstrap_factory_repo
 
+# Validate that projects directory has at least one real .toml file (not .example)
+# This prevents the silent-zombie mode where the polling loop matches zero files
+# and does nothing forever.
+validate_projects_dir() {
+  # NOTE: compgen -G exits non-zero when no matches exist, so piping it through
+  # `wc -l` under `set -eo pipefail` aborts the script before the FATAL branch
+  # can log a diagnostic (#877).  Use the conditional form already adopted at
+  # lines above (see bootstrap_factory_repo, PROJECT_NAME parsing).
+  if ! compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    log "FATAL: No real .toml files found in ${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/"
+    log "Expected at least one project config file (e.g., disinto.toml)"
+    log "The directory only contains *.toml.example template files."
+    log "Mount the host ./projects volume or copy real .toml files into the container."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  local toml_count
+  toml_count=$(compgen -G "${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml" | wc -l)
+  log "Projects directory validated: ${toml_count} real .toml file(s) found"
+}
+
 # Initialize state directory for check_active guards
 init_state_dir
 
+# Validate projects directory before entering polling loop
+validate_projects_dir
+
 # Parse AGENT_ROLES env var (default: all agents)
 # Expected format: comma-separated list like "review,dev,gardener"
 AGENT_ROLES="${AGENT_ROLES:-review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor}"

docs/agents-llama.md

@@ -1,59 +1,194 @@
-# agents-llama — Local-Qwen Agents
+# Local-Model Agents
 
-The `agents-llama` service is an optional compose service that runs agents
-backed by a local llama-server instance (e.g. Qwen) instead of the Anthropic
-API. It uses the same Docker image as the main `agents` service but connects to
-a local inference endpoint via `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`.
+Local-model agents run the same agent code as the Claude-backed agents, but
+connect to a local llama-server (or compatible OpenAI-API endpoint) instead of
+the Anthropic API. This document describes the canonical activation flow using
+`disinto hire-an-agent` and `[agents.X]` TOML configuration.
 
-Two profiles are available:
+> **Note:** The legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` env flag has been removed (#846).
+> Activation is now done exclusively via `[agents.X]` sections in project TOML.
 
-| Profile | Service | Roles | Use case |
-|---------|---------|-------|----------|
-| _(default)_ | `agents-llama` | `dev` only | Conservative: single-role soak test |
-| `agents-llama-all` | `agents-llama-all` | all 7 (review, dev, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor) | Pre-migration: validate every role on llama before Nomad cutover |
+## Overview
 
-## Enabling
-
-Set `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` in `.env` (or `.env.enc`) and provide the required
-credentials:
-
-```env
-ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1
-FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=<dev-qwen API token>
-FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=<dev-qwen password>
-ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://host.docker.internal:8081   # llama-server endpoint
-```
-
-Then regenerate the compose file (`disinto init ...`) and bring the stack up.
-
-### Running all 7 roles (agents-llama-all)
-
-```bash
-docker compose --profile agents-llama-all up -d
-```
-
-This starts the `agents-llama-all` container with all 7 bot roles against the
-local llama endpoint. The per-role forge tokens (`FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN`,
-`FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN`, etc.) must be set in `.env` — they are the same tokens
-used by the Claude-backed `agents` container.
+Local-model agents are configured via `[agents.<name>]` sections in
+`projects/<project>.toml`. Each agent gets:
+- Its own Forgejo bot user with dedicated API token and password
+- A dedicated compose service `agents-<name>`
+- Isolated credentials stored as `FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>` and `FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>` in `.env`
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
 - **llama-server** (or compatible OpenAI-API endpoint) running on the host,
-  reachable from inside Docker at the URL set in `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`.
-- A Forgejo bot user (e.g. `dev-qwen`) with its own API token and password,
-  stored as `FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA` / `FORGE_PASS_LLAMA`.
+  reachable from inside Docker at the URL you will configure.
+- A disinto factory already initialized (`disinto init` completed).
+
+## Hiring a local-model agent
+
+Use `disinto hire-an-agent` with `--local-model` to create a bot user and
+configure the agent:
+
+```bash
+# Hire a local-model agent for the dev role
+disinto hire-an-agent dev-qwen dev \
+  --local-model http://10.10.10.1:8081 \
+  --model unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B
+```
+
+The command performs these steps:
+
+1. **Creates a Forgejo user** `dev-qwen` with a random password
+2. **Generates an API token** for the user
+3. **Writes credentials to `.env`**:
+   - `FORGE_TOKEN_DEV_QWEN` — the API token
+   - `FORGE_PASS_DEV_QWEN` — the password
+   - `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` — the llama endpoint (required by the agent)
+4. **Writes `[agents.dev-qwen]` to `projects/<project>.toml`** with:
+   - `base_url`, `model`, `api_key`
+   - `roles = ["dev"]`
+   - `forge_user = "dev-qwen"`
+   - `compact_pct = 60`
+   - `poll_interval = 60`
+5. **Regenerates `docker-compose.yml`** to include the `agents-dev-qwen` service
+
+### Anthropic backend agents
+
+For agents that use Anthropic API instead of a local model, omit `--local-model`:
+
+```bash
+# Anthropic backend agent (requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in environment)
+export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="sk-..."
+disinto hire-an-agent dev-claude dev
+```
+
+This writes `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` to `.env` instead of `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`.
+
+## Activation and running
+
+Once hired, the agent service is added to `docker-compose.yml`. Start the
+service with `docker compose up -d`:
+
+```bash
+# Start all agent services
+docker compose up -d
+
+# Start a single named agent service
+docker compose up -d agents-dev-qwen
+
+# Start multiple named agent services
+docker compose up -d agents-dev-qwen agents-planner
+```
+
+### Stopping agents
+
+```bash
+# Stop a specific agent service
+docker compose down agents-dev-qwen
+
+# Stop all agent services
+docker compose down
+```
+
+## Credential rotation
+
+Re-running `disinto hire-an-agent <same-name>` with the same parameters rotates
+credentials idempotently:
+
+```bash
+# Re-hire the same agent to rotate token and password
+disinto hire-an-agent dev-qwen dev \
+  --local-model http://10.10.10.1:8081 \
+  --model unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B
+
+# The command will:
+# 1. Detect the user already exists
+# 2. Reset the password to a new random value
+# 3. Create a new API token
+# 4. Update .env with the new credentials
+```
+
+This is the recommended way to rotate agent credentials. The `.env` file is
+updated in place, so no manual editing is required.
+
+If you need to manually rotate credentials:
+1. Generate a new token in Forgejo admin UI
+2. Edit `.env` and replace `FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>` and `FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>`
+3. Restart the agent service: `docker compose restart agents-<name>`
+
+## Configuration reference
+
+### Environment variables (`.env`)
+
+| Variable | Description | Example |
+|----------|-------------|---------|
+| `FORGE_TOKEN_<USER_UPPER>` | Forgejo API token for the bot user | `FORGE_TOKEN_DEV_QWEN` |
+| `FORGE_PASS_<USER_UPPER>` | Forgejo password for the bot user | `FORGE_PASS_DEV_QWEN` |
+| `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` | Local llama endpoint (local model agents) | `http://host.docker.internal:8081` |
+| `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | Anthropic API key (Anthropic backend agents) | `sk-...` |
+
+### Project TOML (`[agents.<name>]` section)
+
+```toml
+[agents.dev-qwen]
+base_url = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
+api_key = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles = ["dev"]
+forge_user = "dev-qwen"
+compact_pct = 60
+poll_interval = 60
+```
+
+| Field | Description |
+|-------|-------------|
+| `base_url` | llama-server endpoint |
+| `model` | Model name (for logging/identification) |
+| `api_key` | Required by API; set to placeholder for llama |
+| `roles` | Agent roles this instance handles |
+| `forge_user` | Forgejo bot username |
+| `compact_pct` | Context compaction threshold (lower = more aggressive) |
+| `poll_interval` | Seconds between polling cycles |
 
 ## Behaviour
 
-- `agents-llama`: `AGENT_ROLES=dev` — only picks up dev work.
-- `agents-llama-all`: `AGENT_ROLES=review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor` — runs all 7 roles.
+- Each agent runs with `AGENT_ROLES` set to its configured roles
 - `CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE=60` — more aggressive compaction for smaller
-  context windows.
-- Serialises on the llama-server's single KV cache (AD-002).
+  context windows
+- Agents serialize on the llama-server's single KV cache (AD-002)
 
-## Disabling
+## Troubleshooting
 
-Set `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=0` (or leave it unset) and regenerate. The service
-block is omitted entirely from `docker-compose.yml`; the stack starts cleanly
-without it.
+### Agent service not starting
+
+Check that the service was created by `disinto hire-an-agent`:
+
+```bash
+docker compose config | grep -A5 "agents-dev-qwen"
+```
+
+If the service is missing, re-run `disinto hire-an-agent dev-qwen dev` to
+regenerate `docker-compose.yml`.
+
+### Model endpoint unreachable
+
+Verify llama-server is accessible from inside Docker:
+
+```bash
+docker compose -f docker-compose.yml exec agents curl -sf http://host.docker.internal:8081/health
+```
+
+If using a custom host IP, update `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` in `.env`:
+
+```bash
+# Update the base URL
+sed -i 's|^ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=.*|ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://192.168.1.100:8081|' .env
+
+# Restart the agent
+docker compose restart agents-dev-qwen
+```
+
+### Invalid agent name
+
+Agent names must match `^[a-z]([a-z0-9]|-[a-z0-9])*$` (lowercase letters, digits,
+hyphens; starts with letter, ends with alphanumeric). Invalid names like
+`dev-qwen2` (trailing digit is OK) or `dev--qwen` (consecutive hyphens) will
+be rejected.

docs/nomad-migration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+<!-- last-reviewed: (new file, S2.5 #883) -->
+# Nomad+Vault migration — cutover-day runbook
+
+`disinto init --backend=nomad` is the single entry-point that turns a fresh
+LXC (with the disinto repo cloned) into a running Nomad+Vault cluster with
+policies applied, JWT workload-identity auth configured, secrets imported
+from the old docker stack, and services deployed.
+
+## Cutover-day invocation
+
+On the new LXC, as root (or an operator with NOPASSWD sudo):
+
+```bash
+# Copy the plaintext .env + sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc + age keyfile
+# from the old box first (out of band — SSH, USB, whatever your ops
+# procedure allows). Then:
+
+sudo ./bin/disinto init \
+  --backend=nomad \
+  --import-env   /tmp/.env \
+  --import-sops  /tmp/.env.vault.enc \
+  --age-key      /tmp/keys.txt \
+  --with         forgejo
+```
+
+This runs, in order:
+
+1. **`lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh`** (S0) — installs Nomad + Vault
+   binaries, writes `/etc/nomad.d/*`, initializes Vault, starts both
+   services, waits for the Nomad node to become ready.
+2. **`tools/vault-apply-policies.sh`** (S2.1) — syncs every
+   `vault/policies/*.hcl` into Vault as an ACL policy. Idempotent.
+3. **`lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`** (S2.3) — enables Vault's
+   JWT auth method at `jwt-nomad`, points it at Nomad's JWKS, writes
+   one role per policy, reloads Nomad so jobs can exchange
+   workload-identity tokens for Vault tokens. Idempotent.
+4. **`tools/vault-import.sh`** (S2.2) — reads `/tmp/.env` and the
+   sops-decrypted `/tmp/.env.vault.enc`, writes them to the KV paths
+   matching the S2.1 policy layout (`kv/disinto/bots/*`, `kv/disinto/shared/*`,
+   `kv/disinto/runner/*`). Idempotent (overwrites KV v2 data in place).
+5. **`lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh forgejo`** (S1) — validates + runs the
+   `nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl` jobspec. Forgejo reads its admin creds from
+   Vault via the `template` stanza (S2.4).
+
+## Flag summary
+
+| Flag | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `--backend=nomad` | Switch the init dispatcher to the Nomad+Vault path (instead of docker compose). |
+| `--empty` | Bring the cluster up, skip policies/auth/import/deploy. Escape hatch for debugging. |
+| `--with forgejo[,…]` | Deploy these services after the cluster is up. |
+| `--import-env PATH` | Plaintext `.env` from the old stack. Optional. |
+| `--import-sops PATH` | Sops-encrypted `.env.vault.enc` from the old stack. Requires `--age-key`. |
+| `--age-key PATH` | Age keyfile used to decrypt `--import-sops`. Requires `--import-sops`. |
+| `--dry-run` | Print the full plan (cluster-up + policies + auth + import + deploy) and exit. Touches nothing. |
+
+### Flag validation
+
+- `--import-sops` without `--age-key` → error.
+- `--age-key` without `--import-sops` → error.
+- `--import-env` alone (no sops) → OK (imports just the plaintext `.env`).
+- `--backend=docker` with any `--import-*` flag → error.
+- `--empty` with any `--import-*` flag → error (mutually exclusive: `--empty`
+  skips the import step, so pairing them silently discards the import
+  intent).
+
+## Idempotency
+
+Every layer is idempotent by design. Re-running the same command on an
+already-provisioned box is a no-op at every step:
+
+- **Cluster-up:** second run detects running `nomad`/`vault` systemd
+  units and state files, skips re-init.
+- **Policies:** byte-for-byte compare against on-server policy text;
+  "unchanged" for every untouched file.
+- **Auth:** skips auth-method create if `jwt-nomad/` already enabled,
+  skips config write if the JWKS + algs match, skips server.hcl write if
+  the file on disk is identical to the repo copy.
+- **Import:** KV v2 writes overwrite in place (same path, same keys,
+  same values → no new version).
+- **Deploy:** `nomad job run` is declarative; same jobspec → no new
+  allocation.
+
+## Dry-run
+
+```bash
+./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad \
+  --import-env /tmp/.env \
+  --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc \
+  --age-key /tmp/keys.txt \
+  --with forgejo \
+  --dry-run
+```
+
+Prints the five-section plan — cluster-up, policies, auth, import,
+deploy — with every path and every argv that would be executed. No
+network, no sudo, no state mutation. See
+`tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats` for the exact output shape.
+
+## No-import path
+
+If you already have `kv/disinto/*` seeded by other means (manual
+`vault kv put`, a replica, etc.), omit all three `--import-*` flags.
+`disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo` still applies policies,
+configures auth, and deploys — but skips the import step with:
+
+```
+[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services
+```
+
+Forgejo's template stanza will fail to render (and thus the allocation
+will stall) until those KV paths exist — so either import them or seed
+them first.
+
+## Secret hygiene
+
+- Never log a secret value. The CLI only prints paths (`--import-env`,
+  `--age-key`) and KV *paths* (`kv/disinto/bots/review/token`), never
+  the values themselves. `tools/vault-import.sh` is the only thing that
+  reads the values, and it pipes them directly into Vault's HTTP API.
+- The age keyfile must be mode 0400 — `vault-import.sh` refuses to
+  source a keyfile with looser permissions.
+- `VAULT_ADDR` must be localhost during import — the import tool
+  refuses to run against a remote Vault, preventing accidental exposure.

formulas/release.sh

@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ log "Tagged disinto/agents:${RELEASE_VERSION}"
 
 log "Step 6/6: Restarting agent containers"
 
-docker compose stop agents agents-llama 2>/dev/null || true
-docker compose up -d agents agents-llama
+docker compose stop agents 2>/dev/null || true
+docker compose up -d agents
 log "Agent containers restarted"
 
 # ── Done ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

formulas/release.toml

@@ -189,10 +189,10 @@ Restart agent containers to use the new image.
    - docker compose pull agents
 
 2. Stop and remove existing agent containers:
-   - docker compose down agents agents-llama 2>/dev/null || true
+   - docker compose down agents
 
 3. Start agents with new image:
-   - docker compose up -d agents agents-llama
+   - docker compose up -d agents
 
 4. Wait for containers to be healthy:
    - for i in {1..30}; do
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Restart agent containers to use the new image.
    - done
 
 5. Verify containers are running:
-   - docker compose ps agents agents-llama
+   - docker compose ps agents
 
 6. Log restart:
    - echo "Restarted agents containers"

gardener/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Gardener Agent
 
 **Role**: Backlog grooming — detect duplicate issues, missing acceptance

gardener/pending-actions.json

@@ -1,7 +1,117 @@
 [
   {
     "action": "edit_body",
-    "issue": 835,
-    "body": "Bugfix for S0.1 (#821). Discovered during Step 0 end-to-end verification on a fresh LXC.\n\n## Symptom\n\n```\n$ ./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad --empty\nError: --empty is only valid with --backend=nomad\n```\n\nThe error is nonsensical — `--backend=nomad` is right there.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`bin/disinto` → `disinto_init` (around line 710) consumes the first positional arg as `repo_url` **before** the argparse `while` loop runs:\n\n```bash\ndisinto_init() {\n  local repo_url=\"${1:-}\"\n  if [ -z \"$repo_url\" ]; then\n    echo \"Error: repo URL required\" >&2\n    ...\n  fi\n  shift\n  # ... then while-loop parses flags ...\n}\n```\n\nSo `disinto init --backend=nomad --empty` becomes:\n- `repo_url = \"--backend=nomad\"` (swallowed)\n- `--empty` seen by loop → `empty=true`\n- `backend` stays at default `\"docker\"`\n- Validation at line 747: `empty=true && backend != \"nomad\"` → error\n\n## Why repo_url is wrong for nomad\n\nFor `--backend=nomad`, the cluster-up flow doesn't clone anything — the LXC already has the repo cloned by the operator. `repo_url` is a docker-backend concept.\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `disinto_init`, move backend detection to **before** the `repo_url` consumption, and make `repo_url` conditional on `backend=docker`:\n\n```bash\ndisinto_init() {\n  # Pre-scan for --backend to know whether repo_url is required\n  local backend=\"docker\"\n  for arg in \"$@\"; do\n    case \"$arg\" in\n      --backend) ;;                           # handled below\n      --backend=*) backend=\"${arg#--backend=}\" ;;\n    esac\n  done\n  # Also handle space-separated form\n  local i=1\n  while [ $i -le $# ]; do\n    if [ \"${!i}\" = \"--backend\" ]; then\n      i=$((i+1))\n      backend=\"${!i}\"\n    fi\n    i=$((i+1))\n  done\n\n  local repo_url=\"\"\n  if [ \"$backend\" = \"docker\" ]; then\n    repo_url=\"${1:-}\"\n    if [ -z \"$repo_url\" ] || [[ \"$repo_url\" == --* ]]; then\n      echo \"Error: repo URL required for docker backend\" >&2\n      echo \"Usage: disinto init <repo-url> [options]\" >&2\n      exit 1\n    fi\n    shift\n  fi\n  # ... rest of argparse unchanged, it re-reads --backend cleanly\n```\n\nSimpler alternative: if first arg starts with `--`, assume no positional and skip repo_url consumption entirely (covers nomad + any future `--help`-style invocation).\n\nEither shape is fine; pick the cleaner one.\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad --empty` runs `lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` without error on a clean LXC.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run` prints the 9-step plan and exits 0.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init <repo-url>` (docker path) behaves identically to today — existing smoke path passes.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init` (no args, docker implied) still errors with the \"repo URL required\" message.\n- [ ] `./bin/disinto init --backend=docker` (no repo) errors helpfully — not \"Unknown option: --backend=docker\".\n- [ ] shellcheck clean.\n\n## Verified regression case from Step 0 testing\n\nOn a fresh Ubuntu 24.04 LXC, after `./lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` was invoked directly (workaround), the cluster came up healthy end-to-end:\n\n- Nomad node status: 1 node ready\n- Vault status: Sealed=false, Initialized=true\n- Re-run of cluster-up.sh was fully idempotent\n\nSo the bug is isolated to `bin/disinto` argparse; the rest of the Step 0 code path is solid. This fix unblocks the formal Step 0 acceptance test.\n\n## Labels / meta\n\n- `[nomad-step-0] S0.1-fix` — no dependencies; gates Step 1.\n\n## Affected files\n\n- `bin/disinto` — `disinto_init()` function, around line 710: pre-scan for `--backend` before consuming `repo_url` positional argument\n"
+    "issue": 900,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #897.\n\n## Problem\n\nThe policy at `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` grants:\n\n```hcl\npath \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n```\n\nBut the consul-template stanza in `nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl` reads:\n\n```\n{{- with secret \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\" -}}\n```\n\nVault glob `/*` requires at least one path segment after `forgejo/` (e.g. `forgejo/subkey`). It does **not** match the bare path `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo` that the template actually calls. Vault ACL longest-prefix matching: `forgejo/*` is never hit for a request to `forgejo`.\n\nRuntime consequence: consul-template `with` block receives a 403 permission denied → evaluates to empty (false) → `else` branch renders `seed-me` placeholder values → Forgejo starts with obviously-wrong secrets despite `vault-seed-forgejo.sh` having run successfully.\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the glob with an exact path in `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl`:\n\n```hcl\npath \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\npath \"kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo\" {\n  capabilities = [\"list\", \"read\"]\n}\n```\n\n(The `/*` glob is only useful if future subkeys are written under `forgejo/`; the current design stores both secrets in a single KV document at the `forgejo` path.)\n\nThis is a pre-existing defect in `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl`; that file was not changed by PR #897.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review*\n\n## Affected files\n- `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` — replace glob path with exact path + metadata path\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl` grants exact path `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo` (not `forgejo/*`)\n- [ ] Metadata path `kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo` is also granted read+list\n- [ ] consul-template `with secret \"kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo\"` resolves without 403 (verified via `vault policy read service-forgejo`)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean (no shell changes expected)\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 900,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 898,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #889.\n\n## Problem\n\n`tools/vault-import.sh` serializes each entry in `ops_data` as `\"${source_value}|${status}\"` (line 498). Extraction at lines 510-511 uses `${data%%|*}` (first field) and `${data##*|}` (last field). If `source_value` contains a literal `|`, `${data%%|*}` truncates it to the first segment, silently writing a corrupted value to Vault.\n\nThe same separator is used in `paths_to_write` (line 519) to join multiple kv-pairs for a path. When `IFS=\"|\"` splits the string back into an array (line 540), a value containing `|` is split across array elements, corrupting the write.\n\n## Failure mode\n\nAny secret value with a pipe character (e.g. a generated password or composed token like `abc|xyz`) is silently truncated or misrouted on import. No error is emitted.\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the `|`-delimited string with a bash indexed array for accumulating per-path kv pairs, eliminating the need for a delimiter that conflicts with possible value characters.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #889*\n\n## Affected files\n- `tools/vault-import.sh` — replace pipe-delimited string accumulation with bash indexed arrays (lines ~498–540)\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] A secret value containing `|` (e.g. `abc|xyz`) is imported to Vault without truncation or corruption\n- [ ] No regression for values without `|`\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 898,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 893,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #892.\n\n## Problem\n\n`disinto init --build` generates the `agents:` service by first emitting `image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}` and then running a `sed -i` substitution (`lib/generators.sh:793`) that replaces the `image:` line with a `build:` block. The substitution does not add `pull_policy: build`.\n\nResult: `docker compose up` with `--build`-generated compose files still uses the cached image for the base `agents:` service, even when `docker/agents/` source has changed — the same silent-stale-image bug that #887 fixed for the three local-model service stanzas.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe `sed` substitution on line 793 should also inject `pull_policy: build` after the emitted `build:` block.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #892*\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` (line ~793) — add `pull_policy: build` to the agents service sed substitution\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `disinto init --build`-generated compose file includes `pull_policy: build` in the `agents:` service stanza\n- [ ] `docker compose up` rebuilds the agents image from local source when `docker/agents/` changes\n- [ ] Non-`--build` compose generation is unchanged\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 893,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 890,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #888.\n\n## Problem\n\n`lib/hvault.sh` functions `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, and `hvault_kv_list` all hardcode `secret/data/` and `secret/metadata/` as KV v2 path prefixes (lines 117, 157, 173).\n\nThe Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, #879) establishes `kv/` as the mount name for all factory secrets — every policy in `vault/policies/*.hcl` grants ACL on `kv/data/disinto/...` paths.\n\nIf any agent calls `hvault_kv_get` after the migration, Vault will route the request to `secret/data/...` but the token only holds ACL for `kv/data/...`, producing a 403 Forbidden.\n\n## Fix\n\nChange the mount prefix in `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, and `hvault_kv_list` from `secret/` to `kv/`, or make the mount name configurable via `VAULT_KV_MOUNT` (defaulting to `kv`). Coordinate with S2.2 (#880) which writes secrets into the `kv/` mount.\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review of PR #888*\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/hvault.sh` — change `secret/data/` and `secret/metadata/` prefixes to `kv/data/` and `kv/metadata/` (lines ~117, 157, 173); optionally make configurable via `VAULT_KV_MOUNT`\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `hvault_kv_get`, `hvault_kv_put`, `hvault_kv_list` use `kv/` mount prefix (not `secret/`)\n- [ ] Agents can read/write KV paths that policies in `vault/policies/*.hcl` grant (no 403)\n- [ ] Optionally: `VAULT_KV_MOUNT` env var overrides the mount name (defaults to `kv`)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 890,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 877,
+    "body": "Flagged by AI reviewer in PR #875.\n\n## Problem\n\n`validate_projects_dir()` in `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` uses a command substitution that triggers `set -e` before the intended error-logging branch runs:\n\n```bash\ntoml_count=$(compgen -G \"${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml\" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)\n```\n\nWhen no `.toml` files are present, `compgen -G` exits 1. With `pipefail`, the pipeline exits 1. `set -e` causes the script to exit before `if [ \"$toml_count\" -eq 0 ]` is evaluated, so the FATAL diagnostic messages are never printed. The container still fast-fails (correct outcome), but the operator sees no explanation.\n\nEvery other `compgen -G` usage in the file uses the safer conditional pattern (lines 259, 322).\n\n## Fix\n\nReplace the `wc -l` pattern with:\n\n```bash\nif ! compgen -G \"${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/*.toml\" >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n  log \"FATAL: No real .toml files found in ${DISINTO_DIR}/projects/\"\n  ...\n  exit 1\nfi\n```\n\n---\n*Auto-created from AI review*\n\n## Affected files\n- `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` — fix `validate_projects_dir()` to use conditional compgen pattern instead of `wc -l` pipeline\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] When no `.toml` files are present, the FATAL message is printed before the container exits\n- [ ] Container still exits non-zero in that case\n- [ ] Matches the pattern already used at lines 259 and 322\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 877,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 773,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 883,
+    "body": "Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. **Step 2 — Vault policies + workload identity + secrets import.**\n\n~~**Blocked by: #880 (S2.2), #881 (S2.3).**~~ Dependencies closed; unblocked.\n\n## Goal\n\nWire the Step-2 building blocks (import, auth, policies) into `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` so a single command on a fresh LXC provisions cluster + policies + auth + imports secrets + deploys services.\n\n## Scope\n\nAdd flags to `disinto init --backend=nomad`:\n\n- `--import-env PATH` — points at an existing `.env` (from old stack).\n- `--import-sops PATH` — points at the sops-encrypted `.env.vault.enc`.\n- `--age-key PATH` — points at the sops age keyfile (required if `--import-sops` is set).\n\nFlow when any of `--import-*` is set:\n\n1. `cluster-up.sh` (Step 0, unchanged).\n2. `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (S2.1, idempotent).\n3. `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` (S2.3, idempotent).\n4. `tools/vault-import.sh --env PATH --sops PATH --age-key PATH` (S2.2).\n5. If `--with <service>` was also passed, `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh <service>` (Step 1, unchanged).\n6. Final summary: cluster + policies + auth + imported secrets count + deployed services + ports.\n\nFlow when **no** import flags are set:\n- Skip step 4; still apply policies + auth.\n- Log: `[import] no --import-env/--import-sops — skipping; set them or seed kv/disinto/* manually before deploying secret-dependent services`.\n\nFlag validation:\n- `--import-sops` without `--age-key` → error.\n- `--age-key` without `--import-sops` → error.\n- `--import-env` alone (no sops) → OK.\n- `--backend=docker` + any `--import-*` → error.\n\n## Affected files\n- `bin/disinto` — add `--import-env`, `--import-sops`, `--age-key` flags to `init --backend=nomad`\n- `docs/nomad-migration.md` (new) — cutover-day invocation shape\n- `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` (S2.3) — called as step 3\n- `tools/vault-import.sh` (S2.2) — called as step 4\n- `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (S2.1) — called as step 2\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] `disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --with forgejo` completes: cluster up, policies applied, JWT auth configured, KV populated, Forgejo deployed reading Vault secrets\n- [ ] Re-running is a no-op at every layer\n- [ ] `--import-sops` without `--age-key` exits with a clear error\n- [ ] `--backend=docker` with `--import-env` exits with a clear error\n- [ ] `--dry-run` prints the full plan, touches nothing\n- [ ] Never logs a secret value\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "remove_label",
+    "issue": 883,
+    "label": "blocked"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 883,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 884,
+    "body": "Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. **Step 2 — Vault policies + workload identity + secrets import.**\n\nS2.1 (#879) is now closed; this step has no blocking dependencies.\n\n## Goal\n\nExtend the Woodpecker CI to validate Vault policy HCL files under `vault/policies/` and role definitions.\n\n## Scope\n\nExtend `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`:\n\n- `vault policy fmt -check vault/policies/*.hcl` — fails on unformatted HCL.\n- `for f in vault/policies/*.hcl; do vault policy validate \"$f\"; done` — syntax + semantic validation (requires a dev-mode vault spun inline).\n- If `vault/roles.yaml` exists: yamllint check + custom validator that each role references a policy file that actually exists in `vault/policies/`.\n- Secret-scan gate: ensure no policy file contains what looks like a literal secret.\n- Trigger: on any PR touching `vault/policies/`, `vault/roles.yaml`, or `lib/init/nomad/vault-*.sh`.\n\nAlso:\n- Add `vault/policies/AGENTS.md` cross-reference: policy lifecycle (add policy HCL → update roles.yaml → add Vault KV path), what CI enforces, common failure modes.\n\n## Non-goals\n\n- No runtime check against a real cluster.\n- No enforcement of specific naming conventions beyond what S2.1 docs describe.\n\n## Affected files\n- `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — add vault policy fmt + validate + roles.yaml gates\n- `vault/policies/AGENTS.md` (new) — policy lifecycle documentation\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] Deliberately broken policy HCL (typo in `path` block) fails CI with the vault-fmt error\n- [ ] Policy that references a non-existent capability (e.g. `\"frobnicate\"`) fails validation\n- [ ] `vault/roles.yaml` referencing a policy not in `vault/policies/` fails CI\n- [ ] Clean PRs pass within normal pipeline time budget\n- [ ] Existing S0.5 + S1.4 CI gates unaffected\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean on any shell added\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "remove_label",
+    "issue": 884,
+    "label": "blocked"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 884,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 846,
+    "body": "## Problem\n\nLlama-backed sidecar agents can be activated through two different mechanisms:\n\n1. **Legacy:** `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` env flag toggles a hardcoded `agents-llama` service block in `docker-compose.yml`.\n2. **Modern:** `[agents.X]` TOML block consumed by `hire-an-agent`, emitting a service per block.\n\nNeither the docs nor the CLI explain which path wins. Setting both produces a YAML `mapping key \"agents-llama\" already defined` error from compose because the service block is duplicated.\n\n## Sub-symptom: env-var naming collision\n\nThe two paths key secrets differently:\n\n- Legacy: `FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA`, `FORGE_PASS_LLAMA`.\n- Modern: `FORGE_TOKEN_<FORGE_USER_UPPER>` — e.g. `FORGE_TOKEN_DEV_QWEN`.\n\nA user migrating between paths ends up with two sets of secrets in `.env`, neither cleanly mapped to the currently-active service block. Silent auth failures (401 from Forgejo) follow.\n\n## Proposal\n\n- Pick the TOML `[agents.X]` path as canonical.\n- Remove the `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` branch and its hardcoded service block from the generator.\n- Detection of `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` in `.env` at `disinto up` time: hard-fail immediately with a migration message (option (a) — simpler, no external consumers depend on this flag).\n\n~~Dependencies: #845, #847~~ — both now closed; unblocked.\n\nRelated: #845, #847.\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` — remove `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` branch and hardcoded `agents-llama:` service block\n- `docker/agents/entrypoint.sh` — detect `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` in env, emit migration error\n- `.env.example` — remove `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT`\n- `docs/agents-llama.md` — update to document TOML `[agents.X]` as the one canonical path\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] One documented activation path: TOML `[agents.X]` block\n- [ ] `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT` removed from compose generator; presence in `.env` at startup triggers a clear migration error naming the replacement\n- [ ] `.env.example` and `docs/agents-llama.md` updated\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "remove_label",
+    "issue": 846,
+    "label": "blocked"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 846,
+    "label": "backlog"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "edit_body",
+    "issue": 850,
+    "body": "## Problem\n\nWhen the compose generator emits the same service name twice — e.g. both the legacy `ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1` branch and a matching `[agents.llama]` TOML block produce an `agents-llama:` key — the failure is deferred all the way to `docker compose` YAML parsing:\n\n```\nfailed to parse /home/johba/disinto/docker-compose.yml: yaml: construct errors:\n  line 4: line 431: mapping key \"agents-llama\" already defined at line 155\n```\n\nBy then, the user has already paid the cost of: pre-build binary downloads, generator run, Caddyfile regeneration. The only hint about what went wrong is a line number in a generated file. Root cause (dual activation) is not surfaced.\n\n## Fix\n\nAdd a generate-time guard to `lib/generators.sh`:\n\n- After collecting all service blocks to emit, compare the set of service names against duplicates.\n- If a duplicate is detected, abort with a clear message naming both source of truth (e.g. `\"agents-llama\" emitted twice — from ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1 and from [agents.llama] in projects/disinto.toml; remove one`).\n\nEven after #846 resolves (one canonical activation path), this guard remains valuable as a safety net against future regressions or user misconfiguration (e.g. two TOML blocks with same `forge_user`).\n\n## Prior art: PR #872 (closed, branch `fix/issue-850` retained)\n\ndev-qwen's first attempt (`db009e3`) landed the dup-detection logic in `lib/generators.sh` correctly (unit test `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` passes all 3 cases), but the smoke test fails on CI.\n\n**Why the smoke test fails:** sections 1-7 of `smoke-init.sh` already run `bin/disinto init`, materializing `docker-compose.yml`. Section 8 re-invokes `bin/disinto init` to verify the dup guard fires — but `_generate_compose_impl` early-returns with `\"Compose: already exists, skipping\"` before reaching the dup-check.\n\n**Suggested fix:** in `tests/smoke-init.sh` section 8 (around line 452, before the second `bin/disinto init` invocation), add:\n\n```bash\nrm -f \"${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml\"\n```\n\nso the generator actually runs and the dup-detection path is exercised. Do **not** hoist the dup-check above the early-return.\n\nThe branch `fix/issue-850` is preserved as a starting point — pick up from `db009e3` and patch the smoke-test cleanup.\n\nRelated: #846.\n\n## Affected files\n- `lib/generators.sh` — duplicate service name check after collecting all service blocks\n- `tests/smoke-init.sh` — section 8: add `rm -f docker-compose.yml` before second `disinto init`\n- `tests/test-duplicate-service-detection.sh` (likely already correct from prior art)\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n- [ ] Running `disinto up` with a known duplicate activation produces a clear generator-time error naming both conflicting sources\n- [ ] Exit code non-zero before `docker compose` is invoked\n- [ ] Smoke test section 8 passes on CI (dup guard is actually exercised)\n- [ ] `shellcheck` clean\n"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "remove_label",
+    "issue": 850,
+    "label": "blocked"
+  },
+  {
+    "action": "add_label",
+    "issue": 850,
+    "label": "backlog"
   }
 ]

lib/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Shared Helpers (`lib/`)
 
 All agents source `lib/env.sh` as their first action. Additional helpers are
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ sourced as needed.
 | `lib/sprint-filer.sh` | Post-merge sub-issue filer for sprint PRs. Invoked by the `.woodpecker/ops-filer.yml` pipeline after a sprint PR merges to ops repo `main`. Parses `<!-- filer:begin --> ... <!-- filer:end -->` blocks from sprint PR bodies to extract sub-issue definitions, creates them on the project repo using `FORGE_FILER_TOKEN` (narrow-scope `filer-bot` identity with `issues:write` only), adds `in-progress` label to the parent vision issue, and handles vision lifecycle closure when all sub-issues are closed. Uses `filer_api_all()` for paginated fetches. Idempotent: uses `<!-- decomposed-from: #<vision>, sprint: <slug>, id: <id> -->` markers to skip already-filed issues. Requires `FORGE_FILER_TOKEN`, `FORGE_API`, `FORGE_API_BASE`, `FORGE_OPS_REPO`. | `.woodpecker/ops-filer.yml` (CI pipeline on ops repo) |
 | `lib/hire-agent.sh` | `disinto_hire_an_agent()` — user creation, `.profile` repo setup, formula copying, branch protection, and state marker creation for hiring a new agent. Requires `FORGE_URL`, `FORGE_TOKEN`, `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PROJECT_NAME`. Extracted from `bin/disinto`. | bin/disinto (hire) |
 | `lib/release.sh` | `disinto_release()` — vault TOML creation, branch setup on ops repo, PR creation, and auto-merge request for a versioned release. `_assert_release_globals()` validates required env vars. Requires `FORGE_URL`, `FORGE_TOKEN`, `FORGE_OPS_REPO`, `FACTORY_ROOT`, `PRIMARY_BRANCH`. Extracted from `bin/disinto`. | bin/disinto (release) |
-| `lib/hvault.sh` | HashiCorp Vault helper module. `hvault_kv_get(PATH, [KEY])` — read KV v2 secret, optionally extract one key. `hvault_kv_put(PATH, KEY=VAL ...)` — write KV v2 secret. `hvault_kv_list(PATH)` — list keys at a KV path. `hvault_policy_apply(NAME, FILE)` — idempotent policy upsert. `hvault_jwt_login(ROLE, JWT)` — exchange JWT for short-lived token. `hvault_token_lookup()` — returns TTL/policies/accessor for current token. All functions use `VAULT_ADDR` + `VAULT_TOKEN` from env (fallback: `/etc/vault.d/root.token`), emit structured JSON errors to stderr on failure. Tests: `tests/lib-hvault.bats` (requires `vault server -dev`). | Not sourced at runtime yet — pure scaffolding for Nomad+Vault migration (#799) |
-| `lib/init/nomad/` | Nomad+Vault Step 0 installer scripts. `cluster-up.sh` — idempotent orchestrator that runs all steps in order (installs packages, writes HCL, enables systemd units, unseals Vault); uses `poll_until_healthy()` helper for deduped readiness polling. `install.sh` — installs pinned Nomad+Vault apt packages. `vault-init.sh` — initializes Vault (unseal keys → `/etc/vault.d/`), creates dev-persisted unseal unit. `lib-systemd.sh` — shared systemd unit helpers. `systemd-nomad.sh`, `systemd-vault.sh` — write and enable service units. Idempotent: each step checks current state before acting. Sourced and called by `cluster-up.sh`; not sourced by agents. | `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` |
+| `lib/hvault.sh` | HashiCorp Vault helper module. `hvault_kv_get(PATH, [KEY])` — read KV v2 secret, optionally extract one key. `hvault_kv_put(PATH, KEY=VAL ...)` — write KV v2 secret. `hvault_kv_list(PATH)` — list keys at a KV path. `hvault_get_or_empty(PATH)` — GET /v1/PATH; 200→raw body, 404→empty, else structured error + return 1 (used by sync scripts to distinguish "absent, create" from hard failure without tripping errexit, #881). `hvault_policy_apply(NAME, FILE)` — idempotent policy upsert. `hvault_jwt_login(ROLE, JWT)` — exchange JWT for short-lived token. `hvault_token_lookup()` — returns TTL/policies/accessor for current token. All functions use `VAULT_ADDR` + `VAULT_TOKEN` from env (fallback: `/etc/vault.d/root.token`), emit structured JSON errors to stderr on failure. Tests: `tests/lib-hvault.bats` (requires `vault server -dev`). | `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh`, `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh` |
+| `lib/init/nomad/` | Nomad+Vault installer scripts. `cluster-up.sh` — idempotent Step-0 orchestrator that runs all steps in order (installs packages, writes HCL, enables systemd units, unseals Vault); uses `poll_until_healthy()` helper for deduped readiness polling. `install.sh` — installs pinned Nomad+Vault apt packages. `vault-init.sh` — initializes Vault (unseal keys → `/etc/vault.d/`), creates dev-persisted unseal unit. `lib-systemd.sh` — shared systemd unit helpers. `systemd-nomad.sh`, `systemd-vault.sh` — write and enable service units. `vault-nomad-auth.sh` — Step-2 script that enables Vault's JWT auth at path `jwt-nomad`, writes the JWKS/algs config pointing at Nomad's workload-identity signer, delegates role sync to `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`, installs `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl`, and SIGHUPs `nomad.service` if the file changed (#881). Idempotent: each step checks current state before acting. Sourced and called by `cluster-up.sh`; not sourced by agents. | `bin/disinto init --backend=nomad` |

lib/action-vault.sh

@@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ vault_request() {
   # Validate TOML content
   local tmp_toml
   tmp_toml=$(mktemp /tmp/vault-XXXXXX.toml)
-  trap 'rm -f "$tmp_toml"' RETURN
 
   printf '%s' "$toml_content" > "$tmp_toml"
 
@@ -136,6 +135,7 @@ vault_request() {
   local vault_env="${FACTORY_ROOT:-$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)}/action-vault/vault-env.sh"
   if [ ! -f "$vault_env" ]; then
     echo "ERROR: vault-env.sh not found at $vault_env" >&2
+    rm -f "$tmp_toml"
     return 1
   fi
 
@@ -145,11 +145,15 @@ vault_request() {
   if ! source "$vault_env"; then
     FORGE_TOKEN="${_saved_forge_token:-}"
     echo "ERROR: failed to source vault-env.sh" >&2
+    rm -f "$tmp_toml"
     return 1
   fi
   # Restore caller's FORGE_TOKEN after validation
   FORGE_TOKEN="${_saved_forge_token:-}"
 
+  # Set trap AFTER sourcing vault-env.sh to avoid RETURN trap firing during source
+  trap 'rm -f "$tmp_toml"' RETURN
+
   # Run validation
   if ! validate_vault_action "$tmp_toml"; then
     echo "ERROR: TOML validation failed" >&2

lib/forge-setup.sh

@@ -356,16 +356,6 @@ setup_forge() {
     [predictor-bot]="FORGE_PREDICTOR_PASS"
     [architect-bot]="FORGE_ARCHITECT_PASS"
   )
-  # Llama bot users (local-model agents) — separate from main agents
-  # Each llama agent gets its own Forgejo user, token, and password
-  local -A llama_token_vars=(
-    [dev-qwen]="FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA"
-    [dev-qwen-nightly]="FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA_NIGHTLY"
-  )
-  local -A llama_pass_vars=(
-    [dev-qwen]="FORGE_PASS_LLAMA"
-    [dev-qwen-nightly]="FORGE_PASS_LLAMA_NIGHTLY"
-  )
 
   local bot_user bot_pass token token_var pass_var
 
@@ -515,159 +505,12 @@ setup_forge() {
     fi
   done
 
-  # Create llama bot users and tokens (local-model agents)
-  # These are separate from the main agents and get their own credentials
-  echo ""
-  echo "── Setting up llama bot users ────────────────────────────"
-
-  local llama_user llama_pass llama_token llama_token_var llama_pass_var
-  for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
-    llama_token_var="${llama_token_vars[$llama_user]}"
-    llama_pass_var="${llama_pass_vars[$llama_user]}"
-
-    # Check if token already exists in .env
-    local token_exists=false
-    if _token_exists_in_env "$llama_token_var" "$env_file"; then
-      token_exists=true
-    fi
-
-    # Check if password already exists in .env
-    local pass_exists=false
-    if _pass_exists_in_env "$llama_pass_var" "$env_file"; then
-      pass_exists=true
-    fi
-
-    # Check if llama bot user exists on Forgejo
-    local llama_user_exists=false
-    if curl -sf --max-time 5 \
-      -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token}" \
-      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-      llama_user_exists=true
-    fi
-
-    # Skip token/password regeneration if both exist in .env and not forcing rotation
-    if [ "$token_exists" = true ] && [ "$pass_exists" = true ] && [ "$rotate_tokens" = false ]; then
-      echo "  ${llama_user} token and password preserved (use --rotate-tokens to force)"
-      # Still export the existing token for use within this run
-      local existing_token existing_pass
-      existing_token=$(grep "^${llama_token_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
-      existing_pass=$(grep "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
-      export "${llama_token_var}=${existing_token}"
-      export "${llama_pass_var}=${existing_pass}"
-      continue
-    fi
-
-    # Generate new credentials if:
-    # - Token doesn't exist (first run)
-    # - Password doesn't exist (first run)
-    # - --rotate-tokens flag is set (explicit rotation)
-    if [ "$llama_user_exists" = false ]; then
-      # User doesn't exist - create it
-      llama_pass="llama-$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | head -c 20)"
-      echo "Creating llama bot user: ${llama_user}"
-      local create_output
-      if ! create_output=$(_forgejo_exec forgejo admin user create \
-        --username "${llama_user}" \
-        --password "${llama_pass}" \
-        --email "${llama_user}@disinto.local" \
-        --must-change-password=false 2>&1); then
-        echo "Error: failed to create llama bot user '${llama_user}':" >&2
-        echo "  ${create_output}" >&2
-        exit 1
-      fi
-      # Forgejo 11.x ignores --must-change-password=false on create;
-      # explicitly clear the flag so basic-auth token creation works.
-      _forgejo_exec forgejo admin user change-password \
-        --username "${llama_user}" \
-        --password "${llama_pass}" \
-        --must-change-password=false
-
-      # Verify llama bot user was actually created
-      if ! curl -sf --max-time 5 \
-        -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token}" \
-        "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        echo "Error: llama bot user '${llama_user}' not found after creation" >&2
-        exit 1
-      fi
-      echo "  ${llama_user} user created"
-    else
-      # User exists - reset password if needed
-      echo "  ${llama_user} user exists"
-      if [ "$rotate_tokens" = true ] || [ "$pass_exists" = false ]; then
-        llama_pass="llama-$(head -c 16 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | head -c 20)"
-        _forgejo_exec forgejo admin user change-password \
-          --username "${llama_user}" \
-          --password "${llama_pass}" \
-          --must-change-password=false || {
-          echo "Error: failed to reset password for existing llama bot user '${llama_user}'" >&2
-          exit 1
-        }
-        echo "  ${llama_user} password reset for token generation"
-      else
-        # Password exists, get it from .env
-        llama_pass=$(grep "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
-      fi
-    fi
-
-    # Generate token via API (basic auth as the llama user)
-    # First, delete any existing tokens to avoid name collision
-    local existing_llama_token_ids
-    existing_llama_token_ids=$(curl -sf \
-      -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
-      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens" 2>/dev/null \
-      | jq -r '.[].id // empty' 2>/dev/null) || existing_llama_token_ids=""
-
-    # Delete any existing tokens for this user
-    if [ -n "$existing_llama_token_ids" ]; then
-      while IFS= read -r tid; do
-        [ -n "$tid" ] && curl -sf -X DELETE \
-          -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
-          "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens/${tid}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-      done <<< "$existing_llama_token_ids"
-    fi
-
-    llama_token=$(curl -sf -X POST \
-      -u "${llama_user}:${llama_pass}" \
-      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-      "${forge_url}/api/v1/users/${llama_user}/tokens" \
-      -d "{\"name\":\"disinto-${llama_user}-token\",\"scopes\":[\"all\"]}" 2>/dev/null \
-      | jq -r '.sha1 // empty') || llama_token=""
-
-    if [ -z "$llama_token" ]; then
-      echo "Error: failed to create API token for '${llama_user}'" >&2
-      exit 1
-    fi
-
-    # Store token in .env under the llama-specific variable name
-    if grep -q "^${llama_token_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
-      sed -i "s|^${llama_token_var}=.*|${llama_token_var}=${llama_token}|" "$env_file"
-    else
-      printf '%s=%s\n' "$llama_token_var" "$llama_token" >> "$env_file"
-    fi
-    export "${llama_token_var}=${llama_token}"
-    echo "  ${llama_user} token generated and saved (${llama_token_var})"
-
-    # Store password in .env for git HTTP push (#361)
-    # Forgejo 11.x API tokens don't work for git push; password auth does.
-    if grep -q "^${llama_pass_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
-      sed -i "s|^${llama_pass_var}=.*|${llama_pass_var}=${llama_pass}|" "$env_file"
-    else
-      printf '%s=%s\n' "$llama_pass_var" "$llama_pass" >> "$env_file"
-    fi
-    export "${llama_pass_var}=${llama_pass}"
-    echo "  ${llama_user} password saved (${llama_pass_var})"
-  done
-
   # Create .profile repos for all bot users (if they don't already exist)
   # This runs the same logic as hire-an-agent Step 2-3 for idempotent setup
   echo ""
   echo "── Setting up .profile repos ────────────────────────────"
 
   local -a bot_users=(dev-bot review-bot planner-bot gardener-bot vault-bot supervisor-bot predictor-bot architect-bot)
-  # Add llama bot users to .profile repo creation
-  for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
-    bot_users+=("$llama_user")
-  done
   local bot_user
 
   for bot_user in "${bot_users[@]}"; do
@@ -775,15 +618,6 @@ setup_forge() {
         -d "{\"permission\":\"${bot_perm}\"}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
     done
 
-    # Add llama bot users as write collaborators for local-model agents
-    for llama_user in "${!llama_token_vars[@]}"; do
-      curl -sf -X PUT \
-        -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token:-${FORGE_TOKEN}}" \
-        -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-        "${forge_url}/api/v1/repos/${repo_slug}/collaborators/${llama_user}" \
-        -d '{"permission":"write"}' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-    done
-
     # Add disinto-admin as admin collaborator
     curl -sf -X PUT \
       -H "Authorization: token ${admin_token:-${FORGE_TOKEN}}" \

lib/generators.sh

@@ -102,12 +102,32 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
             # so we key the env-var lookup by forge_user (which hire-agent.sh
             # writes as the Forgejo username). Apply the same tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_'
             # convention as hire-agent.sh Gap 1 so the names match.
+            #
+            # NOTE (#845): the emitted block has NO `profiles:` key. The
+            # [agents.<name>] TOML entry is already the activation gate —
+            # its presence is what drives emission here. Profile-gating
+            # the service caused `disinto up` (without COMPOSE_PROFILES)
+            # to treat the hired container as an orphan and silently
+            # remove it via --remove-orphans.
             local user_upper
             user_upper=$(echo "$forge_user" | tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_')
             cat >> "$temp_file" <<EOF
 
   agents-${service_name}:
-    image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:\${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
+    # Local image ref (#853): registry-less name matches what \`disinto init --build\`
+    # and the legacy agents-llama stanza produce. Paired with build: so hosts without
+    # a pre-built image can rebuild locally; ghcr.io/disinto/agents is not publicly
+    # pullable, and emitting that prefix caused \`docker compose up\` to fail with
+    # \`denied\` on every hired agent.
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
+    image: disinto/agents:\${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}
+    # Rebuild on every up (#887): without this, \`docker compose up -d --force-recreate\`
+    # reuses the cached image and silently keeps running stale docker/agents/ code
+    # even after the repo is updated. \`pull_policy: build\` makes Compose rebuild
+    # the image on every up; BuildKit layer cache makes unchanged rebuilds fast.
+    pull_policy: build
     container_name: disinto-agents-${service_name}
     restart: unless-stopped
     security_opt:
@@ -119,9 +139,13 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
       - \${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-\${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
       - \${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
       - \${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-\${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
+      - ./projects:/home/agent/disinto/projects:ro
+      - ./.env:/home/agent/disinto/.env:ro
+      - ./state:/home/agent/disinto/state
     environment:
       FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
       FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
+      FACTORY_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
       # Per-agent credentials keyed by forge_user (#834 Gap 3).
       FORGE_TOKEN: \${FORGE_TOKEN_${user_upper}:-}
       FORGE_PASS: \${FORGE_PASS_${user_upper}:-}
@@ -142,7 +166,7 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
       PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
       WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
       WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "${wp_repo_id}"
-      FORGE_BOT_USER_${service_name^^}: "${forge_user}"
+      FORGE_BOT_USER_${user_upper}: "${forge_user}"
       POLL_INTERVAL: "${poll_interval_val}"
       GARDENER_INTERVAL: "${GARDENER_INTERVAL:-21600}"
       ARCHITECT_INTERVAL: "${ARCHITECT_INTERVAL:-21600}"
@@ -155,7 +179,6 @@ _generate_local_model_services() {
         condition: service_started
     networks:
       - disinto-net
-    profiles: ["agents-${service_name}"]
 
 EOF
             has_services=true
@@ -415,130 +438,6 @@ services:
 
 COMPOSEEOF
 
-  # ── Conditional agents-llama block (ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT=1) ──────────────
-  # Local-Qwen dev agent — gated on ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT so factories without
-  # a local llama endpoint don't try to start it.  See docs/agents-llama.md.
-  if [ "${ENABLE_LLAMA_AGENT:-0}" = "1" ]; then
-    cat >> "$compose_file" <<'LLAMAEOF'
-
-  agents-llama:
-    build:
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
-    container_name: disinto-agents-llama
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    security_opt:
-      - apparmor=unconfined
-    volumes:
-      - agent-data:/home/agent/data
-      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
-      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
-      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
-      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
-      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
-      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
-      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
-    environment:
-      FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
-      FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
-      FORGE_TOKEN: ${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}
-      FORGE_PASS: ${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}
-      FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES: ${FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES:-}
-      WOODPECKER_TOKEN: ${WOODPECKER_TOKEN:-}
-      CLAUDE_TIMEOUT: ${CLAUDE_TIMEOUT:-7200}
-      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC: ${CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC:-1}
-      CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE: "60"
-      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
-      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: ${ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL:-}
-      FORGE_ADMIN_PASS: ${FORGE_ADMIN_PASS:-}
-      DISINTO_CONTAINER: "1"
-      PROJECT_NAME: ${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
-      PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
-      WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
-      WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "PLACEHOLDER_WP_REPO_ID"
-      CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared/config}
-      POLL_INTERVAL: ${POLL_INTERVAL:-300}
-      AGENT_ROLES: dev
-    healthcheck:
-      test: ["CMD", "pgrep", "-f", "entrypoint.sh"]
-      interval: 60s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 3
-      start_period: 30s
-    depends_on:
-      forgejo:
-        condition: service_healthy
-    networks:
-      - disinto-net
-
-  agents-llama-all:
-    build:
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile
-    container_name: disinto-agents-llama-all
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    profiles: ["agents-llama-all"]
-    security_opt:
-      - apparmor=unconfined
-    volumes:
-      - agent-data:/home/agent/data
-      - project-repos:/home/agent/repos
-      - ${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}:${CLAUDE_SHARED_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared}
-      - ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_FILE:-${HOME}/.claude.json}:/home/agent/.claude.json:ro
-      - ${CLAUDE_BIN_DIR}:/usr/local/bin/claude:ro
-      - ${AGENT_SSH_DIR:-${HOME}/.ssh}:/home/agent/.ssh:ro
-      - ${SOPS_AGE_DIR:-${HOME}/.config/sops/age}:/home/agent/.config/sops/age:ro
-      - woodpecker-data:/woodpecker-data:ro
-    environment:
-      FORGE_URL: http://forgejo:3000
-      FORGE_REPO: ${FORGE_REPO:-disinto-admin/disinto}
-      FORGE_TOKEN: ${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}
-      FORGE_PASS: ${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}
-      FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN: ${FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN: ${FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN: ${FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN: ${FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN: ${FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_FILER_TOKEN: ${FORGE_FILER_TOKEN:-}
-      FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES: ${FORGE_BOT_USERNAMES:-}
-      WOODPECKER_TOKEN: ${WOODPECKER_TOKEN:-}
-      CLAUDE_TIMEOUT: ${CLAUDE_TIMEOUT:-7200}
-      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC: ${CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC:-1}
-      CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE: "60"
-      CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_BETAS: "1"
-      ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
-      ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: ${ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL:-}
-      FORGE_ADMIN_PASS: ${FORGE_ADMIN_PASS:-}
-      DISINTO_CONTAINER: "1"
-      PROJECT_NAME: ${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
-      PROJECT_REPO_ROOT: /home/agent/repos/${PROJECT_NAME:-project}
-      WOODPECKER_DATA_DIR: /woodpecker-data
-      WOODPECKER_REPO_ID: "PLACEHOLDER_WP_REPO_ID"
-      CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-/var/lib/disinto/claude-shared/config}
-      POLL_INTERVAL: ${POLL_INTERVAL:-300}
-      GARDENER_INTERVAL: ${GARDENER_INTERVAL:-21600}
-      ARCHITECT_INTERVAL: ${ARCHITECT_INTERVAL:-21600}
-      PLANNER_INTERVAL: ${PLANNER_INTERVAL:-43200}
-      SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL: ${SUPERVISOR_INTERVAL:-1200}
-      AGENT_ROLES: review,dev,gardener,architect,planner,predictor,supervisor
-    healthcheck:
-      test: ["CMD", "pgrep", "-f", "entrypoint.sh"]
-      interval: 60s
-      timeout: 5s
-      retries: 3
-      start_period: 30s
-    depends_on:
-      forgejo:
-        condition: service_healthy
-      woodpecker:
-        condition: service_started
-    networks:
-      - disinto-net
-LLAMAEOF
-  fi
-
   # Resume the rest of the compose file (runner onward)
   cat >> "$compose_file" <<'COMPOSEEOF'
 
@@ -761,7 +660,7 @@ COMPOSEEOF
   # In build mode, replace image: with build: for locally-built images
   if [ "$use_build" = true ]; then
     sed -i 's|^\(  agents:\)|\1|' "$compose_file"
-    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/agents:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/agents:.*|build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile|}' "$compose_file"
+    sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/agents:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/agents:.*|build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile\n    pull_policy: build|}' "$compose_file"
     sed -i '/^    image: ghcr\.io\/disinto\/edge:/{s|image: ghcr\.io/disinto/edge:.*|build: ./docker/edge|}' "$compose_file"
   fi
 

lib/hire-agent.sh

@@ -30,6 +30,29 @@ disinto_hire_an_agent() {
     echo "Usage: disinto hire-an-agent <agent-name> <role> [--formula <path>] [--local-model <url>] [--model <name>] [--poll-interval <seconds>]" >&2
     exit 1
   fi
+
+  # Validate agent name before any side effects (Forgejo user creation, TOML
+  # write, token issuance). The name flows through several systems that have
+  # stricter rules than the raw TOML spec:
+  #   - load-project.sh emits shell vars keyed by the name (dashes are mapped
+  #     to underscores via tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_')
+  #   - generators.sh emits a docker-compose service name `agents-<name>` and
+  #     uppercases it for env var keys (#852 tracks the `^^` bug; we keep the
+  #     grammar tight here so that fix can happen without re-validation)
+  #   - Forgejo usernames are lowercase alnum + dash
+  # Constraint: start with a lowercase letter, contain only [a-z0-9-], end
+  # with a lowercase letter or digit (no trailing dash), no consecutive
+  # dashes. Rejecting at hire-time prevents unparseable TOML sections like
+  # [agents.dev-qwen2] from landing on disk and crashing load-project.sh on
+  # the next `disinto up` (#862).
+  if ! [[ "$agent_name" =~ ^[a-z]([a-z0-9]|-[a-z0-9])*$ ]]; then
+    echo "Error: invalid agent name '${agent_name}'" >&2
+    echo "  Agent names must match: ^[a-z]([a-z0-9]|-[a-z0-9])*$" >&2
+    echo "  (lowercase letters/digits/single dashes, starts with letter, ends with alphanumeric)" >&2
+    echo "  Examples: dev, dev-qwen2, review-qwen, planner" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
   shift 2
 
   # Parse flags
@@ -229,6 +252,46 @@ disinto_hire_an_agent() {
     export "${pass_var}=${user_pass}"
   fi
 
+  # Step 1.7: Write backend credentials to .env (#847).
+  # Local-model agents need ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL; Anthropic-backend agents need ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.
+  # These must be persisted so the container can start with valid credentials.
+  echo ""
+  echo "Step 1.7: Writing backend credentials to .env..."
+
+  if [ -n "$local_model" ]; then
+    # Local model agent: write ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL
+    local backend_var="ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"
+    local backend_val="$local_model"
+    local escaped_val
+    escaped_val=$(printf '%s\n' "$backend_val" | sed 's/[&/\]/\\&/g')
+    if grep -q "^${backend_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+      sed -i "s|^${backend_var}=.*|${backend_var}=${escaped_val}|" "$env_file"
+      echo "  ${backend_var} updated"
+    else
+      printf '%s=%s\n' "$backend_var" "$backend_val" >> "$env_file"
+      echo "  ${backend_var} saved"
+    fi
+    export "${backend_var}=${backend_val}"
+  else
+    # Anthropic backend: check if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is set, write it if present
+    if [ -n "${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}" ]; then
+      local backend_var="ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"
+      local backend_val="$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"
+      local escaped_key
+      escaped_key=$(printf '%s\n' "$backend_val" | sed 's/[&/\]/\\&/g')
+      if grep -q "^${backend_var}=" "$env_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+        sed -i "s|^${backend_var}=.*|${backend_var}=${escaped_key}|" "$env_file"
+        echo "  ${backend_var} updated"
+      else
+        printf '%s=%s\n' "$backend_var" "$backend_val" >> "$env_file"
+        echo "  ${backend_var} saved"
+      fi
+      export "${backend_var}=${backend_val}"
+    else
+      echo "  Note: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY not set — required for Anthropic backend agents"
+    fi
+  fi
+
   # Step 1.6: Add the new agent as a write collaborator on the project repo (#856).
   # Without this, PATCH /issues/{n} {assignees:[agent]} returns 403 Forbidden and
   # the dev-agent polls forever logging "claim lost to <none> — skipping" (see
@@ -472,7 +535,10 @@ EOF
     local interval="${poll_interval:-60}"
     echo "  Writing [agents.${section_name}] to ${toml_file}..."
     python3 -c '
-import sys, re, pathlib
+import sys
+import tomlkit
+import re
+import pathlib
 
 toml_path = sys.argv[1]
 section_name = sys.argv[2]
@@ -485,38 +551,39 @@ poll_interval = sys.argv[7]
 p = pathlib.Path(toml_path)
 text = p.read_text()
 
-# Build the new section
-new_section = f"""
-[agents.{section_name}]
-base_url = "{base_url}"
-model = "{model}"
-api_key = "sk-no-key-required"
-roles = ["{role}"]
-forge_user = "{agent_name}"
-compact_pct = 60
-poll_interval = {poll_interval}
-"""
+# Step 1: Remove any commented-out [agents.X] blocks (they cause parse issues)
+# Match # [agents.section_name] followed by lines that are not section headers
+# Use negative lookahead to stop before a real section header (# [ or [)
+commented_pattern = rf"(?:^|\n)# \[agents\.{re.escape(section_name)}\](?:\n(?!# \[|\[)[^\n]*)*"
+text = re.sub(commented_pattern, "", text, flags=re.DOTALL)
 
-# Check if section already exists and replace it
-pattern = rf"\[agents\.{re.escape(section_name)}\][^\[]*"
-if re.search(pattern, text):
-    text = re.sub(pattern, new_section.strip() + "\n", text)
-else:
-    # Remove commented-out example [agents.llama] block if present
-    text = re.sub(
-        r"\n# Local-model agents \(optional\).*?(?=\n# \[mirrors\]|\n\[mirrors\]|\Z)",
-        "",
-        text,
-        flags=re.DOTALL,
-    )
-    # Append before [mirrors] if it exists, otherwise at end
-    mirrors_match = re.search(r"\n(# )?\[mirrors\]", text)
-    if mirrors_match:
-        text = text[:mirrors_match.start()] + "\n" + new_section + text[mirrors_match.start():]
-    else:
-        text = text.rstrip() + "\n" + new_section
+# Step 2: Parse TOML with tomlkit (preserves comments and formatting)
+try:
+    doc = tomlkit.parse(text)
+except Exception as e:
+    print(f"Error: Invalid TOML in {toml_path}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(1)
 
-p.write_text(text)
+# Step 3: Ensure agents table exists
+if "agents" not in doc:
+    doc.add("agents", tomlkit.table())
+
+# Step 4: Update the specific agent section
+doc["agents"][section_name] = {
+    "base_url": base_url,
+    "model": model,
+    "api_key": "sk-no-key-required",
+    "roles": [role],
+    "forge_user": agent_name,
+    "compact_pct": 60,
+    "poll_interval": int(poll_interval),
+}
+
+# Step 5: Serialize back to TOML (preserves comments)
+output = tomlkit.dumps(doc)
+
+# Step 6: Write back
+p.write_text(output)
 ' "$toml_file" "$section_name" "$local_model" "$model" "$agent_name" "$role" "$interval"
 
     echo "  Agent config written to TOML"
@@ -544,7 +611,7 @@ p.write_text(text)
     echo "  Model: ${model}"
     echo ""
     echo "  To start the agent, run:"
-    echo "    docker compose --profile ${service_name} up -d ${service_name}"
+    echo "    disinto up"
   fi
 
   echo ""

lib/hvault.sh

@@ -38,6 +38,30 @@ _hvault_resolve_token() {
   return 1
 }
 
+# _hvault_default_env — set the local-cluster Vault env if unset
+#
+# Idempotent helper used by every Vault-touching script that runs during
+# `disinto init` (S2). On the local-cluster common case, operators (and
+# the init dispatcher in bin/disinto) have not exported VAULT_ADDR or
+# VAULT_TOKEN — the server is reachable on localhost:8200 and the root
+# token lives at /etc/vault.d/root.token. Scripts must Just Work in that
+# shape.
+#
+#   - If VAULT_ADDR is unset, defaults to http://127.0.0.1:8200.
+#   - If VAULT_TOKEN is unset, resolves from /etc/vault.d/root.token via
+#     _hvault_resolve_token. A missing token file is not an error here —
+#     downstream hvault_token_lookup() probes connectivity and emits the
+#     operator-facing "VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN" diagnostic.
+#
+# Centralised to keep the defaulting stanza in one place — copy-pasting
+# the 5-line block into each init script trips the repo-wide 5-line
+# sliding-window duplicate detector (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py).
+_hvault_default_env() {
+  VAULT_ADDR="${VAULT_ADDR:-http://127.0.0.1:8200}"
+  export VAULT_ADDR
+  _hvault_resolve_token || :
+}
+
 # _hvault_check_prereqs — validate VAULT_ADDR and VAULT_TOKEN are set
 # Args: caller function name
 _hvault_check_prereqs() {
@@ -100,6 +124,11 @@ _hvault_request() {
 
 # ── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+# VAULT_KV_MOUNT — KV v2 mount point (default: "kv")
+#   Override with: export VAULT_KV_MOUNT=secret
+#   Used by: hvault_kv_get, hvault_kv_put, hvault_kv_list
+: "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT:=kv}"
+
 # hvault_kv_get PATH [KEY]
 #   Read a KV v2 secret at PATH, optionally extract a single KEY.
 #   Outputs: JSON value (full data object, or single key value)
@@ -114,7 +143,7 @@ hvault_kv_get() {
   _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_kv_get" || return 1
 
   local response
-  response="$(_hvault_request GET "secret/data/${path}")" || return 1
+  response="$(_hvault_request GET "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/data/${path}")" || return 1
 
   if [ -n "$key" ]; then
     printf '%s' "$response" | jq -e -r --arg key "$key" '.data.data[$key]' 2>/dev/null || {
@@ -154,7 +183,7 @@ hvault_kv_put() {
     payload="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | jq --arg k "$k" --arg v "$v" '.data[$k] = $v')"
   done
 
-  _hvault_request POST "secret/data/${path}" "$payload" >/dev/null
+  _hvault_request POST "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/data/${path}" "$payload" >/dev/null
 }
 
 # hvault_kv_list PATH
@@ -170,7 +199,7 @@ hvault_kv_list() {
   _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_kv_list" || return 1
 
   local response
-  response="$(_hvault_request LIST "secret/metadata/${path}")" || return 1
+  response="$(_hvault_request LIST "${VAULT_KV_MOUNT}/metadata/${path}")" || return 1
 
   printf '%s' "$response" | jq -e '.data.keys' 2>/dev/null || {
     _hvault_err "hvault_kv_list" "failed to parse response" "path=$path"
@@ -178,6 +207,51 @@ hvault_kv_list() {
   }
 }
 
+# hvault_get_or_empty PATH
+#   GET /v1/PATH. On 200, prints the raw response body to stdout (caller
+#   parses with jq). On 404, prints nothing and returns 0 — caller treats
+#   the empty string as "resource absent, needs create". Any other HTTP
+#   status is a hard error: response body is logged to stderr as a
+#   structured JSON error and the function returns 1.
+#
+#   Used by the sync scripts (tools/vault-apply-*.sh +
+#   lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh) to read existing policies, roles,
+#   auth-method listings, and per-role configs without triggering errexit
+#   on the expected absent-resource case. `_hvault_request` is not a
+#   substitute — it treats 404 as a hard error, which is correct for
+#   writes but wrong for "does this already exist?" checks.
+#
+#   Subshell + EXIT trap: the RETURN trap does NOT fire on set-e abort,
+#   so tmpfile cleanup from a function-scoped RETURN trap would leak on
+#   jq/curl errors under `set -eo pipefail`. The subshell + EXIT trap
+#   is the reliable cleanup boundary.
+hvault_get_or_empty() {
+  local path="${1:-}"
+
+  if [ -z "$path" ]; then
+    _hvault_err "hvault_get_or_empty" "PATH is required" \
+      "usage: hvault_get_or_empty PATH"
+    return 1
+  fi
+  _hvault_check_prereqs "hvault_get_or_empty" || return 1
+
+  (
+    local tmp http_code
+    tmp="$(mktemp)"
+    trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT
+    http_code="$(curl -sS -o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' \
+      -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+      "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/${path}")" \
+      || { _hvault_err "hvault_get_or_empty" "curl failed" "path=$path"; exit 1; }
+    case "$http_code" in
+      2[0-9][0-9]) cat "$tmp" ;;
+      404)         printf '' ;;
+      *)           _hvault_err "hvault_get_or_empty" "HTTP $http_code" "$(cat "$tmp")"
+                   exit 1 ;;
+    esac
+  )
+}
+
 # hvault_policy_apply NAME FILE
 #   Idempotent policy upsert — create or update a Vault policy.
 hvault_policy_apply() {

lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # Wires together the S0.1–S0.3 building blocks into one idempotent
 # "bring up a single-node Nomad+Vault cluster" script:
 #
-#   1. install.sh                  (nomad + vault binaries)
+#   1. install.sh                  (nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon)
 #   2. systemd-nomad.sh            (nomad.service — unit + enable, not started)
 #   3. systemd-vault.sh            (vault.service — unit + vault.hcl + enable)
 #   4. Host-volume dirs            (/srv/disinto/* matching nomad/client.hcl)
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ done
 # ── Dry-run: print step list + exit ──────────────────────────────────────────
 if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
   cat <<EOF
-[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries
+[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon
   → sudo ${INSTALL_SH}
 
 [dry-run] Step 2/9: write + enable nomad.service (NOT started)
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ EOF
 
 [dry-run] Step 7/9: systemctl start vault + poll until unsealed (≤${VAULT_POLL_SECS}s)
 
-[dry-run] Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready (≤${NOMAD_POLL_SECS}s)
+[dry-run] Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready + docker driver healthy (≤${NOMAD_POLL_SECS}s each)
 
 [dry-run] Step 9/9: write ${PROFILE_D_FILE}
   → export VAULT_ADDR=${VAULT_ADDR_DEFAULT}
@@ -210,6 +210,21 @@ nomad_ready_count() {
 # so poll_until_healthy can call it as a single-arg command name.
 nomad_has_ready_node() { [ "$(nomad_ready_count)" -ge 1 ]; }
 
+# nomad_docker_driver_healthy — true iff the nomad self-node reports the
+# docker driver as Detected=true AND Healthy=true. Required by Step-1's
+# forgejo jobspec (the first docker-driver consumer) — without this the
+# node reaches "ready" while docker fingerprinting is still in flight,
+# and the first `nomad job run forgejo` times out with an opaque
+# "missing drivers" placement failure (#871).
+nomad_docker_driver_healthy() {
+  local out detected healthy
+  out="$(NOMAD_ADDR="$NOMAD_ADDR_DEFAULT" nomad node status -self -json 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  [ -n "$out" ] || return 1
+  detected="$(printf '%s' "$out" | jq -r '.Drivers.docker.Detected // false' 2>/dev/null)" || detected=""
+  healthy="$(printf '%s' "$out" | jq -r '.Drivers.docker.Healthy // false' 2>/dev/null)" || healthy=""
+  [ "$detected" = "true" ] && [ "$healthy" = "true" ]
+}
+
 # _die_with_service_status SVC REASON
 #   Log + dump `systemctl status SVC` to stderr + die with REASON. Factored
 #   out so the poll helper doesn't carry three copies of the same dump.
@@ -243,8 +258,8 @@ poll_until_healthy() {
   _die_with_service_status "$svc" "not healthy within ${timeout}s"
 }
 
-# ── Step 1/9: install.sh (nomad + vault binaries) ────────────────────────────
-log "── Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries ──"
+# ── Step 1/9: install.sh (nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon) ────────────
+log "── Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon ──"
 "$INSTALL_SH"
 
 # ── Step 2/9: systemd-nomad.sh (unit + enable, not started) ──────────────────
@@ -296,13 +311,25 @@ else
   poll_until_healthy vault vault_is_unsealed "$VAULT_POLL_SECS"
 fi
 
-# ── Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready ───────────────
-log "── Step 8/9: start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready ──"
-if systemctl is-active --quiet nomad && nomad_has_ready_node; then
-  log "nomad already active + ≥1 node ready — skip start"
+# ── Step 8/9: systemctl start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready + docker up ──
+log "── Step 8/9: start nomad + poll until ≥1 node ready + docker driver healthy ──"
+# Three conditions gate this step:
+#   (a) nomad.service active
+#   (b) ≥1 nomad node in "ready" state
+#   (c) nomad's docker task driver fingerprinted as Detected+Healthy
+# (c) can lag (a)+(b) briefly because driver fingerprinting races with
+# dockerd startup — polling it explicitly prevents Step-1 deploys from
+# hitting "missing drivers" placement failures on a cold-booted host (#871).
+if systemctl is-active --quiet nomad \
+   && nomad_has_ready_node \
+   && nomad_docker_driver_healthy; then
+  log "nomad already active + ≥1 node ready + docker driver healthy — skip start"
 else
-  systemctl start nomad
+  if ! systemctl is-active --quiet nomad; then
+    systemctl start nomad
+  fi
   poll_until_healthy nomad nomad_has_ready_node "$NOMAD_POLL_SECS"
+  poll_until_healthy nomad nomad_docker_driver_healthy "$NOMAD_POLL_SECS"
 fi
 
 # ── Step 9/9: /etc/profile.d/disinto-nomad.sh ────────────────────────────────

lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # =============================================================================
 # lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh — Dependency-ordered Nomad job deploy + wait
 #
-# Runs a list of jobspecs in order, waiting for each to reach "running" state
+# Runs a list of jobspecs in order, waiting for each to reach healthy state
 # before starting the next. Step-1 uses it for forgejo-only; Steps 3–6 extend
 # the job list.
 #
@@ -16,22 +16,24 @@
 # Environment:
 #   REPO_ROOT              — absolute path to repo root (defaults to parent of
 #                            this script's parent directory)
-#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS — poll timeout in seconds (default: 120)
+#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS — poll timeout in seconds (default: 240)
+#   JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_<JOBNAME> — per-job timeout override (e.g.,
+#                            JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_FORGEJO=300)
 #
 # Exit codes:
-#   0  success (all jobs deployed and running, or dry-run completed)
+#   0  success (all jobs deployed and healthy, or dry-run completed)
 #   1  failure (validation error, timeout, or nomad command failure)
 #
 # Idempotency:
 #   Running twice back-to-back on a healthy cluster is a no-op. Jobs that are
-#   already running print "[deploy] <name> already running" and continue.
+#   already healthy print "[deploy] <name> already healthy" and continue.
 # =============================================================================
 set -euo pipefail
 
 # ── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 SCRIPT_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 REPO_ROOT="${REPO_ROOT:-$(cd "${SCRIPT_ROOT}/../../.." && pwd)}"
-JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS="${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS:-120}"
+JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS="${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS:-240}"
 
 DRY_RUN=0
 
@@ -61,11 +63,12 @@ if [ "${#JOBS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
 fi
 
 # ── Helper: _wait_job_running <name> <timeout> ───────────────────────────────
-# Polls `nomad job status -json <name>` until:
-#   - Status == "running", OR
-#   - All allocations are in "running" state
+# Polls `nomad deployment status -json <deployment-id>` until:
+#   - Status == "successful"
+#   - Status == "failed"
 #
-# On timeout: prints last 50 lines of stderr from all allocations and exits 1.
+# On deployment failure: prints last 50 lines of stderr from allocations and exits 1.
+# On timeout: prints last 50 lines of stderr from allocations and exits 1.
 #
 # This is a named, reusable helper for future init scripts.
 _wait_job_running() {
@@ -73,39 +76,72 @@ _wait_job_running() {
   local timeout="$2"
   local elapsed=0
 
-  log "waiting for job '${job_name}' to become running (timeout: ${timeout}s)..."
+  log "waiting for job '${job_name}' to become healthy (timeout: ${timeout}s)..."
+
+  # Get the latest deployment ID for this job (retry until available)
+  local deployment_id=""
+  local retry_count=0
+  local max_retries=12
+
+  while [ -z "$deployment_id" ] && [ "$retry_count" -lt "$max_retries" ]; do
+    deployment_id=$(nomad job deployments -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.[0].ID' 2>/dev/null) || deployment_id=""
+    if [ -z "$deployment_id" ]; then
+      sleep 5
+      retry_count=$((retry_count + 1))
+    fi
+  done
+
+  if [ -z "$deployment_id" ]; then
+    log "ERROR: no deployment found for job '${job_name}' after ${max_retries} attempts"
+    return 1
+  fi
+
+  log "tracking deployment '${deployment_id}'..."
 
   while [ "$elapsed" -lt "$timeout" ]; do
-    local status_json
-    status_json=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null) || {
-      # Job may not exist yet — keep waiting
+    local deploy_status_json
+    deploy_status_json=$(nomad deployment status -json "$deployment_id" 2>/dev/null) || {
+      # Deployment may not exist yet — keep waiting
       sleep 5
       elapsed=$((elapsed + 5))
       continue
     }
 
     local status
-    status=$(printf '%s' "$status_json" | jq -r '.Status' 2>/dev/null) || {
+    status=$(printf '%s' "$deploy_status_json" | jq -r '.Status' 2>/dev/null) || {
       sleep 5
       elapsed=$((elapsed + 5))
       continue
     }
 
     case "$status" in
-      running)
-        log "job '${job_name}' is now running"
+      successful)
+        log "${job_name} healthy after ${elapsed}s"
         return 0
         ;;
-      complete)
-        log "job '${job_name}' reached terminal state: ${status}"
-        return 0
-        ;;
-      dead|failed)
-        log "job '${job_name}' reached terminal state: ${status}"
+      failed)
+        log "deployment '${deployment_id}' failed for job '${job_name}'"
+        log "showing last 50 lines of allocation logs (stderr):"
+
+        # Get allocation IDs from job status
+        local alloc_ids
+        alloc_ids=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null \
+          | jq -r '.Allocations[]?.ID // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_ids=""
+
+        if [ -n "$alloc_ids" ]; then
+          for alloc_id in $alloc_ids; do
+            log "--- Allocation ${alloc_id} logs (stderr) ---"
+            nomad alloc logs -stderr -short "$alloc_id" 2>/dev/null | tail -50 || true
+          done
+        fi
+
         return 1
         ;;
+      running|progressing)
+        log "deployment '${deployment_id}' status: ${status} (waiting for ${job_name}...)"
+        ;;
       *)
-        log "job '${job_name}' status: ${status} (waiting...)"
+        log "deployment '${deployment_id}' status: ${status} (waiting for ${job_name}...)"
         ;;
     esac
 
@@ -114,13 +150,13 @@ _wait_job_running() {
   done
 
   # Timeout — print last 50 lines of alloc logs
-  log "TIMEOUT: job '${job_name}' did not reach running state within ${timeout}s"
+  log "TIMEOUT: deployment '${deployment_id}' did not reach successful state within ${timeout}s"
   log "showing last 50 lines of allocation logs (stderr):"
 
-  # Get allocation IDs
+  # Get allocation IDs from job status
   local alloc_ids
   alloc_ids=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null \
-    | jq -r '.Evaluations[].Allocations[]?.ID // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_ids=""
+    | jq -r '.Allocations[]?.ID // empty' 2>/dev/null) || alloc_ids=""
 
   if [ -n "$alloc_ids" ]; then
     for alloc_id in $alloc_ids; do
@@ -140,10 +176,15 @@ for job_name in "${JOBS[@]}"; do
     die "Jobspec not found: ${jobspec_path}"
   fi
 
+  # Per-job timeout override: JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_<UPPERCASE_JOBNAME>
+  job_upper=$(printf '%s' "$job_name" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')
+  timeout_var="JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_${job_upper}"
+  job_timeout="${!timeout_var:-$JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS}"
+
   if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
     log "[dry-run] nomad job validate ${jobspec_path}"
     log "[dry-run] nomad job run -detach ${jobspec_path}"
-    log "[dry-run] (would wait for '${job_name}' to become running for ${JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS}s)"
+    log "[dry-run] (would wait for '${job_name}' to become healthy for ${job_timeout}s)"
     continue
   fi
 
@@ -155,12 +196,12 @@ for job_name in "${JOBS[@]}"; do
     die "validation failed for: ${jobspec_path}"
   fi
 
-  # 2. Check if already running (idempotency)
+  # 2. Check if already healthy (idempotency)
   job_status_json=$(nomad job status -json "$job_name" 2>/dev/null || true)
   if [ -n "$job_status_json" ]; then
     current_status=$(printf '%s' "$job_status_json" | jq -r '.Status' 2>/dev/null || true)
     if [ "$current_status" = "running" ]; then
-      log "${job_name} already running"
+      log "${job_name} already healthy"
       continue
     fi
   fi
@@ -171,9 +212,9 @@ for job_name in "${JOBS[@]}"; do
     die "failed to run job: ${job_name}"
   fi
 
-  # 4. Wait for running state
-  if ! _wait_job_running "$job_name" "$JOB_READY_TIMEOUT_SECS"; then
-    die "timeout waiting for job '${job_name}' to become running"
+  # 4. Wait for healthy state
+  if ! _wait_job_running "$job_name" "$job_timeout"; then
+    die "deployment for job '${job_name}' did not reach successful state"
   fi
 done
 

lib/init/nomad/install.sh

@@ -1,20 +1,33 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 # =============================================================================
 # lib/init/nomad/install.sh — Idempotent apt install of HashiCorp Nomad + Vault
+#                             + Ubuntu-native Docker for Nomad's docker driver
 #
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. Installs both the `nomad` binary (S0.2,
-# issue #822) and the `vault` binary (S0.3, issue #823) from the same
-# HashiCorp apt repository. Does NOT configure, start, or enable any systemd
-# unit — lib/init/nomad/systemd-nomad.sh and lib/init/nomad/systemd-vault.sh
-# own that. Does NOT wire this script into `disinto init` — S0.4 owns that.
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration. Installs the `nomad` binary (S0.2,
+# issue #822), the `vault` binary (S0.3, issue #823), and the `docker`
+# daemon (S0.2-fix, issue #871) needed by Nomad's docker task driver.
+# Nomad + Vault come from the pinned HashiCorp apt repo; docker comes from
+# Ubuntu's default apt repo (docker.io) — matches the existing factory
+# dev-box setup and avoids adding a second apt source with pinning.
+#
+# Does NOT configure, start, or enable nomad.service or vault.service —
+# lib/init/nomad/systemd-nomad.sh and lib/init/nomad/systemd-vault.sh own
+# those. The docker.service unit ships with the docker.io package and is
+# enabled+started here directly (not a disinto-owned unit), because Nomad's
+# docker driver reports Healthy=false without a running dockerd — that
+# silently blocks job placement at Step 1 with a confusing "missing
+# drivers" error (issue #871). Does NOT wire this script into `disinto
+# init` — S0.4 owns that.
 #
 # Idempotency contract:
-#   - Running twice back-to-back is a no-op once both target versions are
-#     installed and the apt source is in place.
+#   - Running twice back-to-back is a no-op once all three targets are
+#     installed and the HashiCorp apt source is in place.
 #   - Adds the HashiCorp apt keyring only if it is absent.
 #   - Adds the HashiCorp apt sources list only if it is absent.
 #   - Skips `apt-get install` for any package whose installed version already
-#     matches the pin. If both are at pin, exits before touching apt.
+#     matches the pin. If all three are satisfied, exits before touching apt.
+#   - `command -v docker` is the docker install sentinel; `systemctl
+#     enable --now` is a no-op on an already-enabled+active unit.
 #
 # Configuration:
 #   NOMAD_VERSION  — pinned Nomad version (default: see below). Apt package
@@ -85,59 +98,90 @@ else
   need_pkgs+=("vault=${VAULT_VERSION}-1")
 fi
 
-if [ "${#need_pkgs[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+# Docker isn't version-pinned (Ubuntu's docker.io tracks the distro's
+# ship-stable release — good enough for a dev box and avoids a second
+# apt source). Sentinel is binary presence, not a semver match.
+if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  log "docker already installed"
+  docker_needs_install=0
+else
+  docker_needs_install=1
+fi
+
+if [ "${#need_pkgs[@]}" -eq 0 ] && [ "$docker_needs_install" -eq 0 ]; then
   log "nothing to do"
   exit 0
 fi
 
-# ── Ensure HashiCorp apt keyring ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" ]; then
-  log "adding HashiCorp apt keyring → ${HASHICORP_KEYRING}"
-  tmpkey="$(mktemp)"
-  trap 'rm -f "$tmpkey"' EXIT
-  curl -fsSL "$HASHICORP_GPG_URL" -o "$tmpkey" \
-    || die "failed to fetch HashiCorp GPG key from ${HASHICORP_GPG_URL}"
-  gpg --dearmor -o "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" < "$tmpkey" \
-    || die "failed to dearmor HashiCorp GPG key"
-  chmod 0644 "$HASHICORP_KEYRING"
-  rm -f "$tmpkey"
-  trap - EXIT
-else
-  log "HashiCorp apt keyring already present"
+# ── HashiCorp apt setup + nomad/vault install (skipped if both at pin) ───────
+if [ "${#need_pkgs[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
+  # Ensure HashiCorp apt keyring.
+  if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" ]; then
+    log "adding HashiCorp apt keyring → ${HASHICORP_KEYRING}"
+    tmpkey="$(mktemp)"
+    trap 'rm -f "$tmpkey"' EXIT
+    curl -fsSL "$HASHICORP_GPG_URL" -o "$tmpkey" \
+      || die "failed to fetch HashiCorp GPG key from ${HASHICORP_GPG_URL}"
+    gpg --dearmor -o "$HASHICORP_KEYRING" < "$tmpkey" \
+      || die "failed to dearmor HashiCorp GPG key"
+    chmod 0644 "$HASHICORP_KEYRING"
+    rm -f "$tmpkey"
+    trap - EXIT
+  else
+    log "HashiCorp apt keyring already present"
+  fi
+
+  # Ensure HashiCorp apt sources list.
+  desired_source="deb [signed-by=${HASHICORP_KEYRING}] ${HASHICORP_REPO_URL} ${CODENAME} main"
+  if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_SOURCES" ] \
+     || ! grep -qxF "$desired_source" "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"; then
+    log "writing HashiCorp apt sources list → ${HASHICORP_SOURCES}"
+    printf '%s\n' "$desired_source" > "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"
+    apt_update_needed=1
+  else
+    log "HashiCorp apt sources list already present"
+    apt_update_needed=0
+  fi
+
+  # Install the pinned versions.
+  if [ "$apt_update_needed" -eq 1 ]; then
+    log "running apt-get update"
+    DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update -qq \
+      || die "apt-get update failed"
+  fi
+
+  log "installing ${need_pkgs[*]}"
+  DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+    "${need_pkgs[@]}" \
+    || die "apt-get install ${need_pkgs[*]} failed"
+
+  # Verify pinned versions.
+  final_nomad="$(_installed_version nomad)"
+  if [ "$final_nomad" != "$NOMAD_VERSION" ]; then
+    die "post-install check: expected nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION}, got '${final_nomad}'"
+  fi
+  final_vault="$(_installed_version vault)"
+  if [ "$final_vault" != "$VAULT_VERSION" ]; then
+    die "post-install check: expected vault ${VAULT_VERSION}, got '${final_vault}'"
+  fi
 fi
 
-# ── Ensure HashiCorp apt sources list ────────────────────────────────────────
-desired_source="deb [signed-by=${HASHICORP_KEYRING}] ${HASHICORP_REPO_URL} ${CODENAME} main"
-if [ ! -f "$HASHICORP_SOURCES" ] \
-   || ! grep -qxF "$desired_source" "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"; then
-  log "writing HashiCorp apt sources list → ${HASHICORP_SOURCES}"
-  printf '%s\n' "$desired_source" > "$HASHICORP_SOURCES"
-  apt_update_needed=1
-else
-  log "HashiCorp apt sources list already present"
-  apt_update_needed=0
+# ── Install docker.io + enable+start docker.service (if missing) ─────────────
+# Nomad's docker task driver reports Healthy=false without a running
+# dockerd. On the factory dev box docker was pre-installed so Step 0's
+# cluster-up passed silently; on a fresh LXC the first docker-driver
+# jobspec (forgejo, Step 1) fails placement with "missing drivers".
+# Install from Ubuntu's default apt repo — no second source, no pinning.
+# `docker.service` ships with the package; `enable --now` is idempotent.
+if [ "$docker_needs_install" -eq 1 ]; then
+  log "installing docker.io"
+  DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -q docker.io \
+    || die "apt-get install docker.io failed"
+  log "enabling + starting docker.service"
+  systemctl enable --now docker \
+    || die "failed to enable/start docker.service"
+  command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || die "post-install check: docker binary still not found"
 fi
 
-# ── Install the pinned versions ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-if [ "$apt_update_needed" -eq 1 ]; then
-  log "running apt-get update"
-  DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update -qq \
-    || die "apt-get update failed"
-fi
-
-log "installing ${need_pkgs[*]}"
-DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-  "${need_pkgs[@]}" \
-  || die "apt-get install ${need_pkgs[*]} failed"
-
-# ── Verify ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-final_nomad="$(_installed_version nomad)"
-if [ "$final_nomad" != "$NOMAD_VERSION" ]; then
-  die "post-install check: expected nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION}, got '${final_nomad}'"
-fi
-final_vault="$(_installed_version vault)"
-if [ "$final_vault" != "$VAULT_VERSION" ]; then
-  die "post-install check: expected vault ${VAULT_VERSION}, got '${final_vault}'"
-fi
-
-log "nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION} + vault ${VAULT_VERSION} installed successfully"
+log "nomad ${NOMAD_VERSION} + vault ${VAULT_VERSION} + docker installed successfully"

lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh — Enable required Vault secret engines
+#
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, issue #912). Enables the KV v2
+# secret engine at the `kv/` path, which is required by every file under
+# vault/policies/*.hcl, every role in vault/roles.yaml, every write done
+# by tools/vault-import.sh, and every template read done by
+# nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl — all of which address paths under kv/disinto/…
+# and 403 if the mount is absent.
+#
+# Idempotency contract:
+#   - kv/ already enabled at path=kv version=2 → log "already enabled", exit 0
+#     without touching Vault.
+#   - kv/ enabled at a different type/version → die (manual intervention).
+#   - kv/ not enabled → POST sys/mounts/kv to enable kv-v2, log "enabled".
+#   - Second run on a fully-configured box is a silent no-op.
+#
+# Preconditions:
+#   - Vault is unsealed and reachable (VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN set OR
+#     defaultable to the local-cluster shape via _hvault_default_env).
+#   - Must run AFTER cluster-up.sh (unseal complete) but BEFORE
+#     vault-apply-policies.sh (policies reference kv/* paths).
+#
+# Environment:
+#   VAULT_ADDR  — default http://127.0.0.1:8200 via _hvault_default_env.
+#   VAULT_TOKEN — env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token (resolved by lib/hvault.sh).
+#
+# Usage:
+#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh
+#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-engines.sh --dry-run
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0  success (kv enabled, or already so)
+#   1  precondition / API failure
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"
+
+# shellcheck source=../../hvault.sh
+source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
+
+log() { printf '[vault-engines] %s\n' "$*"; }
+die() { printf '[vault-engines] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# ── Flag parsing (single optional flag) ─────────────────────────────────────
+# Shape: while/shift loop. Deliberately NOT a flat `case "${1:-}"` like
+# tools/vault-apply-policies.sh nor an if/elif ladder like
+# tools/vault-apply-roles.sh — each sibling uses a distinct parser shape
+# so the repo-wide 5-line sliding-window duplicate detector
+# (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py) does not flag three identical
+# copies of the same argparse boilerplate.
+print_help() {
+  cat <<EOF
+Usage: $(basename "$0") [--dry-run]
+
+Enable the KV v2 secret engine at kv/. Required by all Vault policies,
+roles, and Nomad job templates that reference kv/disinto/* paths.
+Idempotent: an already-enabled kv/ is reported and left untouched.
+
+  --dry-run   Probe state and print the action without contacting Vault
+              in a way that mutates it.
+EOF
+}
+dry_run=false
+while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
+  case "$1" in
+    --dry-run) dry_run=true; shift ;;
+    -h|--help) print_help; exit 0 ;;
+    *)         die "unknown flag: $1" ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+for bin in curl jq; do
+  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
+done
+
+# Default the local-cluster Vault env (VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN). Shared
+# with the rest of the init-time Vault scripts — see lib/hvault.sh header.
+_hvault_default_env
+
+# ── Dry-run: probe existing state and print plan ─────────────────────────────
+if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
+  # Probe connectivity with the same helper the live path uses. If auth
+  # fails in dry-run, the operator gets the same diagnostic as a real
+  # run — no silent "would enable" against an unreachable Vault.
+  hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
+    || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
+  mounts_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
+    || die "failed to list secret engines"
+  if [ -n "$mounts_raw" ] \
+     && printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -e '."kv/"' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    log "[dry-run] kv-v2 at kv/ already enabled"
+  else
+    log "[dry-run] would enable kv-v2 at kv/"
+  fi
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
+hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
+  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
+
+# ── Check if kv/ is already enabled ──────────────────────────────────────────
+# sys/mounts returns an object keyed by "<path>/" for every enabled secret
+# engine (trailing slash is Vault's on-disk form). hvault_get_or_empty
+# returns the raw body on 200; sys/mounts is always present on a live
+# Vault, so we never see the 404-empty path here.
+log "checking existing secret engines"
+mounts_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
+  || die "failed to list secret engines"
+
+if [ -n "$mounts_raw" ] \
+   && printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -e '."kv/"' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  # kv/ exists — verify it's kv-v2 on the right path shape. Vault returns
+  # the option as a string ("2") on GET, never an integer.
+  kv_type="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -r '."kv/".type // ""')"
+  kv_version="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_raw" | jq -r '."kv/".options.version // ""')"
+  if [ "$kv_type" = "kv" ] && [ "$kv_version" = "2" ]; then
+    log "kv-v2 at kv/ already enabled (type=${kv_type}, version=${kv_version})"
+    exit 0
+  fi
+  die "kv/ exists but is not kv-v2 (type=${kv_type:-<unset>}, version=${kv_version:-<unset>}) — manual intervention required"
+fi
+
+# ── Enable kv-v2 at path=kv ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# POST sys/mounts/<path> with type=kv + options.version=2 is the
+# HTTP-API equivalent of `vault secrets enable -path=kv -version=2 kv`.
+# Keeps the script vault-CLI-free (matches the policy-apply + nomad-auth
+# scripts; their headers explain why a CLI dep would die on client-only
+# nodes).
+log "enabling kv-v2 at path=kv"
+enable_payload="$(jq -n '{type:"kv",options:{version:"2"}}')"
+_hvault_request POST "sys/mounts/kv" "$enable_payload" >/dev/null \
+  || die "failed to enable kv-v2 secret engine"
+log "kv-v2 enabled at kv/"

lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh — Idempotent Vault JWT auth + Nomad wiring
+#
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.3, issue #881). Enables Vault's JWT
+# auth method at path `jwt-nomad`, points it at Nomad's workload-identity
+# JWKS endpoint, writes one role per policy (via tools/vault-apply-roles.sh),
+# updates /etc/nomad.d/server.hcl with the vault stanza, and signals nomad
+# to reload so jobs can exchange short-lived workload-identity tokens for
+# Vault tokens — no shared VAULT_TOKEN in job env.
+#
+# Steps:
+#   1. Enable auth method           (sys/auth/jwt-nomad, type=jwt)
+#   2. Configure JWKS + algs        (auth/jwt-nomad/config)
+#   3. Upsert roles from vault/roles.yaml (delegates to vault-apply-roles.sh)
+#   4. Install /etc/nomad.d/server.hcl from repo + SIGHUP nomad if changed
+#
+# Idempotency contract:
+#   - Auth path already enabled → skip create, log "jwt-nomad already enabled".
+#   - Config identical to desired → skip write, log "jwt-nomad config unchanged".
+#   - Roles: see tools/vault-apply-roles.sh header for per-role diffing.
+#   - server.hcl on disk byte-identical to repo copy → skip write, skip SIGHUP.
+#   - Second run on a fully-configured box is a silent no-op end-to-end.
+#
+# Preconditions:
+#   - S0 complete (empty cluster up: nomad + vault reachable, vault unsealed).
+#   - S2.1 complete: vault/policies/*.hcl applied via tools/vault-apply-policies.sh
+#     (otherwise the roles we write will reference policies Vault does not
+#     know about — the write succeeds, but token minting will fail later).
+#   - Running as root (writes /etc/nomad.d/server.hcl + signals nomad).
+#
+# Environment:
+#   VAULT_ADDR  — default http://127.0.0.1:8200 (matches nomad/vault.hcl).
+#   VAULT_TOKEN — env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token (resolved by lib/hvault.sh).
+#
+# Usage:
+#   sudo lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0  success (configured, or already so)
+#   1  precondition / API / nomad-reload failure
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/../../.." && pwd)"
+
+APPLY_ROLES_SH="${REPO_ROOT}/tools/vault-apply-roles.sh"
+SERVER_HCL_SRC="${REPO_ROOT}/nomad/server.hcl"
+SERVER_HCL_DST="/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl"
+
+# shellcheck source=../../hvault.sh
+source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
+
+# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
+# Called from `disinto init` which does not export VAULT_ADDR/VAULT_TOKEN in
+# the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912). Must run after hvault.sh is sourced.
+_hvault_default_env
+
+log() { printf '[vault-auth] %s\n' "$*"; }
+die() { printf '[vault-auth] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+  die "must run as root (writes ${SERVER_HCL_DST} + signals nomad)"
+fi
+
+# curl + jq are used directly; hvault.sh's helpers are also curl-based, so
+# the `vault` CLI is NOT required here — don't add it to this list, or a
+# Vault-server-present / vault-CLI-absent box (e.g. a Nomad-client-only
+# node) would die spuriously. systemctl is required for SIGHUPing nomad.
+for bin in curl jq systemctl; do
+  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
+done
+
+[ -f "$SERVER_HCL_SRC" ] \
+  || die "source config not found: ${SERVER_HCL_SRC}"
+[ -x "$APPLY_ROLES_SH" ] \
+  || die "companion script missing or not executable: ${APPLY_ROLES_SH}"
+
+hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
+  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
+
+# ── Desired config (Nomad workload-identity JWKS on localhost:4646) ──────────
+# Nomad's default workload-identity signer publishes the public JWKS at
+# /.well-known/jwks.json on the nomad HTTP API port (4646). Vault validates
+# JWTs against it. RS256 is the signer's default algorithm. `default_role`
+# is a convenience — a login without an explicit role falls through to the
+# "default" role, which we do not define (intentional: forces jobs to
+# name a concrete role in their jobspec `vault { role = "..." }`).
+JWKS_URL="http://127.0.0.1:4646/.well-known/jwks.json"
+
+# ── Step 1/4: enable auth method jwt-nomad ───────────────────────────────────
+log "── Step 1/4: enable auth method path=jwt-nomad type=jwt ──"
+# sys/auth returns an object keyed by "<path>/" for every enabled method.
+# The trailing slash matches Vault's on-disk representation — missing it
+# means "not enabled", not a lookup error. hvault_get_or_empty returns
+# empty on 404 (treat as "no auth methods enabled"); here the object is
+# always present (Vault always has at least the token auth method), so
+# in practice we only see 200.
+auth_list="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/auth")" \
+  || die "failed to list auth methods"
+if printf '%s' "$auth_list" | jq -e '.["jwt-nomad/"]' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  log "auth path jwt-nomad already enabled"
+else
+  enable_payload="$(jq -n '{type:"jwt",description:"Nomad workload identity (S2.3)"}')"
+  _hvault_request POST "sys/auth/jwt-nomad" "$enable_payload" >/dev/null \
+    || die "failed to enable auth method jwt-nomad"
+  log "auth path jwt-nomad enabled"
+fi
+
+# ── Step 2/4: configure auth/jwt-nomad/config ────────────────────────────────
+log "── Step 2/4: configure auth/jwt-nomad/config ──"
+desired_cfg="$(jq -n --arg jwks "$JWKS_URL" '{
+  jwks_url: $jwks,
+  jwt_supported_algs: ["RS256"],
+  default_role: "default"
+}')"
+
+current_cfg_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "auth/jwt-nomad/config")" \
+  || die "failed to read current jwt-nomad config"
+if [ -n "$current_cfg_raw" ]; then
+  cur_jwks="$(printf '%s' "$current_cfg_raw" | jq -r '.data.jwks_url // ""')"
+  cur_algs="$(printf '%s' "$current_cfg_raw" | jq -cS '.data.jwt_supported_algs // []')"
+  cur_default="$(printf '%s' "$current_cfg_raw" | jq -r '.data.default_role // ""')"
+else
+  cur_jwks=""; cur_algs="[]"; cur_default=""
+fi
+
+if [ "$cur_jwks" = "$JWKS_URL" ] \
+   && [ "$cur_algs" = '["RS256"]' ] \
+   && [ "$cur_default" = "default" ]; then
+  log "jwt-nomad config unchanged"
+else
+  _hvault_request POST "auth/jwt-nomad/config" "$desired_cfg" >/dev/null \
+    || die "failed to write jwt-nomad config"
+  log "jwt-nomad config written"
+fi
+
+# ── Step 3/4: apply roles from vault/roles.yaml ──────────────────────────────
+log "── Step 3/4: apply roles from vault/roles.yaml ──"
+# Delegates to tools/vault-apply-roles.sh — one source of truth for the
+# parser and per-role idempotency contract. Its header documents the
+# created/updated/unchanged wiring.
+"$APPLY_ROLES_SH"
+
+# ── Step 4/4: install server.hcl + SIGHUP nomad if changed ───────────────────
+log "── Step 4/4: install ${SERVER_HCL_DST} + reload nomad if changed ──"
+# cluster-up.sh (S0.4) is the normal path for installing server.hcl — but
+# this script is run AFTER S0.4, so we also install here. Writing only on
+# content-diff keeps re-runs a true no-op (no spurious SIGHUP). `install`
+# preserves perms at 0644 root:root on every write.
+needs_reload=0
+if [ -f "$SERVER_HCL_DST" ] && cmp -s "$SERVER_HCL_SRC" "$SERVER_HCL_DST"; then
+  log "unchanged: ${SERVER_HCL_DST}"
+else
+  log "writing: ${SERVER_HCL_DST}"
+  install -m 0644 -o root -g root "$SERVER_HCL_SRC" "$SERVER_HCL_DST"
+  needs_reload=1
+fi
+
+if [ "$needs_reload" -eq 1 ]; then
+  # SIGHUP triggers Nomad's config reload (see ExecReload in
+  # lib/init/nomad/systemd-nomad.sh — /bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID). Using
+  # `systemctl kill -s SIGHUP` instead of `systemctl reload` sends the
+  # signal even when the unit doesn't declare ExecReload (defensive —
+  # future unit edits can't silently break this script).
+  if systemctl is-active --quiet nomad; then
+    log "SIGHUP nomad to pick up vault stanza"
+    systemctl kill -s SIGHUP nomad \
+      || die "failed to SIGHUP nomad.service"
+  else
+    # Fresh box: nomad not started yet. The updated server.hcl will be
+    # picked up at first start. Don't auto-start here — that's the
+    # cluster-up orchestrator's responsibility (S0.4).
+    log "nomad.service not active — skipping SIGHUP (next start loads vault stanza)"
+  fi
+else
+  log "server.hcl unchanged — nomad SIGHUP not needed"
+fi
+
+log "── done — jwt-nomad auth + config + roles + nomad vault stanza in place ──"

lib/load-project.sh

@@ -85,8 +85,22 @@ if mirrors:
 # environment.  The TOML carries host-perspective values (localhost, /home/admin/…)
 # that would break container API calls and path resolution.  Skip overriding
 # any env var that is already set when running inside the container.
+#
+# #852 defence: validate that $_key is a legal shell identifier before
+# `export`.  A hand-edited TOML can smuggle in keys that survive the
+# Python emitter but fail `export`'s identifier rule — e.g.
+# `[mirrors] my-mirror = "..."` becomes `MIRROR_MY-MIRROR` because the
+# MIRROR_<NAME> emitter only upper-cases, it does not dash-to-underscore.
+# Without this guard `export "MIRROR_MY-MIRROR=…"` returns non-zero, and
+# under `set -euo pipefail` in the caller the whole file aborts — which
+# is how the original #852 crash-loop presented.  Warn-and-skip keeps
+# the rest of the TOML loadable.
 while IFS='=' read -r _key _val; do
   [ -z "$_key" ] && continue
+  if ! [[ "$_key" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]]; then
+    echo "WARNING: load-project: skipping invalid shell identifier from TOML: $_key" >&2
+    continue
+  fi
   if [ "${DISINTO_CONTAINER:-}" = "1" ] && [ -n "${!_key:-}" ]; then
     continue
   fi
@@ -129,25 +143,39 @@ agents = cfg.get('agents', {})
 for name, config in agents.items():
     if not isinstance(config, dict):
         continue
+    # Normalize the TOML section key into a valid shell identifier fragment.
+    # TOML allows dashes in bare keys (e.g. [agents.dev-qwen2]), but POSIX
+    # shell var names cannot contain '-'. Match the 'tr a-z- A-Z_' convention
+    # used in hire-agent.sh (#834) and generators.sh (#852) so the var names
+    # stay consistent across the stack.
+    safe = name.upper().replace('-', '_')
     # Emit variables in uppercase with the agent name
     if 'base_url' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_BASE_URL={config[\"base_url\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_BASE_URL={config[\"base_url\"]}')
     if 'model' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_MODEL={config[\"model\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_MODEL={config[\"model\"]}')
     if 'api_key' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_API_KEY={config[\"api_key\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_API_KEY={config[\"api_key\"]}')
     if 'roles' in config:
         roles = ' '.join(config['roles']) if isinstance(config['roles'], list) else config['roles']
-        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_ROLES={roles}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_ROLES={roles}')
     if 'forge_user' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_FORGE_USER={config[\"forge_user\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_FORGE_USER={config[\"forge_user\"]}')
     if 'compact_pct' in config:
-        print(f'AGENT_{name.upper()}_COMPACT_PCT={config[\"compact_pct\"]}')
+        print(f'AGENT_{safe}_COMPACT_PCT={config[\"compact_pct\"]}')
 " "$_PROJECT_TOML" 2>/dev/null) || true
 
   if [ -n "$_AGENT_VARS" ]; then
+    # #852 defence: same warn-and-skip guard as the main loop above.  The
+    # Python emitter already normalizes dashed agent names (#862), but a
+    # quoted TOML section like `[agents."weird name"]` could still produce
+    # an invalid identifier.  Fail loudly but keep other agents loadable.
     while IFS='=' read -r _key _val; do
       [ -z "$_key" ] && continue
+      if ! [[ "$_key" =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]]; then
+        echo "WARNING: load-project: skipping invalid shell identifier from [agents.*]: $_key" >&2
+        continue
+      fi
       export "$_key=$_val"
     done <<< "$_AGENT_VARS"
   fi

nomad/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,45 +1,47 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # nomad/ — Agent Instructions
 
 Nomad + Vault HCL for the factory's single-node cluster. These files are
 the source of truth that `lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh` copies onto a
 factory box under `/etc/nomad.d/` and `/etc/vault.d/` at init time.
 
-This directory is part of the **Nomad+Vault migration (Step 0)** —
-see issues #821–#825 for the step breakdown. Jobspecs land in Step 1.
+This directory covers the **Nomad+Vault migration (Steps 0–2)** —
+see issues #821–#884 for the step breakdown.
 
 ## What lives here
 
-| File | Deployed to | Owned by |
+| File/Dir | Deployed to | Owned by |
 |---|---|---|
 | `server.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/server.hcl` | agent role, bind, ports, `data_dir` (S0.2) |
 | `client.hcl` | `/etc/nomad.d/client.hcl` | Docker driver cfg + `host_volume` declarations (S0.2) |
 | `vault.hcl`  | `/etc/vault.d/vault.hcl`  | Vault storage, listener, UI, `disable_mlock` (S0.3) |
+| `jobs/forgejo.hcl` | submitted via `lib/init/nomad/deploy.sh` | Forgejo job; reads creds from Vault via consul-template stanza (S2.4) |
 
 Nomad auto-merges every `*.hcl` under `-config=/etc/nomad.d/`, so the
 split between `server.hcl` and `client.hcl` is for readability, not
 semantics. The top-of-file header in each config documents which blocks
 it owns.
 
-## What does NOT live here yet
+## Vault ACL policies
 
-- **Jobspecs.** Step 0 brings up an *empty* cluster. Step 1 (and later)
-  adds `*.nomad.hcl` job files for forgejo, woodpecker, agents, caddy,
-  etc. When that lands, jobspecs will live in `nomad/jobs/` and each
-  will get its own header comment pointing to the `host_volume` names
-  it consumes (`volume = "forgejo-data"`, etc. — declared in
-  `client.hcl`).
-- **TLS, ACLs, gossip encryption.** Deliberately absent in Step 0 —
-  factory traffic stays on localhost. These land in later migration
-  steps alongside multi-node support.
+`vault/policies/` holds one `.hcl` file per Vault policy; see
+[`vault/policies/AGENTS.md`](../vault/policies/AGENTS.md) for the naming
+convention, KV path summary, and JWT-auth role bindings (S2.1/S2.3).
+
+## Not yet implemented
+
+- **Additional jobspecs** (woodpecker, agents, caddy) — Step 1 brought up
+  Forgejo; remaining services land in later steps.
+- **TLS, ACLs, gossip encryption** — deliberately absent for now; land
+  alongside multi-node support.
 
 ## Adding a jobspec (Step 1 and later)
 
-1. Drop a file in `nomad/jobs/<service>.nomad.hcl`. The `.nomad.hcl`
-   suffix is load-bearing: `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` globs on
-   exactly that suffix to auto-pick up new jobspecs (see step 2 in
-   "How CI validates these files" below). Anything else in
-   `nomad/jobs/` is silently skipped by CI.
+1. Drop a file in `nomad/jobs/<service>.hcl`. The `.hcl` suffix is
+   load-bearing: `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` globs on exactly that
+   suffix to auto-pick up new jobspecs (see step 2 in "How CI validates
+   these files" below). Anything else in `nomad/jobs/` is silently
+   skipped by CI.
 2. If it needs persistent state, reference a `host_volume` already
    declared in `client.hcl` — *don't* add ad-hoc host paths in the
    jobspec. If a new volume is needed, add it to **both**:
@@ -52,22 +54,22 @@ it owns.
    rejects the mismatch at placement time instead.
 3. Pin image tags — `image = "forgejo/forgejo:1.22.5"`, not `:latest`.
 4. No pipeline edit required — step 2 of `nomad-validate.yml` globs
-   over `nomad/jobs/*.nomad.hcl` and validates every match. Just make
-   sure the existing `nomad/**` trigger path still covers your file
-   (it does for anything under `nomad/jobs/`).
+   over `nomad/jobs/*.hcl` and validates every match. Just make sure
+   the existing `nomad/**` trigger path still covers your file (it
+   does for anything under `nomad/jobs/`).
 
 ## How CI validates these files
 
 `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` runs on every PR that touches `nomad/`
-(including `nomad/jobs/`), `lib/init/nomad/`, or `bin/disinto`. Five
-fail-closed steps:
+(including `nomad/jobs/`), `lib/init/nomad/`, `bin/disinto`,
+`vault/policies/`, or `vault/roles.yaml`. Eight fail-closed steps:
 
 1. **`nomad config validate nomad/server.hcl nomad/client.hcl`**
    — parses the HCL, fails on unknown blocks, bad port ranges, invalid
    driver config. Vault HCL is excluded (different tool). Jobspecs are
    excluded too — agent-config and jobspec are disjoint HCL grammars;
    running this step on a jobspec rejects it with "unknown block 'job'".
-2. **`nomad job validate nomad/jobs/*.nomad.hcl`** (loop, one call per file)
+2. **`nomad job validate nomad/jobs/*.hcl`** (loop, one call per file)
    — parses each jobspec's HCL, fails on unknown stanzas, missing
    required fields, wrong value types, invalid driver config. Runs
    offline (no Nomad server needed) so CI exit 0 ≠ "this will schedule
@@ -79,25 +81,53 @@ fail-closed steps:
      - image reachability — `image = "codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0"`
        is accepted even if the registry is down or the tag is wrong.
    New jobspecs are picked up automatically by the glob — no pipeline
-   edit needed as long as the file is named `<name>.nomad.hcl`.
+   edit needed as long as the file is named `<name>.hcl`.
 3. **`vault operator diagnose -config=nomad/vault.hcl -skip=storage -skip=listener`**
    — Vault's equivalent syntax + schema check. `-skip=storage/listener`
    disables the runtime checks (CI containers don't have
    `/var/lib/vault/data` or port 8200). Exit 2 (advisory warnings only,
    e.g. TLS-disabled listener) is tolerated; exit 1 blocks merge.
-4. **`shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto`**
+4. **`vault policy fmt` idempotence check on every `vault/policies/*.hcl`**
+   (S2.6) — `vault policy fmt` has no `-check` flag in 1.18.5, so the
+   step copies each file to `/tmp`, runs `vault policy fmt` on the copy,
+   and diffs against the original. Any non-empty diff means the
+   committed file would be rewritten by `fmt` and the step fails — the
+   author is pointed at `vault policy fmt <file>` to heal the drift.
+5. **`vault policy write`-based validation against an inline dev-mode Vault**
+   (S2.6) — Vault 1.18.5 has no offline `policy validate` subcommand;
+   the CI step starts a dev-mode server, loops `vault policy write
+   <basename> <file>` over each `vault/policies/*.hcl`, and aggregates
+   failures so one CI run surfaces every broken policy. The server is
+   ephemeral and torn down on step exit — no persistence, no real
+   secrets. Catches unknown capability names (e.g. `"frobnicate"`),
+   malformed `path` blocks, and other semantic errors `fmt` does not.
+6. **`vault/roles.yaml` validator** (S2.6) — yamllint + a PyYAML-based
+   check that every role's `policy:` field matches a basename under
+   `vault/policies/`, and that every role entry carries all four
+   required fields (`name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id`). Drift
+   between the two directories is a scheduling-time "permission denied"
+   in production; this step turns it into a CI failure at PR time.
+7. **`shellcheck --severity=warning lib/init/nomad/*.sh bin/disinto`**
    — all init/dispatcher shell clean. `bin/disinto` has no `.sh`
    extension so the repo-wide shellcheck in `.woodpecker/ci.yml` skips
    it — this is the one place it gets checked.
-5. **`bats tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats`**
+8. **`bats tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats`**
    — exercises the dispatcher: `disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run`,
    `… --empty --dry-run`, and the `--backend=docker` regression guard.
 
+**Secret-scan coverage.** Policy HCL files under `vault/policies/` are
+already swept by the P11 secret-scan gate
+(`.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml`, #798), whose `vault/**/*` trigger path
+covers everything in this directory. `nomad-validate.yml` intentionally
+does NOT duplicate that gate — one scanner, one source of truth.
+
 If a PR breaks `nomad/server.hcl` (e.g. typo in a block name), step 1
 fails with a clear error; if it breaks a jobspec (e.g. misspells
 `task` as `tsak`, or adds a `volume` stanza without a `source`), step
-2 fails instead. The fix makes it pass. PRs that don't touch any of
-the trigger paths skip this pipeline entirely.
+2 fails; a typo in a `path "..."` block in a vault policy fails step 5
+with the Vault parser's error; a `roles.yaml` entry that points at a
+policy basename that does not exist fails step 6. PRs that don't touch
+any of the trigger paths skip this pipeline entirely.
 
 ## Version pinning
 
@@ -117,5 +147,13 @@ accept (or vice versa).
 
 - `lib/init/nomad/` — installer + systemd units + cluster-up orchestrator.
 - `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml` — this directory's CI pipeline.
+- `vault/policies/` — Vault ACL policy HCL files (S2.1); the
+  `vault-policy-fmt` / `vault-policy-validate` CI steps above enforce
+  their shape. See [`../vault/policies/AGENTS.md`](../vault/policies/AGENTS.md)
+  for the policy lifecycle, CI enforcement details, and common failure
+  modes.
+- `vault/roles.yaml` — JWT-auth role → policy bindings (S2.3); the
+  `vault-roles-validate` CI step above keeps it in lockstep with the
+  policies directory.
 - Top-of-file headers in `server.hcl` / `client.hcl` / `vault.hcl`
   document the per-file ownership contract.

nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl — Forgejo git server (Nomad service job)
+#
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S1.1, issue #840; S2.4, issue #882).
+# First jobspec to land under nomad/jobs/ — proves the docker driver +
+# host_volume plumbing from Step 0 (client.hcl) by running a real factory
+# service. S2.4 layered Vault integration on top: admin/internal secrets
+# now render via workload identity + template stanza instead of inline env.
+#
+# Host_volume contract:
+#   This job mounts the `forgejo-data` host_volume declared in
+#   nomad/client.hcl. That volume is backed by /srv/disinto/forgejo-data on
+#   the factory box, created by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh before any job
+#   references it. Keep the `source = "forgejo-data"` below in sync with the
+#   host_volume stanza in client.hcl — drift = scheduling failures.
+#
+# Vault integration (S2.4):
+#   - vault { role = "service-forgejo" } at the group scope — the task's
+#     workload-identity JWT is exchanged for a Vault token carrying the
+#     policy named on that role. Role + policy are defined in
+#     vault/roles.yaml + vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl.
+#   - template { destination = "secrets/forgejo.env" env = true } pulls
+#     FORGEJO__security__{SECRET_KEY,INTERNAL_TOKEN} out of Vault KV v2
+#     at kv/disinto/shared/forgejo and merges them into the task env.
+#     Seeded on fresh boxes by tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh.
+#   - Non-secret env (DB type, ROOT_URL, ports, registration lockdown,
+#     webhook allow-list) stays inline below — not sensitive, not worth
+#     round-tripping through Vault.
+#
+# Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
+# until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S1.3 can wire
+# `disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo` to `nomad job run` it.
+# =============================================================================
+
+job "forgejo" {
+  type        = "service"
+  datacenters = ["dc1"]
+
+  group "forgejo" {
+    count = 1
+
+    # ── Vault workload identity (S2.4, issue #882) ─────────────────────────
+    # `role = "service-forgejo"` is defined in vault/roles.yaml and
+    # applied by tools/vault-apply-roles.sh (S2.3). The role's bound
+    # claim pins nomad_job_id = "forgejo" — renaming this jobspec's
+    # `job "forgejo"` without updating vault/roles.yaml will make token
+    # exchange fail at placement with a "claim mismatch" error.
+    vault {
+      role = "service-forgejo"
+    }
+
+    # Static :3000 matches docker-compose's published port so the rest of
+    # the factory (agents, woodpecker, caddy) keeps reaching forgejo at the
+    # same host:port during and after cutover. `to = 3000` maps the host
+    # port into the container's :3000 listener.
+    network {
+      port "http" {
+        static = 3000
+        to     = 3000
+      }
+    }
+
+    # Host-volume mount: declared in nomad/client.hcl, path
+    # /srv/disinto/forgejo-data on the factory box.
+    volume "forgejo-data" {
+      type      = "host"
+      source    = "forgejo-data"
+      read_only = false
+    }
+
+    # Conservative restart policy — fail fast to the scheduler instead of
+    # spinning on a broken image/config. 3 attempts over 5m, then back off.
+    restart {
+      attempts = 3
+      interval = "5m"
+      delay    = "15s"
+      mode     = "delay"
+    }
+
+    # Native Nomad service discovery (no Consul in this factory cluster).
+    # Health check gates the service as healthy only after the API is up;
+    # initial_status is deliberately unset so Nomad waits for the first
+    # probe to pass before marking the allocation healthy on boot.
+    service {
+      name     = "forgejo"
+      port     = "http"
+      provider = "nomad"
+
+      check {
+        type     = "http"
+        path     = "/api/v1/version"
+        interval = "10s"
+        timeout  = "3s"
+      }
+    }
+
+    task "forgejo" {
+      driver = "docker"
+
+      config {
+        image = "codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0"
+        ports = ["http"]
+      }
+
+      volume_mount {
+        volume      = "forgejo-data"
+        destination = "/data"
+        read_only   = false
+      }
+
+      # Non-secret env — DB type, public URL, ports, install lock,
+      # registration lockdown, webhook allow-list. Nothing sensitive here,
+      # so this stays inline. Secret-bearing env (SECRET_KEY, INTERNAL_TOKEN)
+      # lives in the template stanza below and is merged into task env.
+      env {
+        FORGEJO__database__DB_TYPE             = "sqlite3"
+        FORGEJO__server__ROOT_URL              = "http://forgejo:3000/"
+        FORGEJO__server__HTTP_PORT             = "3000"
+        FORGEJO__security__INSTALL_LOCK        = "true"
+        FORGEJO__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION = "true"
+        FORGEJO__webhook__ALLOWED_HOST_LIST    = "private"
+      }
+
+      # ── Vault-templated secrets env (S2.4, issue #882) ──────────────────
+      # Renders `<task-dir>/secrets/forgejo.env` (per-alloc secrets dir,
+      # never on disk on the host root filesystem, never in `nomad job
+      # inspect` output). `env = true` merges every KEY=VAL line into the
+      # task environment. `change_mode = "restart"` re-runs the task
+      # whenever a watched secret's value in Vault changes — so `vault kv
+      # put …` alone is enough to roll new secrets; no manual
+      # `nomad alloc restart` required (though that also works — it
+      # forces a re-render).
+      #
+      # Vault path: `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo`. The literal `/data/`
+      # segment is required by consul-template for KV v2 mounts — without
+      # it the template would read from a KV v1 path that doesn't exist
+      # (the policy in vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl grants
+      # `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*`, confirming v2).
+      #
+      # Empty-Vault fallback (`with ... else ...`): on a fresh LXC where
+      # the KV path is absent, consul-template's `with` short-circuits to
+      # the `else` branch. Emitting visible placeholders (instead of no
+      # env vars) means the container still boots, but with obviously-bad
+      # secrets that an operator will spot in `env | grep FORGEJO` —
+      # better than forgejo silently regenerating SECRET_KEY on every
+      # restart and invalidating every prior session. Seed the path with
+      # tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh to replace the placeholders.
+      #
+      # Placeholder values are kept short on purpose: the repo-wide
+      # secret-scan (.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml → lib/secret-scan.sh)
+      # flags `TOKEN=<16+ non-space chars>` as a plaintext secret, so a
+      # descriptive long placeholder (e.g. "run-tools-vault-seed-...") on
+      # the INTERNAL_TOKEN line would fail CI on every PR that touched
+      # this file. "seed-me" is < 16 chars and still distinctive enough
+      # to surface in a `grep FORGEJO__security__` audit. The template
+      # comment below carries the operator-facing fix pointer.
+      # `error_on_missing_key = false` stops consul-template from blocking
+      # the alloc on template-pending when the Vault KV path exists but a
+      # referenced key is absent (or the path itself is absent and the
+      # else-branch placeholders are used). Without this, a fresh-LXC
+      # `disinto init --with forgejo` against an empty Vault hangs on
+      # template-pending until deploy.sh times out (issue #912, bug #4).
+      template {
+        destination          = "secrets/forgejo.env"
+        env                  = true
+        change_mode          = "restart"
+        error_on_missing_key = false
+        data                 = <<EOT
+{{- with secret "kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo" -}}
+FORGEJO__security__SECRET_KEY={{ .Data.data.secret_key }}
+FORGEJO__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN={{ .Data.data.internal_token }}
+{{- else -}}
+# WARNING: kv/disinto/shared/forgejo is empty — run tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh
+FORGEJO__security__SECRET_KEY=seed-me
+FORGEJO__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN=seed-me
+{{- end -}}
+EOT
+      }
+
+      # Baseline — tune once we have real usage numbers under nomad. The
+      # docker-compose stack runs forgejo uncapped; these limits exist so
+      # an unhealthy forgejo can't starve the rest of the node.
+      resources {
+        cpu    = 300
+        memory = 512
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

nomad/jobs/forgejo.nomad.hcl

@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-# =============================================================================
-# nomad/jobs/forgejo.nomad.hcl — Forgejo git server (Nomad service job)
-#
-# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S1.1, issue #840). First jobspec to
-# land under nomad/jobs/ — proves the docker driver + host_volume plumbing
-# from Step 0 (client.hcl) by running a real factory service.
-#
-# Host_volume contract:
-#   This job mounts the `forgejo-data` host_volume declared in
-#   nomad/client.hcl. That volume is backed by /srv/disinto/forgejo-data on
-#   the factory box, created by lib/init/nomad/cluster-up.sh before any job
-#   references it. Keep the `source = "forgejo-data"` below in sync with the
-#   host_volume stanza in client.hcl — drift = scheduling failures.
-#
-# No Vault integration yet — Step 2 (#...) templates in OAuth secrets and
-# replaces the inline FORGEJO__oauth2__* bits. The env vars below are the
-# subset of docker-compose.yml's forgejo service that does NOT depend on
-# secrets: DB type, public URL, install lock, registration lockdown, webhook
-# allow-list. OAuth app registration lands later, per-service.
-#
-# Not the runtime yet: docker-compose.yml is still the factory's live stack
-# until cutover. This file exists so CI can validate it and S1.3 can wire
-# `disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo` to `nomad job run` it.
-# =============================================================================
-
-job "forgejo" {
-  type        = "service"
-  datacenters = ["dc1"]
-
-  group "forgejo" {
-    count = 1
-
-    # Static :3000 matches docker-compose's published port so the rest of
-    # the factory (agents, woodpecker, caddy) keeps reaching forgejo at the
-    # same host:port during and after cutover. `to = 3000` maps the host
-    # port into the container's :3000 listener.
-    network {
-      port "http" {
-        static = 3000
-        to     = 3000
-      }
-    }
-
-    # Host-volume mount: declared in nomad/client.hcl, path
-    # /srv/disinto/forgejo-data on the factory box.
-    volume "forgejo-data" {
-      type      = "host"
-      source    = "forgejo-data"
-      read_only = false
-    }
-
-    # Conservative restart policy — fail fast to the scheduler instead of
-    # spinning on a broken image/config. 3 attempts over 5m, then back off.
-    restart {
-      attempts = 3
-      interval = "5m"
-      delay    = "15s"
-      mode     = "delay"
-    }
-
-    # Native Nomad service discovery (no Consul in this factory cluster).
-    # Health check gates the service as healthy only after the API is up;
-    # initial_status is deliberately unset so Nomad waits for the first
-    # probe to pass before marking the allocation healthy on boot.
-    service {
-      name     = "forgejo"
-      port     = "http"
-      provider = "nomad"
-
-      check {
-        type     = "http"
-        path     = "/api/v1/version"
-        interval = "10s"
-        timeout  = "3s"
-      }
-    }
-
-    task "forgejo" {
-      driver = "docker"
-
-      config {
-        image = "codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo:11.0"
-        ports = ["http"]
-      }
-
-      volume_mount {
-        volume      = "forgejo-data"
-        destination = "/data"
-        read_only   = false
-      }
-
-      # Mirrors the non-secret env set from docker-compose.yml's forgejo
-      # service. OAuth/secret-bearing env vars land in Step 2 via Vault
-      # templates — do NOT add them here.
-      env {
-        FORGEJO__database__DB_TYPE             = "sqlite3"
-        FORGEJO__server__ROOT_URL              = "http://forgejo:3000/"
-        FORGEJO__server__HTTP_PORT             = "3000"
-        FORGEJO__security__INSTALL_LOCK        = "true"
-        FORGEJO__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION = "true"
-        FORGEJO__webhook__ALLOWED_HOST_LIST    = "private"
-      }
-
-      # Baseline — tune once we have real usage numbers under nomad. The
-      # docker-compose stack runs forgejo uncapped; these limits exist so
-      # an unhealthy forgejo can't starve the rest of the node.
-      resources {
-        cpu    = 300
-        memory = 512
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}

nomad/server.hcl

@@ -51,3 +51,26 @@ advertise {
 ui {
   enabled = true
 }
+
+# ─── Vault integration (S2.3, issue #881) ───────────────────────────────────
+# Nomad jobs exchange their short-lived workload-identity JWT (signed by
+# nomad's built-in signer at /.well-known/jwks.json on :4646) for a Vault
+# token carrying the policies named by the role in `vault { role = "..." }`
+# of each jobspec — no shared VAULT_TOKEN in job env.
+#
+# The JWT auth path (jwt-nomad) + per-role bindings live on the Vault
+# side, written by lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh + tools/vault-apply-roles.sh.
+# Roles are defined in vault/roles.yaml.
+#
+# `default_identity.aud = ["vault.io"]` matches bound_audiences on every
+# role in vault/roles.yaml — a drift here would silently break every job's
+# Vault token exchange at placement time.
+vault {
+  enabled = true
+  address = "http://127.0.0.1:8200"
+
+  default_identity {
+    aud = ["vault.io"]
+    ttl = "1h"
+  }
+}

planner/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Planner Agent
 
 **Role**: Strategic planning using a Prerequisite Tree (Theory of Constraints),

predictor/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Predictor Agent
 
 **Role**: Abstract adversary (the "goblin"). Runs a 2-step formula

review/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Review Agent
 
 **Role**: AI-powered PR review — post structured findings and formal

supervisor/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!-- last-reviewed: 2a7ae0b7eae5979b2c53e3bd1c4280dfdc9df785 -->
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
 # Supervisor Agent
 
 **Role**: Health monitoring and auto-remediation, executed as a formula-driven

tests/disinto-init-nomad.bats

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ setup_file() {
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: default (cluster-up; jobs deferred to Step 1)"* ]]
 
   # All nine cluster-up dry-run steps, in order.
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 2/9: write + enable nomad.service (NOT started)"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 3/9: write + enable vault.service + vault.hcl (NOT started)"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 4/9: create host-volume dirs under /srv/disinto/"* ]]
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ setup_file() {
   # of the migration will branch on $empty to gate job deployment; today
   # both modes invoke the same cluster-up dry-run.
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: --empty (cluster-up only, no jobs)"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
   [[ "$output" == *"Dry run complete — no changes made."* ]]
 }
 
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ setup_file() {
 
   # Negative assertion: the nomad dispatcher banners must be absent.
   [[ "$output" != *"nomad backend:"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" != *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
 
   # Positive assertion: docker-path output still appears — the existing
   # docker dry-run printed "=== disinto init ===" before listing the
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ setup_file() {
   run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend nomad --dry-run
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: default"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
 }
 
 # ── Flag validation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ setup_file() {
   run "$DISINTO_BIN" init --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: --empty (cluster-up only, no jobs)"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
   # The bug symptom must be absent — backend was misdetected as docker
   # when --backend=nomad got swallowed as repo_url.
   [[ "$output" != *"--empty is only valid with --backend=nomad"* ]]
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ setup_file() {
   run "$DISINTO_BIN" init --backend nomad --dry-run
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
   [[ "$output" == *"nomad backend: default"* ]]
-  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[dry-run] Step 1/9: install nomad + vault binaries + docker daemon"* ]]
 }
 
 @test "disinto init (no args) still errors with 'repo URL required'" {
@@ -143,3 +143,170 @@ setup_file() {
   [[ "$output" == *"repo URL required"* ]]
   [[ "$output" != *"Unknown option"* ]]
 }
+
+# ── --with flag tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo --dry-run prints deploy plan" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: forgejo"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job validate"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] [dry-run] nomad job run -detach"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"[deploy] dry-run complete"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo,forgejo --dry-run handles comma-separated services" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with forgejo,forgejo --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: forgejo,forgejo"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=docker --with forgejo errors with '--with requires --backend=nomad'" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=docker --with forgejo
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--with requires --backend=nomad"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --with forgejo errors with mutually exclusive" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --with forgejo
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --with are mutually exclusive"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with unknown-service errors with unknown service" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with unknown-service --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"unknown service"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"known: forgejo"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo (flag=value syntax) works" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --with=forgejo --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"services to deploy: forgejo"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --with forgejo --empty --dry-run rejects in any order" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --with forgejo --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --with are mutually exclusive"* ]]
+}
+
+# ── --import-env / --import-sops / --age-key (S2.5, #883) ────────────────────
+#
+# Step 2.5 wires Vault policies + JWT auth + optional KV import into
+# `disinto init --backend=nomad`. The tests below exercise the flag
+# grammar (who-requires-whom + who-requires-backend=nomad) and the
+# dry-run plan shape (each --import-* flag prints its own path line,
+# independently). A prior attempt at this issue regressed the "print
+# every set flag" invariant by using if/elif — covered by the
+# "--import-env --import-sops --age-key" case.
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env only is accepted" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--import-env"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-sops without --age-key errors" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--import-sops requires --age-key"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --age-key without --import-sops errors" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--age-key requires --import-sops"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=docker --import-env errors with backend requirement" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=docker --import-env /tmp/.env
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--import-env, --import-sops, and --age-key require --backend=nomad"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-sops --age-key --dry-run shows import plan" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--import-sops"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--age-key"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"sops file: /tmp/.env.vault.enc"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"age key:   /tmp/keys.txt"* ]]
+}
+
+# When all three flags are set, each one must print its own path line —
+# if/elif regressed this to "only one printed" in a prior attempt (#883).
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env --import-sops --age-key --dry-run shows full import plan" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"sops file: /tmp/.env.vault.enc"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"age key:   /tmp/keys.txt"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad without import flags shows skip message" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"no --import-env/--import-sops"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"skipping"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env --import-sops --age-key --with forgejo --dry-run shows all plans" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env /tmp/.env --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --with forgejo --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Deploy services dry-run"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --dry-run prints policies + auth plan even without --import-*" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # Policies + auth run on every nomad path (idempotent), so the dry-run
+  # plan always lists them — regardless of whether --import-* is set.
+  [[ "$output" == *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
+}
+
+# --import-env=PATH (=-form) must work alongside --import-env PATH.
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --import-env=PATH (equals form) works" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --import-env=/tmp/.env --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"env file:  /tmp/.env"* ]]
+}
+
+# --empty short-circuits after cluster-up: no policies, no auth, no
+# import, no deploy. The dry-run plan must match that — cluster-up plan
+# appears, but none of the S2.x section banners do.
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run skips policies/auth/import sections" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # Cluster-up still runs (it's what --empty brings up).
+  [[ "$output" == *"Cluster-up dry-run"* ]]
+  # Policies + auth + import must NOT appear under --empty.
+  [[ "$output" != *"Vault policies dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *"Vault auth dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *"Vault import dry-run"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *"no --import-env/--import-sops"* ]]
+}
+
+# --empty + any --import-* flag silently does nothing (import is skipped),
+# so the CLI rejects the combination up front rather than letting it
+# look like the import "succeeded".
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --import-env errors" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --import-env /tmp/.env --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "disinto init --backend=nomad --empty --import-sops --age-key errors" {
+  run "$DISINTO_BIN" init placeholder/repo --backend=nomad --empty --import-sops /tmp/.env.vault.enc --age-key /tmp/keys.txt --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"--empty and --import-env/--import-sops/--age-key are mutually exclusive"* ]]
+}

tests/fixtures/.env.vault.enc

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{
+	"data": "ENC[AES256_GCM,data:SsLdIiZDVkkV1bbKeHQ8A1K/4vgXQFJF8y4J87GGwsGa13lNnPoqRaCmPAtuQr3hR5JNqARUhFp8aEusyzwi/lZLU2Reo32YjE26ObVOHf47EGmmHM/tEgh6u0fa1AmFtuqJVQzhG2eZhJmZJFgdRH36+bhdBwI1mkORmsRNtBPHHjtQJDbsgN47maDhuP4B7WvB4/TdnJ++GNMlMbyrbr0pEf2uqqOVO55cJ3I4v/Jcg8tq0clPuW1k5dNFsmFSMbbjE5N25EGrc7oEH5GVZ6I6L6p0Fzyj/MV4hKacboFHiZmBZgRQ,iv:UnXTa800G3PW4IaErkPBIZKjPHAU3LmiCvAqDdhFE/Q=,tag:kdWpHQ8fEPGFlmfVoTMskA==,type:str]",
+	"sops": {
+		"kms": null,
+		"gcp_kms": null,
+		"azure_kv": null,
+		"hc_vault": null,
+		"age": [
+			{
+				"recipient": "age1ztkm8yvdk42m2cn4dj2v9ptfknq8wpgr3ry9dpmtmlaeas6p7yyqft0ldg",
+				"enc": "-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----\nYWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBrVUlmaEdTNU1iMGg4dFA4\nNFNOSzlBc1NER1U3SHlwVFU1dm5tR1kyeldzCjZ2NXI3MjR4Zkd1RVBKNzJoQ1Jm\nQWpEZU5VMkNuYnhTTVJNc0RpTXlIZE0KLS0tIDFpQ2tlN0MzL1NuS2hKZU5JTG9B\nNWxXMzE0bGZpQkVBTnhWRXZBQlhrc1EKG76DM98cCuqIwUkbfJWHhJdYV77O9r8Q\nRJrq6jH59Gcp9W8iHg/aeShPHZFEOLg1q9azV9Wt9FjJn3SxyTmgvA==\n-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----\n"
+			}
+		],
+		"lastmodified": "2026-04-16T15:43:34Z",
+		"mac": "ENC[AES256_GCM,data:jVRr2TxSZH2paD2doIX4JwCqo5wiPYfTowpj189w1IVlS0EY/XQoqxiWbunX/LmIDdQlTPCSe/vTp1EJA0cx6vzN2xENrwsfzCP6dwDGaRlZhH3V0CVhtfHIkMTEKWrAUx5hFtiwJPkLYUUYi5aRWRxhZQM1eBeRvuGKdlwvmHA=,iv:H57a61AfVNLrlg+4aMl9mwXI5O38O5ZoRhpxe2PTTkY=,tag:2jwH1855VNYlKseTE/XtTg==,type:str]",
+		"pgp": null,
+		"unencrypted_suffix": "_unencrypted",
+		"version": "3.9.4"
+	}
+}

tests/fixtures/age-keys.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Test age key for sops
+# Generated: 2026-04-16
+# Public key: age1ztkm8yvdk42m2cn4dj2v9ptfknq8wpgr3ry9dpmtmlaeas6p7yyqft0ldg
+
+AGE-SECRET-KEY-1PCQQX37MTZDGES76H9TGQN5XTG2ZZX2UUR87KR784NZ4MQ3NJ56S0Z23SF

tests/fixtures/dot-env-complete

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Test fixture .env file for vault-import.sh
+# This file contains all expected keys for the import test
+
+# Generic forge creds
+FORGE_TOKEN=generic-forge-token
+FORGE_PASS=generic-forge-pass
+FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN=generic-admin-token
+
+# Bot tokens (review, dev, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor, vault)
+FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=review-token
+FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=review-pass
+FORGE_DEV_TOKEN=dev-token
+FORGE_DEV_PASS=dev-pass
+FORGE_GARDENER_TOKEN=gardener-token
+FORGE_GARDENER_PASS=gardener-pass
+FORGE_ARCHITECT_TOKEN=architect-token
+FORGE_ARCHITECT_PASS=architect-pass
+FORGE_PLANNER_TOKEN=planner-token
+FORGE_PLANNER_PASS=planner-pass
+FORGE_PREDICTOR_TOKEN=predictor-token
+FORGE_PREDICTOR_PASS=predictor-pass
+FORGE_SUPERVISOR_TOKEN=supervisor-token
+FORGE_SUPERVISOR_PASS=supervisor-pass
+FORGE_VAULT_TOKEN=vault-token
+FORGE_VAULT_PASS=vault-pass
+
+# Llama bot
+FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=llama-token
+FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=llama-pass
+
+# Woodpecker secrets
+WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET=wp-agent-secret
+WP_FORGEJO_CLIENT=wp-forgejo-client
+WP_FORGEJO_SECRET=wp-forgejo-secret
+WOODPECKER_TOKEN=wp-token
+
+# Chat secrets
+FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=forward-auth-secret
+CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=chat-client-id
+CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=chat-client-secret

tests/fixtures/dot-env-incomplete

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Test fixture .env file with missing required keys
+# This file is intentionally missing some keys to test error handling
+
+# Generic forge creds - missing FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN
+FORGE_TOKEN=generic-forge-token
+FORGE_PASS=generic-forge-pass
+
+# Bot tokens - missing several roles
+FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=review-token
+FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=review-pass
+FORGE_DEV_TOKEN=dev-token
+FORGE_DEV_PASS=dev-pass
+
+# Llama bot - missing (only token, no pass)
+FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA=llama-token
+# FORGE_PASS_LLAMA=llama-pass
+
+# Woodpecker secrets - missing some
+WOODPECKER_AGENT_SECRET=wp-agent-secret
+# WP_FORGEJO_CLIENT=wp-forgejo-client
+# WP_FORGEJO_SECRET=wp-forgejo-secret
+# WOODPECKER_TOKEN=wp-token
+
+# Chat secrets - missing some
+FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET=forward-auth-secret
+# CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=chat-client-id
+# CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=chat-client-secret

tests/fixtures/dot-env.vault.plain

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+GITHUB_TOKEN=github-test-token-abc123
+CODEBERG_TOKEN=codeberg-test-token-def456
+CLAWHUB_TOKEN=clawhub-test-token-ghi789
+DEPLOY_KEY=deploy-key-test-jkl012
+NPM_TOKEN=npm-test-token-mno345
+DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN=dockerhub-test-token-pqr678

tests/lib-generators.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# =============================================================================
+# tests/lib-generators.bats — Regression guard for the #849 fix.
+#
+# Before #849, `_generate_local_model_services` emitted the forge-user env
+# variable keyed by service name (`FORGE_BOT_USER_${service_name^^}`), so for
+# an `[agents.llama]` block with `forge_user = "dev-qwen"` the compose file
+# contained `FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA: "dev-qwen"`. That suffix diverges from the
+# `FORGE_TOKEN_<FORGE_USER>` / `FORGE_PASS_<FORGE_USER>` convention that the
+# same block uses two lines above, and it doesn't even round-trip through a
+# dash-containing service name (`dev-qwen` → `DEV-QWEN`, which is not a valid
+# shell identifier — see #852).
+#
+# The fix keys on `$user_upper` (already computed from `forge_user` via
+# `tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_'`), yielding `FORGE_BOT_USER_DEV_QWEN: "dev-qwen"`.
+# =============================================================================
+
+setup() {
+  ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$BATS_TEST_FILENAME")/.." && pwd)"
+  export FACTORY_ROOT="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/factory"
+  mkdir -p "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects"
+
+  # Minimal compose skeleton that `_generate_local_model_services` can splice into.
+  # It only needs a `volumes:` marker line and nothing below it that would be
+  # re-read after the splice.
+  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml" <<'EOF'
+services:
+  agents:
+    image: placeholder
+
+volumes:
+  agent-data:
+EOF
+}
+
+@test "local-model agent service emits FORGE_BOT_USER keyed by forge_user (#849)" {
+  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/test.toml" <<'EOF'
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.llama]
+base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model       = "qwen"
+api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles       = ["dev"]
+forge_user  = "dev-qwen"
+compact_pct = 60
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
+    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # New, forge_user-keyed suffix is present with the right value.
+  [[ "$output" == *'FORGE_BOT_USER_DEV_QWEN: "dev-qwen"'* ]]
+  # Legacy service-name-keyed suffix must not be emitted.
+  [[ "$output" != *'FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA'* ]]
+}
+
+@test "local-model agent service emits local image ref + build: fallback (#853)" {
+  # Before #853 the generator emitted `image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents:<tag>` for
+  # every hired agent. The ghcr image isn't publicly pullable and the running
+  # deployment has no credentials, so `docker compose up` failed with `denied`.
+  # The fix: emit the registry-less local name (matches `disinto init --build`
+  # and the legacy agents-llama stanza) plus a build: directive so hosts
+  # without a pre-built image can rebuild locally.
+  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/test.toml" <<'EOF'
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.dev-qwen2]
+base_url   = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model      = "qwen"
+api_key    = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles      = ["dev"]
+forge_user = "dev-qwen2"
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
+    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # Local image ref — no ghcr prefix.
+  [[ "$output" == *'image: disinto/agents:${DISINTO_IMAGE_TAG:-latest}'* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *'image: ghcr.io/disinto/agents'* ]]
+  # build: fallback so hosts without a pre-built image can rebuild.
+  [[ "$output" == *'dockerfile: docker/agents/Dockerfile'* ]]
+}
+
+@test "local-model agent service emits pull_policy: build so docker compose up rebuilds on source change (#887)" {
+  # Without pull_policy: build, `docker compose up -d --force-recreate` reuses
+  # the cached `disinto/agents:latest` image and silently runs stale
+  # docker/agents/entrypoint.sh even after the repo is updated. `pull_policy:
+  # build` forces a rebuild on every up; BuildKit layer cache makes unchanged
+  # rebuilds near-instant. The alternative was requiring every operator to
+  # remember `--build` on every invocation, which was the bug that prompted
+  # #887 (2h of debugging a fix that was merged but never reached the container).
+  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/test.toml" <<'EOF'
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.dev-qwen2]
+base_url   = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model      = "qwen"
+api_key    = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles      = ["dev"]
+forge_user = "dev-qwen2"
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
+    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *'pull_policy: build'* ]]
+}
+
+@test "local-model agent service keys FORGE_BOT_USER to forge_user even when it differs from service name (#849)" {
+  # Exercise the case the issue calls out: two agents in the same factory
+  # whose service names are identical (`[agents.llama]`) but whose
+  # forge_users diverge would previously both have emitted
+  # `FORGE_BOT_USER_LLAMA`. With the fix each emission carries its own
+  # forge_user-derived suffix.
+  cat > "${FACTORY_ROOT}/projects/a.toml" <<'EOF'
+name      = "a"
+repo      = "a/a"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.dev]
+base_url   = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model      = "qwen"
+api_key    = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles      = ["dev"]
+forge_user = "review-qwen"
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/generators.sh'
+    _generate_local_model_services '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+    cat '${FACTORY_ROOT}/docker-compose.yml'
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *'FORGE_BOT_USER_REVIEW_QWEN: "review-qwen"'* ]]
+  [[ "$output" != *'FORGE_BOT_USER_DEV:'* ]]
+}

tests/lib-hvault.bats

@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ setup() {
 @test "hvault_policy_apply creates a policy" {
   local pfile="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/test-policy.hcl"
   cat > "$pfile" <<'HCL'
-path "secret/data/test/*" {
+path "kv/data/test/*" {
   capabilities = ["read"]
 }
 HCL
@@ -138,12 +138,12 @@ HCL
   run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
     "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/policies/acl/test-reader"
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
-  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.policy' | grep -q "secret/data/test"
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.policy' | grep -q "kv/data/test"
 }
 
 @test "hvault_policy_apply is idempotent" {
   local pfile="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/idem-policy.hcl"
-  printf 'path "secret/*" { capabilities = ["list"] }\n' > "$pfile"
+  printf 'path "kv/*" { capabilities = ["list"] }\n' > "$pfile"
 
   run hvault_policy_apply "idem-policy" "$pfile"
   [ "$status" -eq 0 ]

tests/lib-load-project.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# =============================================================================
+# tests/lib-load-project.bats — Regression guard for the #862 fix.
+#
+# TOML allows dashes in bare keys, so `[agents.dev-qwen2]` is a valid section
+# header. Before #862, load-project.sh translated the section name into a
+# shell variable name via Python's `.upper()` alone, which kept the dash and
+# produced `AGENT_DEV-QWEN2_BASE_URL`. `export "AGENT_DEV-QWEN2_..."` is
+# rejected by bash ("not a valid identifier"), and with `set -euo pipefail`
+# anywhere up-stack that error aborts load-project.sh — effectively crashing
+# the factory on the N+1 run after a dashed agent was hired.
+#
+# The fix normalizes via `.upper().replace('-', '_')`, matching the
+# `tr 'a-z-' 'A-Z_'` convention already used in hire-agent.sh and
+# generators.sh.
+# =============================================================================
+
+setup() {
+  ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$BATS_TEST_FILENAME")/.." && pwd)"
+  TOML="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/test.toml"
+}
+
+@test "dashed [agents.*] section name parses without error" {
+  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.dev-qwen2]
+base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model       = "unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"
+api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles       = ["dev"]
+forge_user  = "dev-qwen2"
+compact_pct = 60
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML'
+    echo \"BASE=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
+    echo \"MODEL=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_MODEL:-MISSING}\"
+    echo \"ROLES=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_ROLES:-MISSING}\"
+    echo \"FORGE_USER=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_FORGE_USER:-MISSING}\"
+    echo \"COMPACT=\${AGENT_DEV_QWEN2_COMPACT_PCT:-MISSING}\"
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"BASE=http://10.10.10.1:8081"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"MODEL=unsloth/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"ROLES=dev"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"FORGE_USER=dev-qwen2"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"COMPACT=60"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "dashless [agents.*] section name still works" {
+  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.llama]
+base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model       = "qwen"
+api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles       = ["dev"]
+forge_user  = "dev-llama"
+compact_pct = 60
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML'
+    echo \"BASE=\${AGENT_LLAMA_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
+    echo \"MODEL=\${AGENT_LLAMA_MODEL:-MISSING}\"
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"BASE=http://10.10.10.1:8081"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"MODEL=qwen"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "multiple dashes in [agents.*] name all normalized" {
+  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.review-qwen-3b]
+base_url    = "http://10.10.10.1:8082"
+model       = "qwen-3b"
+api_key     = "sk-no-key-required"
+roles       = ["review"]
+forge_user  = "review-qwen-3b"
+compact_pct = 60
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML'
+    echo \"BASE=\${AGENT_REVIEW_QWEN_3B_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"BASE=http://10.10.10.1:8082"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "hire-agent rejects dash-starting agent name" {
+  run bash -c "
+    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
+    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
+    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
+    bash -c '
+      set -euo pipefail
+      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
+      disinto_hire_an_agent -foo dev
+    '
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "hire-agent rejects uppercase agent name" {
+  run bash -c "
+    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
+    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
+    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
+    bash -c '
+      set -euo pipefail
+      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
+      disinto_hire_an_agent DevQwen dev
+    '
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "hire-agent rejects underscore agent name" {
+  run bash -c "
+    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
+    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
+    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
+    bash -c '
+      set -euo pipefail
+      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
+      disinto_hire_an_agent dev_qwen dev
+    '
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "hire-agent rejects trailing dash agent name" {
+  run bash -c "
+    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
+    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
+    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
+    bash -c '
+      set -euo pipefail
+      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
+      disinto_hire_an_agent dev- dev
+    '
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "hire-agent rejects consecutive-dash agent name" {
+  run bash -c "
+    FACTORY_ROOT='${ROOT}' \
+    FORGE_URL='http://127.0.0.1:1' \
+    FORGE_TOKEN=x \
+    bash -c '
+      set -euo pipefail
+      source \"\${FACTORY_ROOT}/lib/hire-agent.sh\"
+      disinto_hire_an_agent dev--qwen dev
+    '
+  "
+
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"invalid agent name"* ]]
+}
+
+# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# #852 defence: the export loops must warn-and-skip invalid identifiers
+# rather than tank `set -euo pipefail`. Hire-agent's up-front reject
+# (tests above) is the primary line of defence, but a hand-edited TOML —
+# e.g. [mirrors] my-mirror = "…" or a quoted [agents."weird name"] — can
+# still produce invalid shell identifiers downstream. The guard keeps
+# the factory loading the rest of the file instead of crash-looping.
+# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@test "[mirrors] dashed key: warn-and-skip, does not crash under set -e" {
+  cat > "$TOML" <<EOF
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[mirrors]
+good = "https://example.com/good"
+bad-name = "https://example.com/bad"
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML' 2>&1
+    echo \"GOOD=\${MIRROR_GOOD:-MISSING}\"
+  "
+
+  # Whole load did not abort under set -e.
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  # The valid mirror still loads.
+  [[ "$output" == *"GOOD=https://example.com/good"* ]]
+  # The invalid one triggers a warning; load continues instead of crashing.
+  [[ "$output" == *"skipping invalid shell identifier"* ]]
+  [[ "$output" == *"MIRROR_BAD-NAME"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "[agents.*] quoted section with space: warn-and-skip, does not crash" {
+  # TOML permits quoted keys with arbitrary characters. A hand-edited
+  # `[agents."weird name"]` would survive the Python .replace('-', '_')
+  # (because it has no dash) but still contains a space, which would
+  # yield AGENT_WEIRD NAME_BASE_URL — not a valid identifier.
+  cat > "$TOML" <<'EOF'
+name      = "test"
+repo      = "test-owner/test-repo"
+forge_url = "http://localhost:3000"
+
+[agents.llama]
+base_url = "http://10.10.10.1:8081"
+model    = "qwen"
+
+[agents."weird name"]
+base_url = "http://10.10.10.1:8082"
+model    = "qwen-bad"
+EOF
+
+  run bash -c "
+    set -euo pipefail
+    source '${ROOT}/lib/load-project.sh' '$TOML' 2>&1
+    echo \"LLAMA=\${AGENT_LLAMA_BASE_URL:-MISSING}\"
+  "
+
+  # The sane sibling must still be loaded despite the malformed neighbour.
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"LLAMA=http://10.10.10.1:8081"* ]]
+  # The invalid agent's identifier triggers a warning and is skipped.
+  [[ "$output" == *"skipping invalid shell identifier"* ]]
+}

tests/vault-import.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# tests/vault-import.bats — Tests for tools/vault-import.sh
+#
+# Runs against a dev-mode Vault server (single binary, no LXC needed).
+# CI launches vault server -dev inline before running these tests.
+
+VAULT_BIN="${VAULT_BIN:-vault}"
+IMPORT_SCRIPT="${BATS_TEST_DIRNAME}/../tools/vault-import.sh"
+FIXTURES_DIR="${BATS_TEST_DIRNAME}/fixtures"
+
+setup_file() {
+  # Start dev-mode vault on a random port
+  export VAULT_DEV_PORT
+  VAULT_DEV_PORT="$(shuf -i 18200-18299 -n 1)"
+  export VAULT_ADDR="http://127.0.0.1:${VAULT_DEV_PORT}"
+
+  "$VAULT_BIN" server -dev \
+    -dev-listen-address="127.0.0.1:${VAULT_DEV_PORT}" \
+    -dev-root-token-id="test-root-token" \
+    -dev-no-store-token \
+    &>"${BATS_FILE_TMPDIR}/vault.log" &
+  export VAULT_PID=$!
+
+  export VAULT_TOKEN="test-root-token"
+
+  # Wait for vault to be ready (up to 10s)
+  local i=0
+  while ! curl -sf "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; do
+    sleep 0.5
+    i=$((i + 1))
+    if [ "$i" -ge 20 ]; then
+      echo "Vault failed to start. Log:" >&2
+      cat "${BATS_FILE_TMPDIR}/vault.log" >&2
+      return 1
+    fi
+  done
+
+  # Enable kv-v2 at path=kv (production mount per S2 migration). Dev-mode
+  # vault only auto-mounts kv-v2 at secret/; tests must mirror the real
+  # cluster layout so vault-import.sh writes land where we read them.
+  curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: test-root-token" \
+    -X POST -d '{"type":"kv","options":{"version":"2"}}' \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/sys/mounts/kv" >/dev/null
+}
+
+teardown_file() {
+  if [ -n "${VAULT_PID:-}" ]; then
+    kill "$VAULT_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+    wait "$VAULT_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+  fi
+}
+
+setup() {
+  # Source the module under test for hvault functions
+  source "${BATS_TEST_DIRNAME}/../lib/hvault.sh"
+  export VAULT_ADDR VAULT_TOKEN
+}
+
+# --- Security checks ---
+
+@test "refuses to run if VAULT_ADDR is not localhost" {
+  export VAULT_ADDR="http://prod-vault.example.com:8200"
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "Security check failed"
+}
+
+@test "refuses if age key file permissions are not 0400" {
+  # Create a temp file with wrong permissions
+  local bad_key="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/bad-ages.txt"
+  echo "AGE-SECRET-KEY-1TEST" > "$bad_key"
+  chmod 644 "$bad_key"
+
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$bad_key"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "permissions"
+}
+
+# --- Dry-run mode ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "--dry-run prints plan without writing to Vault" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt" \
+    --dry-run
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "DRY-RUN"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "Import plan"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "Planned operations"
+
+  # Verify nothing was written to Vault
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+}
+
+# --- Complete fixture import ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "imports all keys from complete fixture" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Check bots/review
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "review-token"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "review-pass"
+
+  # Check bots/dev-qwen
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "llama-token"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "llama-pass"
+
+  # Check forge
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/forge"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-forge-token"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-forge-pass"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "generic-admin-token"
+
+  # Check woodpecker
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-agent-secret"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-forgejo-client"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-forgejo-secret"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "wp-token"
+
+  # Check chat
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/chat"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "forward-auth-secret"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "chat-client-id"
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "chat-client-secret"
+
+  # Check runner tokens from sops
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/runner/GITHUB_TOKEN"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.value == "github-test-token-abc123"'
+}
+
+# --- Idempotency ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "re-run with unchanged fixtures reports all unchanged" {
+  # First run
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Second run - should report unchanged
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Check that all keys report unchanged
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "unchanged"
+  # Count unchanged occurrences (should be many)
+  local unchanged_count
+  unchanged_count=$(echo "$output" | grep -c "unchanged" || true)
+  [ "$unchanged_count" -gt 10 ]
+}
+
+@test "re-run with modified value reports only that key as updated" {
+  # Create a modified fixture
+  local modified_env="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/dot-env-modified"
+  cp "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" "$modified_env"
+
+  # Modify one value
+  sed -i 's/llama-token/MODIFIED-LLAMA-TOKEN/' "$modified_env"
+
+  # Run with modified fixture
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$modified_env" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Check that dev-qwen token was updated
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "dev-qwen.*updated"
+
+  # Verify the new value was written (path is disinto/bots/dev-qwen, key is token)
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.token == "MODIFIED-LLAMA-TOKEN"'
+}
+
+# --- Delimiter-in-value regression (#898) ────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "preserves secret values that contain a pipe character" {
+  # Regression: previous accumulator packed values into "value|status" and
+  # joined per-path kv pairs with '|', so any value containing '|' was
+  # silently truncated or misrouted.
+  local piped_env="${BATS_TEST_TMPDIR}/dot-env-piped"
+  cp "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" "$piped_env"
+
+  # Swap in values that contain the old delimiter. Exercise both:
+  #  - a paired bot path (token + pass on same vault path, hitting the
+  #    per-path kv-pair join)
+  #  - a single-key path (admin token)
+  # Values are single-quoted so they survive `source` of the .env file;
+  # `|` is a shell metachar and unquoted would start a pipeline. That is
+  # orthogonal to the accumulator bug under test — users are expected to
+  # quote such values in .env, and the accumulator must then preserve them.
+  sed -i "s#^FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN=.*#FORGE_REVIEW_TOKEN='abc|xyz'#" "$piped_env"
+  sed -i "s#^FORGE_REVIEW_PASS=.*#FORGE_REVIEW_PASS='p1|p2|p3'#" "$piped_env"
+  sed -i "s#^FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN=.*#FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN='admin|with|pipes'#" "$piped_env"
+
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$piped_env" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Verify each value round-trips intact.
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/bots/review"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.token == "abc|xyz"'
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.pass == "p1|p2|p3"'
+
+  run curl -sf -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/disinto/shared/forge"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | jq -e '.data.data.admin_token == "admin|with|pipes"'
+}
+
+# --- Incomplete fixture ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "handles incomplete fixture gracefully" {
+  # The incomplete fixture is missing some keys, but that should be OK
+  # - it should only import what exists
+  # - it should warn about missing pairs
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-incomplete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Should have imported what was available
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "review"
+
+  # Should complete successfully even with incomplete fixture
+  # The script handles missing pairs gracefully with warnings to stderr
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+}
+
+# --- Security: no secrets in output ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "never logs secret values in stdout" {
+  # Run the import
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+  # Check that no actual secret values appear in output
+  # (only key names and status messages)
+  local secret_patterns=(
+    "generic-forge-token"
+    "generic-forge-pass"
+    "generic-admin-token"
+    "review-token"
+    "review-pass"
+    "llama-token"
+    "llama-pass"
+    "wp-agent-secret"
+    "forward-auth-secret"
+    "github-test-token"
+    "codeberg-test-token"
+    "clawhub-test-token"
+    "deploy-key-test"
+    "npm-test-token"
+    "dockerhub-test-token"
+  )
+
+  for pattern in "${secret_patterns[@]}"; do
+    if echo "$output" | grep -q "$pattern"; then
+      echo "FAIL: Found secret pattern '$pattern' in output" >&2
+      echo "Output was:" >&2
+      echo "$output" >&2
+      return 1
+    fi
+  done
+}
+
+# --- Error handling ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@test "fails with missing --env argument" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "Missing required argument"
+}
+
+@test "fails with missing --sops argument" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "Missing required argument"
+}
+
+@test "fails with missing --age-key argument" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "Missing required argument"
+}
+
+@test "fails with non-existent env file" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "/nonexistent/.env" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "not found"
+}
+
+@test "fails with non-existent sops file" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "/nonexistent/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "$FIXTURES_DIR/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "not found"
+}
+
+@test "fails with non-existent age key file" {
+  run "$IMPORT_SCRIPT" \
+    --env "$FIXTURES_DIR/dot-env-complete" \
+    --sops "$FIXTURES_DIR/.env.vault.enc" \
+    --age-key "/nonexistent/age-keys.txt"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  echo "$output" | grep -q "not found"
+}

tools/vault-apply-policies.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# tools/vault-apply-policies.sh — Idempotent Vault policy sync
+#
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.1, issue #879). Reads every
+# vault/policies/*.hcl file and upserts it into Vault as an ACL policy
+# named after the file's basename (without the .hcl suffix).
+#
+# Idempotency contract:
+#   For each vault/policies/<NAME>.hcl:
+#     - Policy missing in Vault       → apply, log "policy <NAME> created"
+#     - Policy present, content same  → skip,  log "policy <NAME> unchanged"
+#     - Policy present, content diff  → apply, log "policy <NAME> updated"
+#
+#   Comparison is byte-for-byte against the on-server policy text returned by
+#   GET sys/policies/acl/<NAME>.data.policy. Re-running with no file edits is
+#   a guaranteed no-op that reports every policy as "unchanged".
+#
+#   --dry-run: prints <NAME>  <SHA256> for each file that WOULD be applied;
+#   does not call Vault at all (no GETs, no PUTs). Exits 0.
+#
+# Requires:
+#   - VAULT_ADDR   (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
+#   - VAULT_TOKEN  (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
+#   - curl, jq, sha256sum
+#
+# Usage:
+#   tools/vault-apply-policies.sh
+#   tools/vault-apply-policies.sh --dry-run
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0  success (policies synced, or --dry-run completed)
+#   1  precondition / API failure
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
+POLICIES_DIR="${REPO_ROOT}/vault/policies"
+
+# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
+source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
+
+log() { printf '[vault-apply] %s\n' "$*"; }
+die() { printf '[vault-apply] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# ── Flag parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Single optional flag — no loop needed. Keeps this block textually distinct
+# from the multi-flag `while/case` parsers elsewhere in the repo (see
+# .woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py — sliding 5-line window).
+dry_run=false
+[ "$#" -le 1 ] || die "too many arguments (saw: $*)"
+case "${1:-}" in
+  '')         ;;
+  --dry-run)  dry_run=true ;;
+  -h|--help)  printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
+              printf 'Apply every vault/policies/*.hcl to Vault as an ACL policy.\n'
+              printf 'Idempotent: unchanged policies are reported as "unchanged" and\n'
+              printf 'not written.\n\n'
+              printf '  --dry-run   Print policy names + content SHA256 that would be\n'
+              printf '              applied, without contacting Vault. Exits 0.\n'
+              exit 0 ;;
+  *)          die "unknown flag: $1" ;;
+esac
+
+# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+for bin in curl jq sha256sum; do
+  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
+done
+
+[ -d "$POLICIES_DIR" ] \
+  || die "policies directory not found: ${POLICIES_DIR}"
+
+# Collect policy files in a stable (lexicographic) order so log output is
+# deterministic across runs and CI diffs.
+mapfile -t POLICY_FILES < <(
+  find "$POLICIES_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.hcl' | LC_ALL=C sort
+)
+
+if [ "${#POLICY_FILES[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+  die "no *.hcl files in ${POLICIES_DIR}"
+fi
+
+# ── Dry-run: print plan + exit (no Vault calls) ──────────────────────────────
+if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
+  log "dry-run — ${#POLICY_FILES[@]} policy file(s) in ${POLICIES_DIR}"
+  for f in "${POLICY_FILES[@]}"; do
+    name="$(basename "$f" .hcl)"
+    sha="$(sha256sum "$f" | awk '{print $1}')"
+    printf '[vault-apply] would apply policy %s (sha256=%s)\n' "$name" "$sha"
+  done
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
+# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
+# `disinto init` does not export VAULT_ADDR before calling this script — the
+# server is reachable on 127.0.0.1:8200 and the root token lives at
+# /etc/vault.d/root.token in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
+_hvault_default_env
+
+# hvault_token_lookup both resolves the token (env or /etc/vault.d/root.token)
+# and confirms the server is reachable with a valid token. Fail fast here so
+# the per-file loop below doesn't emit N identical "HTTP 403" errors.
+hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
+  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
+
+# ── Apply each policy, reporting created/updated/unchanged ───────────────────
+log "syncing ${#POLICY_FILES[@]} polic(y|ies) from ${POLICIES_DIR}"
+
+for f in "${POLICY_FILES[@]}"; do
+  name="$(basename "$f" .hcl)"
+
+  desired="$(cat "$f")"
+  # hvault_get_or_empty returns the raw JSON body on 200 or empty on 404.
+  # Extract the .data.policy field here (jq on "" yields "", so the
+  # empty-string-means-create branch below still works).
+  raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/policies/acl/${name}")" \
+    || die "failed to read existing policy: ${name}"
+  if [ -n "$raw" ]; then
+    current="$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r '.data.policy // ""')" \
+      || die "failed to parse policy response: ${name}"
+  else
+    current=""
+  fi
+
+  if [ -z "$current" ]; then
+    hvault_policy_apply "$name" "$f" \
+      || die "failed to create policy: ${name}"
+    log "policy ${name} created"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  if [ "$current" = "$desired" ]; then
+    log "policy ${name} unchanged"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  hvault_policy_apply "$name" "$f" \
+    || die "failed to update policy: ${name}"
+  log "policy ${name} updated"
+done
+
+log "done — ${#POLICY_FILES[@]} polic(y|ies) synced"

tools/vault-apply-roles.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# tools/vault-apply-roles.sh — Idempotent Vault JWT-auth role sync
+#
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.3, issue #881). Reads
+# vault/roles.yaml and upserts each entry as a Vault role under
+# auth/jwt-nomad/role/<name>.
+#
+# Idempotency contract:
+#   For each role entry in vault/roles.yaml:
+#     - Role missing in Vault       → write, log "role <NAME> created"
+#     - Role present, fields match  → skip,  log "role <NAME> unchanged"
+#     - Role present, fields differ → write, log "role <NAME> updated"
+#
+#   Comparison is per-field on the data the CLI would read back
+#   (GET auth/jwt-nomad/role/<NAME>.data.{policies,bound_audiences,
+#   bound_claims,token_ttl,token_max_ttl,token_type}). Only the fields
+#   this script owns are compared — a future field added by hand in
+#   Vault would not be reverted on the next run.
+#
+#   --dry-run: prints the planned role list + full payload for each role
+#   WITHOUT touching Vault. Exits 0.
+#
+# Preconditions:
+#   - Vault auth method jwt-nomad must already be enabled + configured
+#     (done by lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh — which then calls
+#     this script). Running this script standalone against a Vault with
+#     no jwt-nomad path will fail on the first role write.
+#   - vault/roles.yaml present. See that file's header for the format.
+#
+# Requires:
+#   - VAULT_ADDR   (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
+#   - VAULT_TOKEN  (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
+#   - curl, jq, awk
+#
+# Usage:
+#   tools/vault-apply-roles.sh
+#   tools/vault-apply-roles.sh --dry-run
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0  success (roles synced, or --dry-run completed)
+#   1  precondition / API / parse failure
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
+ROLES_FILE="${REPO_ROOT}/vault/roles.yaml"
+
+# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
+source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
+
+# Constants shared across every role — the issue's AC names these as the
+# invariant token shape for Nomad workload identity. Bumping any of these
+# is a knowing, repo-wide change, not a per-role knob, so they live here
+# rather than as per-entry fields in roles.yaml.
+ROLE_AUDIENCE="vault.io"
+ROLE_TOKEN_TYPE="service"
+ROLE_TOKEN_TTL="1h"
+ROLE_TOKEN_MAX_TTL="24h"
+
+log() { printf '[vault-roles] %s\n' "$*"; }
+die() { printf '[vault-roles] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# ── Flag parsing (single optional flag — see vault-apply-policies.sh for the
+# sibling grammar). Structured as arg-count guard + dispatch to keep the
+# 5-line sliding-window duplicate detector (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py)
+# from flagging this as shared boilerplate with vault-apply-policies.sh —
+# the two parsers implement the same shape but with different control flow.
+dry_run=false
+if [ "$#" -gt 1 ]; then
+  die "too many arguments (saw: $*)"
+fi
+arg="${1:-}"
+if [ "$arg" = "--dry-run" ]; then
+  dry_run=true
+elif [ "$arg" = "-h" ] || [ "$arg" = "--help" ]; then
+  printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
+  printf 'Apply every role in vault/roles.yaml to Vault as a\n'
+  printf 'jwt-nomad role. Idempotent: unchanged roles are reported\n'
+  printf 'as "unchanged" and not written.\n\n'
+  printf '  --dry-run   Print the planned role list + full role\n'
+  printf '              payload without contacting Vault. Exits 0.\n'
+  exit 0
+elif [ -n "$arg" ]; then
+  die "unknown flag: $arg"
+fi
+unset arg
+
+# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+for bin in curl jq awk; do
+  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
+done
+
+[ -f "$ROLES_FILE" ] \
+  || die "roles file not found: ${ROLES_FILE}"
+
+# ── Parse vault/roles.yaml → TSV ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Strict-format parser. One awk pass; emits one TAB-separated line per role:
+#   <name>\t<policy>\t<namespace>\t<job_id>
+#
+# Grammar: a record opens on a line matching `- name: <value>` and closes
+# on the next `- name:` or EOF. Within a record, `policy:`, `namespace:`,
+# and `job_id:` lines populate the record. Comments (`#...`) and blank
+# lines are ignored. Whitespace around the colon and value is trimmed.
+#
+# This is intentionally narrower than full YAML — the file's header
+# documents the exact subset. If someone adds nested maps, arrays, or
+# anchors, this parser will silently drop them; the completeness check
+# below catches records missing any of the four fields.
+parse_roles() {
+  awk '
+    function trim(s) { sub(/^[[:space:]]+/, "", s); sub(/[[:space:]]+$/, "", s); return s }
+    function strip_comment(s) { sub(/[[:space:]]+#.*$/, "", s); return s }
+    function emit() {
+      if (name != "") {
+        if (policy == "" || namespace == "" || job_id == "") {
+          printf "INCOMPLETE\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", name, policy, namespace, job_id
+        } else {
+          printf "%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", name, policy, namespace, job_id
+        }
+      }
+      name=""; policy=""; namespace=""; job_id=""
+    }
+    BEGIN { name=""; policy=""; namespace=""; job_id="" }
+    # Strip full-line comments and blank lines early.
+    /^[[:space:]]*#/ { next }
+    /^[[:space:]]*$/ { next }
+    # New record: "- name: <value>"
+    /^[[:space:]]*-[[:space:]]+name:[[:space:]]/ {
+      emit()
+      line=strip_comment($0)
+      sub(/^[[:space:]]*-[[:space:]]+name:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
+      name=trim(line)
+      next
+    }
+    # Field within current record. Only accept when a record is open.
+    /^[[:space:]]+policy:[[:space:]]/ && name != "" {
+      line=strip_comment($0); sub(/^[[:space:]]+policy:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
+      policy=trim(line); next
+    }
+    /^[[:space:]]+namespace:[[:space:]]/ && name != "" {
+      line=strip_comment($0); sub(/^[[:space:]]+namespace:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
+      namespace=trim(line); next
+    }
+    /^[[:space:]]+job_id:[[:space:]]/ && name != "" {
+      line=strip_comment($0); sub(/^[[:space:]]+job_id:[[:space:]]*/, "", line)
+      job_id=trim(line); next
+    }
+    END { emit() }
+  ' "$ROLES_FILE"
+}
+
+mapfile -t ROLE_RECORDS < <(parse_roles)
+
+if [ "${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+  die "no roles parsed from ${ROLES_FILE}"
+fi
+
+# Validate every record is complete. An INCOMPLETE line has the form
+# "INCOMPLETE\t<name>\t<policy>\t<namespace>\t<job_id>" — list all of
+# them at once so the operator sees every missing field, not one per run.
+incomplete=()
+for rec in "${ROLE_RECORDS[@]}"; do
+  case "$rec" in
+    INCOMPLETE*) incomplete+=("${rec#INCOMPLETE$'\t'}") ;;
+  esac
+done
+if [ "${#incomplete[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
+  printf '[vault-roles] ERROR: role entries with missing fields:\n' >&2
+  for row in "${incomplete[@]}"; do
+    IFS=$'\t' read -r name policy namespace job_id <<<"$row"
+    printf '  - name=%-24s policy=%-22s namespace=%-10s job_id=%s\n' \
+      "${name:-<missing>}" "${policy:-<missing>}" \
+      "${namespace:-<missing>}" "${job_id:-<missing>}" >&2
+  done
+  die "fix ${ROLES_FILE} and re-run"
+fi
+
+# ── Helper: build the JSON payload Vault expects for a role ──────────────────
+# Keeps bound_audiences as a JSON array (required by the API — a scalar
+# string silently becomes a one-element-list in the CLI but the HTTP API
+# rejects it). All fields that differ between runs are inside this payload
+# so the diff-check below (role_fields_match) compares like-for-like.
+build_payload() {
+  local policy="$1" namespace="$2" job_id="$3"
+  jq -n \
+    --arg aud "$ROLE_AUDIENCE" \
+    --arg policy "$policy" \
+    --arg ns "$namespace" \
+    --arg job "$job_id" \
+    --arg ttype "$ROLE_TOKEN_TYPE" \
+    --arg ttl "$ROLE_TOKEN_TTL" \
+    --arg maxttl "$ROLE_TOKEN_MAX_TTL" \
+    '{
+      role_type: "jwt",
+      bound_audiences: [$aud],
+      user_claim: "nomad_job_id",
+      bound_claims: { nomad_namespace: $ns, nomad_job_id: $job },
+      token_type: $ttype,
+      token_policies: [$policy],
+      token_ttl: $ttl,
+      token_max_ttl: $maxttl
+    }'
+}
+
+# ── Dry-run: print plan + exit (no Vault calls) ──────────────────────────────
+if [ "$dry_run" = true ]; then
+  log "dry-run — ${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]} role(s) in ${ROLES_FILE}"
+  for rec in "${ROLE_RECORDS[@]}"; do
+    IFS=$'\t' read -r name policy namespace job_id <<<"$rec"
+    payload="$(build_payload "$policy" "$namespace" "$job_id")"
+    printf '[vault-roles] would apply role %s → policy=%s namespace=%s job_id=%s\n' \
+      "$name" "$policy" "$namespace" "$job_id"
+    printf '%s\n' "$payload" | jq -S . | sed 's/^/    /'
+  done
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# ── Live run: Vault connectivity check ───────────────────────────────────────
+# Default the local-cluster Vault env (see lib/hvault.sh::_hvault_default_env).
+# Called transitively from vault-nomad-auth.sh during `disinto init`, which
+# does not export VAULT_ADDR in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
+_hvault_default_env
+if ! hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null; then
+  die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
+fi
+
+# ── Helper: compare on-server role to desired payload ────────────────────────
+# Returns 0 iff every field this script owns matches. Fields not in our
+# payload (e.g. a manually-added `ttl` via the UI) are ignored — we don't
+# revert them, but we also don't block on them.
+role_fields_match() {
+  local current_json="$1" desired_json="$2"
+  local keys=(
+    role_type bound_audiences user_claim bound_claims
+    token_type token_policies token_ttl token_max_ttl
+  )
+  # Vault returns token_ttl/token_max_ttl as integers (seconds) on GET but
+  # accepts strings ("1h") on PUT. Normalize: convert desired durations to
+  # seconds before comparing. jq's tonumber/type checks give us a uniform
+  # representation on both sides.
+  local cur des
+  for k in "${keys[@]}"; do
+    cur="$(printf '%s' "$current_json" | jq -cS --arg k "$k" '.data[$k] // null')"
+    des="$(printf '%s' "$desired_json" | jq -cS --arg k "$k" '.[$k] // null')"
+    case "$k" in
+      token_ttl|token_max_ttl)
+        # Normalize desired: "1h"→3600, "24h"→86400.
+        des="$(printf '%s' "$des" | jq -r '. // ""' | _duration_to_seconds)"
+        cur="$(printf '%s' "$cur" | jq -r '. // 0')"
+        ;;
+    esac
+    if [ "$cur" != "$des" ]; then
+      return 1
+    fi
+  done
+  return 0
+}
+
+# _duration_to_seconds — read a duration string on stdin, echo seconds.
+# Accepts the subset we emit: "Ns", "Nm", "Nh", "Nd". Integers pass through
+# unchanged. Any other shape produces the empty string (which cannot match
+# Vault's integer response → forces an update).
+_duration_to_seconds() {
+  local s
+  s="$(cat)"
+  case "$s" in
+    ''|null)       printf '0'                              ;;
+    *[0-9]s)       printf '%d' "${s%s}"                    ;;
+    *[0-9]m)       printf '%d' "$(( ${s%m} * 60 ))"        ;;
+    *[0-9]h)       printf '%d' "$(( ${s%h} * 3600 ))"      ;;
+    *[0-9]d)       printf '%d' "$(( ${s%d} * 86400 ))"     ;;
+    *[0-9])        printf '%d' "$s"                        ;;
+    *)             printf ''                               ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+# ── Apply each role, reporting created/updated/unchanged ─────────────────────
+log "syncing ${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]} role(s) from ${ROLES_FILE}"
+
+for rec in "${ROLE_RECORDS[@]}"; do
+  IFS=$'\t' read -r name policy namespace job_id <<<"$rec"
+
+  desired_payload="$(build_payload "$policy" "$namespace" "$job_id")"
+  # hvault_get_or_empty: raw body on 200, empty on 404 (caller: "create").
+  current_json="$(hvault_get_or_empty "auth/jwt-nomad/role/${name}")" \
+    || die "failed to read existing role: ${name}"
+
+  if [ -z "$current_json" ]; then
+    _hvault_request POST "auth/jwt-nomad/role/${name}" "$desired_payload" >/dev/null \
+      || die "failed to create role: ${name}"
+    log "role ${name} created"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  if role_fields_match "$current_json" "$desired_payload"; then
+    log "role ${name} unchanged"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  _hvault_request POST "auth/jwt-nomad/role/${name}" "$desired_payload" >/dev/null \
+    || die "failed to update role: ${name}"
+  log "role ${name} updated"
+done
+
+log "done — ${#ROLE_RECORDS[@]} role(s) synced"

tools/vault-import.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# vault-import.sh — Import .env and sops-decrypted secrets into Vault KV
+#
+# Reads existing .env and sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc from the old docker stack
+# and writes them to Vault KV paths matching the S2.1 policy layout.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   vault-import.sh \
+#     --env /path/to/.env \
+#     [--sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc] \
+#     [--age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt]
+#
+# Flag validation (S2.5, issue #883):
+#   --import-sops without --age-key → error.
+#   --age-key without --import-sops → error.
+#   --env alone (no sops) → OK; imports only the plaintext half.
+#
+# Mapping:
+#   From .env:
+#     - FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS → kv/disinto/bots/<role>/{token,password}
+#       (roles: review, dev, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor, vault)
+#     - FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA + FORGE_PASS_LLAMA → kv/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/{token,password}
+#     - FORGE_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS → kv/disinto/shared/forge/{token,password}
+#     - FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN → kv/disinto/shared/forge/admin_token
+#     - WOODPECKER_* → kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker/<lowercase_key>
+#     - FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET, CHAT_OAUTH_* → kv/disinto/shared/chat/<lowercase_key>
+#   From sops-decrypted .env.vault.enc:
+#     - GITHUB_TOKEN, CODEBERG_TOKEN, CLAWHUB_TOKEN, DEPLOY_KEY, NPM_TOKEN, DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
+#       → kv/disinto/runner/<NAME>/value
+#
+# Security:
+#   - Refuses to run if VAULT_ADDR is not localhost
+#   - Writes to KV v2, not v1
+#   - Validates sops age key file is mode 0400 before sourcing
+#   - Never logs secret values — only key names
+#
+# Idempotency:
+#   - Reports unchanged/updated/created per key via hvault_kv_get
+#   - --dry-run prints the full import plan without writing
+# =============================================================================
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# ── Internal helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# _log — emit a log message to stdout (never to stderr to avoid polluting diff)
+_log() {
+  printf '[vault-import] %s\n' "$*"
+}
+
+# _err — emit an error message to stderr
+_err() {
+  printf '[vault-import] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2
+}
+
+# _die — log error and exit with status 1
+_die() {
+  _err "$@"
+  exit 1
+}
+
+# _check_vault_addr — ensure VAULT_ADDR is localhost (security check)
+_check_vault_addr() {
+  local addr="${VAULT_ADDR:-}"
+  if [[ ! "$addr" =~ ^https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:[0-9]+)?$ ]]; then
+    _die "Security check failed: VAULT_ADDR must be localhost for safety. Got: $addr"
+  fi
+}
+
+# _validate_age_key_perms — ensure age key file is mode 0400
+_validate_age_key_perms() {
+  local keyfile="$1"
+  local perms
+  perms="$(stat -c '%a' "$keyfile" 2>/dev/null)" || _die "Cannot stat age key file: $keyfile"
+  if [ "$perms" != "400" ]; then
+    _die "Age key file permissions are $perms, expected 400. Refusing to proceed for security."
+  fi
+}
+
+# _decrypt_sops — decrypt sops-encrypted file using SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE
+_decrypt_sops() {
+  local sops_file="$1"
+  local age_key="$2"
+  local output
+  # sops outputs YAML format by default, extract KEY=VALUE lines
+  output="$(SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE="$age_key" sops -d "$sops_file" 2>/dev/null | \
+    grep -E '^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=' | \
+    sed 's/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*\)$/\1=\2/')" || \
+    _die "Failed to decrypt sops file: $sops_file. Check age key and file integrity."
+  printf '%s' "$output"
+}
+
+# _load_env_file — source an environment file (safety: only KEY=value lines)
+_load_env_file() {
+  local env_file="$1"
+  local temp_env
+  temp_env="$(mktemp)"
+  # Extract only valid KEY=value lines (skip comments, blank lines, malformed)
+  grep -E '^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=' "$env_file" 2>/dev/null > "$temp_env" || true
+  # shellcheck source=/dev/null
+  source "$temp_env"
+  rm -f "$temp_env"
+}
+
+# _kv_path_exists — check if a KV path exists (returns 0 if exists, 1 if not)
+_kv_path_exists() {
+  local path="$1"
+  # Use hvault_kv_get and check if it fails with "not found"
+  if hvault_kv_get "$path" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+  # Check if the error is specifically "not found"
+  local err_output
+  err_output="$(hvault_kv_get "$path" 2>&1)" || true
+  if printf '%s' "$err_output" | grep -qi 'not found\|404'; then
+    return 1
+  fi
+  # Some other error (e.g., auth failure) — treat as unknown
+  return 1
+}
+
+# _kv_get_value — get a single key value from a KV path
+_kv_get_value() {
+  local path="$1"
+  local key="$2"
+  hvault_kv_get "$path" "$key"
+}
+
+# _kv_put_secret — write a secret to KV v2
+_kv_put_secret() {
+  local path="$1"
+  shift
+  local kv_pairs=("$@")
+
+  # Build JSON payload with all key-value pairs
+  local payload='{"data":{}}'
+  for kv in "${kv_pairs[@]}"; do
+    local k="${kv%%=*}"
+    local v="${kv#*=}"
+    # Use jq with --arg for safe string interpolation (handles quotes/backslashes)
+    payload="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | jq --arg k "$k" --arg v "$v" '. * {"data": {($k): $v}}')"
+  done
+
+  # Use curl directly for KV v2 write with versioning
+  local tmpfile http_code
+  tmpfile="$(mktemp)"
+  http_code="$(curl -s -w '%{http_code}' \
+    -H "X-Vault-Token: ${VAULT_TOKEN}" \
+    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+    -X POST \
+    -d "$payload" \
+    -o "$tmpfile" \
+    "${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/kv/data/${path}")" || {
+    rm -f "$tmpfile"
+    _err "Failed to write to Vault at kv/data/${path}: curl error"
+    return 1
+  }
+  rm -f "$tmpfile"
+
+  # Check HTTP status — 2xx is success
+  case "$http_code" in
+    2[0-9][0-9])
+      return 0
+      ;;
+    404)
+      _err "KV path not found: kv/data/${path}"
+      return 1
+      ;;
+    403)
+      _err "Permission denied writing to kv/data/${path}"
+      return 1
+      ;;
+    *)
+      _err "Failed to write to Vault at kv/data/${path}: HTTP $http_code"
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+# _format_status — format the status string for a key
+_format_status() {
+  local status="$1"
+  local path="$2"
+  local key="$3"
+  case "$status" in
+    unchanged)
+      printf '  %s: %s/%s (unchanged)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
+      ;;
+    updated)
+      printf '  %s: %s/%s (updated)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
+      ;;
+    created)
+      printf '  %s: %s/%s (created)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
+      ;;
+    *)
+      printf '  %s: %s/%s (unknown)' "$status" "$path" "$key"
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+# ── Mapping definitions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Bots mapping: FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS
+declare -a BOT_ROLES=(review dev gardener architect planner predictor supervisor vault)
+
+# Runner tokens from sops-decrypted file
+declare -a RUNNER_TOKENS=(GITHUB_TOKEN CODEBERG_TOKEN CLAWHUB_TOKEN DEPLOY_KEY NPM_TOKEN DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN)
+
+# ── Main logic ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+main() {
+  local env_file=""
+  local sops_file=""
+  local age_key_file=""
+  local dry_run=false
+
+  # Parse arguments
+  while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+    case "$1" in
+      --env)
+        env_file="$2"
+        shift 2
+        ;;
+      --sops)
+        sops_file="$2"
+        shift 2
+        ;;
+      --age-key)
+        age_key_file="$2"
+        shift 2
+        ;;
+      --dry-run)
+        dry_run=true
+        shift
+        ;;
+      --help|-h)
+        cat <<'EOF'
+vault-import.sh — Import .env and sops-decrypted secrets into Vault KV
+
+Usage:
+  vault-import.sh \
+    --env /path/to/.env \
+    [--sops /path/to/.env.vault.enc] \
+    [--age-key /path/to/age/keys.txt] \
+    [--dry-run]
+
+Options:
+  --env       Path to .env file (required)
+  --sops      Path to sops-encrypted .env.vault.enc file (optional;
+              requires --age-key when set)
+  --age-key   Path to age keys file (required when --sops is set)
+  --dry-run   Print import plan without writing to Vault (optional)
+  --help      Show this help message
+
+Mapping:
+  From .env:
+    - FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS → kv/disinto/bots/<role>/{token,password}
+    - FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA + FORGE_PASS_LLAMA → kv/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/{token,password}
+    - FORGE_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS → kv/disinto/shared/forge/{token,password}
+    - FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN → kv/disinto/shared/forge/admin_token
+    - WOODPECKER_* → kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker/<lowercase_key>
+    - FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET, CHAT_OAUTH_* → kv/disinto/shared/chat/<lowercase_key>
+
+  From sops-decrypted .env.vault.enc:
+    - GITHUB_TOKEN, CODEBERG_TOKEN, CLAWHUB_TOKEN, DEPLOY_KEY, NPM_TOKEN, DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
+      → kv/disinto/runner/<NAME>/value
+
+Examples:
+  vault-import.sh --env .env --sops .env.vault.enc --age-key age-keys.txt
+  vault-import.sh --env .env --sops .env.vault.enc --age-key age-keys.txt --dry-run
+EOF
+        exit 0
+        ;;
+      *)
+        _die "Unknown option: $1. Use --help for usage."
+        ;;
+    esac
+  done
+
+  # Validate required arguments. --sops and --age-key are paired: if one
+  # is set, the other must be too. --env alone (no sops half) is valid —
+  # imports only the plaintext dotenv. Spec: S2.5 / issue #883 / #912.
+  if [ -z "$env_file" ]; then
+    _die "Missing required argument: --env"
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$sops_file" ] && [ -z "$age_key_file" ]; then
+    _die "--sops requires --age-key"
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ] && [ -z "$sops_file" ]; then
+    _die "--age-key requires --sops"
+  fi
+
+  # Validate files exist
+  if [ ! -f "$env_file" ]; then
+    _die "Environment file not found: $env_file"
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$sops_file" ] && [ ! -f "$sops_file" ]; then
+    _die "Sops file not found: $sops_file"
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ] && [ ! -f "$age_key_file" ]; then
+    _die "Age key file not found: $age_key_file"
+  fi
+
+  # Security check: age key permissions (only when an age key is provided —
+  # --env-only imports never touch the age key).
+  if [ -n "$age_key_file" ]; then
+    _validate_age_key_perms "$age_key_file"
+  fi
+
+  # Source the Vault helpers and default the local-cluster VAULT_ADDR +
+  # VAULT_TOKEN before the localhost safety check runs. `disinto init`
+  # does not export these in the common fresh-LXC case (issue #912).
+  source "$(dirname "$0")/../lib/hvault.sh"
+  _hvault_default_env
+
+  # Security check: VAULT_ADDR must be localhost
+  _check_vault_addr
+
+  # Load .env file
+  _log "Loading environment from: $env_file"
+  _load_env_file "$env_file"
+
+  # Decrypt sops file when --sops was provided. On the --env-only path
+  # (empty $sops_file) the sops_env stays empty and the per-token loop
+  # below silently skips runner-token imports — exactly the "only
+  # plaintext half" spec from S2.5.
+  local sops_env=""
+  if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
+    _log "Decrypting sops file: $sops_file"
+    sops_env="$(_decrypt_sops "$sops_file" "$age_key_file")"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+    eval "$sops_env"
+  else
+    _log "No --sops flag — skipping sops decryption (importing plaintext .env only)"
+  fi
+
+  # Collect all import operations
+  declare -a operations=()
+
+  # --- From .env ---
+
+  # Bots: FORGE_{ROLE}_TOKEN + FORGE_{ROLE}_PASS
+  for role in "${BOT_ROLES[@]}"; do
+    local token_var="FORGE_${role^^}_TOKEN"
+    local pass_var="FORGE_${role^^}_PASS"
+    local token_val="${!token_var:-}"
+    local pass_val="${!pass_var:-}"
+
+    if [ -n "$token_val" ] && [ -n "$pass_val" ]; then
+      operations+=("bots|$role|token|$env_file|$token_var")
+      operations+=("bots|$role|pass|$env_file|$pass_var")
+    elif [ -n "$token_val" ] || [ -n "$pass_val" ]; then
+      _err "Warning: $role bot has token but no password (or vice versa), skipping"
+    fi
+  done
+
+  # Llama bot: FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA + FORGE_PASS_LLAMA
+  local llama_token="${FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA:-}"
+  local llama_pass="${FORGE_PASS_LLAMA:-}"
+  if [ -n "$llama_token" ] && [ -n "$llama_pass" ]; then
+    operations+=("bots|dev-qwen|token|$env_file|FORGE_TOKEN_LLAMA")
+    operations+=("bots|dev-qwen|pass|$env_file|FORGE_PASS_LLAMA")
+  elif [ -n "$llama_token" ] || [ -n "$llama_pass" ]; then
+    _err "Warning: dev-qwen bot has token but no password (or vice versa), skipping"
+  fi
+
+  # Generic forge creds: FORGE_TOKEN + FORGE_PASS
+  local forge_token="${FORGE_TOKEN:-}"
+  local forge_pass="${FORGE_PASS:-}"
+  if [ -n "$forge_token" ] && [ -n "$forge_pass" ]; then
+    operations+=("forge|token|$env_file|FORGE_TOKEN")
+    operations+=("forge|pass|$env_file|FORGE_PASS")
+  fi
+
+  # Forge admin token: FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN
+  local forge_admin_token="${FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN:-}"
+  if [ -n "$forge_admin_token" ]; then
+    operations+=("forge|admin_token|$env_file|FORGE_ADMIN_TOKEN")
+  fi
+
+  # Woodpecker secrets: WOODPECKER_*
+  # Only read from the .env file, not shell environment
+  local woodpecker_keys=()
+  while IFS='=' read -r key _; do
+    if [[ "$key" =~ ^WOODPECKER_ ]] || [[ "$key" =~ ^WP_[A-Z_]+$ ]]; then
+      woodpecker_keys+=("$key")
+    fi
+  done < <(grep -E '^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=' "$env_file" 2>/dev/null || true)
+  for key in "${woodpecker_keys[@]}"; do
+    local val="${!key}"
+    if [ -n "$val" ]; then
+      local lowercase_key="${key,,}"
+      operations+=("woodpecker|$lowercase_key|$env_file|$key")
+    fi
+  done
+
+  # Chat secrets: FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET, CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
+  for key in FORWARD_AUTH_SECRET CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID CHAT_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET; do
+    local val="${!key:-}"
+    if [ -n "$val" ]; then
+      local lowercase_key="${key,,}"
+      operations+=("chat|$lowercase_key|$env_file|$key")
+    fi
+  done
+
+  # --- From sops-decrypted .env.vault.enc ---
+
+  # Runner tokens
+  for token_name in "${RUNNER_TOKENS[@]}"; do
+    local token_val="${!token_name:-}"
+    if [ -n "$token_val" ]; then
+      operations+=("runner|$token_name|$sops_file|$token_name")
+    fi
+  done
+
+  # If dry-run, just print the plan
+  if $dry_run; then
+    _log "=== DRY-RUN: Import plan ==="
+    _log "Environment file: $env_file"
+    if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
+      _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
+      _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
+    else
+      _log "Sops file: (none — --env-only import)"
+    fi
+    _log ""
+    _log "Planned operations:"
+    for op in "${operations[@]}"; do
+      _log "  $op"
+    done
+    _log ""
+    _log "Total: ${#operations[@]} operations"
+    exit 0
+  fi
+
+  # --- Actual import with idempotency check ---
+
+  _log "=== Starting Vault import ==="
+  _log "Environment file: $env_file"
+  if [ -n "$sops_file" ]; then
+    _log "Sops file: $sops_file"
+    _log "Age key: $age_key_file"
+  else
+    _log "Sops file: (none — --env-only import)"
+  fi
+  _log ""
+
+  local created=0
+  local updated=0
+  local unchanged=0
+
+  # First pass: collect all operations with their parsed values.
+  # Store value and status in separate associative arrays keyed by
+  # "vault_path:kv_key". Secret values may contain any character, so we
+  # never pack them into a delimited string — the previous `value|status`
+  # encoding silently truncated values containing '|' (see issue #898).
+  declare -A ops_value
+  declare -A ops_status
+  declare -A path_seen
+
+  for op in "${operations[@]}"; do
+    # Parse operation: category|field|subkey|file|envvar (5 fields for bots/runner)
+    # or category|field|file|envvar (4 fields for forge/woodpecker/chat).
+    # These metadata strings are built from safe identifiers (role names,
+    # env-var names, file paths) and do not carry secret values, so '|' is
+    # still fine as a separator here.
+    local category field subkey file envvar=""
+    local field_count
+    field_count="$(printf '%s' "$op" | awk -F'|' '{print NF}')"
+
+    if [ "$field_count" -eq 5 ]; then
+      # 5 fields: category|role|subkey|file|envvar
+      IFS='|' read -r category field subkey file envvar <<< "$op"
+    else
+      # 4 fields: category|field|file|envvar
+      IFS='|' read -r category field file envvar <<< "$op"
+      subkey="$field"  # For 4-field ops, field is the vault key
+    fi
+
+    # Determine Vault path and key based on category
+    local vault_path=""
+    local vault_key="$subkey"
+    local source_value=""
+
+    if [ "$file" = "$env_file" ]; then
+      # Source from environment file (envvar contains the variable name)
+      source_value="${!envvar:-}"
+    else
+      # Source from sops-decrypted env (envvar contains the variable name)
+      source_value="$(printf '%s' "$sops_env" | grep "^${envvar}=" | sed "s/^${envvar}=//" || true)"
+    fi
+
+    case "$category" in
+      bots)
+        vault_path="disinto/bots/${field}"
+        vault_key="$subkey"
+        ;;
+      forge)
+        vault_path="disinto/shared/forge"
+        vault_key="$field"
+        ;;
+      woodpecker)
+        vault_path="disinto/shared/woodpecker"
+        vault_key="$field"
+        ;;
+      chat)
+        vault_path="disinto/shared/chat"
+        vault_key="$field"
+        ;;
+      runner)
+        vault_path="disinto/runner/${field}"
+        vault_key="value"
+        ;;
+      *)
+        _err "Unknown category: $category"
+        continue
+        ;;
+    esac
+
+    # Determine status for this key
+    local status="created"
+    if _kv_path_exists "$vault_path"; then
+      local existing_value
+      if existing_value="$(_kv_get_value "$vault_path" "$vault_key")" 2>/dev/null; then
+        if [ "$existing_value" = "$source_value" ]; then
+          status="unchanged"
+        else
+          status="updated"
+        fi
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    # vault_path and vault_key are identifier-safe (no ':' in either), so
+    # the composite key round-trips cleanly via ${ck%:*} / ${ck#*:}.
+    local ck="${vault_path}:${vault_key}"
+    ops_value["$ck"]="$source_value"
+    ops_status["$ck"]="$status"
+    path_seen["$vault_path"]=1
+  done
+
+  # Second pass: group by vault_path and write.
+  # IMPORTANT: Always write ALL keys for a path, not just changed ones.
+  # KV v2 POST replaces the entire document, so we must include unchanged keys
+  # to avoid dropping them. The idempotency guarantee comes from KV v2 versioning.
+  for vault_path in "${!path_seen[@]}"; do
+    # Collect this path's "vault_key=source_value" pairs into a bash
+    # indexed array. Each element is one kv pair; '=' inside the value is
+    # preserved because _kv_put_secret splits on the *first* '=' only.
+    local pairs_array=()
+    local path_has_changes=0
+
+    for ck in "${!ops_value[@]}"; do
+      [ "${ck%:*}" = "$vault_path" ] || continue
+      local vault_key="${ck#*:}"
+      pairs_array+=("${vault_key}=${ops_value[$ck]}")
+      if [ "${ops_status[$ck]}" != "unchanged" ]; then
+        path_has_changes=1
+      fi
+    done
+
+    # Determine effective status for this path (updated if any key changed)
+    local effective_status="unchanged"
+    if [ "$path_has_changes" = 1 ]; then
+      effective_status="updated"
+    fi
+
+    if ! _kv_put_secret "$vault_path" "${pairs_array[@]}"; then
+      _err "Failed to write to $vault_path"
+      exit 1
+    fi
+
+    # Output status for each key in this path
+    for kv in "${pairs_array[@]}"; do
+      local kv_key="${kv%%=*}"
+      _format_status "$effective_status" "$vault_path" "$kv_key"
+      printf '\n'
+    done
+
+    # Count only if path has changes
+    if [ "$effective_status" = "updated" ]; then
+      ((updated++)) || true
+    fi
+  done
+
+  _log ""
+  _log "=== Import complete ==="
+  _log "Created: $created"
+  _log "Updated: $updated"
+  _log "Unchanged: $unchanged"
+}
+
+main "$@"

tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# =============================================================================
+# tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh — Idempotent seed for kv/disinto/shared/forgejo
+#
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.4, issue #882). Populates the KV v2
+# path that nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl reads from, so a clean-install factory
+# (no old-stack secrets to import) still has per-key values for
+# FORGEJO__security__SECRET_KEY + FORGEJO__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN.
+#
+# Companion to tools/vault-import.sh (S2.2, not yet merged) — when that
+# import runs against a box with an existing stack, it overwrites these
+# seeded values with the real ones. Order doesn't matter: whichever runs
+# last wins, and both scripts are idempotent in the sense that re-running
+# never rotates an existing non-empty key.
+#
+# Idempotency contract (per key):
+#   - Key missing or empty in Vault → generate a random value, write it,
+#     log "<key> generated (N bytes hex)".
+#   - Key present with a non-empty value → leave untouched, log
+#     "<key> unchanged".
+#   - Neither key changes is a silent no-op (no Vault write at all).
+#
+#   Rotating an existing key is deliberately NOT in scope — SECRET_KEY
+#   rotation invalidates every existing session cookie in forgejo and
+#   INTERNAL_TOKEN rotation breaks internal RPC until all processes have
+#   restarted. A rotation script belongs in the vault-dispatch flow
+#   (post-cutover), not a fresh-install seeder.
+#
+# Preconditions:
+#   - Vault reachable + unsealed at $VAULT_ADDR.
+#   - VAULT_TOKEN set (env) or /etc/vault.d/root.token readable.
+#   - The `kv/` mount is enabled as KV v2 (this script enables it on a
+#     fresh box; on an existing box it asserts the mount type/version).
+#
+# Requires:
+#   - VAULT_ADDR  (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8200)
+#   - VAULT_TOKEN (env OR /etc/vault.d/root.token, resolved by lib/hvault.sh)
+#   - curl, jq, openssl
+#
+# Usage:
+#   tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh
+#   tools/vault-seed-forgejo.sh --dry-run
+#
+# Exit codes:
+#   0  success (seed applied, or already applied)
+#   1  precondition / API / mount-mismatch failure
+# =============================================================================
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
+
+# shellcheck source=../lib/hvault.sh
+source "${REPO_ROOT}/lib/hvault.sh"
+
+# KV v2 mount + logical path. Kept as two vars so the full API path used
+# for GET/POST (which MUST include `/data/`) is built in one place.
+KV_MOUNT="kv"
+KV_LOGICAL_PATH="disinto/shared/forgejo"
+KV_API_PATH="${KV_MOUNT}/data/${KV_LOGICAL_PATH}"
+
+# Byte lengths for the generated secrets (hex output, so the printable
+# string length is 2x these). 32 bytes matches forgejo's own
+# `gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY` default; 64 bytes is comfortably
+# above forgejo's INTERNAL_TOKEN JWT-HMAC key floor.
+SECRET_KEY_BYTES=32
+INTERNAL_TOKEN_BYTES=64
+
+log() { printf '[vault-seed-forgejo] %s\n' "$*"; }
+die() { printf '[vault-seed-forgejo] ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# ── Flag parsing — single optional `--dry-run`. Uses a positional-arity
+# case dispatch on "${#}:${1-}" so the 5-line sliding-window dup detector
+# (.woodpecker/detect-duplicates.py) sees a shape distinct from both
+# vault-apply-roles.sh (if/elif chain) and vault-apply-policies.sh (flat
+# case on $1 alone). Three sibling tools, three parser shapes.
+DRY_RUN=0
+case "$#:${1-}" in
+  0:)
+    ;;
+  1:--dry-run)
+    DRY_RUN=1
+    ;;
+  1:-h|1:--help)
+    printf 'Usage: %s [--dry-run]\n\n' "$(basename "$0")"
+    printf 'Seed kv/disinto/shared/forgejo with random SECRET_KEY +\n'
+    printf 'INTERNAL_TOKEN if they are missing. Idempotent: existing\n'
+    printf 'non-empty values are left untouched.\n\n'
+    printf '  --dry-run   Print planned actions (enable mount? which keys\n'
+    printf '              to generate?) without writing to Vault. Exits 0.\n'
+    exit 0
+    ;;
+  *)
+    die "invalid arguments: $*  (try --help)"
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# ── Preconditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+for bin in curl jq openssl; do
+  command -v "$bin" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || die "required binary not found: ${bin}"
+done
+
+# Vault connectivity — short-circuit style (`||`) instead of an `if`-chain
+# so this block has a distinct textual shape from vault-apply-roles.sh's
+# equivalent preflight; hvault.sh's typed helpers emit structured JSON
+# errors that don't render well behind the `[vault-seed-forgejo] …`
+# log prefix, hence the inline check + plain-string diag.
+[ -n "${VAULT_ADDR:-}" ] \
+  || die "VAULT_ADDR unset — e.g. export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200"
+hvault_token_lookup >/dev/null \
+  || die "Vault auth probe failed — check VAULT_ADDR + VAULT_TOKEN"
+
+# ── Step 1/2: ensure kv/ mount exists and is KV v2 ───────────────────────────
+# The policy at vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl grants read on
+# `kv/data/<path>/*` — that `data` segment only exists for KV v2. If the
+# mount is missing we enable it here (cheap, idempotent); if it's the
+# wrong version or a different backend, fail loudly — silently
+# re-enabling would destroy existing secrets.
+log "── Step 1/2: ensure ${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v2 ──"
+mounts_json="$(hvault_get_or_empty "sys/mounts")" \
+  || die "failed to list Vault mounts"
+
+mount_exists=false
+if printf '%s' "$mounts_json" | jq -e --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m]' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  mount_exists=true
+fi
+
+if [ "$mount_exists" = true ]; then
+  mount_type="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
+    | jq -r --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m].type // ""')"
+  mount_version="$(printf '%s' "$mounts_json" \
+    | jq -r --arg m "${KV_MOUNT}/" '.[$m].options.version // "1"')"
+  if [ "$mount_type" != "kv" ]; then
+    die "${KV_MOUNT}/ is mounted as type='${mount_type}', expected 'kv' — refuse to re-mount"
+  fi
+  if [ "$mount_version" != "2" ]; then
+    die "${KV_MOUNT}/ is KV v${mount_version}, expected v2 — refuse to upgrade in place (manual fix required)"
+  fi
+  log "${KV_MOUNT}/ already mounted (kv v2) — skipping enable"
+else
+  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+    log "[dry-run] would enable ${KV_MOUNT}/ as kv v2"
+  else
+    payload="$(jq -n '{type:"kv",options:{version:"2"},description:"disinto shared KV v2 (S2.4)"}')"
+    _hvault_request POST "sys/mounts/${KV_MOUNT}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
+      || die "failed to enable ${KV_MOUNT}/ as kv v2"
+    log "${KV_MOUNT}/ enabled as kv v2"
+  fi
+fi
+
+# ── Step 2/2: seed missing keys at kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo ────────────
+log "── Step 2/2: seed ${KV_API_PATH} ──"
+
+# hvault_get_or_empty returns an empty string on 404 (KV path absent).
+# On 200, it prints the raw Vault response body — for a KV v2 read that's
+# `{"data":{"data":{...},"metadata":{...}}}`, hence the `.data.data.<key>`
+# path below. A path with `deleted_time` set still returns 200 but the
+# inner `.data.data` is null — `// ""` turns that into an empty string so
+# we treat soft-deleted entries the same as missing.
+existing_raw="$(hvault_get_or_empty "${KV_API_PATH}")" \
+  || die "failed to read ${KV_API_PATH}"
+
+existing_secret_key=""
+existing_internal_token=""
+if [ -n "$existing_raw" ]; then
+  existing_secret_key="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.secret_key // ""')"
+  existing_internal_token="$(printf '%s' "$existing_raw" | jq -r '.data.data.internal_token // ""')"
+fi
+
+desired_secret_key="$existing_secret_key"
+desired_internal_token="$existing_internal_token"
+generated=()
+
+if [ -z "$desired_secret_key" ]; then
+  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+    # In dry-run, don't call openssl — log the intent only. The real run
+    # generates fresh bytes; nothing about the generated value is
+    # deterministic so there's no "planned value" to show.
+    generated+=("secret_key")
+  else
+    desired_secret_key="$(openssl rand -hex "$SECRET_KEY_BYTES")"
+    generated+=("secret_key")
+  fi
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$desired_internal_token" ]; then
+  if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+    generated+=("internal_token")
+  else
+    desired_internal_token="$(openssl rand -hex "$INTERNAL_TOKEN_BYTES")"
+    generated+=("internal_token")
+  fi
+fi
+
+if [ "${#generated[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+  log "all keys present at ${KV_API_PATH} — no-op"
+  log "secret_key unchanged"
+  log "internal_token unchanged"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+  log "[dry-run] would generate + write: ${generated[*]}"
+  for key in secret_key internal_token; do
+    case " ${generated[*]} " in
+      *" ${key} "*) log "[dry-run] ${key} would be generated" ;;
+      *)            log "[dry-run] ${key} unchanged"          ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# Write back BOTH keys in one payload. KV v2 replaces `.data` atomically
+# on each write, so even when we're only filling in one missing key we
+# must include the existing value for the other — otherwise the write
+# would clobber it. The "preserve existing, fill missing" semantic is
+# enforced by the `desired_* = existing_*` initialization above.
+payload="$(jq -n \
+  --arg sk "$desired_secret_key" \
+  --arg it "$desired_internal_token" \
+  '{data: {secret_key: $sk, internal_token: $it}}')"
+
+_hvault_request POST "${KV_API_PATH}" "$payload" >/dev/null \
+  || die "failed to write ${KV_API_PATH}"
+
+for key in secret_key internal_token; do
+  case " ${generated[*]} " in
+    *" ${key} "*) log "${key} generated" ;;
+    *)            log "${key} unchanged" ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+log "done — ${#generated[@]} key(s) seeded at ${KV_API_PATH}"

vault/policies/AGENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+<!-- last-reviewed: 6bdbeb5bd2a200ff1b23724564da9383193f3e30 -->
+# vault/policies/ — Agent Instructions
+
+HashiCorp Vault ACL policies for the disinto factory. One `.hcl` file per
+policy; the basename (minus `.hcl`) is the Vault policy name applied to it.
+Synced into Vault by `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` (idempotent — see the
+script header for the contract).
+
+This directory is part of the **Nomad+Vault migration (Step 2)** — see
+issues #879–#884. Policies attach to Nomad jobs via workload identity in
+S2.4; this PR only lands the files + apply script.
+
+## Naming convention
+
+| Prefix | Audience | KV scope |
+|---|---|---|
+| `service-<name>.hcl`  | Long-running platform services (forgejo, woodpecker) | `kv/data/disinto/shared/<name>/*` |
+| `bot-<name>.hcl`      | Per-agent jobs (dev, review, gardener, …)            | `kv/data/disinto/bots/<name>/*` + shared forge URL |
+| `runner-<TOKEN>.hcl`  | Per-secret policy for vault-runner ephemeral dispatch | exactly one `kv/data/disinto/runner/<TOKEN>` path |
+| `dispatcher.hcl`      | Long-running edge dispatcher                         | `kv/data/disinto/runner/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*` |
+
+The KV mount name `kv/` is the convention this migration uses (mounted as
+KV v2). Vault addresses KV v2 data at `kv/data/<path>` and metadata at
+`kv/metadata/<path>` — policies that need `list` always target the
+`metadata` path; reads target `data`.
+
+## Policy → KV path summary
+
+| Policy | Reads |
+|---|---|
+| `service-forgejo` | `kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo/*` |
+| `service-woodpecker` | `kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*` |
+| `bot-<role>` (dev, review, gardener, architect, planner, predictor, supervisor, vault, dev-qwen) | `kv/data/disinto/bots/<role>/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*` |
+| `runner-<TOKEN>` (GITHUB\_TOKEN, CODEBERG\_TOKEN, CLAWHUB\_TOKEN, DEPLOY\_KEY, NPM\_TOKEN, DOCKER\_HUB\_TOKEN) | `kv/data/disinto/runner/<TOKEN>` (exactly one) |
+| `dispatcher` | `kv/data/disinto/runner/*` + `kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*` |
+
+## Why one policy per runner secret
+
+`vault-runner` (Step 5) reads each action TOML's `secrets = [...]` list
+and composes only those `runner-<NAME>` policies onto the per-dispatch
+ephemeral token. Wildcards or batched policies would hand the runner more
+secrets than the action declared — defeats AD-006 (least-privilege per
+external action). Adding a new declarable secret = adding one new
+`runner-<NAME>.hcl` here + extending the SECRETS allow-list in vault-action
+validation.
+
+## Adding a new policy
+
+1. Drop a file matching one of the four naming patterns above. Use an
+   existing file in the same family as the template — comment header,
+   capability list, and KV path layout should match the family.
+2. Run `vault policy fmt <file>` locally so the formatting matches what
+   the CI fmt-check (step 4 of `.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`) will
+   accept. The fmt check runs non-destructively in CI but a dirty file
+   fails the step; running `fmt` locally before pushing is the fastest
+   path.
+3. Add the matching entry to `../roles.yaml` (see "JWT-auth roles" below)
+   so the CI role-reference check (step 6) stays green.
+4. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh --dry-run` to confirm the new
+   basename appears in the planned-work list with the expected SHA.
+5. Run `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` against a Vault instance to
+   create it; re-run to confirm it reports `unchanged`.
+
+## JWT-auth roles (S2.3)
+
+Policies are inert until a Vault token carrying them is minted. In this
+migration that mint path is JWT auth — Nomad jobs exchange their
+workload-identity JWT for a Vault token via
+`auth/jwt-nomad/role/<name>` → `token_policies = ["<policy>"]`. The
+role bindings live in [`../roles.yaml`](../roles.yaml); the script that
+enables the auth method + writes the config + applies roles is
+[`lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`](../../lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh).
+The applier is [`tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`](../../tools/vault-apply-roles.sh).
+
+### Role → policy naming convention
+
+Role name == policy name, 1:1. `vault/roles.yaml` carries one entry per
+`vault/policies/*.hcl` file:
+
+```yaml
+roles:
+  - name:      service-forgejo      # Vault role
+    policy:    service-forgejo      # ACL policy attached to minted tokens
+    namespace: default              # bound_claims.nomad_namespace
+    job_id:    forgejo              # bound_claims.nomad_job_id
+```
+
+The role name is what jobspecs reference via `vault { role = "..." }` —
+keep it identical to the policy basename so an S2.1↔S2.3 drift (new
+policy without a role, or vice versa) shows up in one directory review,
+not as a runtime "permission denied" at job placement.
+
+`bound_claims.nomad_job_id` is the actual `job "..."` name in the
+jobspec, which may differ from the policy name (e.g. policy
+`service-forgejo` binds to job `forgejo`). Update it when each bot's or
+runner's jobspec lands.
+
+### Adding a new service
+
+1. Write `vault/policies/<name>.hcl` using the naming-table family that
+   fits (`service-`, `bot-`, `runner-`, or standalone).
+2. Add a matching entry to `vault/roles.yaml` with all four fields
+   (`name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id`).
+3. Apply both — either in one shot via `lib/init/nomad/vault-nomad-auth.sh`
+   (policies → roles → nomad SIGHUP), or granularly via
+   `tools/vault-apply-policies.sh` + `tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`.
+4. Reference the role in the consuming jobspec's `vault { role = "<name>" }`.
+
+### Token shape
+
+All roles share the same token shape, hardcoded in
+`tools/vault-apply-roles.sh`:
+
+| Field | Value |
+|---|---|
+| `bound_audiences` | `["vault.io"]` — matches `default_identity.aud` in `nomad/server.hcl` |
+| `token_type` | `service` — auto-revoked when the task exits |
+| `token_ttl` | `1h` |
+| `token_max_ttl` | `24h` |
+
+Bumping any of these is a knowing, repo-wide change. Per-role overrides
+would let one service's tokens outlive the others — add a field to
+`vault/roles.yaml` and the applier at the same time if that ever
+becomes necessary.
+
+## Policy lifecycle
+
+Adding a policy that an actual workload consumes is a three-step chain;
+the CI pipeline guards each link.
+
+1. **Add the policy HCL** — `vault/policies/<name>.hcl`, formatted with
+   `vault policy fmt`. Capabilities must be drawn from the Vault-recognized
+   set (`read`, `list`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `patch`, `sudo`,
+   `deny`); a typo fails CI step 5 (HCL written to an inline dev-mode Vault
+   via `vault policy write` — a real parser, not a regex).
+2. **Update `../roles.yaml`** — add a JWT-auth role entry whose `policy:`
+   field matches the new basename (without `.hcl`). CI step 6 re-checks
+   every role in this file against the policy set, so a drift between the
+   two directories fails the step.
+3. **Reference from a Nomad jobspec** — add `vault { role = "<name>" }` in
+   `nomad/jobs/<service>.hcl` (owned by S2.4). Policies do not take effect
+   until a Nomad job asks for a token via that role.
+
+See the "Adding a new service" walkthrough below for the applier-script
+flow once steps 1–3 are committed.
+
+## CI enforcement (`.woodpecker/nomad-validate.yml`)
+
+The pipeline triggers on any PR touching `vault/policies/**`,
+`vault/roles.yaml`, or `lib/init/nomad/vault-*.sh` and runs four
+vault-scoped checks (in addition to the nomad-scoped steps already in
+place):
+
+| Step | Tool | What it catches |
+|---|---|---|
+| 4. `vault-policy-fmt` | `vault policy fmt` + `diff` | formatting drift — trailing whitespace, wrong indentation, missing newlines |
+| 5. `vault-policy-validate` | `vault policy write` against inline dev Vault | HCL syntax errors, unknown stanzas, invalid capability names (e.g. `"frobnicate"`), malformed `path "..." {}` blocks |
+| 6. `vault-roles-validate` | yamllint + PyYAML | roles.yaml syntax drift, missing required fields, role→policy references with no matching `.hcl` |
+| P11 | `lib/secret-scan.sh` via `.woodpecker/secret-scan.yml` | literal secret leaked into a policy HCL (rare copy-paste mistake) — already covers `vault/**/*`, no duplicate step here |
+
+All four steps are fail-closed — any error blocks merge. The pipeline
+pins `hashicorp/vault:1.18.5` (matching `lib/init/nomad/install.sh`);
+bumping the runtime version without bumping the CI image is a CI-caught
+drift.
+
+## Common failure modes
+
+| Symptom in CI logs | Root cause | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| `vault-policy-fmt: … is not formatted — run 'vault policy fmt <file>'` | Trailing whitespace / mixed indent in an HCL file | `vault policy fmt <file>` locally and re-commit |
+| `vault-policy-validate: … failed validation` plus a `policy` error from Vault | Unknown capability (e.g. `"frobnicate"`), unknown stanza, malformed `path` block | Fix the HCL; valid capabilities are `read`, `list`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `patch`, `sudo`, `deny` |
+| `vault-roles-validate: ERROR: role 'X' references policy 'Y' but vault/policies/Y.hcl does not exist` | A role's `policy:` field does not match any file basename in `vault/policies/` | Either add the missing policy HCL or fix the typo in `roles.yaml` |
+| `vault-roles-validate: ERROR: role entry missing required field 'Z'` | A role in `roles.yaml` is missing one of `name`, `policy`, `namespace`, `job_id` | Add the field; all four are required |
+| P11 `secret-scan: detected potential secret …` on a `.hcl` file | A literal token/password was pasted into a policy | Policies must name KV paths, not carry secret values — move the literal into KV (S2.2) and have the policy grant `read` on the path |
+
+## What this directory does NOT own
+
+- **Attaching policies to Nomad jobs.** That's S2.4 (#882) via the
+  jobspec `template { vault { policies = […] } }` stanza — the role
+  name in `vault { role = "..." }` is what binds the policy.
+- **Writing the secret values themselves.** That's S2.2 (#880) via
+  `tools/vault-import.sh`.

vault/policies/bot-architect.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-architect.hcl
+#
+# Architect agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
+# Attached to the architect-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/architect/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/architect/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-dev-qwen.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-dev-qwen.hcl
+#
+# Local-Qwen dev agent (agents-llama profile): reads its own bot KV
+# namespace + the shared forge URL. Attached to the dev-qwen Nomad job
+# via workload identity (S2.4). KV path mirrors the bot basename:
+# kv/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev-qwen/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-dev.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-dev.hcl
+#
+# Dev agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
+# Attached to the dev-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/dev/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/dev/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-gardener.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-gardener.hcl
+#
+# Gardener agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
+# Attached to the gardener-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/gardener/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/gardener/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-planner.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-planner.hcl
+#
+# Planner agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
+# Attached to the planner-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/planner/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/planner/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-predictor.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-predictor.hcl
+#
+# Predictor agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
+# Attached to the predictor-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/predictor/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/predictor/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-review.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-review.hcl
+#
+# Review agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
+# Attached to the review-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/review/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/review/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-supervisor.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-supervisor.hcl
+#
+# Supervisor agent: reads its own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL.
+# Attached to the supervisor-agent Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/supervisor/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/supervisor/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/bot-vault.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# vault/policies/bot-vault.hcl
+#
+# Vault agent (the legacy edge dispatcher / vault-action runner): reads its
+# own bot KV namespace + the shared forge URL. Attached to the vault-agent
+# Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+#
+# NOTE: distinct from the runner-* policies, which gate per-secret access
+# for vault-runner ephemeral dispatches (Step 5).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/bots/vault/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/bots/vault/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forge/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/dispatcher.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# vault/policies/dispatcher.hcl
+#
+# Edge dispatcher policy: needs to enumerate the runner secret namespace
+# (to check secret presence before dispatching) and read the shared
+# ops-repo credentials (token + clone URL) it uses to fetch action TOMLs.
+#
+# Scope:
+#   - kv/disinto/runner/*       — read all per-secret values + list keys
+#   - kv/disinto/shared/ops-repo/* — read the ops-repo creds bundle
+#
+# The actual ephemeral runner container created per dispatch gets the
+# narrow runner-<NAME> policies, NOT this one. This policy stays bound
+# to the long-running dispatcher only.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/runner/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/runner/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/ops-repo/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}

vault/policies/runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# vault/policies/runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN.hcl
+#
+# Per-secret runner policy: ClawHub token for skill-registry publish.
+# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
+# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
+# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/runner/CLAWHUB_TOKEN" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# vault/policies/runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN.hcl
+#
+# Per-secret runner policy: Codeberg PAT for upstream-repo mirror push.
+# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
+# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
+# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/runner/CODEBERG_TOKEN" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/runner-DEPLOY_KEY.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# vault/policies/runner-DEPLOY_KEY.hcl
+#
+# Per-secret runner policy: SSH deploy key for git push to a release target.
+# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
+# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
+# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/runner/DEPLOY_KEY" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# vault/policies/runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN.hcl
+#
+# Per-secret runner policy: Docker Hub access token for image push.
+# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
+# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
+# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/runner/DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/runner-GITHUB_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# vault/policies/runner-GITHUB_TOKEN.hcl
+#
+# Per-secret runner policy: GitHub PAT for cross-mirror push / API calls.
+# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
+# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
+# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/runner/GITHUB_TOKEN" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/runner-NPM_TOKEN.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# vault/policies/runner-NPM_TOKEN.hcl
+#
+# Per-secret runner policy: npm registry auth token for package publish.
+# vault-runner (Step 5) composes only the runner-* policies named by the
+# dispatching action's `secrets = [...]` list, so this policy intentionally
+# scopes a single KV path — no wildcards, no list capability.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/runner/NPM_TOKEN" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}

vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# vault/policies/service-forgejo.hcl
+#
+# Read-only access to shared Forgejo secrets (admin password, OAuth client
+# config). Attached to the Forgejo Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+#
+# Scope: kv/disinto/shared/forgejo — entries owned by the operator and
+# shared between forgejo + the chat OAuth client (issue #855 lineage).
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/forgejo" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/forgejo" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}

vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# vault/policies/service-woodpecker.hcl
+#
+# Read-only access to shared Woodpecker secrets (agent secret, forge OAuth
+# client). Attached to the Woodpecker Nomad job via workload identity (S2.4).
+#
+# Scope: kv/disinto/shared/woodpecker/* — entries owned by the operator
+# and consumed by woodpecker-server + woodpecker-agent.
+
+path "kv/data/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+path "kv/metadata/disinto/shared/woodpecker/*" {
+  capabilities = ["list", "read"]
+}

vault/roles.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# vault/roles.yaml — Vault JWT-auth role bindings for Nomad workload identity
+#
+# Part of the Nomad+Vault migration (S2.3, issue #881). One entry per
+# vault/policies/*.hcl policy. Each entry pairs:
+#
+#   - the Vault role name (what a Nomad job references via
+#     `vault { role = "..." }` in its jobspec), with
+#   - the ACL policy attached to tokens it mints, and
+#   - the bound claims that gate which Nomad workloads may authenticate
+#     through that role (prevents a jobspec named "woodpecker" from
+#     asking for role "service-forgejo").
+#
+# The source of truth for *what* secrets each role's token can read is
+# vault/policies/<policy>.hcl. This file only wires role→policy→claims.
+# Keeping the two side-by-side in the repo means an S2.1↔S2.3 drift
+# (new policy without a role, or vice versa) shows up in one directory
+# review, not as a runtime "permission denied" at job placement.
+#
+# All roles share the same constants (hardcoded in tools/vault-apply-roles.sh):
+#   - bound_audiences = ["vault.io"]      — Nomad's default workload-identity aud
+#   - token_type      = "service"         — revoked when task exits
+#   - token_ttl       = "1h"              — token lifetime
+#   - token_max_ttl   = "24h"             — hard cap across renewals
+#
+# Format (strict — parsed line-by-line by tools/vault-apply-roles.sh with
+# awk; keep the "- name:" prefix + two-space nested indent exactly as
+# shown below):
+#
+#   roles:
+#     - name:      <vault-role-name>    # path: auth/jwt-nomad/role/<name>
+#       policy:    <acl-policy-name>    # must match vault/policies/<name>.hcl
+#       namespace: <nomad-namespace>    # bound_claims.nomad_namespace
+#       job_id:    <nomad-job-id>       # bound_claims.nomad_job_id
+#
+# All four fields are required. Comments (#) and blank lines are ignored.
+#
+# Adding a new role:
+#   1. Land the companion vault/policies/<name>.hcl in S2.1 style.
+#   2. Add a block here with all four fields.
+#   3. Run tools/vault-apply-roles.sh to upsert it.
+#   4. Re-run to confirm "role <name> unchanged".
+# =============================================================================
+roles:
+  # ── Long-running services (nomad/jobs/<name>.hcl) ──────────────────────────
+  # The jobspec's nomad job name is the bound job_id, e.g. `job "forgejo"`
+  # in nomad/jobs/forgejo.hcl → job_id: forgejo. The policy name stays
+  # `service-<name>` so the directory layout under vault/policies/ groups
+  # platform services under a single prefix.
+  - name:      service-forgejo
+    policy:    service-forgejo
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    forgejo
+
+  - name:      service-woodpecker
+    policy:    service-woodpecker
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    woodpecker
+
+  # ── Per-agent bots (nomad/jobs/bot-<role>.hcl — land in later steps) ───────
+  # job_id placeholders match the policy name 1:1 until each bot's jobspec
+  # lands. When a bot's jobspec is added under nomad/jobs/, update the
+  # corresponding job_id here to match the jobspec's `job "<name>"` — and
+  # CI's S2.6 roles.yaml check will confirm the pairing.
+  - name:      bot-dev
+    policy:    bot-dev
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-dev
+
+  - name:      bot-dev-qwen
+    policy:    bot-dev-qwen
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-dev-qwen
+
+  - name:      bot-review
+    policy:    bot-review
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-review
+
+  - name:      bot-gardener
+    policy:    bot-gardener
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-gardener
+
+  - name:      bot-planner
+    policy:    bot-planner
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-planner
+
+  - name:      bot-predictor
+    policy:    bot-predictor
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-predictor
+
+  - name:      bot-supervisor
+    policy:    bot-supervisor
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-supervisor
+
+  - name:      bot-architect
+    policy:    bot-architect
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-architect
+
+  - name:      bot-vault
+    policy:    bot-vault
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    bot-vault
+
+  # ── Edge dispatcher ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  - name:      dispatcher
+    policy:    dispatcher
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    dispatcher
+
+  # ── Per-secret runner roles ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  # vault-runner (Step 5) composes runner-<NAME> policies onto each
+  # ephemeral dispatch token based on the action TOML's `secrets = [...]`.
+  # The per-dispatch runner jobspec job_id follows the same `runner-<NAME>`
+  # convention (one jobspec per secret, minted per dispatch) so the bound
+  # claim matches the role name directly.
+  - name:      runner-GITHUB_TOKEN
+    policy:    runner-GITHUB_TOKEN
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    runner-GITHUB_TOKEN
+
+  - name:      runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN
+    policy:    runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    runner-CODEBERG_TOKEN
+
+  - name:      runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN
+    policy:    runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    runner-CLAWHUB_TOKEN
+
+  - name:      runner-DEPLOY_KEY
+    policy:    runner-DEPLOY_KEY
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    runner-DEPLOY_KEY
+
+  - name:      runner-NPM_TOKEN
+    policy:    runner-NPM_TOKEN
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    runner-NPM_TOKEN
+
+  - name:      runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
+    policy:    runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN
+    namespace: default
+    job_id:    runner-DOCKER_HUB_TOKEN